Key Success Factor 1: provide the negotiator with a clear strategic vision

What was striking during the interviews was the crucial difference between negotiators who act on the basis of a clear strategic vision and those who seem to navigate without any precise direction. The clearer the strategy of a negotiator, the more efficiently he/she will act.

The difference between a cooperative vision of negotiation (‘win/win’) and a competitive vision (‘win/lose’) is mentioned by several negotiators. Most often a cooperative approach is advocated, with as main goal the satisfaction of both sides involved. This requires understanding the parties on the other side of the table, putting oneself in their shoes, and anticipating how they will react. We will return to this.

In the European negotiators’ approaches, the cooperative vision competes with a concessive vision (‘give/take’), which assumes that negotiation in view of a compromise is based on an ongoing exchange of concessions wherein each party has to give ground in order to fulfil one’s key objectives. The concessive vision is also part of the European negotiators’ routines.

Next to these well-known categories, it is essential to add visions specific to the European context. It is important to capture them through new formulas that may guide the negotiators. For instance, the European policy regarding trade agreements moved from a mercantilist vision, in which everyone fights against everyone in favour of protectionism or against free trade, towards a global and responsible market economy vision, in which free trade goes hand in hand with an unconditional support for the developing countries. During his term as Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, in his initiative ‘Everything but arms (EBA)’, promoted favourable treatment for products from poor countries. Although technically it was not always easy to implement this political vision, and although it did not come at no cost to some sectors of the European economy, it provided major guidance to the EC negotiation teams.

Key Success Factor 2: prepare, set an agenda, and debrief

Any negotiation process unfolds through three key moments: what happens before (preparation), during (the negotiation itself), and afterwards (the debriefing). Sadly, with the exception of the accession negotiation process, there does not seem to be any shared structured approach amongst most EC negotiators towards the preparation of negotiation, meeting management, and mission reports.

Prepare the negotiation – It is remarkable to notice the extent to which negotiators underline the importance of preparation for negotiation success. The risk of failure is often measured by a lack of preparation. If all the data necessary to conduct a negotiation are not known, the negotiator is quickly aware of his or her gaps at the table. Negotiation also starts very poorly if teams are not specifically dedicated to the UN international organisations where the EC is represented. The Commission can thus be at a disadvantage compared with countries (for example, Nicaragua) that have long experience with the UN system, and whose diplomats know the mechanisms well. It is necessary to set up ad-hoc EC teams for specific situations, with an identified mandate and a working agenda. Even without malicious intent, EC teams may cooperate very badly when, for instance, a text has been changed by one of the EC negotiators without prior consultation with, or notice to, his colleagues, who may discover the new version only during the meeting with the other party. The EC teams must learn to prepare together and rehearse before action.

Here, the key is time and staff resources necessary for preparation. It is hard to defend the interests of the Commission when, in some international negotiations, its staff is smaller than that of some of its Member-States. How can one prepare and negotiate effectively when there are only one or two people on the Commission’s side while another party can afford a team of a hundred or more? If a specific international negotiation constitutes a priority for the EC, the necessary resources have to be dedicated to it. This is not always the case, because the EC agenda is more often tuned to the development of a cooperative European policy between, and with, Member-States, rather than towards an external policy worthy of the name.

Contrariwise, negotiations for which preparations are structured give better outcomes. It is essential to go into the details of the dossiers, but apart from this technical briefing, it is necessary to sum up ‘in only one page’ – a so-called ‘steering note’ – the points to remember. These should contain the key objectives, and possible solutions on every topic, people to involve, and the tactical process to follow. The logistics of the meeting, matter as well. Often, an early arrival in the meeting room is necessary to make the last arrangements.

Lead a negotiation according to an agenda – In bilateral negotiations, the Commission often, on the basis of previous experience, guides the process. It knows better the various steps of the agenda to be followed than the countries with which it collaborates. Although this gives the EC considerable leverage in the negotiations, it should be careful not to abuse it, as this has disempowering consequences. Some countries that work with the Commission often have a day-to-day approach to the negotiation and do not always understand the overall process or the particular mechanisms at stake. Some countries, on occasion, even ask the Commission itself to formalise the agreement that is emerging.

The setting of an agenda must be precise; listing a few topics is not sufficient and it is often useful to go into more detail and to develop sub-topics. Timing is also essential. For instance, how to structure one day of negotiation with a country that is about to join the EU with about 20 items on the agenda?

The negotiation process is sometimes very long, due not only to the ‘red tapism’ at different levels internal to the Commission, but also due to the mandate that is discussed beforehand with the Delegations of the Commission and the Member-States, and which regularly has to be revalidated. There are approvals to obtain at different levels. If the deadline for a negotiation is, for example, 31 December, one has to anticipate the slowness connected to the validation process. Some countries, such as India, require a very long approval process and it is important to take this into account at the start of the process by giving oneself room for manoeuvre.

Given this anticipated slowness, the Commission’s civil servants must not only be straightforward and open but also precise about the calendar, notably with a view to the integration of the acquis communautaire by accession candidates. It is often necessary to ask immediately for more efforts, in the knowledge that this is the only way to satisfy the necessary conditions of accession before the deadline. Even when one started a negotiation intensively, in retrospect the start always seems to drag and things only speed up when the deadline approaches. However that is when feelings of unease increase too.

Complex negotiations also take place by chapters. Several negotiations are run at parallel tables involving specific areas of expertise, such as, for instance, environment, trade, etc. Technical experts circulate relevant information and documents. Daily meetings take place in which everyone debriefs his or her specific meeting and is, in turn, briefed by the Commissioner for the next meeting. The information that comes from the foreign press and is gathered by the Commissioner’s spokesman can also serve as feedback for the European delegation and keep them informed about what are the key points for other delegations.

It does not seem desirable to leave the most difficult issues to the end, for they will in any case remain sticky until the end. As they are difficult, one will have to discuss them several times. Therefore, it is important to book partial successes along the way so as to spark a positive dynamic favourable to the negotiation process. Important arbitrations may also happen towards the end, when the technical experts cannot resolve matters within their mandate and have to be replaced by political decision-makers.

The process of complex negotiations must also try to integrate key stakeholders in order to represent the different interests at work. Thus, if at the 1999 Seattle WTO talks NGOs were not represented at the conference, they were at the centre of the 2003 Cancun WTO plan of action, sometimes even serving as advisors to negotiators from the developing countries, and, through intermediaries, expressed their views on the content of the conference.

The process that aims to take into account the different European orientations demands the setting up of coalitions, which can also be slow to emerge. On a question related to hunting, the Scandinavian countries wanted to proceed very carefully whereas some Mediterranean countries adopted a more flexible approach with the result that three weeks of talks, or rather three weeks of ‘therapy’, were needed to build a common European position.

