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PRISON TALK: THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S INTERNAL STRUGGLE DURING GAMAL ABDEL NASSER'S PERSECUTION, 1954 TO 1971

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 August 2007

Barbara Zollner
Barbara Zollner
Affiliation:
Barbara Zollner is Associate Lecturer for Islamic Studies at Birkbeck College, University of London, 26 Russell Square, London WC1 5RU, UK; e-mail: b.zollner@bbk.ac.uk
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Abstract

These words, which were written by the unnamed editor of the book Duʿat la Qudat (Preachers Not Judges), summarize the Society of the Muslim Brothers' (Jamʿiyya al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) prison discourse in the late 1960s. The writer claims that once the organization became aware that radical ideas had surfaced in its midst, it objected to these ideas, even as it lived through the very context of their germination, namely Gamal Abdel Nasser's prisons.

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ARTICLES
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International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 39 , Issue 3 , August 2007, pp. 411 - 433
Copyright
© 2007 Cambridge University Press

It was when the Brothers had to suffer in their prison cells and detention camps that some chose to pronounce unbelief on Muslims or to doubt the truth of their belief in Islam. Despite the harsh conditions of their imprisonment and incarceration, [other] Brothers then rushed to correct this understanding … Their general guide at the time, Master Hasan Ismaʿil al-Hudaybi, … gave in response to the thesis [of takfīr] a comprehensive answer, which shaped the path of the Muslim Brothers, determined their method, and laid down their mission. “We are preachers, but we are not judges….”1

Foreword by the editor: Hasan al-Hudaybi, Duʿat la Qudat (Cairo: Dar al-Tabaʿa wa-l-Nashr al-Islamiyya, 1977).

These words, which were written by the unnamed editor of the book Duʿat la Qudat (Preachers Not Judges), summarize the Society of the Muslim Brothers' (Jamʿiyya al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) prison discourse in the late 1960s. The writer claims that once the organization became aware that radical ideas had surfaced in its midst, it objected to these ideas, even as it lived through the very context of their germination, namely Gamal Abdel Nasser's prisons.

Setting aside, for the moment, the issue of whether this account or similar descriptions match relevant historical events, the quote above indicates an important discourse within the Muslim Brotherhood and links it to the organization's trajectory. The alliances that came to the fore within this internal debate were complex; so, too, were the conditions for ideological development during the years 1954 to 1971, as Abu-Rabiʿ rightly pointed out in his research on Sayyid Qutb.2

Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabiʿ, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1996), 162.

Although Abu-Rabiʿ's work sets an example for scholarship on the Brotherhood's history, a dominant trend adopts a simple formula—one that has been reiterated time and time again since Kepel's and Sivan's studies.3

Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt. The Prophet and the Pharaoh (London: Al Saqi Books, 1985), 26–38; Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam. Medieval Theology and Modern Politics (New Haven, Conn./London: Yale University Press, 1990), 83–94; 117–29.

This approach, which draws a direct genealogical line between Qutb and extremist groups emerging in the early 1970s, has the objective of explaining the ideological root of later “jihadist networks.”4

It might be useful to define terms at this point. “Radical” is used to denote ideas, concepts, policies, and ideologies that promote sweeping and immediate political and social changes, usually brought about by extremist activities. In contrast, “moderate” is used to describe views that are not radical and therefore do not promote violent activities or terrorist actions. “Extremism,” “militancy,” “terrorism,” and the various adjectives related to these terms denote active use of political violence and terror, usually backed by radical ideology and with the aim of seizing political power or at least destabilizing the existing political and social system. The phrase “jihadist networks” describes cells, groups, organizations, and loose networks of extremists that understand the concept of jihad in a military and revolutionary sense, thus calling for a confrontation with existing state systems and society in order to establish an order deemed to be Islamic.

All it seems to provide, however, is a retrospective vindication, extracting Qutbian thoughts from the context of their formulation. It does not do justice to the intricacies of the Brotherhood's vibrant internal struggles during the period of imprisonment. Moreover, this ahistorical line of research suggests by mere implication—rather than through critical studies of the past and present—that Egypt's largest Islamist movement has adopted a radical ideological stance. For these reasons it is necessary to revisit the years of imprisonment of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The aim of this article is to give a historical account of the prison experience of the Muslim Brotherhood during the years 1954 to 1971. This period, which was initiated by Nasser's autocratic regime, largely coincides with the leadership of its second murshid (general guide), Hasan al-Hudaybi. Although these seventeen years saw waves of persecution of Brotherhood members, they also set the framework for significant developments within the Brotherhood. It is, therefore, imperative to recall the episodes of persecution and to then correlate these to organizational adjustments and ideological discussions.

This leads to a closer investigation of the Brotherhood's relationship with Sayyid Qutb. Setting Qutb's work within the context of its original composition, I will show that Maʿalim fi al-Tariq (Milestones) was designed as a guidebook for the so-called Organization 1965. Although Qutb's work had an immediate impact on establishment of cells under the Islamist umbrella, it could be argued that the celebration of his legacy as one of the most outstanding members of the Muslim Brotherhood reveals a paradox. Although the leadership supported his engagement in the early 1960s, by the late 1960s it overtly objected to Qutbian ideas. It seems, at first sight, that the Brotherhood was and remains caught between divergent sentiments: between acceptance and rejection of Qutbian thought. The events after 1965, and the subsequent internal discourse, are key to understanding this apparent contradiction. Importantly, it was then that the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood articulated a moderate Islamist stance toward radical premises.

Duʿat la Qudat, completed in 1969, has been described as the first clear rejection of Qutb's ideas.5

Ahmad M. Gomaa, “Islamic Fundamentalism during the 1930s and 1970s. Comparative Notes” in Islam, Nationalism and Radicalism in Egypt and the Sudan, ed. Gabriel R. Warburg and Uri M. Kupferschmidt (New York: Praeger, 1983), 143–58; Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 61–63; Sivan, Radical Islam, 108–10; Gudrun Krämer, Gottes Staat als Republik. Reflexionen Zeitgenössischer Muslime zu Islam, Menschenrechten und Demokratie (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), 220.

The fact that the text was presented as the official statement of al-Hudaybi poses some questions. First, was the text really a refutation of Qutbian thought, and, if so, why did the Brotherhood not react sooner? Second, and of even greater importance, was the text actually written by al-Hudaybi? If not, what implications does this have on this text's relevance as an official statement?

Once the Muslim Brotherhood's internal discourse during the time of miḥna (tribulation) is reviewed, a more differentiated picture of the organization's history and ideology emerges. This picture suggests that the organization began to turn away from radical ideologies by the late 1960s—even before extremist cells established militant organizations. Furthermore, there is evidence that the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood began to align itself with the religious establishment in order to target the rise of radical Islamist thought. Because al-Azhar and its scholars were under the regime's direct control, one could reason that first attempts toward reconciliation between the Brotherhood and the Egyptian state were already under way during the last years of Nasser's presidency. Understanding whether this really was the case needs careful consideration; the key is Duʿat la Qudat. This text had an immense impact on the ideological direction of the Brotherhood, and its theological content contains powerful arguments against radical Islamist thought.

THE CAUSES OF THE NEAR COLLAPSE OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

The attempt on Nasser's life on 26 October 1954 signaled the beginning of persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood.6

Nasser was a member of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), consisting of Free Officers who took governmental power in July 1952. He grew increasingly influential in this circle and dominated the RCC's strategy toward the Muslim Brotherhood from mid-1953 onward. In March 1954 he took the position of Prime Minister; in November 1954 he became president of Egypt (the former president Muhammad al-Najib was accused of conspiring with the Muslim Brotherhood). In the following years, Nasser gained almost dictatorial power. For further information, see Joel Gordon, Nasser's Blessed Movement. Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) and Kirk J. Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Society (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994).

There is considerable disagreement about whether the attempt was, indeed, instigated by the Brotherhood or whether it was staged by Nasser himself in order to remove religious–political opposition. In any event, the Muslim Brotherhood was deemed responsible.7

Gordon, Nasser's Blessed Movement, 148–51; Olivier Carré and Gérard Michaud, Les Frères Musulmans (Paris: Gallimard Julliard, 1983), 59–63; Gordon, Nasser's Blessed Movement,179–83; Mahmud ʿAbd al-Halim, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun: Ahdath Sanaʿat al-Tarikh: Ruءyya min al-Dakhil, 3 vols. (Alexandria: Dar al-Daʿwa, 1986), 3:399–405; Jabir Rizq, Madhabih al-Ikhwan fi Sujun Nasir (Cairo: Dar al-Iʿtisam, 1977), 20–28; Ibrahim Zahmul, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun: Awraq Tarikhiyya (Cairo: n.p., 1985), 261–67; ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Ramadan, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa-l-Tanzim al-Sirri (Cairo: Maktab Madbuli, 1982), 239–404; Ahmad ʿAdil Kamal, al-Nuqat Fawqa al-Huruf: Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa-l-Nizam al-Khass (Cairo: al-Sahraء li-l-Iʿlam al-ʿArabi, 1989), 417–22; ʿAbbas al-Sisi, Fi Qafilat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, 3 vols. (Alexandria: Dar al-Qubs li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawziʿ, 1989), 3:71–85.

