As witnessed by the continuing popularity of former Air Self-Defense Force General Tamogami Toshio, who was sacked for insubordination over his hard-line views, the political right in Japan, albeit still a minority, is visible and vocal. Thus, the increasing readership of such far-right journals as WILL, in contrast to the recent demise of the merely conservative journal Shokun, makes one wonder whether Japan has undergone a fundamental shift in its security identity and has finally dumped its traditional pacifist inclinations embodied in Article 9 of the constitution. In sum, is Japan being normalized?
This is the question that Andrew L. Oros seeks to answer in his monograph. Through meticulous research and interviews, Oros not only follows the evolution of Japan's security policy but also ventures forth to hypothesize its future direction. He does this by scrutinizing the content of and changes in security identity for Japan's entire postwar history. Given that conceptions of security identity in Japan are highly political, Oros carefully assesses the domestic political process, in addition to the impact of the external variable, the international environment. The book possesses qualities that make it of interest to both policy pundits and academics.
Oros's book consists of an introduction followed by seven chapters. The first chapter clarifies the theoretical framework by borrowing heavily from such political scientists as Legro and Abdelal in laying out the multiple factors that contribute to the formulation of a general policy. Oros chooses to utilize the concept of security identity in order to understand this process of change. This theory is then applied to Japan, which Oros refers to as a country in which postwar security identity is grounded in the “politics of antimilitarism” epitomized by the “three Rs” policy of “reach, reconcile, reassure” (p. 33). The latter section of the chapter reviews the vast body of scholarship that explains the reasons behind Japan's security practice. His aim is not to present a radically new interpretation of Japan's security policies, but rather to build and expand on earlier research.
Chapter 2 takes a historical approach and traces how Japan's security identity, grounded in domestic antimilitarism, was shaped by devastation and total defeat in 1945 and why it has been so enduring and resilient. Yoshida Shigeru appears prominently in this chapter as the creator of the National Police Reserves (1950)—the forerunner to the Japan Self-Defense Forces—as a foundational element in Japan's postwar security policy. The chapter also discusses domestic antimilitarism in the context of the U.S.–Japan alliance and the Cold War, while sketching the institutionalization of Japanese security politics in the postwar period.
Chapter 3 shifts the focus to the post–Cold War era, Japan's so-called Lost Decade. Here Oros shows that despite Japan's increased security vulnerability and its diminishing economic prowess, a dramatic break did not take place in Japan's security identity. What transpired instead were incremental modifications to cope with the drastically changing international and domestic environment. The catchword for international security contribution gradually shifted from “show the flag” to “boots on the ground,” as witnessed by greater and more active Japan Self-Defense Forces participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations missions.
Chapters 4–6 examine in greater detail the politics behind the policy shift and the mechanisms by which the changes were effected. These three chapters form the core of the book, making up what Oros refers to as the case-based analysis, and they examine the issue of arms exports, the use of outer space, and the most pressing issue today, missile defense. Although Japan is definitely not a normal state when gauged by its policy of banning the export of arms, Oros points to significant concessions at the level of policy implementation, including modification of the original ban on military communication and surveillance satellites. Finally, he examines the issue of missile defense as the “engine of change” in Japanese defense policy (p. 150), showing that antimilitarism has played a crucial role in determining the policy course of missile defense as it brings to the fore the critical problem of collective defense.
Chapter 7 wraps up the book by linking the three case studies to present the most plausible future course for Japan. Oros states succinctly that despite new challenges to old constraints, Japan's current politics regarding security are not all “new,” as they still continue to be shaped by the “three Rs.” Restated, Japan's security practices still revolve around the tradition of domestic antimilitarism; they are not, as Oros elucidates, based on fundamentally new principles (p. 171). This is supported by recent survey results showing that despite some changes, Japanese public opinion does not strongly support a fundamental departure to create a new, more “normal” security identity. In conclusion, Oros states that Japan will continue to embrace the security identity of antimilitarism in the future in the absence of a major external or internal shock; he does not predict changes in the constitution either. In other words, despite several policy innovations in the post–September 11 period, Japan's security policy will remain largely consistent with past Japanese policy constraints and outcomes; Japan's neighbors can rest assured that the “future will look much like the recent past” (p. 197), and that “Japan will not once again become, a great, rival military power in East Asia in the foreseeable future” (p. 198).
It is clear that a tremendous amount of hard work and research went into the creation of this book, which unfortunately is not always the case in the recent flood of literature dealing with Japan's postwar security policies, and it surely will become a standard work, frequently cited by political scientists. At the same time, however, the author's grasp of Japan's postwar history, particularly as evidenced in chapters 2 and 3, seems at times to be somewhat superficial and primarily reliant on secondary sources, with little utilization of the work of younger Japanese scholars (both political scientists and historians) who have published a wealth of original and groundbreaking research on postwar Japanese politics based on newly available archival material. Instead, his Japanese-language sources primarily comprise publications by senior Japanese scholars whose works are aimed more toward a general audience rather than fellow scholars. Moreover, the rendering of Japanese names—given name, family name—is unconventional and a little disconcerting. Finally, although it is nearly impossible to publish a book that is devoid of typos, occasional misspelling of Japanese names could have been avoided with more assiduous copyediting. (These, admittedly, are minor criticisms.) Less minor is insufficient discussion of Japan's historical position on nuclear weapons, including the issue of secret nuclear agreements with the United States.
Nevertheless, credit must be given to Oros for writing a book that is completely borderless with respect to sources, whether texts or interviews; he represents a new breed of Japan specialists who operate with equal facility in Japan and in their own countries. With the first significant change in government in Japan since 1955, it will be interesting to see how Japan's domestic antimilitarism will change under the leadership of Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio, who has called for a more equal partnership with the United States. This reviewer will not be the only one looking forward to an updated version of Oros's book. Until that time, this book should be required reading for current and aspiring Japan specialist in the arena of politics and security.