Sometimes coalitions build up at the expense of the Commission’s interests, as at the 2003 G8 Evian Summit. But it is better to anticipate and initiate the coalitions that are forming. Thus, the ‘four corners game’ identified in the WTO negotiations allowed four groups of actors to emerge: a first one around the European Union (with Japan for example), a second around the United States (with Australia), a third known as G20 (with Brazil, India, South Africa), and a fourth grouping the poorest countries in the world (G90 with ACP countries for instance). In the negotiations over a protocol of biodiversity, three main groups of countries had been identified: the GMO export countries, the developing countries and, in-between, the European Union, along with countries such as Switzerland and Norway. The interests of the European Union and the developing countries were not incompatible, and a compromise could be considered which the representatives of the Union were ready to formulate. As a result, an alliance with the developing countries emerged. Among the developing countries there were some actors that played a core role in defining African countries’ policies. These were targeted for bilateral contacts. In this way, the countries in favour of GMO (the United States, Canada and Argentina) were isolated. The final compromise, then, was close to the European Union’s objectives. In retrospect, however, the outcome of the negotiations was not ideal because the countries in favour of the GMO did not ratify the agreement in the end. Although the EC negotiators got what they wanted in the immediate outcome, then, when it came to its implementation that outcome lacked effectiveness.

Beyond what goes on in the process of negotiation itself, it is important to show flexibility without ever calling it such. The demands made at the end of a process are often tougher than anticipated, as each party needs to make clear ‘what the agreement is’ without emphasising much ‘what was imposed in it’.

A negotiator must stay on his/her guard until the end, as the process may suddenly veer off track. During multilateral trade negotiations, while an overall agreement was emerging, a major third-world country suddenly, out of the blue, raised a last minute objection without arguing from a specific apparent interest, thereby risking a deadlock in the process, and jeopardising the very balance of the agreement about to shape up.

Debrief any Negotiation – During the process described, and at the end of it, lessons must be drawn for the next negotiation. This is the last step of a structured process, which enables negotiators to improve their skills. It seems that this step is more neglected than others, undoubtedly due to lack of time, but also due to habit.

When a mistake is made in the negotiation, there is no internal reflex of debriefing except through the overuse of emails which, instead of enabling assessment of the reactions generated, often look like a monologue. Nothing appears to be more dangerous today than the ill-considered use of email as it is impossible to set ‘the right tone’ via this medium.

A structure of knowledge management able to capitalize on a specific mission to a country, to the same, or to another country, also seems to be missing. Even if situations or economies vary in time and space, a learning curve should be implemented to ensure continuity and to record the good practices and positive routines. As a result of learning by doing, only the ‘negotiations’ on accession seem to follow an increasingly structured process. This systemic approach has virtues beyond the accession context and would usefully constitute a true handbook for the European negotiator.

Key Success Factor 3: communicate efficiently at the table and beyond

Due to its role, the Commission has to be concerned with internal communication between the negotiators and the external communication of the negotiation’s outcome.

Internal Communication between negotiators – Communication aims to move forward or unblock a situation and has to work in two directions: one has to listen to the counterparty’s objectives carefully and succeed in communicating one’s own strategic objectives, including legitimating the reason for pursuing the negotiation in question.

• Listening phase. During the listening phase, it is necessary to read between the lines, beyond words, and to gather as much information as possible. During interviews, the active listening concept, which allows analysing more precisely the other’s point of view, and which is based on an empathic restating, was rarely quoted as useful to better understand the other’s motivations. Nevertheless, this technique allows a better understanding of the other’s message.

There are situations in which the Commission has actually very little to negotiate, either because its room for manoeuvre is narrow due to tight control over its action, or because it has little to concede to its interlocutor as far as resources are concerned. More than ever, in this situation active listening is advised. A striking example is to be found in the ‘negotiations’ with the accession countries over the integration of the Community acquis. As a rule, these countries, which have to indicate when they will apply a particular disposal, explain the difficulties they go through. If the Commission carefully listens to the concerns of the country in question, and shows to its representatives that their concerns are understood, it will be easier to bring technical answers to the table in the next phase. Thus, for instance with regard to the lead-free petrol issue, it will be easier to explain how Portugal, faced with a similar issue, managed to find solutions that allowed adopting the petrol directive within one year of accession. An example shows that transparency in communication allows moving forward more efficiently.

Transparency is more often an ideal than a reality, although, because international negotiation usually takes place in an intercultural context, which increases the risk of misunderstanding. A ‘yes’ or a ‘thank you’ in a specific culture mean really different things and listening, once again, enables a verification of the real meaning of the message.

It is sometimes necessary to accompany the listening phase with validation of the data discussed. Some financial data, for instance, may be searched in common.

The talks can also happen through emails. In addition, the talks may require skilled interpreters, whose skills may actually have to be verified in advance, so as to reduce the risks of misunderstanding.

• Speaking phase. In this phase, a negotiator has to talk well and talk little. What is said may be something that should not have been communicated. Key objectives, the framework one adheres to, as well as a range of solutions may be communicated. It is often necessary to reshape and reframe the elements that are presented. For example, it is absolutely necessary to explain to an interlocutor why a Member-State is opposed to an agreement and why this opposition curbs the Commission’s mandate. This can be an implicit invitation to the interlocutor to talk with the Member-State’s Minister and study the different ways to soften the latter’s position. The invitation of ‘side movements’ tends to soften the Commission’s mandate.

It is not useless to repeat the same notion several times. Talks, which often happen in a language that is not the interlocutors’ – generally in English – do not always allow for expressing all the nuances and it is essential to check that key elements have been understood. Even if an interlocutor speaks English very well this does not mean that he\she will understand all subtleties. Slang or jargon must be avoided as a negotiator whose mother tongue is not English may not grasp them.

To make understanding and persuasion easier it is useful to distribute to all participants, preferably before the meeting, a written document that will help in the progress of the debates, clarify the ideas presented and, possibly, constitute a first written attempt to arrive at a likely agreement (one-text procedure, technique developed further in this report in the paragraphs dedicated to multilateral negotiations).

In any case, the solutions at the table must be suggested rather than imposed. Arrogance must be avoided, especially when being more powerful. It can also be an internal risk when “old” Member-States’ representatives behave condescendingly towards “new” Member-States’ representatives or accession States. Trying to show to one’s interlocutor that one is cleverer than him/her must be absolutely avoided. ‘You do not win on the basis of your intellectual arguments.’

There are situations in which it is in one’s interest to talk first, where a good start will be crucial for the negotiation that follows. For example, a pre-emptive step, which consists of explaining oneself first even before listening to the complaints from the other side and having to answer them, avoids being defensive afterward.

External communication vis-à-vis the public opinion

PR and press relationships have become as important as internal communication management. If the media is badly managed this may entail a negative effect on the negotiation itself. ‘Managing the media’ turns out to be necessary before, during, and after the negotiation. Targeted interventions allow for the testing of ideas and prepares for a progressive acceptance of the results.

Contact with the press plays a key role in breaking away from preconceived ideas and to explain the reasons for a particular political or technical choice. Inversely, they are useful to limit the negotiation, to make some domains sanctuaries by indicating the absence of leeway on some questions such as, for instance, culture or the audiovisual media in some major trade negotiations. This is a way to distinguish between what can be negotiated and what cannot be.

