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Evaluation of third-party punishment depends on its type and severity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2025

Olivia Seubert*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Würzburg, Germany
Anne Böckler
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Würzburg, Germany
*
Corresponding author: Olivia Seubert; Email: o.seubert@icloud.com
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Abstract

Sacrificing own resources to punish norm violators is often regarded an altruistic act, promoting cooperation and fairness within social groups. However, recent studies highlight difficulties in interpreting third-party punishment as a prosocial and cooperative signal. Moving beyond abstract, decontextualized settings typically employed in economic game paradigms, we aimed to better understand the appraisal of observed punishment and punishers in real-world situations. To this end, we created and validated 24 written vignettes of everyday-life scenarios depicting interactions between a perpetrator, a victim, and a punisher. Across two preregistered experiments, we systematically manipulated key aspects of third-party punishment: transgression type and punishment type (property-oriented, corporal, or psychological; Experiment 1; N = 48) and punishment severity (weak or strong; Experiment 2; N = 50). Participants rated punishment adequacy and the punisher’s warmth, competence, and suitability as an interaction partner, whether as a friend or team leader. Results indicated preferences for psychological punishments, punishments that aligned with transgression type, and less severe punishments. Our findings support the notion that punishment is an ambiguous issue and reveal important contextual factors that contribute to its evaluation as a useful social strategy.

Information

Type
Empirical Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Society for Judgment and Decision Making and European Association for Decision Making
Figure 0

Figure 1 Overview of experiments, setup, and procedure.Note: In the upper right part of the figure, the two experiments and their independent variables (IVs) are displayed. Each trial involved participants reading a vignette depicting a transgression and subsequent punishment, always representing one specific condition. Participants’ task was to picture the scenario and then rate the punishment, the punisher, and their interaction tendency on rating scales (displayed below the questions). These ratings comprised the five dependent variables (DVs).

Figure 1

Figure 2 Rating means per condition and DVs and correlations between DVs (Experiment 1).Note: (A) Perceived adequacy of the punishment. Four on the rating scale indicates appropriate adequacy, with lower values indicating too weak punishment and higher values indicating too strong punishment. (B) Perceived warmth of the punisher. (C) Perceived competence of the punisher. (D) The correlation matrix displays Pearson correlations for all five ratings averaged across conditions. (E) The hypothetical willingness to befriend the punisher. (F) The hypothetical willingness to be part of a team led by the punisher. Error bars indicate standard errors. ns p ≥ .05, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Detailed violin plots displaying participant-level dispersion are provided in the Supplementary Figure S1.

Figure 2

Table 1 Rating means (M) and standard deviations (SD) for types of punishment by types of transgression (Experiment 1)

Figure 3

Table 2 Pairwise comparisons of ratings between types of punishment, separately for types of transgression (Experiment 1)

Figure 4

Figure 3 Results of mediation analyses for the effect of type of punishment on interaction tendencies mediated by perceptions of the punisher (Experiment 1).Note: prop = property-oriented, psych = psychological. c’ indicates the direct effect of type of punishment on the interaction tendency, c indicates the total effect c’ + a * b. (A) The perceived warmth of the punisher was revealed as a full mediator for the willingness to befriend the punisher. (B) The perceived competence of the punisher was revealed as a partial mediator for the willingness to accept the punisher as a team leader.

Figure 5

Figure 4 Rating means per condition and DV and correlations between DVs (Experiment 2).Note: (A) Perceived adequacy of the punishment. Four on the rating scale indicates appropriate adequacy, with lower values indicating too weak punishment and higher values indicating too strong punishment. (B) Perceived warmth of the punisher. (C) Perceived competence of the punisher. (D) The correlation matrix displays Pearson correlations for all five ratings averaged across conditions. (E) The hypothetical willingness to befriend the punisher. (F) The hypothetical willingness to be part of a team led by the punisher. Error bars indicate standard errors. ns p >= .05, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Detailed violin plots displaying participant-level dispersion are provided in the Supplementary Figure S2.

Figure 6

Table 3 Rating means (M) and standard deviations (SD) for types of punishment by severities of punishment (Experiment 2)

Figure 7

Figure 5 Results of mediation analyses for the effect of type of punishment on interaction tendencies mediated by perceptions of the punisher (Experiment 2).Note: prop = property-oriented, psych = psychological. c’ denotes the direct effect of type of punishment on the interaction tendency, and c denotes the total effect c’ + a * b. (A) The perceived warmth of the punisher was revealed as a partial mediator for the willingness to befriend the punisher. (B) The perceived competence of the punisher was revealed as a partial mediator for the willingness to accept the punisher as a team leader.

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