What is one to make of an academic book about Iraq's constitution the stated purpose of which is “to demonstrate how precisely the constitution came to be so successful” (p. 1)? In August 2014 alone, when this review was being written, Iraq faced multiple constitutional crises. Under pressure from the United States, the president of Iraq, the ethnically Kurdish Fuʾad Maʿsum, refused to nominate Nuri Kamal al-Maliki for prime minister despite the fact that al-Maliki's Daʿwa Party had the largest number of votes in recent parliamentary elections and the constitution mandated his nomination. Instead, with the overt support of both the United States and Iran, Maʿsum nominated Haider al-Abadi, nominally a deputy chairman of Daʿwa but disavowed by other party members at the moment of his nomination. Al-Abadi then became prime minister.
Meanwhile, as forces associated with the organization variously known as the Islamic State or Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) took Mosul, Kurdish forces took Kirkuk, a disputed city surrounded by oilfields, which the constitution's drafters had refused to assign to Iraqi Kurdistan. ISIL incursions subsequently jeopardized Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan; yet despite relying on the United States for airstrikes to help drive back the invaders, the leadership of the Kurdish regional government gave no ground in relation to Kirkuk.
To make constitutional matters worse, through the entire summer of 2014, Sunni Arab Iraqi soldiers and Kurdish Peshmerga refused to fight alongside Shiʿi Iraqi regulars to defend Iraqi sovereign territory from ISIL, some of whose core members are themselves Iraqi Sunnis. The fragile bargain between Iraq's three main ethno-denominational groups seemed to have broken down when it came to providing the most fundamental public good in any state's constitutional arsenal, namely collective self-defense. By the time this review is published, perhaps some of these constitutional crises will have been resolved—but it seems at least as likely that they will persist in some form, or even worsen.
Although the word is much overused, it is not an exaggeration to say that each of the three crises is existential with respect to Iraq's constitutional future. And none of this preliminary analysis even considers the question of the Iraqi constitution's guarantees of basic liberties, which by nearly all accounts have been systematically ignored. Corruption in Iraq, also treated with special concern by the constitution, has become so bad that Iraq scored 171 out of 175 countries on Transparency International's 2013 corruption index.
The argument of the book derives from a striking set of circumstances. The author tells us that he spent much of 2009 in the Green Zone in Baghdad as an advisor to a constitutional review committee “tasked with developing consensual amendments” to the 2005 constitution (p. xi). At the end of the year, it transpired that the Council of Representatives had no interest in implementing the committee's proposals. This result, says the author, occurred because the constitution had become “acceptable to the Sunni population which had once opposed it.” Indeed, “the Sunni population no longer viewed it as a foreign instrument imposed on them, thus rendering the formal amendments entirely unnecessary” (p. 4, emphasis in original).
The evidence for this claim is rhetorical. The author gives several examples of Sunni politicians criticizing the behavior of mostly Shiʿi government officials on grounds that it violated the constitution (pp. 4–5). This mistakes politicians’ use of language for underlying political reality. In particular political circumstances, to certain audiences, it is useful for political actors to criticize their perceived opponents for failing to adhere to a bargain they putatively made. It is wholly logical to render such criticism even if one believes the bargain was unfair, unjust, or indeed temporary. Similarly, it is—rather obviously—wrong to say that the Iraqi constitution “serves as a ‘constituent agent’ of Iraqi identity” (p. 1). The author contends, for example, that the constitution reflected “identitarian agreement” because Iraq's Kurds were willing to settle for only a mild “commitment to their own pan-national community” (p. 132) in the constitution's text. Yet this was—obviously—simply a strategic judgment by Kurdish leaders that the regional autonomy validated by the constitution was of greater value to them than some abstract statement of Iraq's multiethnic nature.
The central claim of the book is that the open-ended nature of the Iraqi constitutional bargain facilitated the acceptance of the constitution by multiple actors. It is certainly true that, in order to generate agreement on the text of Iraq's constitution, its drafters—sans significant Sunni representation—often settled on vague, indeterminate language to address controversial issues. This is a familiar strategy for constitution-drafters faced with apparently intractable disagreement. It has the effect of deferring structural disagreements to some future time, an effect that is always both highly useful and risky.
In the case of Iraq, there was no practical alternative to such an approach, for three main reasons. First, Iraqi Kurdistan enjoyed de facto regional autonomy and was prepared to go it alone if its leaders did not get an advantageous deal. Shiʿi negotiators had no substantial leverage over the Kurds. The result was indeterminate language with respect to Kurdish claims over geography and energy rights. Second, because the constitutional negotiations took place in the absence of meaningful Sunni representative participation, there was no possibility of cooperation between Iraq's Sunni Arab and Kurdish population, which alone could have counterbalanced the numerical plurality (or perhaps majority) of Iraqi's Shiʿa. As a result, Shiʿi politicians enjoyed a clear majority; if they could not be placated, the constitution could not go forward. Third, the United States exercised enormous political pressure to produce a constitutional deal. This outside influence raised the value of an agreement substantially above the value of walking away. It therefore gave great incentives to the involved parties to reach some sort of agreement, however vague. (One reason Iraqi Sunnis did not participate is that they did not receive comparable incentives in the form of credible guarantees of access to resources.)
It is fair to ask, then, whether the Iraqi constitution has mattered at all in the period since its drafting and ratification. The answer is a qualified yes, but not for the reasons the author suggests. In brief, even a partial, incomplete, temporary agreement among political elites is preferable to no agreement all. Such an agreement amounts to a provisional, constantly revisable point of reference for further negotiation. The author seems to believe that open-endedness itself facilitates adoption and legitimation. But such legitimation, when it occurs, is wholly contingent on successful ongoing negotiation among political elites, followed by public acceptance that is usually influenced by the apparent success of the elite bargain. A narrowly drafted constitution can be just as much a reference point for future renegotiation as a loosely drafted one. To be more precise still, there is hardly any measurable analytic difference between the effects of vague and specific constitutional provisions. Language is inherently open-textured, and the possibilities for creative interpretation are not and indeed cannot be constrained by text alone. Interpretation is a creative, human activity. In the constitutional context, at least, that particular social activity is constrained by institutional politics, not the nature of the written word. If Iraq's constitution survives, it will be because political elites find it a valuable tool for framing their consensus. If it fails, the fault will lie not in the stars or in the text, but in the leaders themselves.