One has to learn how to simplify the message that will be broadcast through, for example, vivid metaphors to explain the ongoing negotiations and by avoiding technical jargon, whilst at the same time protecting the confidentiality of the talks on sensitive issues that cannot allow clarification at that moment. For example, if an agreement signed between China and the USA causes unease to the Commission, it can be explained that the agreement satisfies the European interests for 80%, but that the ‘remaining 20%’ need to be negotiated.

Boomerang effects, following press statements, can be expected. When in the instance just cited some journalist asked, months later, how much of the 20% had been obtained, a Commissioner answered ‘I would say 16.5%’.

Contacts with the press work not only one way: from the Commission to the media. They also work the other way around, informing the Commission on the state of mind that prevails in a particular foreign delegation during a negotiation. This is a major source of information, printed but informal.

It is ever more acknowledged that non-governmental actors should also be involved in the negotiation process. NGOs play an important role as a positive or negative communication relay. Regular meetings (including different formats) with their representatives during the negotiations have now become usual with the Commission. Consultations with NGOs and, at times, with other non-governmental groups, such as industry, are organized on a regular basis. Industry seems to be uneasy in multiparty negotiations, and it may therefore be difficult to develop a close relation with them. Some actors also adopt defensive positions of a type which show strong conflicts of interests.

Key Success Factor 4: define an efficient mandate and discover the other’s mandate

The Commission’s mandate – Earlier, we insisted on the need of establishing a strategic vision for the negotiator. It is best if the principal does this, but if not, agents themselves may propose to their principal how they intend to approach the negotiations.

For many multilateral international negotiations, the Commission’s mandate follows from preceding negotiations internal to a working group of the Council. A very open process, usually managed by the Presidency and the Commission, gathers Member-States’ representatives who are fairly sensitive to the interest of the case being negotiated. For example, on the issue of the environment, representatives are drawn from four or five countries with which any discussion will have to reckon and without which no important decision on the objectives of the mandate will be possible. The constellation of this group has changed over the years, but some countries, for instance The Netherlands, which for obvious geographical reasons is very sensitive to climate change, and Spain, which is very active on biodiversity, have remained steady participants.

When this preliminary mandate is defined it is up to the Commissioner and to the various hierarchical managers to establish the framework of the negotiation and, thereafter, implement it.

The more this framework is expressed in terms of objectives or key motivations to be met, and not in terms of means or specific solutions to adopt, the more likely the negotiator will succeed. He will remain within the framework while being able to manoeuvre. At times, there will be some concerns as some issues regard several DGs, cyber-criminality for instance. The different teams then must show a genuine talent for transversality and elaborate a mandate by mobilizing, at any level of negotiation, technical experts who represent the various components of the issue considered. The more the Commissioners get along with each other, the better the chances for success. An accredited negotiator, whose challenge will be to find one position among the different DG, must also be appointed.

For international bilateral negotiations between the Commission and the countries outside the European Union, it is in Brussels itself that the framework of negotiation is established and given to the Delegations of the European Union around the world. Each Delegation is a diplomatic representation that acts according to instructions and prepares, if necessary, the visits of the headquarters’ representatives. However, one has to check carefully whether the headquarters and the delegations act on similar lines since a usual tactic for the foreign negotiation partners is to play off one against the other. Reversely, the delegations may blame the headquarters for their inertia, or vice-versa, in order to curry favour with the host country. ‘Going native’, that is to say being influenced by the host country to the extent of identifying oneself with its interests rather than those of the EU, remains a risk. A good relationship between the headquarters of the Commission and the Delegations is crucial for a smooth implementation of the mandate.

In some action fields related to the external relationship of the EC, a danger of ‘floating’ appeared from some interviews. Some negotiators who complain about this situation seem to act without a predetermined framework or with a framework that they are the only ones to determine. With or without the help of the Delegation, they themselves organise their schedule in the country they visit, go wherever they want to, meet whomever they wish, with objectives that do not seem very precise. This approach looks more like exploratory diplomacy than one based on an elaborate strategic vision and puts into question the credibility of the Commission and its negotiators. A mission report made following the visit that yielded these complaints has relativised them somewhat.

Any floating of the mandate of the negotiators of the Commission can often be put down to prior difficulty in elaborating an operating synthesis based on diametrically opposed positions expressed by the representatives of the Member-States.

The absence of a clear consensus after first level intra-community negotiations leads to instructions that are not precise enough for second level extra-community negotiations and induces a vagueness that is exhibited during the process and influences the result. To avoid this pitfall, it might be relevant, during the sessions of COREPER, to confront the Member-States with their contradictions and, therefore, their responsibilities by underlining the risks involved in moving forward in important negotiations without consistent guidelines. Similarly, it is essential to criticise the dangers associated with such contradictions if not overcome, as they may not only make further negotiations very difficult but can also end up in bad legislation.

In addition to the well-known formal notion of mandate, the introduction of the complementary operational concept of ‘authorizing environment’ appeared useful. This covers a wider field and aims at a wider or looser understanding of all the stakeholders’ views.

The Other Party’s Mandate – Depending on the negotiating partner countries, their histories, their situations, their policies at the time of negotiation, and the topic discussed, the mandates received by their diplomatic or administrative representatives will vary considerably. Some countries have a policy that delegates power to negotiators while others, with more centralised traditions, may be reluctant to let them act on their own. The standard mandate of a negotiator who represents China or East-Timor will, therefore, vary, and will be executed very differently. This has nothing to do with the size of a country or its resources, but rather with its status and with the resources it can draw upon to satisfy its interests. A difference in approach can be anticipated and confirmed readily enough, usually as soon as one talks to the representatives of the country.

Some negotiators may be under government instructions to delay, not to move forward at all, or inversely, and worse, to accelerate the negotiating process by a series of offensive tactics, and conclude it before, say, internal elections, because an agreement will be well received by the local public opinion. All these signs suggest the strong will of a State wishing to ensure that the powers of solution and decision bespeak its own sovereignty.

If the topic relates to the vital interest of a country, a strict mandate can be expected, which includes a positional attitude during the negotiations, or even hostile gestures. For example, following the accession of Spain and Portugal to the then European Communities, Canada was of the opinion that its interests in the fishing industry were challenged and decided to extend its territorial waters. The country unilaterally arrogated to itself a fishing quota exceeding the international level. The European Union thought it had settled the situation with Canada, in an agreement signed in 1992. However, Canadian elections in 1995 brought the Liberals to power, and these tried to curry favour with Canadian public opinion by stopping and searching a Spanish ship. A Canadian delegation even unexpectedly came to Brussels. Following these incidents a Memorandum of Understanding was signed and ratified by the Union, despite opposition by some Member-States, but it was never ratified by Canada. In the tense context just described, what may be solved by a technical approach (for example, the fishing quota) and what will require a political intervention (setting limits to the extension of territorial waters) will have to be distinguished in the mandate, as was the case with Jacques Delors’s visit to Canada.

