Urban historians typically portray the completion of the Croton Aqueduct in 1848 as triumph of engineering and good governance. And with good reason. Before the aqueduct was completed, New York City was plagued by epidemics and diseases associated with impure water, and the city's crude death rate averaged 24 deaths per 1,000. The aqueduct changed all this, eliminating the cholera and typhoid that had engulfed the city for so many years, and setting in motion a long-term decline in mortality that culminated in a 70 percent reduction in the city's crude death rate. Reading only this portion of the story, one would get the sense that the Croton Aqueduct, and later the complementary Catskill and Delaware water networks, were unambiguous success stories, but in his book Empire of Water, David Soll places these networks in a broader regional and environmental context and in the process raises a host of questions the standard narrative misses. In particular, Soll describes how in their quest for pure and plentiful water supplies, New York City politicians affected the broader regional environment, displacing property owners, adversely impacting hunting and fishing grounds, and generally running roughshod over the property rights of rural residents who had the misfortune of living in or near New York City's watershed.
Early on in his narrative, Soll writes (p. 5): “Those who lost their homes to new reservoirs or saw their businesses fade with the disruption of community living patterns generally received some compensation…. However, some residents entitled to monetary awards received nothing or next to nothing.” Given this, Soll concludes: “In theory, watershed expansion took place under the watchful eye of state and federal authorities charged with balancing the interests of county and city. In practice, the scales of power were rigged in favor of New York City.” Later in Empire of Water Soll presents stories and anecdotes supportive of this interpretation, but it would have been useful to have a more systematic analysis along the lines of Gary Libecap (“Chinatown Revisited: Owens Valley and Los Angeles—Bargaining Costs and Fairness Perceptions of the First Major Water Rights Exchange,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 25, no. 2 (2008): 311–48). Libecap analyzes how land values in the Owens River Valley responded to efforts by Los Angeles to acquire water rights in the region, in much the same way New York authorities did in the Catskills. Libecap shows that farmers who were able to collude in selling their lands to Los Angeles did better than those who did not, but that most of the gains from exchange went to Los Angeles residents and landowners. This is consistent with what Soll suggests for the Catskills, but without more quantitative evidence it is hard to be certain.
There is no question that New York City's burgeoning population and rapidly expanding industrial base created a vast demand for water, and in this sense it is no surprise that the city was pushed to search for new and pure water sources in the mountains, rivers, and streams of neighboring areas. Yet Soll stresses that the city had options. For example, the city could have filtered water from the Hudson River, but chose not to because it was too expensive. Alternatively, the city could have filtered water from the Catskills. This course would have made it possible to be less aggressive in controlling access to water reservoirs in the Catskills, and lightened the burden placed on residents in the Catskills. But the city did not have to pay for the costs it imposed on Catskill residents; it only paid for the costs of filtering. Given this, it is not surprising the city chose not to filter water from the Catskills. Soll explains (p. 46): “Once the state granted New York the authority to impose sanitary regulations on Catskill watersheds, the incentive to filter the new supply quickly disappeared.” Building a filtration plant was, from the city's perspective, for more expensive than “replacing privies, constructing small sewage treatment plants for Catskill villages, and paying… policemen” to monitor local residents and make sure they complied with sanitary regulations.
Another course of action would have been to meter the city's water supply and distribution. Meters were not introduced in New York City, however, until the late 1980s; by contrast, most large American cities began metering during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Metering was a highly effective way to encourage city residents to conserve water and in turn reduce pressure on the city's water system. Had they been employed by the city earlier, meters might have slowed the city's expansion into the Catskills and the Delaware. The city's refusal to use meters stemmed at least in part from the fact that it did not bear all of the costs of expanding into the Catskills and the Delaware. Had those costs been fully born by the city, and not just rural residents, meters might have been adopted much earlier. Aside from meters, New York City also implemented a series of other water conservation programs during the 1980s. These included an initiative to replace millions of inefficient toilets. The result of metering and these other conservation efforts was to reduce water consumption by at least 25 percent (p. 163).
One of Soll's most contentious claims is that the Watershed Memorandum Agreement (MOA) transformed the political battles over New York City's watershed. Signed in 1997, the MOA was intended to balance New York City's desire to minimize human activities in its watershed areas with the desire of watershed residents to use their resources as they saw fit and to promote economic activity in the region. In Soll's view the MOA ushered in a fundamental shift in how New York City and watershed residents interacted. No longer would New York rule the watershed as a colonial extension of the city; now watershed residents would have a genuine and effective voice in governance; now there would be collaboration and compromise. As evidence for this position, Soll describes what happened when the city introduced new signs in the area that encouraged motorists to report individuals polluting the watershed. Local residents opposed these signs, perceiving them as reflections of a “police state” and “Communist Russia.” And when residents complained, city agencies capitulated, re-writing the signs with tamer language. The difficulty with using this anecdote to illustrate a new spirit of cooperation between the city and watershed residents is that there were other, more substantial conflicts where the relationship between the city and watershed residents appears as contentious as it ever was. One wonders, for example, if gas fracking would have been banned in the watershed area were it not for pressure from New York City. That said, Soll offers plenty of evidence of reconciliation and cooperation in areas such as the city's replacement of septic systems in the watershed, and recreational usage of watershed land and water.
Overall, Empire of Water is an excellent book. It is thoroughly researched, creative in its conception, carefully annotated, and well written. It is, most of all, a balanced and fundamentally honest book; Soll tries to tell every side of the story. I can, therefore, recommend it highly to anyone interested in environmental history, political economy, water resources, or urban history.
