When the title for this final presidential address went to press in 2007, the imminent demise of the Washington consensus did not seem likely; when this volume of the Transactions is published in November 2009, it might well have been given a decent burial. But I will not hasten to change the title to ‘the rise and demise of the Washington consensus’: my concern today is with the emergence of a new set of assumptions about the proper management of the world economy and Britain's place within it, in response to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates after Nixon's announcement of the suspension of the convertibility of the dollar into gold on 15 August 1971, and the subsequent failure of the Smithsonian agreement of December 1971 to reestablish pegged exchanges. The result was the emergence of greater capital mobility, floating exchanges and the creation of new financial instruments which were celebrated (until recently) by Alan Greenspan and Gordon Brown as the basis for economic prosperity. In today's lecture, I will consider how this new order came about, and how politicians and officials in Britain coped with the fundamental changes to the system which had been created after the Second World War. The story of how hubris led to nemesis in 2008, and how the institutions of the world economy were reshaped, is a topic for another occasion when greater historical distance offers a chance for reflection.Footnote 1
What was the Washington consensus? The phrase was coined by John Williamson in 1990 to refer to ‘the lowest common denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington-based institutions [that is, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the US Treasury] to Latin American countries as of 1989’. In many ways, it was an extrapolation of what the Thatcher and Reagan administrations adopted domestically in the late 1970s and early 1980s before being applied to other parts of the world, starting with Latin America, continuing with the former Soviet Union and its dependants, and informing responses to the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Williamson did not mean to imply that the reforms were imposed by the Washington-based institutions, but rather claimed that there was intellectual convergence on free-market economics and a major shift in attitudes towards the role of the state in the economy. The Washington consensus was characterised by a number of policies: fiscal discipline; redirection of public expenditure to areas offering high economic returns and improved income distribution such as primary health care, primary education and the infrastructure; tax reform to reduce marginal rates and broaden the tax base; interest rate or financial liberalisation; competitive exchange rates; trade liberalisation; inflows of foreign direct investment; privatisation; deregulation of business in order to remove barriers to entry and exit; and secure property rights. Williamson argued that these policies emerged over the previous twenty years and were widely seen as sensible. He objected to the use of the term ‘Washington consensus’ as a synonym for neo-liberalism or what George Soros called ‘market fundamentalism’ which implied a minimal state and monetarism. In Soros's opinion,
we are once again in danger of drawing the wrong conclusions from the lessons of history. This time the danger comes not from communism but from market fundamentalism. Communism abolished the market mechanism and imposed collective control over all economic activities. Market fundamentalism seeks to abolish collective decision making and to impose the supremacy of market values over all political and social values. Both extremes are wrong. What we need is a correct balance between politics and markets, between rule making and playing by the rules.
Williamson feared that applying the term ‘Washington consensus’ to a more dogmatic approach based on the assumption that markets would solve everything would discredit the policies that he wished to see adopted.Footnote 2
An entire lecture could be devoted to discussing these policies and their application around the world. We might note that growth in some countries, and above all China, occurred without adopting these policies, and that growth has not always been achieved where the policies have been pursued. Indeed, even before the recent financial collapse, the Washington consensus was strongly criticised by Joseph Stiglitz who complained that it concentrated on growth in the Gross Domestic Product rather than improving living standards or democratic and sustainable development.Footnote 3 Certainly, the emergence of the Washington consensus was a remarkable shift in policies from the 1950s and 1960s, and marked the end of a number of intellectual approaches. It ended the earlier decoupling of development economics from mainstream economics which had been at the heart of the conflict between the IMF and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and their critics in the Group of 77 and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development which had been so serious in the 1960s and 1970s. Dependency theories which stressed the creation of ‘under-development’ by the advanced industrial economies were weakened, and there was a move away from centralised planning on a large scale by the developing countries.Footnote 4 More particularly, in the case of Britain it meant the demise of the fixed exchange rate system of 1944, the abandonment of the sterling area, a shift to floating exchanges, the adoption of financial liberalisation and the removal of capital controls, all of which had major consequences for domestic economic policies such as wages policy, the control of inflation and labour relations. My focus is on the political debates over these major shifts in Britain's position in the international economy and their domestic implications.
In the first of these addresses, I utilised the organising concept of the trilemma – the trade-off between the three variables of exchange rates, capital movements and domestic monetary policy. When exchange rates are fixed, as on the gold standard, and capital is allowed to move freely, an active domestic monetary policy is not feasible: a reduction in interest rates to stimulate the domestic economy would lead to an outflow of capital and pressure on exchanges; or a high demand of capital from abroad as between 1905 and 1914 would force up domestic interest rates and hit domestic recovery or investment in the social infrastructure. In the 1930s, the trade-off was different: the pursuit of low interest rates to stimulate the domestic economy was associated with floating exchanges and capital controls. Of course, the attempt of the British and other governments to stimulate their domestic economies resulted in beggar-my-neighbour policies and serious strains in the international economy from which everyone suffered. After the Second World War, an attempt was made to combine domestic employment and prosperity with international stability through fixed exchange rates (with some scope for variation to protect domestic welfare), and controls over capital movements so that interest rates could be varied for purely domestic reasons without a fear for the international consequences. By the early 1970s, this particular trade-off was no longer sustainable and policies changed towards floating exchange rates and freer capital movements, with major consequences for domestic economic policies.Footnote 5 The change was fraught and contested, with many domestic repercussions and disputes over what sort of economic policy should be pursued. It is one of the major changes in British history in the last quarter of the twentieth century, and is still being worked out.