This distinction between more or less flexible mandates in extra-community relationship, elucidated in the previous two paragraphs, can be also applied to talks with Member-States on a directive. The Commission’s field of competencies once verified, talks with the representatives of the member countries will be carried through.

At times, negotiators will be relatively open regarding their mandate constraints. An American representative did not hide from his European counterpart that having the enactment approved by Congress would be difficult and he even requested the latter’s help (‘help me help you’).

At times, in order to soften the other’s mandate, the Commission in the country in question launches campaigns of explanation that goes beyond the political circles. For instance, it initiates talks with the trade-unions of the country. It utilises the media carefully. An organised leak or an interview for a newspaper at the right time can spark a softening of the policy of a country, or, on the contrary, raise awareness that this is an issue on which the Commission will not agree.

From the same perspective, the mandate received by the other may constitute an opportunity also for internal purposes. Reforms that might not have been possible to push through internally may, as a corollary to the negotiation, be ‘imposed from the outside’. Reforms in common agricultural policy, made compulsory by the WTO agreements, are a good where any internal progress was always very slow, and progress could be made only under pressure from outside the Union.

What is true about pressure from the extra-European side upon the European side is also true of pressure from the European side upon the Member-States. The Commission holds the permanent ‘bad cop’ role, supposedly imposing on the Member-States policies they do not want because of adverse public opinion, but which they know they cannot evade. The negotiators of the Commission are used to a scapegoat status; they accept blame to enable the negotiators of the countries to save their face.

Nevertheless, it is important to avoid being considered responsible for the failure of negotiation. In Cancun, for example, one of the parties at the table might have had an interest in organising a failure by structuring the agenda in such a way that an item that was sure to create a problem for the European delegation be treated first, thus stopping the negotiation from moving on to other points, and allowing the party in question to blame Europe for a total failure. The ‘quick’ failure of negotiations on the first of the five points thus released the non-European delegation from the necessity of entering upon points that would have exposed its own part in the overall failure of the negotiations.

In a bilateral negotiation, the mandate can be relatively easily identified. With hundreds of countries around the table, it is more thoughtful to anticipate the mandate of the various parties, the numerous interactions that will affect them during the negotiation process, and the constitution of alliances that could be more or less foreseen. In a multilateral framework, as it is difficult to gauge the others’ mandates, it is even more necessary on the part of the Commission to envision a sustainable mandate that will remain relevant no matter what the changes are later on. Such a mandate will have to determine larger objectives for the Union: helping its services industry to develop, elaborating anti-dumping rules, helping the poorest countries, etc. These objectives must be large enough to adapt as much to the upcoming interactions as to be reflecting the 27 Member-States’ interests. Here, the concept of ‘constructive ambiguity’ makes sense whereby the same mandate, like the agreement later, will be read liberally by some, protectionist by others, and be ‘sold’ on both sides of the European political spectrum.

Factor Key Success 5: build a relationship based on trust with the other negotiator

It is difficult to reach an agreement with someone we do not trust. Still, a sufficient level of trust can be built with the same interlocutor by suggesting that trust is lacking while at the same time giving signs of trust anyway. Trust is based on honesty and reciprocity throughout the negotiation process. Paradoxically, trust can be superior when one negotiates with strangers, towards whom one has no prejudice and who have no prejudice against us. To build trust more easily, nothing is better than knowing one’s interlocutor’s passions. Thus, in important negotiations, before meeting the other side, a valuable key may be to compile a ‘CV book’ which not only rests on a ‘background check’ of everyone on the other side, but also on personalities’ reports enabling one to more accurately read the negotiators.

As a proper technical step, complicity is important not only between top-level negotiators but at any level. It is important to talk to everyone, to understand the chief of the delegation and the interests he represents. A famous example is that of the relationship built between a Trade Commissioner and his Russian counterpart. This complicity included a three-day stay in a dacha so that they might get to know each other better and, subsequently, develop a common strategy to get the Duma’s support.

To reinforce trust, top-level negotiators are sometimes obliged to reveal the bottom-line imposed upon them by, say, the executive power or a major industrial power. The less bluff there is or the less hidden the agenda, the better it usually will be.

If the relationship is important one does not have to fall into emotional excess. One day, a negotiator asked his interlocutor: ‘What do you have against us?’ Actually, this not an issue about people but is an issue about problems. At times, the mandate or the constraints are such that the negotiator’s margin of manoeuvre is limited, and no favour will be possible even if the relationship between the people is good. What a good relationship does is to enable frank talk, and to initiate a common search for solutions. When there is no zone of possible agreement, a good relationship will not change much. In these circumstances it is highly unlikely that any agreement will emerge.

Even in cases in which an agreement cannot be reached, except in exceptional circumstances, negotiations should not be broken off, but only suspended. Breaking off the relationship with a country must be avoided, as this is interpreted as a lack of tact. One has to know where to go and also know one’s limits, one has to be able to leave the table with the respect owed to each country and its representatives, one has to avoid fighting and acknowledge that the issue is serious. A suspension is relevant not only ‘to recover physically’ but also to gather data, arguments, or additional allies. This is also an invitation to the other side to come back to the table later on, with a greater margin of manoeuvre if needed, new statistics, etc.

Breaking trust often results from a lack of consultation and communication, from a misunderstanding of the rules that prevail on either side of the table. For example, the non-respect for hierarchical rules, especially in countries where this is a sensitive issue, can be perceived badly and entail a loss of trust.

Key Success Factor 6: interpret the cultural dimension at home and at the others’ place

Intercultural issues at the EC, as everybody knows, start at headquarters. Cultural differences at the Commission are visible not only through national differences – even regional differences – between civil servants, but also through the implementation of an administrative culture originating amidst this confluence. Initially the French administrative style, combined with a strong respect for hierarchical principles, and the French language were dominant, but now this style is competing with a more horizontal approach effected through the English language and more in line with Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavian models.

Differences of style between the representatives of various countries can be noticed by negotiators. For example, American negotiators are more concerned with the time constraint and adopt a more direct style. Brazilian negotiators favour a more indirect approach. Russians are tougher negotiators. Nevertheless, one should not hastily draw from this conclusions on the national level, as the difference spectrum can be equally wide within cultures as from one culture to another. One has to be careful not to put in a ‘box’ the interlocutor one meets; he/she can be quite atypical.

The organisational culture of the Commission combines rationalist and empiricist, deductive and inductive, idealist and pragmatic models to constitute a rich cocktail, which can be quite explosive. The awareness of intercultural aspects was born in Brussels itself and the ability of each civil servant to move within the service itself, with inspiration and fluidity, will more or less foretell his/her efficiency with extra-European partners. Although an awareness of intercultural aspects multiplies the risk of fostering prejudice against oneself, at the same time it cultivates its own antidotes.