Shortly after the Manshiyya incident of October 1954, Brothers were rounded up in what appeared to be a well-planned exercise. Thousands were sent to prison with or without trial, and a number of leading figures were sentenced to death by military tribunals while others managed to flee the country.

When describing the mood among those imprisoned, primary accounts convey a silent desperation in the first years of this persecution. There are numerous memoirs written by Brothers sent to prison.8

Examples of memoirs relevant to the subject: Farid ʿAbd al-Khaliq, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Mizan al-Haqq (Cairo: Dar al-Sahwa, 1987); ʿAbd al-Halim, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun; Rizq, Madhabih al-Ikhwan; Kamal, al-Nuqat Fawqa al-Huruf; Sayyid Qutb, Li-Madha aʿDamuni? (Jiddah: al-Sharika al-Saʿudiyya li-l-Abhath wa-l-Taswiq, n.d.); Zaynab al-Ghazzali, Ayyam min Hayati (Cairo: al-Matbaʿa al-Adabiyya, 1987); Ahmad Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء: Safahat min al-Tarikh al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Cairo: al-Zahraء li-l-Iʿlam al-ʿArabi, 1986); ʿAli Jarisha, Fi al-Zinzana (al-Mansura: Dar al-Wafaء li-l-Tubaʿa wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawziʿ, 1988); Ahmad ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa-ʿAbd al-Nasir. Al-Qissa al-Kamila li-Tanzim 1965 (Cairo: al-Zahra li-l-Aʿlam al-ʿArabi, 1991). Most of these memoirs were written in the 1980s. On the literary genre, see Sabry Hafez, “Torture, Imprisonment, and Political Assassination in the Arab Novel,” http://www.aljadid.com/TortureImprisonmentandPoliticalAssassination.html (accessed 7 April 2007).

Most of them discuss, at length, the alleged assassination attempt on Nasser's life and the trials that followed. Also of interest are the intermittent, finely detailed descriptions of torture and hardship endured in prison. The authors of these accounts do not refer to any internal discourse among prisoners, however, at least not at the beginning of the miḥna.

This is surprising. It would be expected that Brothers who suddenly found themselves in prison enduring state persecution would question why the amicable relations with the revolutionaries of 1952 had turned so sour. Furthermore, how does one explain that, only a few years later, the prevailing mood of apathy was suddenly replaced by attempts to revive the movement and reestablish groups? The following analysis of the 1954 to 1958 prison years shows that—even more than exile, imprisonment, or the death sentences imposed on a number of leading figures—a suppressed internal discontent is what actually weakened the movement's unity. This discontent focused on leadership, direction, and participation. The struggle underlay al-Hudaybi's guidance from the day of his appointment. It was also the major reason for the disillusionment and distressed silence at the beginning of the miḥna, as well as for the seemingly inevitable disintegration of the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization.

As previously highlighted, the hanging or exile of a number of leading figures of the Muslim Brotherhood had a debilitating effect.9

Six members of the Brotherhood were hanged, about 1100 were given various prison sentences, and a further large group was incarcerated without any charges. See Eric Davis, “Ideology, Social Class and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt” in From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, ed. Said A. Arjomand (London: Macmillan in association with St. Anthony's College, Oxford, 1984), 134–57; Richard Paul Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 160–62; Carré and Michaud, Les Frères Musulmans, 68.

Of even greater impact on the breakdown of communication was that Brothers of different administrative ranks were sent to different prisons. Most of the leading members (the generation active in the guidance council before the miḥna) were first incarcerated in Cairo's Sijn al-Harbi (War Prison) before being moved to the prison in al-Wahat in the Western desert region and to Liman al-Turra near Cairo. The majority of younger, lower-ranking members of the organization were inmates of various local prisons scattered around the country.10

Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 28; ʿAbd al-Khaliq, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 109; Kamal, al-Nuqat Fawqa al-Huruf, 387–92; Qutb, Li-Madha Aʿdamuni?,20.

Al-Hudaybi, the head, was effectively removed from the body of the Brotherhood. Although he was initially under a death sentence, he was released after only a short period of imprisonment and then placed under house arrest.11

Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 29.

Indeed, authorities adopted a divide et impera policy that brought internal communication between the leadership and the members to a complete halt.

Measures taken by the government did contain and curtail potentially defiant members, but this technique of silencing opposition only partially explains the burgeoning disillusionment that was at the core of the impending organizational implosion. Severing administrative structures cannot be the main factor for the near disbanding of the Brotherhood. This conclusion is supported by the fact that only three years later members were able to build new communication networks even though the same prison policies were in place.

In order to explain the pervading and disenchanted silence, one needs to look more closely at the Brotherhood's history immediately before persecution. As Egypt remodeled itself as a republic after the so-called 1952 revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood was attempting to influence the political scene through cooperation with the new regime under the auspices of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Although the organization was at the height of its political significance, there were already signs of discontent and internal friction in its ranks. Internal tensions regarding a disagreement over the absolute power of the murshid go back to the formative period of the Brotherhood under al-Banna.12

Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 52–55, 295–302; Zahmul, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 41–43.

Despite the commonly held perception that al-Banna was the ultimate charismatic leader and undisputed guide, expulsion of leading figures such as Ahmad Muhammad al-Sukkari clearly demonstrates internal challenges to al-Banna's claim of absolute leadership.13

Al-Sukkari was a childhood friend of al-Banna, one of the founding members of the Brotherhood and its deputy secretary until his dismissal in 1949, when he led an internal opposition that demanded a more democratic constitution and greater organizational transparency; see Salah Shadi, Safahat min al-Tarikh: Hasad al-ʿUmr (Kuwait: Sharika al-Shuʿaʿ li-l-Nashr, 1981), 2–21, 32–34, 84–115. See further Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 52–79.

At the same time, and in the context of the increasingly anarchic political environment of the late 1940s, al-Banna lost control over al-Nizam al-Khass (the so-called Secret Unit)—the military arm of the Brotherhood.14

Unless one assumes that al-Banna was complicit in the planning, organization, and execution of terrorist acts such as the assassination of Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi, his fervent statement shortly before his own assassination in February 1949 indicates that his command was effectively challenged by the activities of the organization's guerrilla group. For the history, see Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 54–55, 58–71; Carré and Michaud, Les Frères Musulmans, 226; and Shadi, Safahat min al-Tarikh, 169– 79.

It was under the command of Salih al-ʿAshmawi, and subsequently ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Sanadi, that the Secret Unit effectively established a high level of executive autonomy.15

See Shadi, Safahat min al-Tarikh,32–34, 115; Carré and Michaud, Les Frères Musulmans, 226. Salih al-ʿAshmawi (not to be mistaken with Hasan al-ʿAshmawi) was the leader of the Secret Unit until 1947, when ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Sanadi took over.

Al-ʿAshmawi's nomination as deputy secretary in succession to al-Sukkari further supports this argument, because the powerful leadership of the Secret Unit gained direct access to the organizational core. After al-Banna's assassination in 1949, the Brotherhood operated in secrecy, surviving only because leaders of internal factions, namely Salih al-ʿAshmawi, ʿAbd al-Hakim ʿAbidin, ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Banna, and Shaykh Hasan al-Baquri, put their differences aside.16

ʿAbd al-Halim, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 2:422–24; Shadi, Safahat min al-Tarikh, 79–80; interview with ʿAbd al-Badiʿ Saqr, in Jabir Rizq, Hasan al-Hudaybi: Al-Imam al-Mumtahan (Cairo: Dar al-Liwaء li-l-Tibaʿa wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawziʿ, 1991), 61–71. According to Carré, Salih al-ʿAshmawi represented the extremist fraction of the Brotherhood and took leadership over the Brotherhood after al-Banna's death. Shaykh Hasan al-Baquri was a trained al-Azhar theologian and member of the guidance council; he stood for the middle of the road tendency and was al-ʿAshmawi's major contender. ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Banna was Hasan al-Banna's brother; he represented the conservative wing. ʿAbd al-Hakim ʿAbidin was the secretary general and al-Banna's brother-in-law; see Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 84–85 and Olivier Carré, Mysticism and Politics: A Critical Reading of Fi Zilal al-Qurءan by Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2003), 5.

However, when al-Hudaybi was elected general guide in 1951, the leading circle did not intend to give up its influence.17

Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 84–85; Carré, Mysticism and Politics, 5; Rizq, Hasan al-Hudaybi, 21–25; see also the interviews with Jamal Fawzi, ibid., 53–57; Ahmad Malat, ibid., 75–80; Ismaʿil al-Hudaybi, ibid., 116–25; ʿAbd al-Halim, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 173–78.