The shift in international economic policies was intimately connected with domestic policies. Under fixed exchanges after the Second World War, it was not possible to allow the exchange rate to take the pressure of generous wage settlements and inflation: if domestic costs were allowed to rise, British goods would be expensive in foreign markets, the balance of payments would deteriorate and action would be needed to protect the value of the pound. The outcome was the so-called ‘low-effort bargain’. In order to mitigate wage increases through voluntary restraint, industrialists agreed to limit their dividends and the government agreed to improve welfare entitlements, with the result that modest wages and profits were combined with a lack of incentive to improve productivity. This institutional package had a longer history, back to the recognition of trade unions in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and their exceptional legal privileges in the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, and it was confirmed in the post-war bargain between capital, labour and the state. The bargain could only survive so long as British industry was sheltered from competition at home through price-fixing agreements, and from abroad through import controls and tariffs. As soon as competition appeared with the reduction of tariffs, and above all membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), industrialists were threatened with a loss of market share unless they could be more efficient and productive which placed pressure on the institutional structure that developed after the war. Although a variant of this institutional structure was found in other European countries, the British system had some distinctive features. Unions were recognised but they (and their employers) were not bound by contractual obligations: any bargain could be broken without penalty. Further, bargaining remained adversarial, based on a zero-sum game rather than collaboration to raise productivity to benefit wages and profits.Footnote 6 By the late 1960s and 1970s, this pattern was under serious pressure and its dissolution was closely connected with debates over the future shape of Britain and international economic policies.
By the end of the 1960s, the trade-off negotiated at Bretton Woods was under threat. Capital controls were permitted by the Bretton Woods agreement so that countries could preserve the fixed exchange rate and allow an active domestic monetary policy, and this possibility was used by the Kennedy administration in response to the deterioration in the American balance of payments. In his advice to Kennedy, the economist J. K. Galbraith insisted that restrictions on capital flows were the least damaging option available to the president. Another possibility was to reduce overseas military spending which was opposed by the State Department; or to deflate the domestic economy which was clearly not politically desirable. In Galbraith's view, the Treasury's preference for free capital movements was a serious case of ‘bankers’ syndrome’. It made more sense to retain investment at home in order to improve the efficiency of the American economy and so solve the balance of payments problem. The initial outcome was the Interest Equalization Tax of 1963 rather than actual controls: the cost of borrowing in America was raised for foreigners above the domestic rate. In 1965, President Johnson adopted direct controls which Richard Nixon pledged to abolish if elected. In fact, he could only moderate rather than abolish the interest rate differential and controls. Henry Kissinger, as Nixon's adviser on national security, realised, as had Galbraith before him, that free movement of capital would have serious strategic repercussions. The weakening of the balance of payments as a result of a greater outflow of funds would lead to criticism by European governments of irresponsibility, so undermining American strategic influence. Kissinger argued that it was better to retain controls than cut military spending or to force allies to pay more for defence which would alienate them.Footnote 7 Nevertheless, controls were much more difficult to enforce with the widespread adoption of convertibility. Capital could move via the current account, and controls could be evaded by holding dollars off-shore through the emerging Euro-dollar market. Although capital mobility was still lower than in the 1920s let alone prior to 1914, and far from the levels reached by the 1990s, capital controls were already facing greater pressure.Footnote 8
Furthermore, the trade-off between international and domestic economic policies was unstable. In the 1930s, the pursuit of national economic policies was widely seen as destroying international economic stability; by contrast, the fixed exchange rates of the gold standard were believed to have sacrificed domestic prosperity and inspired a nationalistic backlash. The trade-off in 1944 tried to hold a balance: the pursuit of international stability should not be at the expense of domestic prosperity by allowing a degree of flexibility in exchange rates. However, there was a basic problem in the Bretton Woods agreement. There was nothing to require a country to revalue an under-valued currency which led the assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget, James Schlesinger, to complain that under-valuation of the yen and Deutschmark in order to ‘engross’ international trade ‘are clearly beggar-my neighbour policies . . . There is no reason that the United States should be willing graciously to tolerate such a condition.’Footnote 9 Equally, other countries complained that the Americans were behaving irresponsibly as their balance of payments weakened and the dollar came under pressure. There was nothing in the Bretton Woods agreement to require the Americans to devalue, any more than that there was any requirement for the Japanese and Germans to revalue, and it would be difficult for the Americans to do so given that the dollar was fixed at a gold price of $35 per ounce, and all other currencies were pegged to the dollar. The Americans covered their deficit by paying in dollars which was in many ways beneficial to the world economy by providing liquidity.
