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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 February 2005
The author of Iran's Unresolved Revolution is concerned with the evolution of the 1979 revolution and the roots of the turmoil in Iran (p. x). He faults the prevailing policies and perspectives adopted toward Iran over the past two decades as being “misguided,” overly Western, and uninformed. This, Downes feels, is due mainly to the closed nature of Iranian society and analysts' minimal reliance on Persian sources (pp. x, xii), neither of which is remedied in the present work. Rather, the author wishes to propose a new analytical model based on “first hand experience” (p. x). The book's approach is both theoretical and policy oriented. As regards the former, the author maintains that (1) the term “revolution” is ambiguous and inappropriately used, because it focuses on “an event in time” rather than on an “evolutionary” process (pp. 43, 66); (2) a revolution should be understood by its goals, not its causes, and by how it changes the role citizens play in governance (p. xiii) (he considers a revolution incomplete when its initial goals are unmet or the new elites block “the re-allocation of power” [p. 166]); and (3) the present concept of revolution is weak because it does not “measure the propensity for socio-political unrest in society” (p. 63), does not tell us “when revolutions are likely to occur” (pp. 65–66), does not tell us when the “process is complete” (p. 72), and fails to “assess the tangible changes in society” (p. 165). To remedy these, the author suggests using “Binary Opposition Analysis.”
As for policy issues, Downes advances the following propositions: (1) the Iranian revolution is incomplete because its original goals (liberty, freedom, republicanism, and development) remain unmet, and therefore its final outcome remains unknown (p. 65); (2) the Islamic movement that started the revolution has lost direction; and (3) the revolution has come full circle because those who staged it are now opposed to its present tenants and are being persecuted for their opposition.
In explaining the 1979 Iranian revolution, Downes gives primary importance to the concept of alienation and the theory of rising and unmet expectations (pp. 60, 66), which are heavily rooted in economic arguments. Yet he also devalues economic considerations in favor of greater need for political participation (p. 165). At the same time, he accepts at least five other, equally applicable theories as to the causes of the Iranian revolution (pp. 106–107). What is missing here is a framework inside which data and analysis can be applied to desired scenarios, leading to clearer conclusions.
Maintaining that revolutions follow a process, that the turmoil in Iran is ongoing (and likely to continue), and that its end result is still unknown are not novel insights. There seems to be a bit of confusion in this work between a revolutionary condition, a revolutionary outcome, and a period of consolidation. Whether this calls for a new and “universally acceptable definition” of revolution that encompasses all that the author suggests is neither obvious nor realistic. Going by these definitions, almost all revolutions may have to be reclassified, since it is questionable whether revolutions ever meet all—or even most—of the objectives that the original revolutionaries had in mind. One challenge in determining whether the objectives of the 1979 revolution were met relates to whose objectives we are more concerned with. As the book acknowledges, most of the groups that supported the revolution had divergent ideologies (pp. 82, 164). However, the dominant themes that brought the clergy to power were those clearly outlined by Ayatollah Khomeini long before 1979. Those themes pertained to the overthrow of monarchy, a return to Islam, and independence from foreign influence, not the establishment of a liberal democracy, which was rejected as Western. In many ways, these goals have been met. Is it not possible, then, that the present turmoil points to a rejection of the excesses of these earlier goals rather than a desire to espouse them more fully?
The fact that the initial supporters of the revolution are being persecuted is not a new phenomenon, either, as this seems to be a common development in revolutions. In Iran, however, the purges and persecutions that began in early 1979 have continued. Hence, this situation is not synonymous with a revolution having come “full circle.” This issue brings us to the problem of how we can determine whether a revolution is still in progress, or whether it has even occurred (pp. 79–80). Downes's measurement looks at the pre- and post-revolution periods and compares them through five variables. These variables, which are assigned “arbitrarily determined” numbers (p. 78), include such factors as “the political system's capacity for change.” But even under the unlikely scenario that the required numbers are accurately derived, and a methodology for deriving them actually exists, predicting a revolution would be altogether a different matter.
As is, the book contains useful descriptive material pertaining to periods leading to Khomeini's rise to power and the conflicts that arose in the consolidation phase of the revolution (1991–2001). It provides a brief overview of Iranian political events and theories of revolution, but the reader requires good knowledge of both to navigate through them. The author's idea of keeping an eye on the equilibrium of societal forces is worth expanding. However, the supporting arguments and the sources cited by Downes fail to reinforce one another coherently or to provide a set of solid and novel conclusions. In short, Iran's Unresolved Revolution could benefit from fewer generalities and contradictions, improved use of theoretical material, and more attention to the sources and the bibliography (page numbers are often omitted).