In the Philosophy of Right (§4, §151) and the Encyclopaedia (§410), Hegel uses the concept of ‘second nature’ to describe the realm of spirit and ethical life. Although Hegel does not systematically expand on it, in this book Filippo Ranchio argues that the concept of second nature is pivotal to Hegel’s thought and accordingly seeks to reconstruct Hegel’s practical philosophy on this basis. The book consists of four chapters. The main philosophical work is done in Chapter One, where the author discusses the various ‘dimensions of second nature’ in Hegel’s works. Chapters Two and Three reconstruct Hegel’s theory of second nature in the early works and the Phenomenology of Spirit. The author’s aim in these chapters is to show that, although Hegel explicitly uses the concept of second nature only in his later work, the concept is present in the earlier works too. Chapter Four delves into Hegel’s conception of ‘habit’ to unfold Hegel’s theory of second nature. In what follows, I focus on the first and final chapters.
In order to develop Hegel’s theory of second nature, Ranchio begins by focusing on Hegel’s conception of nature, which, he argues, is marked by a ‘conjunction of two opposites’. On the one hand, organic nature is quasi-autonomous because of its capacity for self-maintenance in the environment in which it lives. In this sense, nature has a ‘pre-reflexive’ or ‘proto-intentional’ structure that can be found in human beings too. On the other hand, nature is governed by mechanical, causal laws and in this sense seems to stand over against human beings qua autonomous, free individuals (10). Such ‘ambivalence’ in the conception of nature, Ranchio argues, allows Hegel to show that spirit is both ‘continuous and discontinuous with nature’ and so dissolve the traditional dichotomy between spirit and nature. That is to say, the human being is not merely a natural organism, but has a ‘spiritual relationship to its own corporeality’ and unlike other organisms knows itself as a self-organizing, self-maintaining entity (14).
Defending Hegel’s dialectical conception of nature, Ranchio challenges the approaches of both McDowell, and Pippin and Brandom. Against McDowell’s ‘expanded naturalism’, Ranchio argues that ‘the characteristic normativity and freedom of spirit’ cannot simply be explained through ‘a natural process of evolution’, and that freedom in part consists of the possibility of reacting negatively towards one’s own natural make-up (16). Against Pippin and Brandom, Ranchio argues that nature ‘cannot be dissolved, without resistance or remainder, into a social or cultural category’, and that nature has some qualities of its own, and thus ‘cannot be arbitrarily defined over and over again within the social space of reasons’ (17).
According to Ranchio, the relation of spirit to nature is not merely a ‘local’ epistemological or ontological issue, but ‘permeates the whole practical philosophy of Hegel’ (11). The key is to understand nature not only as the realm of mechanistic necessity, but also in terms of the mechanisms operating in human society, i.e., as second nature. This does not imply that second nature is exactly nature: obviously, the mechanisms operating in second nature are the result of the intentional actions of individuals. But conceiving of second nature as a variety of nature does imply that these mechanisms function independently of individuals—individuals inescapably find themselves surrounded, and constituted, by second nature. Second nature, so to speak, results from the ‘repetition’ of nature in spirit (20). Ranchio discusses three dimensions of second nature for Hegel that are all internally related to each other, what he calls the ‘ontological’, the ‘genealogical’, and the ‘normative’ dimension.
From the ontological point of view, according to Ranchio, Hegel conceives of second nature as the unity of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ moments (29). By subjective second nature, Ranchio means the corporeal and mental constitution of individuals obtained through the process of education (Bildung) and socialization. By objective second nature, Ranchio means the social institutions and specific shapes of life that, although being collectively constituted by individuals, nonetheless exist independently of any given individual. Hegel discusses the subjective dimension of second nature through the concept of habit, and its objective dimension through the concept of right (30). Hegel’s conception of second nature, according to Ranchio, is specific, in that Hegel conceives of the unity and the mutual conditioning of the subjective and the objective dimension. The habits of individuals presuppose relatively fixed social institutions, and conversely, social institutions presuppose the internalization of their norms and laws in the habits of individuals.