Here was Robert Triffin's dilemma: the world economy needed liquidity if it were to continue to grow, and this was provided by the dollars created by the American deficit; but the deficit put the dollar under pressure. This situation was not sustainable. If the Americans took action to solve the Triffin dilemma by deflating the US economy, it might well harm the world economy by cutting off the flow of dollars. In the opinion of General De Gaulle, this was no bad thing for he argued that the Americans were indulging in ‘greenback imperialism’, using their ability to issue dollars in order to finance military adventures and to purchase European firms, as well as creating inflation which was politically dangerous. His preferred solution, and that of the French economist Jacques Rueff, was to return to the gold standard. Others were more sceptical and feared a loss of liquidity from a return to gold or from a rectification of the American balance of payments.Footnote 10
Would the Americans be able to improve their balance of payments? Kennedy tried to make the American economy more efficient and productive through a programme designed to create faster economic growth and to utilise capacity to the full, through tax breaks on depreciation in order to stimulate investment, improved welfare benefits and minimum wages, investment in human resources, as well as the differential between domestic and overseas interest rates. By these policies, he aimed to stimulate the domestic economy and improve the balance of payments. Although he accepted capital controls as compatible with Bretton Woods, in other respects he took steps to liberalise the world economy through the ‘Kennedy Round’ of GATT and his advocacy of the ‘UN Development Decade’ to encourage growth in the developing economies (and halt the spread of communism).Footnote 11
Nixon took a somewhat different line, shifting the trade-off to give more attention to domestic political considerations at the expense of the international economy. He was deeply concerned about the possibility of domestic recession in the run-up to the election of 1972, and he wished to build a new electoral alliance with the South and blue-collar workers in a new form of Republicanism. Consequently, he was unable to respond to the continued weakening of the US balance of payments and the appearance of the first post-war trade deficit by deflating the domestic economy. Instead, his answer was to force currency realignment by the under-valued currencies of Germany and Japan.Footnote 12
The regime of fixed exchange rates was therefore under pressure by the late 1960s. The American administration was facing a weakened trade position and mounting costs of war in Vietnam, and did not wish to devalue the dollar by changing the price of gold from $35 per ounce. Rather, it preferred forcing other countries to revalue, above all the yen and the Deutschmark. For its part, the Labour government devalued in 1967 after a considerable delay, and faced continuing problems in maintaining sterling as the second reserve currency. Was the attempt any longer feasible and if not, should British monetary policy abandon the sterling area and shift to Europe? The issues that had troubled the Labour government over the European Payments Union were now more pressing. What forum could be used to deal with these major shifts in the world's monetary regime? It might be thought that the obvious venue for re-negotiating the exchange rates was the IMF, but this did not prove feasible as a result of political tensions. The head of the IMF had always been a European, and the European governments had enough votes to block changes they did not like. The United States had the largest single vote but not sufficient to impose reform – and of course any attempt to use its economic clout would create political animosity. The IMF failed to make any serious proposals for reform, spending a considerable amount of time and effort in proposing minor changes that failed to command assent. Should the solution come from an international conference as in 1944, which the US proposed at one stage to the annoyance of the IMF which felt it would be marginalised; or should it come from the advanced economies of the Group of 10 (G-10) which would challenge both the IMF and American leadership? Meanwhile, the developing countries were asserting their voice, and they produced their own report through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1965 which pressed for long-term aid rather than liquidity as the main issue. Reform of the Bretton Woods system was frustrated by institutional difficulties, by conflicts between the US, Europe and developing countries; and by serious disagreements over the appropriate solution, whether it be wider margins between currencies, a ‘crawling peg’, floating, realignment of currencies with fixed rates, or the introduction of a new form of liquidity less dependent on the dollar.Footnote 13
Meanwhile, the EEC started to move towards its own solution at The Hague in 1969, when the members agreed to consider Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This ambition was formalised in the Werner Report of October 1970 which set out the steps towards EMU, starting with a reduction in the margin of fluctuation between member currencies as a stage towards fixed rates, integrated financial markets and coordinated budgets.Footnote 14 This plan led to considerable tension within the EEC (in particular between France and Germany) as the Bretton Woods system collapsed – and placed the British government in a dilemma as it prepared for entry. It intensified fundamental issues about British monetary policy that had been apparent since the war: could the pound remain a reserve currency; should Britain adopt an Atlanticist policy; should it throw in its lot with EMU; or could it continue to steer its own path between these options in order to retain a degree of autonomy?