As he/she is likely to be familiar with intercultural aspects and show more empathy than others, the European civil servant is likely to perform more easily in a negotiation in which he will be ‘the European’ and in which the other defends the country he/she represents. The stronger his or her relationship with ‘real’ people from the other culture, the better the European civil servant will negotiate. At times, an appointment with a Central Bank’s Vice-Director or with a Vice-Minister, less a political animal than their boss, will reveal more about the other culture than that with a strict executive who wears a mask and plays a role.

It is also important to acknowledge that, in most countries, relationship matters more than the substance of the negotiation. For example, a Swede, who had been successfully negotiating substantive issues for over a year in an Arab country, had established a quality relationship with his interlocutor. When the Swede, after a promotion, was replaced by another negotiator, the negotiations with the foreign partner came to an abrupt halt as the latter interpreted the Swede’s departure as a betrayal. It seems that ‘the more south one goes, the more important the relationship is’. This observation also goes for other issues.

At times, one has to be ready to swallow an affront. For some cultures the international negotiation style may come across as very tough. A country such as China or Russia may deem that it has to adopt a tough position in order to protect its sovereignty or its national pride. This may be only posturing, but it has to be taken seriously. Anyone who knows the history of these countries immediately understands that the message actually says ‘we have been existing for centuries and we can live without you and your money’. It is important to treat the negotiators from all countries on an equal footing. The existence of a strong personal relationship will help to overcome crises. Thus, when, during a meeting, an interlocutor suddenly refused the proposal and put an end to the negotiation it was only because of prior good relationships that the dialogue could eventually resume as if nothing had happened.

It is by exploring these informal frameworks that important information can be gathered, especially when one talks to the right person. Thus, the real amount of debt of a particular country was only accidentally revealed during a conversation with a very nice lady who was pencilling in all the outstanding loans in her notebook. Understanding foreign cultures sometimes implies accepting the diversity of information or evaluation channels.

This also implies ‘saving face’. Let us take the example of tuna fish exported from a Far-Eastern country. In principle, tuna imported into the European Union has to meet required sanitary conditions. Some tuna was found to be contaminated at arrival. The exporting country claimed that the contamination had happened during the journey. The Union, for its part, suspected that the tuna was already contaminated at departure. So that everyone could save face, controls were implemented at both source and arrival. The Commission could not start from the hypothesis that ‘tuna is contaminated in the country of origin country’ as this would have meant the trade partner loses face. Hence, a double safety was implemented. The necessity to never make the other lose face not only applies to Asia; an adroit negotiator should always keep it in mind.

One has to be careful with the written procedures the Commission is so much fond of but which can hurt the sensitivity of a country. If, for instance, rules are defined and a violation of them is noticed, the usual follow-up for the Commission is to send a letter to the country in question and then await an answer. However, such a written document may actually have an adverse effect, as it may be considered bad faith, and as a denial of the efforts made by the country in question to apply the rules correctly.

The awareness that different approaches are necessary often requires greater sensitivity in the treatment of some issues, particularly at the beginning of a negotiation process. The role of delegations of the Commission in third-party countries is crucial in this matter. They play an informative role. It is not only through the translation of documents from a particular country but also, and perhaps even more so, through knowledge of its customs that the life of EC negotiators is made easier. The same leverage effect, obviously, cannot be expected from a representation composed of 60 people, as was the case in Sarajevo, as from a representation of four people, as in the case of Tajikistan.

During the negotiations with the countries that sought to join the EU, one had to find a way to interact with all representatives equally efficiently. The Polish negotiators were very concerned with respect for their sovereignty and protocol. The Hungarian negotiators, riding on a strong political consensus in favour of the European Union in their country, were eager to appear as model-leaders so as to accelerate accession. With the Hungarians, as with the Slovenes, one could appear more direct, proceed decrescendo, starting with the most difficult points, whereas with Poland, going crescendo was preferred by considering, first, the topics that were based on consensus and only when a propitious atmosphere was established, could talks start about the topics of disagreement. One has to also take into account the fact that some processes proposed or modifications imposed did differ from the norms and routines that were prevailing in the previous communist regimes. At times, the will to change was not enough to bring about changes.

The Cypriot negotiators have always warmly welcomed the Commission’s representatives; they have even used them as leverage to pass internal reforms which their government would have found difficult to get accepted otherwise. However, with the Maltese negotiators many more buy-in methods had to be imagined as they were much more suspicious of the Commission requests. Was this due to the long-lasting British influence or rather to the fragile political context involving a government with only a small majority?

Some factors that weigh on the decision can appear irrational from the European negotiator’s point of view but they make eminent sense to the local interlocutor. While the organisation of a conference about the death penalty was possible in Indonesia, it was not at all possible in Thailand as the king explicitly stated that he was in favour of the death penalty. This declaration made any negotiation useless. It was better to come back to it later, when the king’s declaration was all but forgotten.

Key Success Factor 7: proceed by concentric circles in multilateral negotiation

The specifics linked to a mandate in a multilateral context and the necessity to set up coalitions has been mentioned before. One has to enter into the details of the mechanism that are useful to facilitate the progress and success of such complex negotiations. It is important to be even more careful with the process in this context than in the context of a bilateral process, and to play the role of ‘bridge-builder’ between positions that are sometimes at extremes with each other. The 1999 WTO Conference in Seattle made such a bad impression that lessons had to be drawn from it. This was an example of a negotiation badly prepared by not only the European Union but by everyone else too. The Commission participated in the Conference without really knowing its objectives, which outcome could be reasonably expected, and with extremely diverging positions, which revealed, thereby, major dissensions between the Member States. Due to its process, the round that ended in Seattle was a fiasco. This failure should be analysed to avoid making the same mistakes.

The key to success is to organise, parallel to the multilateral processes, the process of caucuses, which take place in ‘greenrooms’ a space without windows, where one has only one idea in mind: to be done as fast as possible. The method of ‘concentric circles’ enables working with a core group representing all the countries that are present. This small group will do basic clearing work and each member who is present starts working on a text and explains the progress and possible proposals to the other countries’ representatives who implicitly gave him/her a mandate.

Paradoxically, the European Union and the United States may appear quite flexible within the core group and are able to make big changes. Thus, the European Union decided to withdraw from the agenda the ‘Singaporean issues’. However, countries such as Rwanda, representing 60 African countries, may find it difficult to profile themselves within the core group as they do not know whether they must say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a particular question and therefore cautiously tend to say ‘no’.

The same caution is necessary regarding pre-agreements. A strategic mistake may be made by entering into a pre-agreement with one country rather than another. For example, on export subsidies, the European Union and the United States agreed without consulting other countries. Brazil, which had just elected Lula, decided to lead a coalition of the poor countries against the EU/US project. The EU and US had, thus, erroneously assessed the reaction to their pre-agreement.

In this context, the choice of who chairs a committee is fundamental. The president acts like a shepherd who brings his flock in safe and sound. He has to appear independent and neutral. He must not be a European Commissioner. For example, a New Zealand ambassador was excellent in this role. At times, it can be impossible for a member of the core group to suggest a proposal, or to change the proposition tabled, because he will be acting outside his mandate. The president may then propose a compromise which can be imposed upon the other members (or imposed upon us). The procedure known as the ‘one-text procedure, proposed by the presidency’, is the Chair’s best assessment of the balance.

