In The Making of Jordan, Yoav Alon analyzes how the Jordanian tribes became integrated into the modern state structure under the leadership of Amir Abdullah and the country's British colonizers. Alon's thesis posits that the Hashemite state and its associated British officials succeeded in their endeavor because Abdullah and then Commander John Bagot Glubb extended services to the tribes while incorporating fundamental aspects of tribal law and relationships into the structure of state institutions. Although these acts did not immediately eliminate tribal military opposition to the state, the combination of the state's own military prowess and its increasing ability to provide benefits to its citizenry brought the tribes and the state to an accommodation long before independence in 1946.
Alon deepens our knowledge of Jordanian political development because he moves away from the trope that Abdullah and his British advisors were the primary actors in the country during the early 20th century. Tribal shaykhs and their followers made well-reasoned decisions when they chose to support state policies and found their positions respected and often enhanced as a result. Tribal members also saw benefits accrue from the new forms of employment and protection they received, particularly through the military. Their choices helped create a state that adopted tribal characteristics and adapted them to a successful modern state structure. Abdullah and the British could not have succeeded without tribal input and, as Alon explains, the result has been a more stable and less coercive integration of the tribal population into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan than that which occurred in neighboring countries. Furthermore, as Alon theorizes, the continuing existence of the tribal system in Jordan provides tribal members with a sense of local community within the larger state structure.
To prove his thesis, Alon provides a detailed examination of Jordan's tribal and state history from 1918 to 1946. In Alon's view, Abdullah understood the need for personal contacts with the tribes and their shaykhs, which helped mold his state's relations with them. In advancing this policy, Abdullah clashed with an initial British opinion that the modern state needed to destroy tribal configurations in order to guarantee obedience. By the time Glubb took control of the Desert Patrol in the 1930s, the British had come to accept Abdullah's view and henceforth encouraged the integration of tribal elements into the state. Glubb simultaneously became the chief contact between the desert tribes and the state, displacing Abdullah from this role. Using Jordanian and British sources, Alon narrates how both the British and Abdullah took advantage of three key elements within Jordanian tribal society: tribal solidarity, the tribe as the basic unit of organization, and the leading role tribal shaykhs played in tribal members’ lives. By incorporating these structural aspects into the identity of the state, the state and the tribes established a reciprocal and beneficial relationship. By showing respect for tribal organizational structures and extending positions to tribal leaders, the state succeeded in bringing tribal areas under its control in largely peaceful ways.
Alon's work is useful well beyond the boundaries of Jordan because he completely debunks a lingering theory that tribes are in some way antimodern or that states with substantial tribal constituencies must continually struggle to centralize. The tribes and the Hashemite state worked together successfully up through independence in 1946. The state afforded tribal leaders a good deal of autonomy throughout this era, using coercive power only when other expedients failed. In addition, as Alon explains, aspects of tribal life, especially the tribal legal system, provided ready-made mechanisms for establishing law and order. The state's leaders did not have to negate tribal processes in their quest to bring the tribes under state control; these processes could be used to convince the tribes and their leaders that the state protected their interests.
Although Alon confines his discussion to the specific relationship between the state and the tribes in Jordan, he puts forward a template for how an artificially created state can gain legitimacy. He treats the Jordanian state not as a political actor but rather as a political framework within which the country's actors have learned to function. Their changing relationships make up much of the history of this state. Alon's work will be useful to scholars of Jordan and to those students of state construction who are looking for a clear and persuasive theory for how states and nations develop.