The solution adopted by the Nixon administration was ‘benign neglect’, allowing a crisis to develop without taking action to avert it, in the hope that it would create the opportunity to realign currencies. The moment came on 15 August 1971 when Nixon announced that he was suspending the convertibility of the dollar into gold, without consultation with the IMF or any other country. At the same time, Nixon set out his New Economic Policy, a programme of price and wage controls to limit inflation – an approach strongly criticised by Milton Friedman who feared that Nixon was moving from the true path of free markets. ‘Sooner or later, and the sooner the better, it will end as all previous attempts to freeze prices and wages have ended, from the time of the Roman Emperor Diocletian to the present, in utter failure and the emergence into the open of suppressed inflation.’ George Shultz, the secretary of the Treasury and a colleague and disciple of Friedman at the University of Chicago, realised that failure would indeed come sooner rather than later: ‘a freeze will stop when labor blows it up with a strike. Don't worry about getting rid of it – labor will do that for you.’Footnote 15 His prediction had resonance on the other side of the Atlantic, as the government of Edward Heath was to discover.
Nixon's decision marked the end of sterling–dollar diplomacy between Britain and the United States. It led to considerable uncertainty about what would happen, for the US administration did not have a plan for major reform now that the crisis had arrived. Did it want anything more than a realignment of currencies before returning to the existing order of Bretton Woods; or would the trilemma be fundamentally changed with a new trade-off? In December 1971, Nixon and President Georges Pompidou of France met on the Azores and agreed on a package of realignments which was modified and confirmed by other members of G-10 in the Smithsonian agreement. This agreement was predicated on the assumption that realignment would permit the survival of the Bretton Woods system of fixed but variable exchange rates. Although Nixon had previously opposed devaluation of the dollar, he now agreed that this should be done by changing the price of gold from $35 to $38 per ounce. Germany agreed to revalue the Deutschmark by 13.57 per cent and Japan to revalue the yen by 16.9 per cent, so that there was an overall devaluation of the dollar against other G-10 currencies of 10 per cent. In addition, an attempt was made to introduce an element of reform. The Smithsonian agreement introduced a wider band of variation in exchange rates: instead of allowing a fluctuation of 1 per cent either side of the central rate, the new figure was 2.25 per cent. The result, it was hoped, would be more flexibility within the system of fixed but variable rates, so that stability could be combined with adjustment to changed circumstances. Nixon welcomed the Smithsonian agreement as ‘the most significant monetary agreement in the history of the world’.Footnote 16 The Bretton Woods system seemed to have been reestablished and floating rejected – but the agreement did not hold and floating rates were soon introduced in the early 1970s. Why did the Smithsonian agreement fail?
An intellectual case for floating rather than fixed rates was made by Milton Friedman as long ago as 1950 in a memorandum for the Economic Cooperation Administration in Europe; it was published in 1953. Friedman argued against the entire assumption of the Bretton Woods conference in favour of fixed exchange rates, claiming instead that floating rates were ‘absolutely essential for the fulfilment of our basic economic objective: the achievement and maintenance of a free and prosperous world community engaging in unrestricted multilateral trade’. Multilateral trade was the main aim of policy, but there had been little success in removing trade barriers because of the commitment to ‘an essentially minor goal’ of rigid exchange rates. He felt that a country could respond to changes in its balance of payments in four different ways. One was to adjust reserves, which was not possible given their low level after the war. A second possibility was to alter internal prices and incomes, as happened after the First World War when Britain tried to force down wages and costs. Friedman accepted that such an approach was no longer politically feasible as a result of the general commitment to internal stability.
The third approach was favoured by Friedman: the adoption of flexible exchange rates where any move in the balance of payments immediately affected the exchange rate, and at once prompted corrective action. By contrast, the existence of fixed exchange rates meant that steps to correct the balance of payments could be delayed and when something was eventually done, it was by administrative action such as controls on capital flows or prices rather than automatic market forces. Friedman argued that flexible exchange rates were not so much rejected as ignored without any explicit consideration as a result of a misinterpretation of the history of the 1930s. On the one hand, traditionalists who wanted to return to the certainties of the gold standard and its ability to constrain domestic policies had no sympathy with floating rates. On the other hand, reformers distrusted the price mechanism in all forms. The result, Friedman remarked, was a ‘curious coalition of the most unreconstructed believers in the price system, in all its other roles, and its most extreme opponents’, with the result that floating exchanges were not even considered in the debates leading to the Bretton Wood conference.