The change of political regime in July 1952 meant that the Brotherhood reappeared on the political scene with renewed strength, giving the impression of a united and homogenous organization—one capable of being a “real” political force. However, the unresolved internal power struggle continued to simmer. Internal strife between the new murshid and the Secret Unit, which was then headed by al-Sanadi and backed by al-ʿAshmawi, was only one symptom of a much larger power struggle over influence, strategies, and political conviction.18

Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 118–25; Ramadan, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun,119; ʿAbd al-Halim, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 3:189–92, 201–2; Shadi, Safahat min al-Tarikh,101–4; ʿAbbas al-Sisi, Fi Qafilat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, 2:138–40.

At stake was not only the Brotherhood's negotiating power via the state system, but also the matter of successful internal management of members and organizational structures.19

In fact, al-Sanadi and al-ʿAshmawi temporarily joined up with a fraction of the Brotherhood demanding a democratic distribution of power within the organization and, furthermore, did not hesitate to ally with Nasser in his campaign against al-Hudaybi's leadership. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 116–25; ʿAbd al-Halim, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 3:189–92, 201–25.

Although al-Hudaybi repeatedly fended off challenges from within the organization, his support was fading by the 1954 Manshiyya incident.20

An indicator of al-Hudaybi's declining power were the attempts to force him to resign (November 1953). When he regained power, influential figures, such Salih al-ʿAshmawi and Muhammad al-Ghazzali, were expelled. Furthermore, when it became increasingly clear that his fellow Brothers saw al-Hudaybi as an obstacle in coming to an amicable solution with the RCC and Nasser, his position as leader of the Brotherhood became even more of an internal crisis. Al-Hudaybi thus decided to detach himself from the crisis and traveled abroad (June to September 1954). Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 122–35.

The continuing internal dissent in the prelude to the miḥna was thus a contributing cause of persecution. Certainly Gamal Abdel Nasser made use of this discord.

The staged court cases of 1954 could not establish blame with al-Hudaybi, the Secret Unit, or any individual members.21

See the contradicting accounts of Muslim Brothers: ʿAbd al-Halim, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 3:399–400; Ramadan, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 239–309; Kamal, al-Nuqat Fawqa al-Huruf,417–22; ʿAbd al-Khaliq, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 105–7.

Confusion was further increased by disenchantment with the revolution and Nasser. Many Brothers, among them Sayyid Qutb, had supported the political vision of Nasser22

Gordon, Nasser's Blessed Movement, 99; Ahmad Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism. The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992), 32–34; Yvonne Haddad, “Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival” in Voices of Resurgent Islam, ed. John L. Esposito (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 67–98, 73; Muhammad Hafiz Diyab, Sayyid Qutb: Al-Khitab wa-l-Idiyulujiyya (Cairo: Dar al-Thaqafa al-Jadida, 1987), 100–101.

when the latter was an upcoming RCC member. Others collaborated with Nasser because he was antagonistic toward al-Hudaybi's leadership, thus sharing and using the agenda of those Brothers who were dissatisfied with their murshid.23

Gordon, Nasser's Blessed Movement, 53, 98–108; Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 88–146, 105–25.

Nasser's objective was calculated: to stir up internal conflict and use it to rid himself of political competition and religious opposition.24

Carré and Michaud, Les Frères Musulmans, 59–63; ʿAbd al-Halim, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 399–405; Zahmul, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 261–67; Rizq, Madhabih al-Ikhwan, 20–28.

Unresolved questions of the pre-miḥna period were thus not only a contributing cause of the persecution, but actually the reason for the silence following the Manshiyya incident.

Enduring isolation and torture, imprisoned Brothers found the issue of responsibility for governmental persecution of the organization to be a painful reality.25

Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 155–58.

They not only lost trust in the organization's leadership and judgment, they also questioned themselves about their role in the debacle. Their silence is an indication of turning inward to engage in self-assessment.

FILLING THE IDEOLOGICAL GAP

Given the Brotherhood's desolate situation at the beginning of the miḥna, it is not surprising that a stringent ideology was absent. Al-Hudaybi left hardly any guidelines that Brothers could hold onto in this situation. The few official addresses and rasāءil (statements) he issued between 1951 and 1954 made explicit references to political developments of years of relative collaboration with the regime. They did not provide any long-term strategies, policies, or spiritual advice.26

Hasan al-Hudaybi, al-Islam wa-l-Daʿiyya: Majallat, Bayanat, Nasharat, Rasa'il, Madhaʿat (Cairo: Dar al-Ansar, 1978).

This does not mean, however, that key ideas were not current. In fact, there was a common basis upon which most Brothers agreed. The concepts of niẓām al-Islām (a holistic Islamic system) and ḥaraka Islāmiyya (Islamic activism) were part of the Brotherhood's ideological makeup and were already propagated by its founder, Hasan al-Banna.27

Hasan al-Banna, Majmuʿat Rasa'il al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna (Beirut: Dar al-Daʿwa, 1990).

Adding to this politicized understanding of Islam, a general trend toward more vigorous theological ideas had impacted the Brotherhood's ideological framework in the late 1940s and early 1950s. For example, one of the Brotherhood's most famous propagandists, ʿAbd al-Qadir ʿAwda, reemphasized that it is a religious duty to actively oppose state control if its leadership is not subscribing to sharʿia (Islamic law).28

ʿAbd al-Qadir ʿAwda, al-Islam wa-Awdaʿuna al-Qanuniyya (Cairo: n.p., 1977); idem, al-Tashriʿ al-Jina'i al-Islami: Muqaranan bi-l-Qanun al-Wadiʿi (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risala, 1986). For a summary of ʿAwda's interpretation, see Krämer, Gottes Staat Als Republik, 196–206.

Although this interpretation was not new and was, in fact, substantiated through classical Islamic theory on the state, ʿAwda's stance gained new meaning because, after the termination of the caliphate, state leadership was essentially secular.

Furthermore, modern Islamist interpretative literature had already addressed the binary distinction between jāhiliyya (ignorance) on the one hand and ḥākimiyyat Allāh (“absolute” sovereignty of God) on the other hand. Two writers from South Asia, Abul Aʿla al-Maududi and Abul Hasan al-Nadwi, were among those to reformulate this set of ideas and apply it to modern times. Some of al-Maududi's works, which asserted the concept of ḥākimiyyat Allāh, were available in translation by the early 1950s and were certainly known to Sayyid Qutb.29

Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 175–81; Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam. Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London/New York: Routledge, 1991), 66; Sivan, Radical Islam, 22–23; Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 48–49. See also Charles J. Adams, “Mawdudi and the Islamic State” in Voices of Resurgent Islam, ed. John L. Esposito, 99–133. The term “ḥākimiyyat Allāh” is not used in the Qurءan. It is related to the Arabic noun ḥukm (judgment, rule, governance), which is used several times in the Qurءan and signifies that any rule other than that of God should be rendered illegal.

Al-Nadwi's writing on the idea of a modern jāhiliyya had crucial impact on Qutb; he knew this book and even wrote an introduction to the second edition, published in 1954.30

Abu al-Hasan ʿAli al-Hasani al-Nadwi, Madha Khasira al-ʿAlam bi-Inhitat al-Muslimin (Kuwait: Dar al-Qalam, 1980); see also Sivan, Radical Islam, 23, 36.

Even though the lack of concrete guidelines from al-Hudaybi did leave a deep ideological gap, there should be no doubt that core concepts, which formed the foundation for later discussions, were present even before the beginning of the miḥna. The evolution of a clear, activist, Islamist message, epitomized in Qutb's later works, was built on these core ideas.

Qutb channeled preexisting ideas, but he gradually developed his own interpretation. His development of thought is as much a continuum of existing key concepts as it is a response to imprisonment or to the ideological vacuum within the Brotherhood.31

Gomaa, “Islamic Fundamentalism,” 143–58; Binder, Islamic Liberalism, 170–205.

Considerable insightful scholarly work has shown the gradual transformation epitomized in Qutb's works and has explained his radicalization within the prison environment.32

Charles Tripp, “Sayyid Qutb: The Political Vision” in Pioneers of Islamic Revival, ed. Ali Rahnema (London: Zed Books, 1994), 154–83; Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabiʿ, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence, 92–166; Binder, Islamic Liberalism, 170–71; Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism, 19–67; Carré, Mysticism and Politics; Hasan Hanafi, al-Haraka al-Diniyya al-Muʿasira, 5 vols. (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1989), 167–300. For the thesis that Qutb epitomized the radicalization of the Muslim Brotherhood, see Ayubi, Political Islam, 134–42; Sivan, Radical Islam, 50, 83–129; Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 26–38.

There is a common postulation that Qutb represents the Muslim Brotherhood's ideological development during the crucial years of imprisonment.33

Ayubi, Political Islam, 134–42; Sivan, Radical Islam, 50, 83–129; Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 26–38; Binder, Islamic Liberalism, 170–71.

This holds true to a great extent, but—as will be shown in the subsequent analysis—Qutb's development is interlinked with both a change of political environment and the resultant regrouping and revival of the Brotherhood outside prison with a new spirit of action.

