This volume is the result of a colloquium which brought together specialists in the two traditions. The articles, written in French and English, reopen the gates that M. Gigante opened 30 years ago with Scetticismo e epicureismo: per l'avviamento di un discorso storiografico. Gigante there acknowledged the difficulties inherent: the size of the task; the paucity of source material; and the dearth of work in this area. The volume makes use of fresh insights to explore where Gigante pointed. The collection acknowledges and accepts the differences between the two traditions and the premise that dogmatic Epicureanism is clearly opposed to the Sceptic suspension of judgement. But the colloquium highlighted similarities as well as differences between the two, so this collection considers their complex relationship. The two traditions, despite opposing one another, are mutually-beneficial, nourishing themselves by addressing the other's objections, and so need one another and evolve together. The collection analyses the places where the two traditions converge, before concluding that it is impossible to separate them absolutely.
The first part of the collection is ‘Proximités du scepticisme et de l’épicurisme'. In the first article, ‘Tranquility: Democritus and Pyrrho’, S.H. Svavarsson, perhaps oddly, weighs a non-Epicurean in Democritus against Pyrrho, the first Sceptic. But Democritus deserves inclusion as, anachronistically, he seems Epicurean at heart but owns to certain Sceptic concepts. Sextus Empiricus does not consider Democritus a true Sceptic, whereas Colotes aligns Democritus with Scepticism against Epicureanism. Indeed Democritus' pessimism about his own philosophy is Sceptic in itself. Democritus almost embodies the convergence of the two schools, from whom they diverged away. Both Democritus and Pyrrho value ἀταραξία, tranquillity. For Democritus, this is attained through reasoning and a commitment to true beliefs. For Pyrrho, ἀταραξία is not intellectual, but is attained through non-belief. Therefore each values ἀταραξία, but for the one it is attained by avoiding false beliefs, for the other by avoiding all beliefs.
M. Erler's ‘Chain of Proof in Lucretius, Sextus, and Plato: Rhetorical Tradition and Philosophy’ picks up on the idea of tranquillity, demonstrating that both traditions share a strategy of argumentation. Despite Sceptic impassivity, Scepticism valued argumentation as much as dogmatic Epicureanism, and the therapeutic importance of argumentation for tranquillity. This is a shared inheritance from the Platonic tradition, to accumulate arguments without indicating preference, more arguments than necessary, with the insistence that more are available as and when required. This is to overwhelm and remove resistance, and ultimately persuade, and is also a rhetorical strategy. Cicero later referred to this as levatio, and so paradoxically accumulation of argument was thought by both traditions to alleviate affection.
J. Giovacchini's ‘Scepticisme et thérapeutique: Le cas de conscience du dogmatisme épicurien’ finds common ground between the two traditions despite Sceptic opposition to rationalisation and Epicurean hostility to Scepticism. Each strives for ἀταραξία, Epicureans through sensation and reasoning, and Sceptics through suspension of judgement. Epicureans justify their dogmatism by its therapeutic value, because understanding, clarity and conviction are important to remove the falsehood and ignorance which cause anxiety and prevent tranquillity. In Lucretius' metaphor of honey and absinthe, the medium of poetry sweetens the bitterness of Epicurean doctrine. But the metaphor also denotes therapy, of the antiseptic to remove infection. But interestingly the metaphor suggests that reasoning can be manipulated and tricked into believing that the repulsive is good and acceptable, although all sensations are true. The Epicurean philosopher must be dogmatic for plausibility, authority and confidence. Yet Philodemus, for instance, is also cautious, conscious of the possibility of error. This error does not belong to the remedy, Epicurean doctrine, but to its quantity and its suitability to an individual. Therefore Philodemus adapts his philosophical language according to the audience. This very caution is Sceptic, and so the two traditions converge, with cautious faith in rationalism, ‘adoucissement de la rudesse philosophique épicurienne par une forme de scepticisme’.
M.'s ‘Le statut de la philosophie épicurienne dans le néo-pyrrhonisme’ highlights the proximity of the two traditions by revealing elements of Epicureanism in Neo-Pyrrhonian Scepticism, with Scepticism borrowing Epicurean terms and concepts and using them against dogmatism and to explain their own, contrary position, thereby nourishing itself. First, Aenesidemus criticises the Epicurean αἰτιολογία, arguing that phenomena cannot be explained or confirmed as the phenomena will ultimately disprove any theory, calling to mind K. Popper's principle of refutability. Second, Sextus Empiricus reuses the Epicurean term προσδοξάζειν. For the Epicurean, no opinion surajoutée, as termed by M., can be true, whereas for the Sceptic, no opinions are true. And thirdly, Aenesidemus concedes that some sensations are true, though for Epicureans all are, but both agree that it is only sensations that are true.
The second part of the collection is ‘Épicurisme, cyrénaïsme, scepticisme’. J. Warren's ‘Epicureans and Cyrenaics on Pleasure as a Pathos’ opens this part by contrasting these two hedonists. With the example of the ‘pathos’ of pleasure, Cyrenaics do not think that this is generated solely by sensation, but is also fashioned by one's individual understanding and experience of it. But for Epicureans, pleasure results directly from sensation, and such contextualisation and interpretation can render this sensation false.
D. Machuca's ‘La critique du critère du vérité épicurien chez Sextus Empiricus: un scepticisme sur le monde extérieur’ builds upon the work of G. Fine, to understand Pyrrhonism better by analysing where Sextus Empiricus criticises the Epicurean criteria of truth. For Epicureans, simulacra are always true, originating in real objects which they accurately represent, and as such are evidence of the existence of a real, external world. Orthodox Sceptic logic suspends judgement about the existence of the exterior world as nothing can be definitively known. But Machuca argues that Sextus Empiricus' own position is radical as he suggests the existence of external objects.
The third part of the collection is ‘Sextus Empiricus, source de l’épicurisme'. V.'s ‘Epicurean Attitude Towards Geometry: the Sceptical Account’ uses Sextus Empiricus' work amongst others to ascertain whether Epicureans had a position on geometry. This is in doubt as Epicurus was critical of geometry and none of his work on it survives. But V. offers evidence to suggest that there was an Epicurean position: from Demetrius of Laconia; from Philonides of Laodicea which suggests an Epicurean interest; from Sextus Empiricus' Against Geometers which analyses the Epicurean approach to geometry; and from the preface of Apollonius' Κωνικά where the author asks for a copy of the book to be given to the Epicurean, Philonides ὁ γεωμέτρης.
In the last article, ‘Sextus Empiricus et le τέλος épicurien: le plaisir est-il par nature digne d’être choisi?', E. Spinelli analyses two of Sextus Empiricus' texts in order to understand better the Epicurean thesis exposed by them, the so-called ‘Cradle Argument’. Outlines of Pyrrhonism suggests Epicureans held that pleasure must by nature be preferable because all animals instinctively and from birth tend to pleasure and avoid pain. Against the Moralists suggests that later Epicureans refined the works of their master, by stressing the fundamental importance of pleasure, ‘enlightened hedonism’ as Spinelli quotes Sedley.
This is a timely collection of articles which asks an important question about the complex relationship between the two traditions, and also leaves the door ajar for future work to be conducted, with the authors readily admitting the limitations of their work. The articles are arranged sequentially with a common thematic strand running throughout. However, more care could have been taken with stylistic consistency, difficult as this may be with a collection of articles written in more than one language. This includes inconsistencies whether or not to give the Latin and Greek and some references are rather lengthy. There are occasional minor typographical errors (the unnecessary space between d' Épicure [p. ii] and the misspelling Apollonious [p. 140]). A conclusion would have been useful in such a collection to bring the articles together.