By default, a fourth option was adopted, which Friedman believed was the least desirable: direct controls over foreign exchange. Friedman's support for flexible exchange rates did not mean that he expected rates would in fact be unstable, for ‘the ultimate objective is a world in which exchange rates, while free to vary, are in fact highly stable. Instability of exchange rates is a symptom of instability in the underlying economic structure.’ In his opinion, fixed exchanges ‘froze’ the economy by requiring various controls in order to protect the rate; if everything were flexible, the economy could respond to changing conditions and exchange rates would consequently remain stable as a result of the free play of market forces.Footnote 17
Of course, Friedman's case for floating rates was linked with his wider neo-liberal agenda, but there was also support for the policy from different ideological positions. In 1955, James Meade set out a democratic socialist case for floating. As he pointed out, fixed exchange rates meant that a country facing a balance of payments deficit would have to deflate with an increase in unemployment, which was unthinkable. Consequently, domestic deflation would soon be abandoned in favour of direct controls on imports. ‘Free trade and fixed exchange rate are incompatible in the modern world; and all modern free traders should be in favour of variable exchange rates.’ Such a claim seemed like apostasy on the part of one of the founders of the Bretton Woods system, with its assumption that stable rates were crucial to ending beggar-my-neighbour policies of currency depreciation which had led to a collapse of trade in the 1930s. But Meade felt that times had changed, so that the risk of competitive depreciation was no longer present and could therefore be discounted in devising policies. In the 1930s, deflation and unemployment meant that competitive devaluation appealed to politicians as a way of reducing imports and stimulating exports in order to boost employment at home. In the 1950s, the problem was one of inflation which removed the attraction of competitive devaluation which would only make the problem worse by increasing the price of imports and stimulating exports at a time when capacity was already under pressure. Hence the historical problem leading to the adoption of the fixed exchange rate regime in 1944 was no longer applicable.Footnote 18
Despite this scepticism about the virtues of fixed exchanges, the system became firmly entrenched in the minds of British policy makers. Although the case for floating was made in Operation Robot in 1952, the intellectual case of Friedman and Meade attracted little interest amongst officials or politicians: the issue seemed to have been closed, and the adoption of convertibility in 1958 marked the successful completion of the transition to the principles of 1944.Footnote 19 Fixed exchanges were sacrosanct, and the occasional need for devaluation was a major policy decision that entailed considerable anxiety in 1949 and 1967. The Bretton Woods system was validated by the rapid economic growth of western Europe up to the early 1970s. However, the pound started to float in June 1972 and by February–March 1973 floating was widespread throughout the world. Two questions follow. The first question is whether ideas led to change, such as through Friedman's influence on members of Nixon's administration or a growing turn to monetarism and neo-liberalism; or whether the driving force was political contingencies? The second question is whether floating, when it did come and for whatever reason, did indeed have the outcome suggested by Friedman, or something rather different and disruptive?
Ideas were not the major driver of change, for acceptance of the case made by Friedman and Meade was slow and largely followed changes introduced by the pressure of circumstances. In 1971, most officials and politicians still assumed that a realignment of rates was needed rather than floating. In the final stages of the pegged system of exchanges, the only open advocate of floating was Karl Schiller (the German finance minister) who allowed the Deutschmark to float on 9 May 1971 in response to an influx of dollars looking for a safe home and a possible gain from revaluation. It seemed better to stop the influx by floating than by reducing interest rates which would undermine the tight monetary policy favoured by Germany. The Europeans were united in their hostility to the damage and uncertainty caused by American ‘benign neglect’ but were also divided amongst themselves, which threatened progress with the Werner plan to create a haven of stability or ‘benign regionalism’. The French were horrified by Schiller's action, preferring to maintain parities through the use of exchange controls, and the Commission of the EEC was alarmed that the decision of the Germans undermined plans for EMU. The division between France and Germany posed a real threat to the EEC, and after Nixon announced the suspension of convertibility of the dollar into gold on 15 August 1971, the two countries came together in support of a realignment of European currencies and devaluation of the dollar. At this point, floating seemed to have been rejected and fixed exchanges rescued.Footnote 20
In 1972, Shultz favoured floating exchanges, at least in private. However, he could not express his views in public, and the eventual collapse of the Smithsonian agreement and the emergence of floating was a defeat rather than a conscious policy decision. In the words of the economist Gottfried Haberler – the intellectual father of benign neglect – it was a ‘non-system’. In June 1972, Arthur Laffer (the chief economist to the Office of Management and Budget) explained that the view in the administration was not that ‘a floating rate system would be a preferred alternative but rather that it might not be such a bad alternative’.Footnote 21 Why, then, did the Smithsonian agreement collapse if it were not the result of a conscious decision and the power of economic analysis?