While spending most of his time in the Liman al-Turra prison hospital, Sayyid Qutb was able to work on a number of projects. He continued his voluminous Qurءanic commentary Fi Zilal al-Qurءan (Under the Shade of the Qurءan), revised his renowned book al-ʿAdala al-Ijtimaʿiyya fi al-Islam (Social Justice in Islam), and wrote numerous shorter manuscripts.34

Sayyid Qutb, al-ʿAdala al-Ijtimaʿiyya fi al-Islam (Cairo/Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1974) and Sayyid Qutb, Fi Zilal al-Qurءan (Beirut: n.p., 1967). For an analysis of social justice, see William Shepard, “Islam as a System in Later Writings of Sayyid Qutb” in Middle Eastern Studies 25 (1989), 31–50 and Sayyid Qutb, Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996); for an interpretation of his Qurءanic commentary, see Carré, Mysticism and Politics, pass. A list of his works is in Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism, 46–55.

Most descriptions of Qutb's development emphasize the psychological strain caused by his imprisonment and torture.35

Moussalli states that “being absorbed in the text made him far removed from realities of life and allowed him to structure a utopian political existence…” Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism, 35. A similar argument is presented by Hasan Hanafi, al-Haraka al-Diniyya al-Muʿasira, 167–300; Diyab, Sayyid Qutb, 103; Charles Tripp, “Sayyid Qutb: The Political Vision,” 154–83; Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 26–38; Sivan, Radical Islam, 83–94, 117–29.

There is no doubt that torture convinced him that the state–system, and particularly Nasser, was evil. However, closer investigation shows that the silence during the first few years of the miḥna applies to Qutb as well. Being a supporter of the revolutionary ideas of the RCC in the period after the revolution, he also had to deal with disenchantment caused by persecution.36

Qutb acted as adviser on cultural issues to the RCC and was director of Hayءat al-Tahrir (The Liberation Rally), a governmental initiative that replaced all parties and nongovernmental organizations. Gordon, Nasser's Blessed Movement, 99; Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism, 32–34; Haddad, “Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival,” 73; Diyab, Sayyid Qutb, 100–101.

He expressed his disillusionment in the early years of persecution through revision of his previous works. His thinking at this stage, however, did not take the form of a stringent, radical Islamist ideology. A definitive turn toward a more explicit and more radical formulation of political ideology can be identified no earlier than 1957.37

Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 30; ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa-ʿAbd al-Nasir, 65–67.

Moreover, his most prominent manuscript, Maʿalim fi al-Tariq, which was to a large extent extracted from his commentary, was compiled only a couple of years later.38

Sayyid Qutb, Maʿalim fi al-Tariq (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1993); for a translation, see Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Indianapolis, Ind.: American Trust Publication, 1993).

The dating of Qutb's radicalization of thought is crucial, particularly when relating his personal ideological development to changes within the Brotherhood, which occurred at the same time.

QUTB AND THE REFORMATION OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

The years 1957 and 1958 constitute a turning point within the Muslim Brotherhood's trajectory. It was then that signs of revival began to replace disillusionment. There are three major indicators of this change. First, during this period prisoners started to exchange and discuss ideas. Second, a communication network was built up, linking prisoners, and notably Qutb, to Brotherhood members and leaders on the outside. Third, Nasser relaxed his tight grip on the Brotherhood and released members with lesser prison sentences.

It is well known that Qutb was able to communicate and exchange thoughts because of his hospitalization at Liman al-Turra prison.39

Sivan, Radical Islam, 26; Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 28.

His discussion with Muhammad Hawwash on the interpretation of Surat Yusuf, which apparently inspired him to rethink his ideas on resistance, is often referred to as evidence of his change of thought. More important than evaluating whether details of reports of this incident are correct, the anecdote is an important indicator that Liman al-Turra's prison hospital was particularly significant for restoring internal communications. Qutb used the shared space of the hospital to discuss and communicate his thoughts with prisoners who had been transferred from other detention centers for the period of their treatment.40

Qutb, Li-Madha Aʿdamuni?,28, 30–31, 35.

Upon their return to their various prisons, Qutb's conversationalists began to engage in discussion groups and propagate his new approach. Brothers Farid ʿAbd al-Khaliq and ʿAbd ʿAzim Ramadan, as well as Qutb himself, depict the steady diffusion of ideas. They describe how the younger members at Qanatir prison were particularly inspired by Qutbian ideas, eagerly adopting the concept of takfīr (accusation of unbelief).41

ʿAbd al-Khaliq, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 109–12; Ramadan, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 313–14, and see also Qutb, Li-Madha Aʿdamuni?,31–37.

It can thus be said that Qutb was at the heart of discourse among prisoners, which pumped life back into the body of the organization.

As indicated, Qutb's ideas were not only discussed inside the prison walls. It has also been well documented that Qutb had contact with individuals outside the prison. Several sources mention that Zaynab al-Ghazzali, leader of al-Sayyidat al-Muslimat (the Muslim Sisterhood) was a crucial link.42

Al-Ghazzali, Ayyam min Hayati, 32–34; ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa-ʿAbd al-Nasir,59–60; Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء, 237; Fuءad ʿAllam, al-Ikhwan … wa ana: Min al-Manshiyya ila al-Minassa (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith li-l-Tibaʿa wa-l-Nashr, 1996), 193–203.

Qutb's sisters, Amina and Hamida; al-Hudaybi's wife and his daughters Khalida, ʿAliyya, and Tahiyya; and ʿAmal al-ʿAshmawi, the wife of al-Hudaybi's supporter Munir al-Dilla, are also said to have been messengers. This circle of women regularly visited Qutb and other prisoners. In fact, these women were not only another means of conveying information from one prison to another through visiting their imprisoned relatives and friends; they constituted the crucial communicative link between inside and outside.

The involvement of the Muslim Sisterhood, which was nominally operating a prisoners' support program, attests not only to women's involvement in the organization's activities but their importance. Ultimately they contributed to the Brotherhood's survival. These women were connectors between Qutb and the official leadership, which was at least ostensibly still in al-Hudaybi's hands. The Brotherhood's leadership was informed of Qutb's ideas. Zaynab al-Ghazzali mediated between both, and al-Hudaybi's close female relatives were involved in the Muslim Sisterhood.43

Al-Ghazzali, Ayyam min Hayati, 32–34; ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir,59–60; Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء, 237; ʿAllam, al-Ikhwan … wa ana, 193–203.

The fact that guidance council delegates were subsequently sent to see Qutb personally documents that the Brotherhood's leadership was well aware of what was happening.44

Qutb, Li-Madha Aʿdamuni?,37–38; ʿAbd al-Khaliq, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 109–12; Ramadan, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 313–14.

ʿUmar al-Tilmisani and ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Attiyya approached Qutb and disclosed their concern about the implications of his ideas. Although it seems that the premises of Qutb's politicized theology were received with some caution by the Brotherhood's leadership circle, it must be stressed that there is no evidence that al-Hudaybi or any member of the guidance council spoke out.

Incidentally, the spread of Qutb's ideas was accelerated by a third factor, which resulted from government policies. In 1957 and 1958, Nasser's persecution measures were relaxed, and Brothers with minor prison sentences and those not charged after all were released.45

ʿAbd al-Khaliq, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 109; Ramadan, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 313–14; al-Ghazzali, Ayyam min hayati, 28; Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 29 (mentioning 1956 as a date).

Lower ranks of the Brotherhood were no longer considered a threat to a regime that was able to consolidate its power after the Suez victory. Nasser's popularity was on the rise, reaching euphoric proportions through Pan-Arab populist propaganda during the short-lived unity with Syria (1959 to 1961) and then through the rhetoric of Arab socialism from 1962 onward. At the same time, Qutb was writing and reworking a number of texts.46

Gordon, Nasser's Blessed Movement, 189–98.

Although Qutb was incarcerated behind the walls of the prison hospital, he was kept well informed about national politics and deliberated about its effects on the development of the Brotherhood. As previously outlined, his thought was at the center of the revival of communications among Brothers, and thus at the center of a new internal discourse. When Brothers were released, Qutb's message gave members the necessary ideological parameters to commence with activities. His thought laid the groundwork for the regrouping of Brothers outside the prison environment and was thus essential to the revival of the Muslim Brotherhood.47

ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir,45–47; Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء, 236; al-Ghazzali, Ayyam min Hayati, 32–33, 36–38; see also Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 29–30.

It is not surprising then that al-Hudaybi and the leading circle did not object to Qutb's ideas because the restoration of the Brotherhood was in their interest.

ORGANIZATION 1965

During the years from 1957 to 1958, a new formation of the Brotherhood took shape outside the prison walls. The group, which was later to be named in court as Nizam 1965 (Organization 1965), started to take shape with the release of those Brothers who had served minor prison sentences.48

ʿAbd al-Khaliq, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 109–12; ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir,45–52; Ramadan, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 313–14; Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء, 236; al-Ghazzali, Ayyam min Hayati, 28, 32–33, 36–38; see also Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 29–30. The group received its name in reference to the court cases against its members in 1965.