As regards the genealogical dimension of the concept of second nature, of particular interest is the difference between the modern, Hegelian and the ancient, Aristotelian viewpoint. For Aristotle, there is a certain continuity between first and second nature. Through education, the virtuous human being has developed the skills and dispositions that correspond to the first-nature of the genus human being. In this account, so Ranchio, the principal autonomy of individuals is not adequately taken into account. Hegel, by contrast, conceives of second nature as primarily constituted by the thinking and willing subject (53). However, Hegel’s conception remains indebted to Aristotle, in the sense that it emphasizes the constitutive role of education for the emergence of autonomy. For Hegel, according to Ranchio, subjects are not autonomous by nature, or innately, but become autonomous through the process of education within society. Hegel conceives of the transition from nature to freedom not in terms of the mere unfolding of a potential, as Aristotle would do, but as a process of ‘liberation’ from nature. This process does not leave nature behind, but re-instigates nature as second nature. Thus, in Hegel’s conception, second nature is not determined by first nature, as is in Aristotle, but is ‘repeated’ in and through the autonomy of individuals (21).
The normative dimension, finally, examines whether the laws and mechanisms inherent in second nature foster or hinder the freedom of individuals. In this context, Ranchio again stresses the fundamental ‘ambivalence’ of Hegel’s conception of second nature, and maintains that second nature consists of ‘a necessary-affirmative moment of self-actualization, and at the same time, a pathological moment of self-loss that deserves to be criticized’ (58). As the genealogical dimension has shown, for Hegel, human beings are not by nature free, but they acquire freedom through a process of liberation that culminates in second nature. In this sense, second nature is necessary for freedom. But at the same time, second nature considered as the mechanisms and regularities that exist independently of individuals hinders the actualization of their freedom. The interplay of the affirmative and the negative moment of second nature can develop in either of two ways: second nature can become a truly ‘spiritual mechanism’ through which individuals gain their autonomy, or it can petrify in a ‘natural-pathological automatism’ that blocks and suffocates the freedom of individuals (59).
On the basis of this conceptual framework, in Chapter Four Ranchio turns to Hegel’s conception of habit. Here again, he emphasizes the radical ambivalence of Hegel’s conception of habit. On the one hand, habit has an ineliminably ‘conservative’ side: when acting out of habit, one does things the way one is accustomed to do them and becomes inevitably like a machine. And yet, Ranchio emphasizes, ‘habit is not only the antithesis of freedom, but also the condition of its possibility’ (219). In order to explain his ambivalence thesis, Ranchio invokes ‘the double meaning of the French concept of subjectivation’: Human beings become subject only through subjecting themselves to the power of habit, and it is this intentional subjugation that gives them a contentful, free identity (220). Focusing on Encyclopaedia §410, Ranchio explains that for Hegel the liberatory aspect of habit consists of three points. First, through habit, the external stimuli, say, traffic noise, cease to affect one, and thus habit makes it possible to take notice of novel stimuli. Second, habit results in ‘indifference towards the satisfaction’ of desires. Through habit, desires become ‘dulled’ and lose their intensity, and this allows subjects to develop a rational relationship to them. Third, through habit one acquires ‘dexterity’ to implement one’s intentions. In other words, through habit, intentions become incorporated into bodily movement and thereby gain in actuality (221–24).
Finally, Ranchio uses his thesis of ambivalence of habit to develop a ‘post-metaphysical theory of second nature’ (242–80). In this regard, he follows Honneth’s attempt to decouple Hegel’s social theory from its metaphysical underpinnings. While social institutions must subject individuals to norms, since ‘there is no freedom without habit’, they must give individuals enough space for creative interpretation of these norms. Social institutions must be structurally transparent and let themselves be changed on the basis of critical actions on the part of individuals (268–69). It is only through such a reciprocal, non-dominating relationship between individuals and institutions that a ‘contradiction-free’ form of habit, as both subjugating and liberating, becomes possible.
From the point of view of exposition, the book suffers from considerable repetition, and, I believe, could have been compressed into a book of half its size without damaging the main argument. Ranchio also heavily relies on secondary literature, especially on the work of Menke, Honneth, Pinkard and Testa, and does not exactly make clear what he takes his own contribution to consist in. From a conceptual point of view, the central thesis of the book—the ‘ambivalence of second nature’—is treated as explanatorily primitive, and as a means to solve all problems of practical philosophy. The repetitive claims that second nature is both ‘repressive’ and ‘productive’, both ‘subjugating’ and ‘liberating’, both ‘injury’ and ‘therapy’ etc., ultimately remain allegorical, and may well invite the analytical philosophers’ suspicion that Hegel refutes the law of non-contradiction, without attempting to explain why he is justified to do so. Moreover, reframing Hegel’s thought in terms of this ambivalence brings him closer to Adorno than I hold to be warranted, and drains Hegel of the forceful ‘speculative’ arguments that make his work distinctive.