Domestic American politics played a crucial role, for Nixon's concern for reelection meant that he was unwilling to take action to support the balance of payments and the exchange rate which might lead to a recession and deflation. As a result, the American trade balance deteriorated, and Nixon pursued an expansive monetary policy as much out of a miscalculation as cynicism. Nixon's economic team assumed that capacity was idle and that boosting demand would bring it into use without creating inflation. In reality, there was no idle capacity so that fiscal and monetary expansion led to a surge in prices. Herbert Stein of the Council of Economic Advisers remarked, ‘We misinterpreted.’ Meanwhile, the government hoped that prices and wages could be controlled to stop inflation and allow growth. The policy worked for a time, but the controls were only temporary and there was an obvious danger that once they were removed, Friedman's warning would prove correct: prices would rise in order to restore profits and unions would demand higher wages.Footnote 22
The failures of American policy had international ramifications in two different ways. On the one hand, the US trade deficit meant that countries with a trade surplus (such as Germany) had an in-flow of dollars which created inflationary pressures and placed the exchange rate under strain. On the other hand, countries with a balance of payments deficit – such as Britain – could follow the American example and embark on rapid monetary growth, with an attempt to control inflation through a prices and incomes policy. Not surprisingly, there was continued concern in Europe about the decline in the dollar, with a clear sense that the Americans had no intention of supporting the value of the dollar agreed at the Smithsonian meeting. Mutual mistrust meant that the attempt to reestablish the Bretton Woods system was not likely to last for very long.
One response to these continued concerns was the creation of the European currency ‘snake’ in the Basle agreement of April 1972, in the aftermath of the crisis caused by the floating of the Deutschmark by Schiller and in response to the Smithsonian agreement which created the possibility of too wide a variation between currencies of the members of the EEC. The Smithsonian agreement permitted any currency to move within a band of 2.25 per cent either side of the dollar or a total of 4.5 per cent, and this meant that two non-dollar countries could move against each other by a greater margin. If country A was at the bottom of its band against the dollar and country B was at the top of its band, then A could appreciate by 4.5 per cent against the dollar and B could depreciate by 4.5 per cent; and if both happened simultaneously, they could move against each other by 9 per cent. Such a large change in exchange rates was unlikely, but the potential range of fluctuation was too wide for members of the EEC which wished to converge in EMU. In April 1972, the Basle agreement created the ‘snake in the tunnel’ for the six members of the EEC and the three countries (including Britain) that were about to join. Their currencies were to move within a band of 2.25 per cent of the dollar, so that the maximum fluctuation between any two member currencies would be 4.5 per cent.Footnote 23
Even before the closing of the gold window, Lord Cromer – the former governor of the Bank of England – argued in October 1970 that Britain should take the lead in a new European monetary initiative, as a way of preserving an element of autonomy which had effectively been lost:
we could still use our influence to bring about the creation of a European Monetary System in which the sovereignty, which we have effectively lost due to our chronic Short Term Indebtedness, would be at least equated with that of the other European Powers and build a System of materially greater stability for all those who form part of it. Without some initiative of this nature, brought to a successful conclusion, the future of the United Kingdom in the economic world of to-day looks bleak.
The Treasury and Bank of England were more cautious, arguing that there was no advantage in taking the initiative at a time when the members of the European Community were engaged on their own deliberations; at most, the British government should express interest without taking a position which would be politically dangerous in supporting one side against another.Footnote 24 However, Cromer had raised the fundamental point: could Britain retain a semblance of monetary sovereignty outside the European system, and would membership replace purely theoretical sovereignty by an element of real sovereignty? Britain was moving away from its earlier adherence to the sterling area and dollar diplomacy to a new relationship with Europe, and on 1 May 1972 Britain joined the snake.Footnote 25
The experiment was short-lived, for on 23 June 1972 Britain left the snake and floated the pound which was clearly a politically sensitive matter given the country's imminent membership of the EEC. The decision seems surprising given Edward Heath's strong commitment to Europe, but the policy of his administration was somewhat inconsistent. Membership of the snake was obviously complementary to Heath's desire to show Britain's European credentials but at same time, his administration expanded the monetary supply and did not feel itself limited by exchange rate considerations. As in the United States, domestic and international considerations were in tension. The Treasury was doubtful about membership of the snake, for the obligation to defend exchange rates within narrower bands would constrain policies to reduce unemployment and to set interest rates for domestic reasons. This approach was apparent in Anthony Barber's budget of 21 March 1972 when he proposed a ‘dash for growth’ aimed at reducing unemployment and increasing investment with higher public spending and cuts in personal taxes. The budget was expansionary and consciously rejected international considerations:
The lesson of the international balance of payments upsets of the last few years is that it is neither necessary nor desirable to distort domestic economies to an unacceptable extent in order to maintain unrealistic exchange rates, whether they are too high or too low. Certainly, in the modern world I do not believe that there is any need for this country, or any other, to be frustrated on this score in its determination to sustain economic growth and to reduce unemployment.Footnote 26
In terms of the trilemma, domestic considerations had trumped international commitments.