During a multilateral setting, the presidency gathered a group of about 20 countries representing around a hundred member countries. Due to a deadlock, a secret meeting was organised between the representatives of four members – the European Union, the United States, and two other countries, A and B. This meeting took place over a dinner, which lasted until 3 am. At the end of the meeting a quasi-Shakespearian script was written. The European representative would say ‘X’, the American representative would vehemently say ‘no, this is totally unacceptable’, A’s representative would say ‘a compromise has to be found’, B’s representative would say ‘the idea would be to propose Y’. The play was performed well, there were artificial fights, everything looked natural, and, from this crisis engineering was born a compromise that was finally adopted. But, obviously, one has to choose one’s fights.

For the whole process, time is a crucial factor. First of all, one needs to give oneself extra time. The various states involved have to consult their chancelleries, react, adjust, etc. It is no longer possible to negotiate at the last minute, as it was when the WTO counted a mere eight members. The more one nears the end of a round, the more one has to play on subtleties, risking, in this manner, increasing mistrust within the system and among the members themselves.

In a multilateral negotiation, there is never a clear victory or a clear failure. One is, somehow, always in the middle. The key demand is that a proposal must never be rejected by anybody. There should be nothing in it which can make it unacceptable to anyone. In such negotiations one arrives at a lowest common denominator, because decision is based on consensus. For the European Union, the concept of ‘double level negotiation based on consensus’ can be mentioned, wherein the proposal made by the Commission is the result of discussion and compromise and, therefore, likely to be more integrative than what any country would propose on its own. However, the proposal has to be realistic. Sometimes, the Union neglects the imperative of realism when it adopts a proposal on which it will not get much support in a multilateral setting. On the other hand, if the European compromise is built properly, it is more likely to be adopted by a global system (UN, WTO, etc).

Key Success Factor 8: work on the core motivations of the parties at the table

A negotiator from the Commission cannot afford not to defend the Commission, but what about the other party’s interest? The risk of an unbalanced deal is non-implementation. Negotiated solutions the parties can live with have to be found. From this perspective, it is important to identify early the motivations on each side of the table. A strategic analysis must identify for each key-party not only the main interests (totalling 3) on which it will not compromise, but also the side interests (6) on which it may give in.

Here are the interests of the different protagonists involved in the fisheries conflict with Canada.

Motivations of the European Union

• • Developing the European economy, particularly its fishing industry.

• • Preserving the interest of the newly joining countries, Spain and Portugal.

• • Upholding of good relationship with Canada.

• • Enforcing freedom of fishing in international waters.

• • Upholding the entry of European products in Canada.

• • Defending of the 200 miles principle.

• • Upholding the alliance crafted with the United States.

• • Upholding the Scandinavian countries’ neutrality who in fact favoured the Canadian side.

Motivations of Canada

• • Developing of the Canadian economy, particularly its fishing activity.

• • Upholding a good relationship with the European Union.

• • Upholding or extending of its fishing stocks.

• • Upholding the penetration of Canadian products in Europe.

• • Questioning the 200 miles principle, or, getting ratification of the 300 or 350 miles principle.

• • Validating of the government’s policy by public opinion.

The understanding of the motivations of each party also demands a good integrating of the different stakeholders inside the countries concerned with the negotiation. It deals with the concept of ‘authorizing environment’, mentioned earlier, in which one has to arbitrate between the States’ interests, which are at times contradictory, their business communities (business leaders, industry sectors, Chamber of Agriculture, etc), and their trade-unions or associations (employees, NGO, consumers, etc). Normally, the government of each country, when it starts negotiating, has already managed this kind of internal arbitration, but it is indispensable to understand its strategy in order to decipher the reasons for the vehemence it may show on a particular point. It is only by analysing in depth the various internal stakeholders’ positions that one can arrive at a proper understanding of their motivations.

The negotiation is more likely to succeed when both parties are interested in a consistent common denominator. It is easier to negotiate with countries that are already bound by a privileged trade or economic agreement with the Union, or with States that are about to join the Union. The common and compatible motivation during the joining phase is a driving force behind the negotiation. The more a State depends on the Union and has to deal with it for help or for an upcoming decision, the more its interest pushes it to an agreement with the Union. The EU has no interest in a confrontation but rather in a long-term perspective, i.e. that it is not questioned by either of the two parties. The upholding of a relationship of partnership becomes more important than the result of a negotiation.

On the other hand, the more the common denominator is reduced at the outset, the more difficult the negotiation is likely to become. The investment in preparation has to increase. At times, the absence of easy negotiations is due to the fact that the motivations of one party are of such a kind that inertia or non-agreement is preferred to an actual agreement. With European countries that are not candidates for accession, or non-European countries that do not want close relations, or to which the Commission cannot grant any massive help, getting interests to converge often turns out to be less than easy. This is also the case with a country such as China which, although it might qualify for help can actually do very well without. Its interest at times is to pursue its policy unilaterally, without any European interference whatsoever on human rights, rather than to get conditional financial help.

It is, of course, up to the Commission’s negotiators to demonstrate the advantage a party is likely to find on a point X but such an intellectual demonstration often remains insufficient. One has to think about a different, Y interest, which would not be linked, and which a party could get in order to reach an agreement on point X. An exit has to be proposed to the other so that he/she does not seem to give in ‘for nothing’. One has to think of what might constitute an incentive to make the other say ‘yes’ eventually. Something has to be offered in exchange. For example, it is possible to produce a logical reasoning that shows the virtues of the liberalisation of services in Africa, but this demonstration would not be enough to make it happen. It is necessary, for instance, to mention that sugar will be allowed to enter the EU more easily. This compensatory mechanism must be identified early on in the negotiation. It is sometimes difficult to imagine that the other could have such interest. An African country with faulty logistics and high transport costs may well not be responsive to this type of exchange.

It is obvious that the kind of barter transaction mentioned above must remain virtual and is not to be explicitly stated in the media because otherwise it might be understood as if Europe favours one economic sector (the services industry) at the expense of another (agriculture). It is necessary to show that, in the end, a balance was struck, and everybody’s interest was safeguarded.

European agriculture is not very competitive and offers lots of room for improvement. One cannot please everybody or satisfy all interests: thus, if someone is the winner in the services industry, part of the agricultural sector might suffer. What matters, in external communication, is to present the situation as a package: a liberalisation within the services industry happened, ‘geographical indications’ like the label of origin guaranteeing the quality of a product followed, quality agricultural products were reinforced. The same effort is required for sugar in the United States and everything that helps African imports.

Key Success Factor 9: look for optimal solutions at the table for everybody

Whatever the strategic preparation with regard to each party’s motivations, one has always to imagine a series of possible solutions: upfront solutions (Plan A) and fall-back positions (Plan B), or, one has to entertain a great flexibility about the means to reach one’s objectives. A scenario can be prepared: for example, if the other says ‘C’, then one says Plan B or, one says Plan A, etc.

