Although its title is Federations, this is a book about the act of federating, in particular about the dynamics that impel federations to form. It is a subject on which, for far too long, we have made do with William H. Riker's postulate, as articulated in his (1964) Federalism, that federations arise in response to strategic threat or opportunity.
The book's thesis is clear and simple: “Federal unions are born when vulnerable states demand political commitments, up front, from their potential partners as the price of their cooperation” (p. 161). The argument is that states may hold back from cooperative arrangements that would deliver general benefits for fear that they will be left vulnerable by a degree of investment beyond that being made by other partners. The solution is to lock those more cavalier partners into the deal through a genuine union. The key premise is that all of the desired benefits of cooperation can be achieved through the much simpler and less costly means of an international organization (IO), and so something must be required to explain why in some instances states go to the extreme of forming a federal union.
To demonstrate, Rector explores five cases: three successful attempts at federation (Australia, Argentina, and Germany) and two abortive attempts (the East African Federation and the Federation of the West Indies). To be persuasive, Rector's argument must provide a compelling account, in particular, of the formation of the two unambiguously successful federal systems in that group, Australia and Germany.
The Australian case is well chosen: It is a textbook instance of democratic federation, and it flummoxed Riker. Most obviously it did so, as Rector quite correctly insists, by falsifying Riker's strategic threat hypothesis. Strategic threats and opportunities were at best a very minor consideration in the Australian decision to federate. It has strong prima facie appeal for Rector's theory since what he calls the nonvulnerable colony, New South Wales (NSW), was indeed recalcitrant. According to the author's theory, the vulnerable colony was Victoria because it sought an arrangement whereby it could expand its protected domestic market—most notably to the other populous colony, NSW—but risked becoming captive to the whims of a free trade jurisdiction if that arrangement was not rock solid.
The problem, though, is that the opposition in NSW was based first and foremost on the simple calculation that economic union with Victoria would mean being dragged “into the mire of protection” (W. G. McMinn, Nationalism and Federalism in Australia, 1994, p. 138). There is little or no supporting evidence for Rector's reinterpretation in the historical accounts—including, it must be emphasized, in the sources the author himself cites. Contrary to his assertions, cooperation through a customs union (an IO) was for some time the first choice for all jurisdictions. However, this more modest goal proved completely unattainable despite repeated efforts because it would have meant deciding up front on whether a common policy of free trade or protectionism would be followed. The more ambitious goal of federation was more feasible because, as a political union rather than an economic association, federation did not involve making such painful decisions up front—they could be (and were) left to the new Commonwealth parliament.
Rector significantly overplays the possibility of New Zealand joining the federation so that he can then proceed to show how his theory explains their ultimate decision not to do so. Yes, New Zealand did send a delegation; however, the reality is that the “New Zealanders … had come from politeness” (J. A. La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution, 1972, p. 14). According to La Nauze, the very first contribution they made was to insist that the inclusive term Australasia be dropped from the opening resolutions and replaced with the narrower term Australia that left them out.
With the German case, Rector immediately gets himself into a muddle since the nonvulnerable state, Prussia, was the one opting for federation and the main vulnerable states, Saxony and Bavaria, were being made an offer they could not refuse. Thus, the puzzle is why Prussia settled for such a cooperative outcome rather than simply absorbing those states as conquered territories. That is the puzzle that Daniel Ziblatt, in Structuring the State (2006), resolved quite persuasively in his comparison of German and Italian unification.
For Rector, though, Ziblatt has left unresolved the question of why Prussia did not opt simply for an IO. After all, he says, that is what the Soviet Union did with its conquered territories in the Warsaw Pact. At this point, one really starts wishing for Occam to make an appearance: Is there any reason to think that this was a plausible scenario in the context? Are we really comparing like with like when we compare German unification with the Soviet empire? Rector has to make an alliance seem not just plausible but indeed the default scenario. The way he does that is to assert that “building a federation” takes “an enormous effort,” and that “Prussia … did not have a surplus of military or economic resources that would allow it to pursue unnecessary projects” (p. 130). Why, though, should we think that great military or economic resources are required for launching a federation? Moreover, any such costs would pale into insignificance beside the massive military and economic resources that would (and did) accrue to Prussia by virtue of its absorption of Saxony and Bavaria into a Prussian-dominated union.
The other cases cannot be dealt with here. Suffice it to say that it is very hard to see what corroboration for Rector's thesis is provided by the abortive East African Federation. This was an instance of two parties baulking at forming a federation with a third party that would have enjoyed the lion's share of economic benefits and dominated politically; no surprises there. Given that the three states shared little by way of common identity, there was no reason to expect a union to form, and thus no puzzle to explain.
Why does Rector get it so badly wrong? I think the reason lies in the book's very subtitle. The entire case is built on the premise that federations are just another form of “cooperation.” The trouble is that they are not; federations are about union. Once separate polities join a federation, they create a new polity. They are no longer “cooperating”; they have submerged themselves. This is why the identity dimension is so crucially important to the federal story. As one Australia observer cited by Rector put it at the time, “throughout the continent to-day the cry of ‘Australians as one people,’ has become irresistible” (Arthur Duckworth, “The Economic Aspect of Australian Federation,” The Economic Journal 9 [June 1899]: pp. 322–27). Rector attempts to downplay this element, so manifestly important in both the Australian and German cases, with the fanciful notion that these are things constructed manipulatively by “elites.”
Rector's argument stands up very poorly to empirical scrutiny, essentially because it misconstrues the nature of the problem. Nonetheless, any book that systematically probes the origins of federal systems and invites readers to engage theoretically with key questions of history, causation, and comparison cannot help but be of interest.