Its initial members included former prisoners, some of whom had been incarcerated in the aforementioned prison of Qanatir, but also a number of Brothers who had escaped the 1954 wave of arrests. Efforts to reorganize the scattered Brothers were channeled by a council of five, with ʿAbd al-Fattah as its head. Ahmad ʿAbd al-Majid, one of the leading five, describes that alongside ʿAbd al-Fattah and himself, Shaykh Muhammad Fathi Rifaʿi and ʿAli al-ʿAshmawi were also involved, taking care of cells that were spread all over the country.49

ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir

. Ahmad Raءif, who later met members of the organization in prison, writes that the committee of five consisted of ʿAbd al-Fattah, ʿAbd al-Majid, Sabri ʿArafa al-Kaumi, Majdi ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, and ʿAli al-ʿAshmawi.50

Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء, 236.

A network of personal acquaintances was used to build up these cells, which they regularly visited.

The Muslim Sisterhood continued to play an important role and was employed to enable communication with the still-imprisoned Brothers, in particular Sayyid Qutb. It is well documented that Zaynab al-Ghazzali was a central link for the group's activities. She visited members of the guidance council, as well as Hasan al-Hudaybi, on a number of occasions and organized the group's educational program.51

ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir, 49–50.

Furthermore, she traveled to Saudi Arabia to meet donors, who were mainly located abroad.52

Ibid., 45–52; al-Ghazzali, Ayyam min Hayati, 32–33, 36–38; Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء, 236; see also Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 29–31.

With the basic network in place, Sayyid Qutb was then asked to act as the group's spiritual guide.53

Qutb, Li-Madha Aʿdamuni?,36; ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir,65–67; al-Ghazzali, Ayyam min Hayati, 32–33, 36–38.

With Qutb's immediate connection to Organization 1965, an educational agenda was set up. At the top of the list of readings were Qutb's works and those of Abul Aʿla al-Maududi, as well as extracts from works of such classical commentators as Ibn Kathir, Ibn Hanbal, and Ibn Taymiyya.54

ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir,65–67.

Qutb's most well-known and propagandistic writing, Maʿalim fi al-Tariq, seems to have been composed to instruct members of Organization 1965. Bearing in mind that Maʿalim fi al-Tariq is a composition based to a large extent on his Qurءanic commentary, it can explain why this text was designed as a textbook for the evolving ḥaraka Islāmiyya (Islamist activism). In fact, it specifically refers to this purpose.55

Qutb, Maʿalim fi al-Tariq, 2.

In terms of strategic considerations and planning, the group subscribed to Qutb's idea that they, as the vanguard of Islamist activism, have to pass through several challenging stages of study, preaching, and persecution in order to reach their goal of establishing a just Islamic society.56

Ibid., 66–68; Haddad, “Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival,” 90.

A number of sources stress that al-Hudaybi, who remained the Brotherhood's official murshid, was informed and asked for his permission for the group's formation.57

ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir,59–60; Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء,238–39; al-Ghazzali, Ayyam min Hayati, 35–36.

Apparently, he gave his consent and approved ʿAbd al-Fattah as the group's operational head. Although al-Hudaybi was undoubtedly linked to the communication network, he did not play any further role. It could be argued that he was unable to contribute to organizational matters and planning because his freedom was restricted through house arrest.58

For the contradicting remarks of ʿAbd al-Majid, see al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir,59–60; al-Ghazzali, Ayyam min Hayati, 35–36; Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء, 238–39; ʿAllam, al-Ikhwan … wa Ana, 131.

However, this seems unlikely; the communication network did reach him quite effectively. It is more probable that al-Hudaybi deliberately chose to stay in the background. Because Qutb's ideological development was not a secret, we can also conclude that al-Hudaybi was aware of the ideological foundation of Organization 1965. In any case, al-Hudaybi made no effort to object to the group or Qutb's theories, and it can be assumed that he chose to tacitly accept, if not support, the activities of Organization 1965.

When the group was detected by the regime and brought to court in 1965, members were accused of planning to overthrow the state system. However, it is unlikely that Organization 1965 (let alone the Brotherhood as a whole) had concrete plans for terrorist activities.59

See the contradicting notes of ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir,64–71; al-Ghazzali, Ayyam min Hayati, 35–36; Ramadan, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 319 and Qutb, Li-Madha Aʿdamuni?,47–53. Kepel explains this contradiction, indicating that different groups emerged under the heading of Organization 1965; one subgroup met at al-Ghazzali's home, only for the purpose of “Muslim education,” and several other nuclei had militant aims; see Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 29–30.

It is doubtful that the emerging group had the military capacity to organize a plot, although Qutb did admit that the group attempted to build up an arsenal.60

Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء, 241–42, 253; Qutb, Li-Madha Aʿdamuni?, 47–53.

Regarding whether the group had a militant objective at all, the answer, however, is a cautious yes.61

Ramadan argues that ʿAbd al-Majid and Sayyid Qutb worked on strategies to assassinate state officials in May 1965. Ramadan, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 319.

Without any doubt, Nasser was seen as the prime enemy, and his regime represented the epitome of un-Islamic conduct. Although Qutb did not state—even in his most explicit writing—that he charged Nasser or his regime with the ultimate crime of apostasy, his clear rejection of the existing social and political system implied that the use of violent means was legitimate in order to bring about change. Qutb's Maʿalim fi al-Tariq, therefore, contained the ideological framework for radical and militant Islamism. Although one needs to be cautious about declaring Qutb the ideological leader of the Muslim Brotherhood during this period, it is fair to see him as the ideological leader of a Brotherhood subgroup, which was active in the most challenging period of the organization.

THE NEW WAVE OF PERSECUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MODERATE IDEOLOGY

When the group was detected in 1965, a second wave of persecution hit the Muslim Brotherhood.62

Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism, 36, 172–75; Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 31–35; Walid M. Abdelnasser, The Islamic Movement in Egypt. Perceptions of International Relations, 1967–1981 (London/New York: Kegan Paul International, 1994), 172–78.

Pervasive raids were ordered, and the mere possession of Qutb's Maʿalim fi al-tariq, which had been published with official consent only a year before, was used as justification for detainment.63

Sivan, Radical Islam, 26; Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism, 52.

The state persecution did not target only members of Organization 1965; a wider circle of people affiliated with the Brotherhood was also arrested. Similar to 1954, charges of conspiracy and high treason were leveled against a large number of individuals. With obvious parallels to the court cases of 1954, both prosecution and judges maintained that an attempt on Nasser's life had been planned but stopped in time. The court hearings, which were held in 1966, announced a number of death sentences and long-term prison sentences.64

For the trials, military rather than civil law was applied, arguing that the military judiciary must tackle the severity of conspiracy. Effectively, this meant that the death sentence, which is verified only within military law, could be employed.

Among those charged with the death penalty was Sayyid Qutb, who was hanged in August 1966.65

A list of members of Organization 1965 can be found in ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir,193–98, 200–201. This list does not include members of the mainstream Brotherhood, which were sentenced at the same time.

Once again, Muslim Brothers filled Egypt's prisons. In contrast to the period of 1954 to 1956, this time the mood of those detained was transformed. On their return from trial, those who were given the death penalty were received as heroes.66

Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء, 400–406.

This incident demonstrates the clear sense of community that existed among detainees, at least at the onset of the second wave of persecution. Nevertheless, a fierce dispute over ideological differences broke out among those imprisoned. Among the centers of heated discussions were the prisons of Qanatir, Qinaء, and, in particular, Liman al-Turra, where members of the “old generation” of Muslim Brotherhood leaders, including al-Hudaybi, and members of Organization 1965 were incarcerated.67

Ibid., 400–406; Sivan, Radical Islam, 17–20, 47–49, 108–9, 131–35.

According to ʿAbd al-Majid, unrest within the ranks began when members of the (nominal) leadership (those close to Hasan al-Hudaybi) approached members of Organization 1965 to investigate whether the state's accusations were fact or fiction.68

ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir,251–69.

Furthermore, he argues that the even more important issue was raised of whether the tactics of Organization 1965 were based on the idea of takfīr. Although those asked for their statements denied that this was the objective, al-Hudaybi gave a speech soon afterward in which he distanced himself from the group. Analysis of ʿAbd al-Majid's account clarifies that it is unlikely that the group's activities or ideology was the real issue at stake, because al-Hudaybi must have known the answer to both questions. Hence, the real reason for the dispute was related to his responsibility years earlier and, more immediately, his continuous authority as leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Al-Hudaybi's declaration distancing himself from the activities of Organization 1965 raised serious questions about his trustworthiness. ʿAbd al-Majid describes that Organization 1965 members could not believe that the murshid, who had given his permission, was now withdrawing that same consent.69

Ibid., 254–69.