Barber's approach was welcomed by Peter Jay, the economics editor of The Times, who remarked that these were ‘the most important words to be spoken by any Chancellor for a decade’. Jay was a supporter of floating and saw the implication of Barber's approach: the exchange rate could not be held within the limits of the snake.Footnote 27 Robert Solomon of the Federal Reserve later explained the reaction to the budget speech:
Although an economist could not quarrel with one word in this statement, it was not the sort of thing that foreign exchange market operators expected to hear from a finance minister. It was interpreted to signify that, should sterling come under pressure, Barber would not wait long before changing its value.Footnote 28
Sterling was indeed soon to come under pressure, for the balance of payments was in deficit; price and wage inflation were mounting; and labour disputes were threatened, with a possible dock strike triggering speculation against the pound. There was a general assumption in Europe that the pound needed to be devalued if Britain were to be competitive. Dennis Healey, the shadow chancellor, pointed out on 19 June 1972 that devaluation was widely expected prior to British membership of the EEC: ‘The fact that the Chancellor has given warning that he will devalue rather than deflate when he thinks he will be in trouble means that all foreigners will want to pre-empt the devaluation.’Footnote 29 Barber denied that he had any intention of devaluing the pound, arguing that the pound was not at an unrealistic rate, that the IMF debt had been paid off for first time since 1964 and that reserves were strong.Footnote 30 In fact, sterling was sold and the exchange rate fell below its floor. Although interest rates were raised and the Bank intervened to support the pound, the attempt to support the rate failed.
The government had two options: it could devalue and try to hold the new rate; or it could float the pound. Heath's government opted for floating, ostensibly because it was less disruptive to the international financial system (which was true) but in reality because the weakness of its incomes policy and the deterioration in labour relations meant that it could not guarantee its ability to hold a new fixed rate. The post-war institutional system was failing as increased competition at home and from abroad threatened the ‘low-effort bargain’ between wages and profits. The level of profit was squeezed and it was increasingly fraught to pay higher wages demanded by the unions.Footnote 31 In this difficult economic situation, sterling was floated on 23 June 1972. In principle, the government remained committed to fixed exchanges, and claimed that floating was a temporary measure to deal with the speculative movement of what Heath called ‘the vast masses of highly mobile funds which can be switched out of one currency into another at very short notice and in enormous volume’.Footnote 32 At the same time, the government extended exchange controls to the sterling area. Here was a crucial moment in defining Britain's identity. Heath's government was retreating ever more from the sterling area which had been so important since the 1930s, but at the same time was raising doubts over its European identity.
The decision to float the pound was generally welcomed as a mark of realism. Supporters of floating were delighted, and not least Friedman who saw it as the beginning of the end of the Smithsonian agreement.Footnote 33 His wish was soon realised, for the dollar was under continued pressure in 1973. Trade figures showed a large American deficit and German surplus, and American wage and price controls were about to expire with the threat of inflation; consequently, there was a flight from the dollar into the Deutschmark and other strong currencies. Paul Volcker, a leading official concerned with international monetary policy at the US Treasury, tried to negotiate new parities to save the Smithsonian system, pressing Japan to revalue the yen by at least 10 per cent and seeking a devaluation of the dollar by 10 per cent against European currencies. The dollar was therefore devalued for a second time in 1973. Shultz was sceptical and did nothing to defend the new rate by raising interest rates as the Europeans were demanding; instead, he opted to float the dollar. In March 1973, the EEC council of ministers agreed to a collective float against the dollar – with Britain remaining outside with its own independent float against both the dollar and the European currencies. The Smithsonian agreement expired in February–March 1973, finally undermined by the oil price shock which created divergences between economies’ ability to adjust. The rule-based system of 1944 came to an end, with a variety of outcomes: some countries still pegged their currencies to the dollar, which was now floated with no link with gold; some countries were members of joint floats, such as the European scheme; and others, including Britain, floated independently.Footnote 34
Floating had arrived, less as a result of intellectual conversion than in response to political exigencies. Friedman and Meade had provided arguments which suggested that the change might be beneficial for the economy, which brings me to my second major question: were the consequences of floating as positive as they believed, or did it lead to new difficulties and problems? Whatever the theoretical advantages of floating in creating a flexible and responsive economy based on free trade, reality was very different as a result of the political circumstances which had led to the adoption of the new policy. Floating the pound removed the need for monetary discipline, for the money supply could now be expanded with less concern for the constraints imposed by the exchange rate. The strain of any balance of payments deficit could now be taken by a decline in the exchange rate, so that there was less need to limit wage demands in order to maintain competitiveness in export markets. The consequence was inflation caused by monetary expansion and wage demands which led to the freezing of prices and wages controls which culminated in 1974 with Labour's ‘social contract’ of voluntary wage restraint in return for food subsidies and rent controls. Far from leading to stable exchanges and a free, flexible economy, floating led to instability and controls.
