The Medicare and Medicaid programs will celebrate their 50th anniversaries in 2015. While Medicare was envisioned by supporters and opponents alike as a potential stepping stone to national health insurance, Medicaid was not. In contrast to Medicare, which is based on social insurance principles, Medicaid is a means-tested social welfare program. Medicaid was not even mentioned by President Johnson when he signed the law that created both programs. Since its adoption, Medicare expanded to include patients with end-stage renal disease in 1972 and the Medicare Modernization Action of 2003 expanded the program to include drug coverage (Medicare Part D), but it never became a model for universal coverage in the United States. During the past 50 years, however, Medicaid has expanded dramatically and today, with 66 million enrollees, is the largest health insurer in the country. A centerpiece of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) was the expansion of Medicaid. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius has limited the Medicaid expansion because the Court’s decision made it easier for states to opt out. The current polarization of American politics encourages Republican governors to do so, but it remains a crucial dimension of the ACA’s strategy for extending health insurance coverage.
In Financing Medicaid: Federalism and the Growth of America’s Health Care Safety Net, Shanna Rose offers an explanation for Medicaid’s unexpected growth that centers on the role of state governors and the National Governor’s Association (NGA) in shaping policy. In doing so, she draws on the concepts of “path dependence” and “policy feedback” to solve the Medicaid expansion puzzle. She argues that the “institutional logic” (p. 17) of Medicaid, along with the influence of U.S. governors on federal policy, help us better understand why the Medicaid program has defied expectations. Her case study also illustrates how bargaining between the executive branch of the federal government and the states has shaped the size and nature of the U.S. health care safety net. Furthermore, Rose’s book demonstrates that, not only does lobbying by governors help to explain Medicaid’s continual growth, the financial incentives of the Medicaid program help to explain the growth of the NGA as a force in American politics.
Medicaid is a means-tested welfare program that is jointly financed and administered by the federal and state governments. The federal government matches state spending based on a formula in which lower-income states receive a higher Medicaid matching rate than higher income states. States that agree to participate in the program must meet minimum federal standards for eligibility and coverage, but for most of its history, the law has allowed for enormous variation among the states. By 1990, the federal government had expanded Medicaid to include all pregnant women and children with incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty level and required states to phase-in coverage of all children in families with incomes below 100 percent of poverty. The ACA Medicaid expansion requires participating states to offer coverage to everyone within 138 percent of the federal poverty level. The federal government will cover 100 percent of the costs associated with the Medicaid expansion between 2014 and 2016 and 90 percent of these costs in subsequent years.
Studying the program’s history, generous federal matching rates are key to understanding pressure from state governors to protect, and at times, to expand the program. Rose argues that the open-ended nature of Medicaid grants to the states provides governors with opportunities to bring substantial federal money into their states. Despite his belief that the financing structure of Medicaid, like the Kerr-Mills program on which it was based, was “basically unsound fiscally” (p. 53), Governor Rockefeller of New York developed “an ambitious Medicaid plan” (p. 51). In the decades since, governors across the country have followed suit.
The financial incentives Medicaid provides to the states are so irresistible that efforts of governors often defy partisan expectations and the policy preferences of governors. Despite the fact that governors often worry about the implications of Medicaid for their state budgets, complain about federal government mandates, and occasionally threaten to eliminate their Medicaid programs, they usually end up supporting its expansion (p. 241). Although Democratic governors are more likely to push for Medicaid expansion and resist calls for federal government retrenchment, Republican governors often join them, much to the chagrin of national party leaders. The rejection of proposals to turn Medicaid into a block grant and cap the federal government financial obligations are compelling examples of how the desire to retain Medicaid’s federal match has often led Republican governors to take positions that conflict with those of the national party. Rose documents the rejection by state governors, including many Republicans, of efforts by Presidents Ronald Reagan (p. 90), George H.W. Bush (p. 148), and George W. Bush (p. 205) to transform Medicaid into a block grant. Rose explains that converting Medicaid to a block grant is appealing to many governors because it would provide states with substantial discretion over how to spend Medicaid money, which they like, but it would also “shift enormous financial risks from the federal government to the states—risks that many state officials are not willing to assume” (p. 211).
The current debate over the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid represents an interesting test of Rose’s argument. In the wake of the NFIB v. Sebelius ruling, state decisions about Medicaid expansion have broken down primarily along party lines. Republican resistance to Medicaid expansion at the state level, however, is already beginning to erode. Republican administrations in Iowa, Michigan and Pennsylvania negotiated waivers with the federal government that will allow them to expand Medicaid on terms that allow them to claim victory over the Obama administration while accepting the new federal matching money. The state of Indiana has a pending waiver that would also lead to an alternative Medicaid expansion plan. It appears that, even in the current political environment, the lure of federal Medicaid money is too great for the states to resist.
The historical evidence supporting Rose’s argument is compelling, but she acknowledges that the intergovernmental lobby and the institutional legacy of Medicaid’s financing structure are not sufficient factors on their own to explain the expansion of Medicaid. She claims that her goal is not to provide a “comprehensive account of all the factors that have shaped Medicaid’s development” (p. 18). Instead, her aim is to offer a “crucial piece of the puzzle that has thus far been the subject of limited study” (p. 18). She highlights a number of other factors that contribute to our understanding of Medicaid politics. These include pressure from health care providers and advocacy groups, broad public support for the Medicaid program as a safety net and—in the tradition of John Kingdon’s (2010) Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies—“policy entrepreneurs.”
The importance of policy entrepreneurs jumps out as particularly important in Rose’s account of Medicaid’s history. The efforts of Governor Richard Riley (R-SC) to mobilize the support of southern governors and Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) are crucial for understanding Medicaid’s growth since the 1980s (p. 110). In the 1980s, Governor Riley lobbied the federal government to allow states to expand Medicaid eligibility for pregnant woman and infants. Within the Congress, Representative Waxman was, and is, an important ally of state efforts to fight against Medicaid block grant proposals, increase federal matching funds, and expand Medicaid eligibility.
Financing Medicaid is a well-written, carefully researched book that contributes to our understanding of health policy, federalism, and policy change. Critics of policy feedback are unlikely to be convinced by this book because the theoretical model that Rose adopts is still too underdeveloped to address concerns about the inability of this theory to predict policy change. Nevertheless, her case study provides an interesting and important example of how policy institutions create incentives that make it more difficult to change the subsequent direction of policy.