Although the question of al-Hudaybi's responsibility for the persecution put the organization under strain, the murshid's presence triggered a heated discussion of a highly political nature. This debate focused on the Brotherhood's stance toward the state system, and in particular, its strategies of opposition. Whether and how a tyrannical ruler such as Nasser should be opposed was at the heart of the discussions. Diverging positions bifurcated even further regarding the 1967 war against Israel.70

Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء, 400–406; Sivan, Radical Islam, 17–19, 47–48, 108–9, 131–35.

A split became apparent between two opposing points of view. A radical faction, which was internally known as al-Qutbiyyun (the Qutbists), because they claimed to follow Sayyid Qutb's line of thought, stood in clear opposition to the old leadership guard, still with al-Hudaybi as the head.71

Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء, 400–406, 409–37; ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir,220–22. Among the Qutbists was Mustafa Shukri, who in the early 1970s established the militant group al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra.

Proponents of this radical faction, among them Mustafa Shukri, effectively broke away from the Brotherhood and, from that point on, refused any association with their former Brothers. A significant number of Brothers appeared undecided. At stake in their decision was not only which account of second-wave persecution events they should trust, but also ultimately whether they should pledge allegiance to al-Hudaybi. A further issue was whether the future direction of the Brotherhood should rest on a radical activist ideology or on some form of conciliation with a regime that was essentially still seen as illegitimate.

Opposed to the suggestion that a tyrannical leader should be supported, even against an external common enemy, Qutbists argued for a clear rejection of the present regime. Relying on a selective reading of Qutb's work, focusing particularly on Maʿalim fi al-Tariq, Qutbists saw themselves as the true heirs of his legacy.72

ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir,220; Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء, 400–406.

Specifically, they adopted the idea of an irreconcilable division between Islam and jāhiliyya, Muslim and kafir (nonbeliever), and fully embraced the concept of revolutionary Islamist activism as the true expression of religious duty. Considering the circumstances, one can argue that these simple, structured binary oppositions did have some logical appeal. Qutbists saw themselves as the true vanguard of Islam, and the state system was accused of being in opposition to ḥukm Allāh (God's law). This self-definition was also a patent rejection of al-Hudaybi's conciliatory approach. Not only did they consider the murshid's political maneuverings, as practiced in the years before the miḥna, to be indecisive, weak, and therefore the main cause of the persecution, but they also accused him of cooperating with a “jāhilī state system.”73

ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir, 220; Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء, 406–9.

Al-Hudaybi's political and religious attitude differed fundamentally from Qutbist ideology. His politics from 1951 to 1954 show a leader who believed in influencing the political system through negotiation, policymaking, and political maneuvering.74

Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 84–85; Carré, Mysticism and Politics, 5; Rizq, Hasan al-Hudaybi, 21–25; see also the interviews with Jamal Fawzi, ibid., 53–57; Ahmad Malat, ibid., 75–80; Ismaʿil al-Hudaybi, ibid., 116–25; ʿAbd al-Halim, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 173–78.

His authority relied on the guidance council rather than on a broad base. Although his goal was undoubtedly the conversion of the state into an Islamic state, he was certainly not a revolutionary but had a revisionist and conservative, upper-class outlook, which intended to reestablish “the glory of Islamic governance” through gradual changes. This political attitude did not change remarkably throughout the prison years. He had never been the “mover of masses,” and his house arrest between 1954 and 1965 did not leave him much opportunity to touch base with members. Because the attempt to revive the Brotherhood in the early 1960s failed and because this attempt in fact led to the second wave of persecution, al-Hudaybi, and the guidance council behind him, needed to restore his severely damaged reputation as leader. Because the Brotherhood's leadership shared prisons with common members after 1965, they had the chance to win back lost power and control of the organization. The murshid still had a lot of questions to answer, however.

Al-Hudaybi's effort to reconnect to fellow Brothers particularly targeted those members who had remained undecided as to whether to break with his authority and follow the Qutbists. A number of incidents are recorded in memoirs, which describe al-Hudaybi's eagerness to discuss issues.75

Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء, 400–406, 409–37; ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir, 220–22.

The dialogue between leadership and members can also be traced through seven public letters issued by al-Hudaybi during his imprisonment.76

The letters are attached to the script of Duʿat la Qudat (Preachers Not Judges) and are included in his collection of speeches. See al-Hudaybi, Duʿat la Qudat, 173–87 and al-Hudaybi, al-Islam wa-l-Daʿiyya, 209–38.

Apparently, these letters were the result of authentic queries from fellow imprisoned Brothers. Questions and the murshid's responses were then collected and issued as official statements. A further product of this prison talk is the book Duʿat la Qudat, which was, according to a note at the end of the text, completed on 23 February 1969.77

Al-Hudaybi, Duʿat la Qudat.

It is known as al-Hudaybi's central work, which contains and explains his vision of the Brotherhood's objectives. It provided the Brotherhood with theological premises and explanations, giving long overdue official guidelines to the organization. In addition, this work finally reaffirmed al-Hudabyi's leadership and the guidance council's authority.

PREACHERS NOT JUDGES

Duʿat la Qudat criticizes radical activism, instead suggesting a moderate theological interpretation of Islamist activity. This criticism is distinct from radical thought and has a broader objective than being written merely as a refutation. In order to highlight its content, the following description focuses on its alternative interpretation of īmān (belief) and kufr (unbelief), the timelessness of religious meaning, and the question of governance. These selected points are in clear contradiction to three central concepts of radical interpretations, namely politicized takfīr (charge of unbelief), the persistence of jāhiliyya into modern time, and ḥākimiyyat Allāh (God's “absolute” sovereignty). Focus on these issues also gives some structure to the overly complicated and fractured argument of the text.

In a powerful argument against propositions of politicized takfīr, the text argues that the shahāda (profession of faith) is the only valid delineator of being a Muslim. Duʿat la Qudat emphasizes that once a person professes this, he or she must be considered a Muslim and remain part of the community.78

Ibid., 11–16, 30–34.

Effectively, this states that humans are not competent to determine whether a Muslim has faith, let alone pronounce someone an apostate. Only if someone, with clear intent and without duress, publicly renounces belief can it be assumed that he or she has left Islam. Apart from this rather unlikely event, only God can judge whether a wrongdoing amounts to unbelief. Focusing on the shahāda as the only valid proof of belief, Duʿat la Qudat thus undermines the position that Islamist activism should be a parameter for inclusion in or exclusion from the community of believers.

In order to substantiate this fundamental affirmation, Duʿat la Qudat elaborates on the concept of sin. Largely adopting traditional Sunni juridical definitions, the text delineates how a Muslim's shortcomings might be pardoned.79

Ibid., 35–46.

The text puts forward three mitigating circumstances, namely jahl (ignorance), khaṭaء (error), and ikrāh (compulsion).80

Ibid., 69–88, 95–97, 114–17.

Although Muslims might have shortcomings, the context for any Muslim's lawbreaking needs to be taken into consideration. God pardons a Muslim if he or she did not know any better, erred in interpretation, or acted under duress. Even though intention is relevant, Duʿat la Qudat confirms that a wrongdoer must be judged as a sinner, not as an unbeliever. Although thus defending individual belief, the text takes a strong stance against takfīr in general, as well as its subsequent application to collectively condemn an entire society.

In its refutation of the idea of a modern jāhiliyya, Duʿat la Qudat grounds its argument with the position that the Qurءan and Sunna provided Muslims with access to religious interpretation at all times.81

Ibid., 8–32.

Assuming that the Qurءan is the word of God, Duʿat la qudat criticizes the idea that the meaning imbedded in the text could have been lost in the course of Islamic history. Discussing al-Maududi's work al-Mustalahat al-Arbaʿa fi al-Qurءan at length, Duʿat la Qudat argues that al-Maududi's view of the relationship between the Qurءan as a text and its meaning and interpretation in Islamic history is fundamentally erroneous.82

Ibid., 16–19. The passages quoted in Duʿat la Qudat correspond to Abu aʿla al-Maududi, al-Mustalahat al-Arbaʿa fi al-Qurءan (Kuwait: n.p., 1993), 8–11.

Although al-Maududi contends that Qurءanic key terms have been continuously misunderstood, and that pre-Islamic values and concepts were not entirely eradicated, he plays on the idea that jāhiliyya, a time of ignorance, continues to the present.83

al-Maududi, al-Mustalahat al-Arbaʿa, pass. Similar to al-Maududi's view of history and, in fact, a precursor to his interpretation of a continuous jāhiliyya is al-Nadwi, Madha Khasira al-ʿAlam.

Duʿat la Qudat comes to the verdict that this view is fundamentally incorrect. Although jāhiliyya is not referred to in the text at all, Duʿat la Qudat disagrees with the interpretative basis of the concept.

Duʿat la Qudat takes on the interpretation of God's sovereignty as it builds up its third set of arguments. Although ḥākimiyyat Allāh is not a Qurءanic term, the text investigates shariʿa and Islamic governance in order to counter radical precepts.84

Ibid., 67–69, 73–74.