Ideally, all options should be identified beforehand, during the preparation itself but, sometimes, during the negotiations there is a flash and an idea emerges which one did not think of earlier. The best example is the Kyoto Protocol, which reflects an original model proposed by the United States for using market tools. The European Union had not thought of this, and its negotiators were convinced by the United States to adopt their innovative model. Interestingly, the Protocol ended in a paradox because today the European Union is the one who is urging most for the Kyoto Protocol’s enforcement, even though the latter is drastically different from the model in mind at the beginning of the negotiation.

The tougher the motivations and the objectives are, the more flexible must remain the means to achieve the objectives. A good negotiator can be identified by the ability to invent on the field, meaning, during the process. He or she is able to discover creative solutions, to put simple ideas in concrete form, and to unblock situations. Team-work and brainstorming are useful to imagine, on the basis of the file, different solutions and to then determine the guidelines to be followed. This is also a way to increase the ownership of solutions by the whole negotiation team (Commissioner and DG).

The European negotiators’ margin of manoeuvre can be reduced, at times, as in the case of the accession processes for which the Community acquis must be registered in the internal legislation of the country-candidate. Here, creativity implies the implementation of transitory phases, or the grant of funds to support, for example, the modernization of some or other economic sector. It also implies taking into account the other’s needs, which may even be symbolic. Thus, in the discussions prior to the accession of Hungary, the acknowledgement of the appellation guaranteeing the quality of the drink ‘palinka’ (a drink similar to but different from whisky) was really appreciated by the Hungarian negotiators even as the Commission had to fight against the whisky lobby. Europe often builds itself more easily on an acknowledgement of diversity based on quality rather than on a levelling down.

In another field, cooperation agreements with Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos included clauses regarding the defence of human rights; they seemed to be meant more as lip service but, in the end, created working groups about governance and human rights that produced unexpected results. These negotiations proceeded very cautiously in the direction wished for by both parties. They were used as precedents for following talk in the framework of cooperation.

To work further on an agreement, the negotiator from the other country can be invited to respond to a text. The negotiators must not hesitate to come to the table with parts of a text or clauses that the other party can read, criticize, choose to amend, etc. For example, the other party will say which parts of the text it agrees or disagrees with. It will then be possible to clarify the text or modify it in such a way that the interest expressed is integrated. It is also possible to propose an alternative text while indicating that the Council may not approve it.

At the negotiation table, it is important for everyone not only to know what the other party wants (objectives), but also how far he/she can go. Thus, we have a series of negotiations in which the negotiators proceed step by step, moving from a first to a second level, to a level where the boss can be eventually called for. Despite the effort of the technical experts, the constraints of their respective mandates may leave many questions unsolved. But, as mentioned earlier, three or four question marks, points of disagreement – which will be as many versions of the agreement as possible and which will only be solved by the political leaders’ – should be kept for the end. The mandate is structured in such a way that these ‘big guns’ must not intervene the first time. The Commission’s negotiator resorts to them only when necessary, when the technical experts have used all the contents and combinations that can be imagined from their mandate. It will also be a success for the Commission’s negotiators if they can convince their interlocutors to return a question to their principals.

When an agreement is about to be reached, one has to be cautious, particularly in the international setting, and protect oneself against last-minute tactics. ‘Nothing is ever done, until it is signed.’

Key Success Factor 10: use justification criteria for everybody

A sustainable agreement is one that each negotiator can easily justify to his/her principal. Sometimes one of the parties finds it more advantageous than another to sign an agreement because its unfulfilled needs make it more vulnerable and flexible than the other party, which does not need the agreement. When the law of supply and demand weighs clearly on one side of the scale, the party that is asking for more has to accept an offer that does not really satisfy it, which it finds difficult to justify, but which it cannot refuse for lack of anything better. The economic theory, if taken literally, states that in this case it is better for an actor to accept crumbs rather than nothing at all because crumbs create some value whereas nothing, obviously, does not create anything at all.

However, people do not reason according to strict economic terms but also anchor their decisions in a psychology that respects human relationships and their perception of equity. Thus, a person may end up refusing an offer at the negotiation table for reasons beyond economic logic, or for reason of feeling humiliated; his/her decision to refuse the crumbs may look irrational at first but from a justice logic is not. He/she implements the paradox of powerlessness which, for a party who is pushed to the breaking point, ends up looking indifferent to the exercise of the other’s dominating power.

A powerful party, such as the Commission, must always keep in mind that a weak party may thwart the stronger one, a warning backed by history and often neglected by a former American government. The Commission’s opportunity to cast itself as an organisation that is more concerned with legitimacy than with the exercise of unilateral strength, a power that strives for an alternative model, and that may constitute the core of a coalition of replacement. The European Union, particularly as it is a growing power, must make the deliberate choice of legitimacy versus the temptation of arbitrary power and so chooses to make up for too much power with a surplus of legitimacy and modesty. Based on justification criteria, the more a party de facto dominates a negotiation, the more it has to exercise its power with self-restraint, beware of power struggles, and avoid all arrogance because it will always be suspected of taking advantage.

Consequently, the principles used, the laws enforced, the figures and facts presented, and the results displayed must be, as much as possible, verifiable and valid for both parties. To make the report of activities easier for the principal and the media, it is indispensable to build the agreement with the other based on such justification criteria. These criteria vary from one negotiation to the other. For the purchase of a building, for example, the Commission’s negotiator would develop some evaluation methodology (block, cost per square metre, condition of the building, renovations, etc) while systematically banking on the view of an external expert who will set up the bottom-line. This search for principles and their use is valid whatever the negotiation is about.

What matters here is to have legal frameworks or to build them in agreement with the other parties and be helped by experts from the competent service. A certain number of rules can be applied regarding the grant of subsidies, tenders or financing, accounting or performance reporting. A country can be very sensitive to these questions and not be willing to apply, or one may say, import accounting rules. For instance, according to a specific rule, only the Commission’s service of contracts can interpret a contract; a civil servant is not allowed to do so, he may only give a personal opinion, which is likely to hold up the civil servant’s negotiation work even more.

Countries receiving aid suffer from a lack of coordination between the backers. The World Bank, the IBRD, the IMF, or the European Union positively do not contradict one another but each donor sticks to different cycles of tenders, has its own evaluation operations, etc, while very few people know what the others do.

The problem of data justification is worsened by the lack of trustworthy statistics on the spot. In the context of subsidies, there might be no local auditing system. At times, the training of people in this field has to be negotiated. If a local auditing system exists, its independence has to be ensured. When an administration hires quality staff, it often ends up with no funds and low salaries. On whom does this system depend? Does it depend on the president, the parliament, a third authority? Without mentioning the risks linked to corruption, there is sometimes no principle of budgetary consistency. The procedures of disbursement are not precise and there is no clear organization chart on the budgetary authorizations. In Bosnia, for example, some faults were noticed in the internal audit system of the administration. The data observed by a consulting firm appointed to the matter were validated, and a period of six months was proposed to complete a precise working programme to correct the system’s shortcomings. The Commission then negotiated the deadline with the Bosnian authorities, while respecting their independence and their decision-making powers to carry out the necessary structural and economic reforms. In this context, the Commission, like any other backer, truly has an important power since, in the end, it is the Commission that decides to release or not the next instalment of aid.

