A central concept, and one that permeates much of the vast corpus of Islamic law, intent has received relatively scant attention in modern scholarship. The work under review constitutes the first book-length study of the multifarious notions of intent, navigating the spheres of ritual, contract, marriage, divorce, inheritance, and penal law. Powers shows intent to be constitutive of ritual acts of worship, bestowing on them a crucial aspect of their identity and conducive to rendering such acts what they are. The integrality of intent to ritual actions causes us to wonder why intent is expressly required, since it is a priori constitutive of such acts, such as if one were to tell “someone to ‘stand up’ and then add to this command, ‘and intend to stand up while you do it’” (p. 60).
In answering this question, the author first dispenses with the scholarly Orientalist commentary that wavers between a total negation of spirituality in the function of intent and a diametrical reversal of this negation. Not the “spiritual phenomenon it has been made out to be,” intent is “what one does with one's mind while performing ritual actions” (p. 73); it is a mental state accompanying a ritual act, a state that says, “I have the intention of performing this act.” This, Powers argues, is not to deny the existence of Islamic discourses that saw in intent a strong element of spirituality but to reject the notion that they represented the mainstream juristic tradition. If spirituality is not the sole concern of intent, then there remains the curious fact that, in ritual law, the worshipper is told to “intend,” to “possess intention,” whereas in other spheres of the law the actors are merely assumed to have such intentions.
Insightfully drawing on the anthropological work of Caroline Humphrey and James Laidlaw, Powers argues that ritual acts are unique because the actor acquires with them, as preexisting entities, an authorial relationship of identity. The worshipper intends to perform an act with an identity that has already been formulated and established as a ritual act. Whereas intent in nonritual acts may be misconstrued or misinterpreted, the intention, once present in rituals, obliterates this ambiguity. Thus, the risk of having the physical movements of the act appear correct but without substance or without being authored anew is thwarted by the creation of intent. Intent guarantees the acts to be substantively what they appear to be on the outside.
These notions of intent in ritual law are to be distinguished from those prevailing in contract law. Here, Powers advances a tripartite typology of contractual speech acts derived from the pervasive all-fiqh distinction between explicit (ṣarīḥ) and allusive (kināya) language. Clear language, constituting type one, remains binding irrespective of intent, for intent is evidenced in its very clarity. Ambiguous language, representing type two, is juridically effective only if shown to be backed by intentions that this language may be interpreted to embody. Finally, type three encompasses locutions so excessively ambiguous that they can never be juridically effective, whatever the intention appearing to lie behind them. Whichever type is involved in contractual language, sincerity remains a requirement. Yet, intentions have a complexity beyond sincerity, where a transacting party might be sincere in entering into a contract but simultaneously anxious to accomplish further, at times potentially unlawful, ends beyond those immediate ones he intended sincerely. In elaborating complex intent (pp. 110–20), Powers curiously draws on the work of Sanhuri as studied by O. Arabi, abandoning a direct enquiry into the classical fiqh sources. That Sanhuri was seeking to articulate a theory of cause that was in harmony with French jurisprudence (p. 119) does not appear, in Powers' mind, to be sufficient reason to cast doubt on the soundness of an almost exclusive reliance on his work and via Arabi's to boot.
In the sphere of personal law, Powers finds that the jurists articulated various notions of intent that differed not only from those operating in the laws of commercial contracts but also from those falling within the various subareas of family law. In marriage, for instance, only type one of speech acts, the ṣarīḥ locutions, were accepted as legally binding and effective, with the consequence that intent was largely, if not entirely, discounted. In divorce, intent is similarly not an issue in unambiguous locutions, but taken into consideration if the language is ambiguous. And because of the Qurءanic predetermination of shares, intent in inheritance plays no role. Powers finds unsatisfactory the explanation that the jurists' strict requirements in the marriage contract were motivated by a concern for social harmony, because divorce—obviously of equal importance in social relationships—was not subjected to the same criterion. It also might be said that this criticism equally applies to inheritance and a multitude of other spheres of the law—including commercial contracts no less—all of which are, in various ways, the site of a complex social existence. That “no single unified theory of intentions in civil law seems emergent” (p. 166) may be the function of juristic compartmentalization, but it may also well be the function of anthropological and sociological considerations that remain almost entirely hidden from our view. This underscores the crucial methodological fact that writing the history of fiqh will remain incomplete—if not confusing—in the absence of such considerations. Yet, having said this, we may not wish to succumb to the assumption of absence in the first place, an assumption that has bedeviled Islamicist scholarship for over a century. We might wish to consider the search for a “single unified theory” to be a modern bias, the result of a modern history of homogenization (often bearing deleterious effects) to which the Muslim jurists should not be expected to subscribe.
Finally, in penal law, Powers reveals the shifts in the terminology used to indicate intent. Having discussed the taxonomy of homicide, which is itself structured in terms of intentionality, he proceeds to ḥudūd, offenses whose punishments are stipulated in the Qurءan. In these offenses, ambiguity of intent is a central consideration that can relegate an offense from a ḥadd to a discretionary status, thus escaping the stiff Qurءanic penalties. Powers rightly avers that juristic considerations of intent constituted one of many venues through which these ḥudūd penalties were—in accordance with a deeply entrenched principle—thwarted in favor of a mitigated form of punishment.
This is a theoretically informed book that engages the fiqh tradition in a linguistically and conceptually sensitive manner. At times a philosophical–linguistic trawl, and at others anthropological, it manages to offer a lucid and mature account of intentionality, thereby raising the bar in the writing of Islamic legal history. The text at times does tend to be repetitive, yet even this may prove beneficial for nonspecialists. In short, this is a magnificent contribution to the study of Islamic law, recommended to anyone who wishes to understand some of the central concepts defining that field.