Adopting the position that Islamic law is not fixed in its entirety but contains a flexible aspect, the book argues that humans are created with a capacity for decision making.85

Ibid., 129–53, esp. 143–53.

Like the work of ʿAbduh and Shaltut, the text emphasizes the distinction between ʿibādāt (religious obligations) that set the ground rules and muʿāmalāt (regulations of social life). Accordingly, Duʿat la Qudat identifies regulating social life as mubāḥāt (permissible actions).86

Ibid., 73–74. For a discussion on the fixed and flexible aspect in modern Islamic legal interpretation, see Malcolm H. Kerr, Islamic Reform. The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad ءAbduh and Rashid Rida (London: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 21, 88–89, 188–90. It should be noted that the distinction between fixed and flexible components in Islamic law has a long tradition in Islamic juridical thought.

It is thus emphasized that human reasoning does not constitute an illegitimate challenge to divine governance, as long as it is not in contradiction to the demands of principal religious obligations. In other words, the text argues against the idea of reducing Islamic governance to the implementation of an essentialist view of law under the pretext of God's sovereignty. Duʿat la Qudat also rejects the assumption that there is a direct link between faithfulness to divine law and the implementation of Islamic law as the law of the state. In fact, the need for Muslims to apply ḥukm Allāh (God's rule) to their daily lives is a much more fundamental aspect of practice than its implementation as law of the state. The point of critique here is against rigid and politicized views of God's sovereignty and of shariʿa, which make divine will unreservedly dependent on a political entity.

Duʿat la Qudat's position against takfīr, neo-jāhiliyya, and ḥākimiyyat Allāh has obvious implications for related issues such as the notion of obedience or resistance. Immediately relevant to the Brotherhood's aims and strategy, the text supports a nonviolent and nonrevolutionary opposition, repeatedly emphasizing conformity to political authority and allowing only a gradual increase in force if a ruler turns against shariʿa. Nevertheless, the aim is to reform society and state and bring them into accordance with ḥukm Allāh.

THE TEXT, THE AUTHOR, AND THE REGIME

Duʿat la Qudat is widely seen by scholars, including Giles Kepel, Emmanuel Sivan, Ahmad M. Gomaa, and Gudrun Krämer, as the first, and still the best-known, work of criticism against Sayyid Qutb's radical Islamist thought.87

Gomaa, “Islamic Fundamentalism,” 143–58; Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 61–63; Sivan, Radical Islam, 108–10; Krämer, Gottes Staat Als Republik, 220.

Nevertheless, a closer reading of the text's history and content raises a few basic questions. The first relates to authorship, the second to whether it does indeed respond to Qutb's ideas, and the third to the text's impact on the Brotherhood's ideological makeup.

As to the first issue, there is considerable indication that Hasan al-Hudaybi was not the actual author. He likely received help with construction of the argument, collection of notes, and even writing. There are a number of firsthand accounts that raise this claim, but they differ slightly on who was actually contributed to the work. Fuʿad ʿAllam, for instance, who had been a brigadier general in the Egyptian Secret Service, emphatically declares that not a single word was written by al-Hudaybi.88

Fuءad ʿAllam, al-Ikhwan … wa Ana,219–27.

ʿAllam claims instead that Hasan's son, Maءmun, who later came to be spokesman and murshid of the Brotherhood, was its author, working on the text in conjunction with the secret service, which instigated the writing of Duʿat la Qudat in order to combat radical views among prisoners. In order to support the project, a selection of al-Azhar scholars actually consulted Maءmun al-Hudaybi and provided him with theological arguments. Once completed, the book was planted and distributed as Hasan al-Hudaybi's work, obviously with the knowledge Maءmun.

The trustworthiness of ʿAllam's account of events is open to question, however.89

Khatab for example relies on ʿAllam and uncritically accepts this explanation at face value. Sayed Khatab, “Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb” in Middle Eastern Studies 38 (2002), 149–50.

His membership in the secret service raises some suspicion. Furthermore, his story contains a number of almost unbelievable twists, which do not add up. It is unlikely that the text could have been planted and distributed.

Ahmad ʿAbd al-Majid, who was imprisoned in Qinaء in 1965 because of his involvement in Organization 1965, provides a much more cautious version of events.90

ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir, pass.

Like ʿAllam, he alleges that Duʿat la Qudat was not written by Hasan al-Hudaybi himself but was the product of an inner circle of Brothers with al-Hudaybi's full consent and under his supervision.91

Ibid., 252–54.

ʿAbd al-Majid also relates that scholars of al-Azhar came to visit al-Hudaybi and his companions in prison to discuss ideas. Thus they had direct input in the thesis. Ahmad Raءif, a Brother who was also incarcerated at Liman al-Turra, briefly refers to similar events. He states that Maءmun al-Hudaybi, with the help of al-Azhar scholars, was the main author of the text, but that his father gave his approval.92

Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء, 578.

Furthermore, ʿUmar al-Tilmisani, who succeeded Hasan al-Hudaybi as general guide in 1973, stated that the murshid asked for his son's help to write Duʿat la Qudat. He indicated that Mustafa Mashhur was involved as well.93

ʿUmar al-Tilmisani, Dhikrayat la Mudhakkirat (Cairo: al-Islamiyya, 1985), 123.

It would be interesting to further analyze these memoirs, but for our purposes it is sufficient to conclude that Hasan al-Hudaybi was not the main author.94

Among those who clearly voiced that al-Hudaybi was not the primary author were ʿAbd al-Khaliq, himself a Brother, and Jamal al-Banna, who was neither imprisoned during this time nor actually a member of the organization, but who remained closely connected to the leadership. See interview with ʿAbd al-Khaliq, 30 April 1998; interview with Jamal al-Banna, 3 May 1998 (interviews recorded with permission to use the information).

It is thus probable that the actual writing of the book was a joint project in which a circle of leading Brothers close to al-Hudaybi were involved and during which scholars of al-Azhar were consulted.

As to who actually initiated the writing, one can only make informed guesses. Maءmun al-Hudaybi is mentioned frequently, and it is apparent that he influenced the content.95

ʿAbd al-Majid, al-Ikhwan wa ʿAbd al-Nasir,252–54; interview, ʿAbd al-Khaliq; interview, Jamal al-Banna.

However, as a trained lawyer, he did not have the theological expertise to piece together the details of a book that shows a high degree of insight into Islamic theology and law. ʿUmar al-Tilmisani, Mustafa Mashhur, and ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Attiyya are other names that appear often.96

See interview, ʿAbd al-Khaliq; interview, Jamal al-Banna.

They were close companions of the murshid and members of the guidance council, and both were imprisoned in Liman al-Turra. However, like Maءmun al-Hudaybi, they had no specific training in Islamic jurisprudence, so it is unlikely that they did the bulk of the research.

The content of the text and its argument substantiate that specialists in Hanafi law were key to the writing process. Involvement of al-Azhar scholars as consultants, or even authors, is astonishing, because Nasser controlled Egypt's central religious institution.97

A. Chris Eccel, Egypt, Islam and Social Change: Al-Azhar in Conflict and Accommodation (Berlin: Schwarz, 1984).

In other words, any participation by al-Azhar scholars would not have been possible without the regime's consent and support. The sensitivity of the situation required tact and confidentiality, which makes it inevitable that Nasser was fully informed and that only a very small number of higher-ranking scholars could have been involved. However, further research is required to identify possible names.

From the argument that Duʿat la Qudat resulted from a coordinated project of leading Brothers who backed al-Hudaybi a more fundamental question arises. Was the text indeed a refutation of Qutb's writings, or did it serve another aim? Qutb is not even mentioned once, nor are his ideas explicitly addressed. The immediate explanation for this obvious lack of reference would be that Qutb's “martyrdom” in 1966 gave him a status whereby criticism would have been considered inappropriate.98

To get a picture of the tense atmosphere in prison, see Raءif, al-Bawwaba al-Sawdaء, 353–57, 402–5; and ʿAbd al-Khaliq, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 108–31.

Certainly, his involvement in the rebuilding of the movement at its most critical time made him a highly respected personality. Rather than blaming him for the renewed wave of persecution, even mainstream Brothers defended him and his work, thus downplaying the radicalization of his thought in later writings and instead focusing on the bulk of his previous work.

A further explanation for the lack of reference to Qutb's Maʿalim fi al-Tariq is the fact that it does not actually elaborate on the idea of takfīr; this concept is merely an outcome of his argument. Because the majority of Qutb's work stresses teaching (dirāsa) and preaching (daʿwa), there was a broad willingness within the ranks to emphasize that his strategy was in accordance with the mainstream mission.99

See, for example, the Brotherhood's website, which lists Sayyid Qutb as their most outstanding representative next to al-Banna, http://www.ummah.net/ikhwan/ (accessed 26 May 2006).

Indeed, Qutb himself, in his autobiographical reflection written shortly before his death, denied that his approach contained any aspect of takfīr.100

Qutb, Li-Madha Aʿdamuni?,30, 38. There is no reason to doubt the honesty of Qutb's perception of his own work as stated in the above source because the same source talks in all frankness about sensitive issues such as the collection of weapons.