The more relevant technical information a negotiator has on the issues at stake and is willing to share with his/her alter ego, the more technical the answers emerging from the negotiation will be and this will reduce the risk of political diversion. It is also important to guess the right time to reveal the technical information, and the negotiator is often the only one to make this decision.

Key Success Factor 11: to take into account the solutions a party has away from the table

The closer the interests of a country are with reference to the Union, the higher the level of its resources dedicated to the development of negotiated solutions and its internal capacity to produce trustworthy information, the more they serve as indicators of the probability of a country to generate with the Union integrative, productive, and sustainable agreements.

In the first category, negotiations on common interest topics between the Commission and trade partners, such as the EFTA, will be integrated. On the other hand, it is less obvious whether negotiations led within the framework of accession should be categorised here since de facto the scales are tipped towards the Commission. One should talk more about ‘accession blocks’ in which the candidate-country has only a small margin of manoeuvre to discuss anything about the terms proposed and must integrate the Community acquis in its national legislation. The process known as ‘accession negotiation’ has more to do with the mechanical checking, by the Commission, that all the points of the check list were met within a given time frame. If the candidate passes all the tests it becomes a Member State without anything to really negotiate about. This was the case for the transition to the euro and the countries qualifying for the criteria. If a country does not qualify it remains outside the Union, or outside of the Euro zone.

Countries with limited resources regarding negotiation skills, goods to exchange, or trustworthy data will often be in a position of dependency during the negotiations, thus imbalancing the partnership in favour of the Commission. In this hypothesis, as the previous key factor for success suggested, the Commission should be extra careful and not take advantage of its dominating power. It always can say ‘no’ to the agreement or impose further conditions, and the other country can often do nothing but say ‘yes. Absence of agreement is much less serious for the Commission than for the country in question, which may need the financial aid under consideration in order to restructure its banking system, pay its civil servants, rebuild its infrastructure, etc. The Commission and the country know that if there is no agreement by a given date the estimated grant for that year will be lost.

Thus, with the clock running, the Commission has a powerful leverage; it has to do nothing but wait for the other country to give in. If the other country does not give in, the Commission simply does not spend the budgeted money, which does not cost the Commission anything at all, except for the minor risk that its reputation might be jeopardised. If the other country does give in, the Commission is proven right to have waited. In both cases, the Commission is the winner. The other country is often tempted to bend over backwards due to the conditionality it faces and the risk of losing everything if it refuses. However, as noted before, this kind of strongly asymmetrical situation, because of the cost of a non-agreement to the weaker negotiations partner, bears the risk of arrogance of power, which must be absolutely avoided.

When a country is dependent only to a certain extent vis-à-vis the European Union or is likely to exercise leverages or sanctions against it, it has viable solutions outside the negotiation and can say ‘no’ to the Commission without taking any big risk. Although this situation is more symmetrical and balanced, it does not imply that negotiations are simpler. China or the United States are good examples. These countries do not always find it to their own advantage to reach an agreement with the EU. They may prefer their best solutions away from the table, for instance status-quo or unilateral action. Negotiations may fail whenever such a country’s cost/benefit analysis is restricted to the advantage that a solution away from the table offers, without the Commission being able to propose anything that may change this equation.

It also happens that the parties play with time, in that they pretend that they do not care about the absence of an agreement while this is in fact only a dummy move. Within the WTO, the risk linked with showing one’s cards is great; that is why one waits. No decision is made, no information is exchanged, nobody really negotiates, everyone waits until the very last moment. However, as time elapses, the risk of not reaching an agreement also increases proportionally. If no decision intervenes, the deadline cannot be met and a situation of no rules or sub-optimal rules will come into being. Thus, all of a sudden, there is a crisis, almost as if coordinated or organized, and everybody wakes up at the same time and calls for help. So far, one had to show to the press and, therefore, to one’s public opinion, that one was selling oneself dearly, that one was not going beyond one’s mandate. The call for help to put aside the spectre of a non-agreement is a political beat of the foot to intervene, broaden the mandate, find a solution, compromise, proceed to exchanges, etc.

When one comes closer to the negotiation end, when all the parties are exhausted and the agreement emerges, it can be tempting for some country to try to gain some last minute advantage by pretending to prefer non-agreement and block everything. To this end, it introduces a new topic, or asks for something new (like the social clause proposed by the United States in Seattle). This last-minute action, whatever the outcome on the substance may be, often pays off in political terms. The Brazilian government did not hesitate to use this tactic. It is Lilliput versus Gulliver. Within a multilateral setting a country seems to have put up resistance to the rest of world, and the political leader who knows how to do this well, particularly with elections in sight, returns home like a hero.

When the Commission is in the position of a limited offer, the negotiations are more random regarding the outcomes. If, for example, the negotiations between the Commission and Moldavia were once broken off, it was because the Commission did not have much to propose either in the short term (financial support) or in the long term (accession perspective). The situation was almost the same with Belarus and Ukraine. The limited influence of the Commission in the negotiation was embedded in the political context of the proximity of these countries to Russia. Even though a poverty alleviation programme forecast a disbursement of around €15 million, everything was put on hold and the governments of these countries did not show any willingness to contact the Commission again. The situation was very different for Albania, which received €25 million.

Let us recap in a few words the key ingredients for success that an experienced European negotiator may draw from experience.

• • The uniqueness of each situation. There are as many negotiations as there are negotiators. There is no standard menu and everyone has to come up with his/her own recipe to prepare the pie.

• • The relational skills. People skills, including humour, are crucial so that complicity, openness, trust, and honesty can create the need for the parties to play the game together and the negotiator can handle the most difficult things in a relaxed way. ‘It is about trust maximising’.

• • The common search for joint gains. Everyone must get a sustainable success. Otherwise, in the long term, a counter-productive dynamic is initiated. For this joint success one has to care about the other party’s interests, particularly so as the Commission is very powerful and can be tempted to push the other towards his/her bottom-line. ‘It is about value maximising’.

• • The knowledge of the dossier. One has to know all facts or details but then succeed in keeping the essentials in sight, and to communicate this to the other and to the press.

• • A very good system of economic intelligence. One has to know very well the political framework of each country, the various constraints that come from the ‘authorising environment’.

• • The key and secondary objectives. It is indispensable to categorise and keep in mind three key objectives to reach and six secondary objectives to put aside, if necessary, during the negotiation.

• • A strong strategy. One has to be able to play at several tables at the same time, to anticipate the obstacles that will be on the road, and to imagine the ways to overcome them.