He became broadly acknowledged as an outstanding figure, even by the moderate Brothers who were attached to the old leadership and to al-Hudaybi.

Going beyond these explanations, the most plausible answer as to why Qutb is not referred to in Duʿat la Qudat is that it was not composed as a refutation of his ideas. In light of the post-1965 prison environment and the fierce dispute of those years, it becomes apparent that Duʿat la Qudat was instead a response to a “post-Qutbian” trend within the Muslim Brotherhood. The text attempts to refute the interpretation of Qutbists, that is, the interpretation of those who were inspired by Qutb's thinking but who effectively turned away from the Brotherhood's principles. Furthermore, the text aims to convince Brothers who were still undecided as to which strategy they should follow that al-Hudaybi's vision of Islamist activity was more “truthful.” It aimed to challenge an uncompromising Islamist ideology postulated by Qutbists and thus persuade Brothers to opt for a nonviolent alternative. The introduction of Duʿat la Qudat clearly states this objective:

[The book contains] some discussions on the various opinions which have been expressed at different times. However, there is no evidence for their correctness. We feel that we have to give a clarifying response referring to the mighty book of God and to the Sunna of the Prophet … to give evidence of the truth in a very clear manner.101

Al-Hudaybi, Duʿat la Qudat, 6–7.

Evidently responding to the Qutbists, Duʿat la Qudat is the product of an effort by the Brotherhood's leadership to regain control over the membership body. While the internal conflict reached its height, the 1967 war broke out. Brothers then faced the immediate question of whether to support the regime in the event of an external threat. Arguing that Nasser's regime was guilty of apostasy and was therefore the prime enemy, Qutbists took the position that the state system had to be opposed by any means. The war, and the devastating losses of the Egyptian army, brought to the fore the long overdue discussion on principles, objectives, and strategy. Duʿat la Qudat was the long overdue directive on the guidance of the organization and suggested a conciliatory alternative to the vision of Qutbists. As its content and aim are not immediately directed against Qutb's work, no mention of him is necessary.

Having been written in the prison environment and distributed there, basic arguments of the text were commonly known to fellow Brothers. Only years later—not until 1977—was Duʿat la Qudat finally published. Al-Hudaybi, who died in 1973, did not live to see his work publicly distributed. Briefly put, the reasons for publishing Duʿat la Qudat were thus related to the onset of Islamist violence under the auspices of the groups al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra and al-Jihad.102

Abdelnasser, The Islamic Movement in Egypt, 62 and Yusuf Qaradawi, al-Zahirat al-Ghulu fi al-Takfir (Kuwait: n.p., 1985), 10.

Under the more relaxed state policy toward the Muslim Brotherhood under Anwar al-Sadat, the aim of the text was no longer to regain the loyalty of Brothers, but to make a clear statement to explicate that the organization distanced itself from terrorist activities.

The rather diffuse structure and complicated line of argument, which hides behind a plethora of juridical and theological considerations, made Duʿat la Qudat difficult to understand. It was not a hit on the book market. Furthermore, uncertainty about who wrote Duʿat la Qudat and why raises questions about its relevance today. The matter becomes even more pertinent when we consider that Hasan al-Hudaybi was not acknowledged as a particularly outstanding representative of the Brotherhood. Sensitivities with regards to the reasons for the miḥna explain that al-Hudaybi could only partly restore his reputation.

Although al-Hudaybi did not live to see “his” work published, during his last years as leader, he was able to ensure that his loyal companions, including his son Maءmun al-Hudaybi, ʿUmar al-Tilmisani, Muhammad Abu al-Nasr, and Mustafa Mashhur, consolidated their position and influence in the running of the organization. Each of these members of al-Hudaybi's guidance council became murshid, and it is through them that the idea of Duʿat la Qudat was carried on and became an integral part of the Brotherhood's ideology.103

See, for example, the Brotherhood's official websites, http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ID=22177&LevelID=2&SectionID=373 (accessed 26 August 2006) and http://www.ummah.net/ikhwan/ (accessed 26 August 2006).

CONCLUSION

This article has been an investigation into the discourse among Muslim Brothers during the most crucial and challenging episode of the organization's history—the period of imprisonment between 1954 and 1971. At the beginning of the miḥna, the prevailing mood among Brothers was desperation and disillusionment. The reasons for this atmosphere are complex and plentiful. Undoubtedly, persecution and imprisonment contributed to this atmosphere, as did the disengagement between leaders and the membership body. However, there were even more substantial reasons as to why the organization was weakening: its hierarchical and autocratic makeup, its undefined mission statement as a mass movement, its opaque means of choosing a leader, and the almost autonomous command of the Secret Unit. These internal issues made the organization vulnerable to Nasser's manipulation in 1954 and to the stresses of the miḥna. The years following the Manshiyya incident were therefore an unpleasant wake-up call for many Brothers, who had supported Nasser after the 1952 revolution. It took years to overcome this initial mood of disillusionment and reticence, which almost brought the organization to collapse. However, in 1957 and 1958, the atmosphere suddenly changed and signs of recovery could be seen.

At the center of these renewed activities was Sayyid Qutb. A communication network was built up, making it possible to circulate and discuss Qutb's ideas. His vision of a vanguard of Islamist activism was talked about beyond the closed environment of Cairo's Liman al-Turra prison. Qutb's vision reached incarcerated Brothers in prisons all over the country and was, even more importantly, communicated to cells outside the prison walls. Qutb's personal ideological development gained immediate relevance on the outside because it coincided with the release of Brothers who began to regroup and coordinate their activities by 1958. Qutb's uncompromising rhetoric inspired this newly reformed group with the idea of resistance and renewed strength. Qutb's Maʿalim fi al-Tariq, which is based on simple binary distinctions between good versus evil, God's sovereignty versus neo-jāhilī society, and Islamist activist versus ignorant apostate, provided ideological directives to this network of Brothers, which was later to be called “Organization 1965.”

The executives of this group, as well as Qutb himself, were in contact with al-Hudaybi, who remained the nominal, though organizationally irrelevant, general guide. Qutb was asked to take a leading position as spiritual guide to the organization. There should be no doubt that al-Hudaybi and his supporters, mainly representatives of the guidance council's old guard, knew about Qutb's ideological shift and the reorganization of the Brotherhood under more radical parameters. However, al-Hudaybi and his followers chose to turn a blind eye to these activities and certainly did not overtly challenge Qutb's influence. After all, the revival of the organization, which had just recovered from near collapse, was in their interest also.

The stakes changed dramatically again when Organization 1965 was exposed and accused of conspiracy against the state. A new wave of arrests followed, again filling prisons with Brotherhood members. Although there were evident parallels to 1954, the general attitude of the Brothers was different. Qutb's thoughts had instilled a lasting confidence in resistance. Numerous memoirs from this period describe the years of imprisonment with a kind of heroism and approbation for objectives of the Islamist cause. Unlike before, lower-ranking members were now allocated to Liman al-Turra, where al-Hudaybi and leading members supporting him were also incarcerated. It was in this environment that the old guard had to face the challenge of answering long-overdue questions on responsibility, strategy, and leadership.

The discourse and discord came to its zenith with the 1967 war. Caused by immediate questions about national loyalty during and after the war, the internal struggle resulted in a schism when a radicalized faction that saw itself as following Qutb's legacy turned away from the Muslim Brotherhood. In this situation the guidance council, with al-Hudaybi as the head, had to face the challenge of reclaiming its authority and convincing a large body of members to embrace their leadership of the Brotherhood.

The text Duʿat la Qudat is a direct result of this discourse and reflects the position of the Brotherhood's leadership, which by now had taken a clear stance against radical ideas. The text was written by a number of trusted authors around al-Hudaybi and issued in his name as the official mission statement of the Brotherhood. Notably, al-Azhar scholars had input in this theological argument. Their assistance is evidence of the beginning of a rapprochement between the regime and the Brotherhood. Because the religious establishment was under state control, it would have been unthinkable that Nasser was not informed about this cooperation. We can infer from this link that the Brotherhood and the regime, even though they remained foes, had their own reasons to challenge the appearance of radical Islamist contenders.

To suggest that Duʿat la Qudat is a refutation of Qutbian thought is an oversimplification. Although Qutb was undoubtedly a central figure in the discourse of the late 1950s and early 1960s, and even though his propagandistic work left a lasting impact on how Brothers viewed themselves, Duʿat la Qudat aimed to contest the ideological shift that became prevalent after 1965. Duʿat la Qudat thus addresses the organization at large, discusses fundamental theological paradigms rather than merely contesting Qutb, and clearly disputes radical ideas. Al-Hudaybi can therefore be credited with imparting a moderate outlook to today's Muslim Brotherhood. Although Duʿat la Qudat did not become exceptionally famous or receive the attention of scholars studying the development of the Muslim Brotherhood, the organization has carried on until today the idea of “preachers not judges.”