Heath was anxious that Britain should rejoin the snake as soon as possible and become part of the collective float of European currencies against the dollar in order to show the country's commitment to the EEC. In the meantime, he wished to manage the sterling float to stay within the 2.25 per cent band. Despite the concern of Barber and the Treasury for domestic growth and unemployment, Heath gave considerable importance to rejoining the snake. The apparent loss of monetary sovereignty with the demise of the sterling area led Heath to see European monetary cooperation as a way of regaining it within Europe. He believed that economic integration with Europe would reimpose external discipline, so overcoming some of the dangers posed by a lack of monetary constraints under a floating regime with the consequent need to control wages and prices. Membership of the collective float of European currencies would reinstate the discipline of preserving the balance of payments.Footnote 35 The Bank of England working party on the sterling exchange rate agreed, arguing that ‘the idea of external discipline has now been revived in the context of the movement towards EMU in Europe’.Footnote 36
The problem was that the collective float was not obviously compatible with the government's domestic economic policy of fast growth, lower unemployment, higher industrial investment, reduction of inflation and avoidance of serious industrial disruption. A commitment to staying within the 2.25 per cent band might threaten this policy by requiring higher interest rates to protect the pound, or limiting wage demands to maintain competitiveness. The tension between the two policies was well put by a Treasury working party in 1973:
All of these objectives [in domestic economic policy] could be affected by a decision to join the collective float, i.e. to refix the pound in relation to the other EEC currencies. Domestically the decision to float implied a higher priority for employment and growth than for our commitments to fixed parity and European monetary arrangements; conversely a decision to refix implies a reversal of these priorities.
The Treasury was deeply sceptical that the snake and collective float were compatible with domestic policies. The commitment to maintain the exchange rate implied no weakening of counter-inflation policy so that British inflation remained in line with its competitors, and it also required that there be no serious industrial disruption. But the Treasury doubted that it was possible to strengthen counter-inflation policy ‘without provoking industrial dislocation’. Measures designed to hold the exchange rate would have a harmful effect on domestic policies: a decision to cut public spending would undermine government proposals to improve the infrastructure; the introduction of higher indirect taxes to reduce demand would increase prices and undermine counter-inflation measures; higher interest rates would hit investment and raise prices. Consequently, the Treasury feared that
measures which reduced demand could, in the context of joining the float, be particularly damaging to our counter-inflation policy . . . If the unions felt that we were deflating solely in order to be able to join the collective float (i.e. that we were sacrificing growth in order to conform to Community ideas about the merits of a fixed parity) their reaction might be very damaging to the prospects for the counter-inflation policy.
Membership of the collective float entailed deflation and restraining demand to hold down prices, which was politically difficult to achieve without alienating the unions and so weakening counter-inflation policies.Footnote 37 Of course, Britain might enter the collective float at a lower exchange rate, which would be more easily defended. But the Treasury doubted the wisdom of this course of action. The Treasury seemed to be locked into the existing institutional system of wage restraint through agreements with the trade unions, and was unwilling to overturn it for the risky venture of fixing the exchange rate. Devaluation would increase prices with serious consequences for counter-inflationary policies. It
could be the last straw as far as the unions were concerned and thus give a disproportionate boost to the domestic inflationary spiral which might even offset all its good effects on long-term competitiveness. It would certainly put more strain on the counter-inflation policy; and success with the counter-inflation policy is critical to all our objectives, including joining and staying in the Community float.Footnote 38
The collective float was intimately connected with the deterioration in industrial relations that was to prove Heath's undoing in 1974.
Meanwhile the Treasury turned to a number of ways of reconciling membership of the European monetary snake and its external discipline with the pursuit of domestic policies. Treasury officials came up with a number of complex proposals which married technical ingenuity and desperation with political difficulties in securing support from the rest of the Community. As one official put it with a sense of realism, ‘It would look altogether as if we had concocted a potion which would be palatable to the United Kingdom and were trying to prescribe it for the rest of the Community.’ The schemes were examples of ‘gamesmanship’ or how to win without actually cheating which would lead to deep suspicion of British sincerity in rejoining. The ‘flexible skinned snake’ allowed wider margins of fluctuation between currencies; the ‘crawling peg snake’ removed a set band with an upper and lower limit and permitted a succession of small parity changes. These ideas were opposed by the French, and D. J. Mitchell of the Treasury was ‘pretty certain that in relation to the French any suggestions which dilute what they regard as the purity of the fixed EEC relationships would be anathema; and we should simply be regarded as preparing for further back-sliding on our part’.Footnote 39
In any case, there were serious reservations about the wisdom of joining the collective float at all. Meade was doubtful, arguing that priority should be given to other measures to harmonise the economies of the EEC. He pointed out that harmonisation would necessarily have a differential impact on the balance of payments of the member countries, and that rigid exchange rates would be a barrier to change. He argued that floating would allow more flexibility.Footnote 40 Barber was sceptical about the desirability of joining, for he felt that there was a wider issue of political presentation and acceptability:
when we make the move we must be in a position to convince public opinion at home that it is a sensible one and that it will assist and not jeopardise our domestic policies. It is going to be difficult to pull this off . . .
I believe that most people – including the CBI and the TUC in our current talks – would think it extraordinary if in circumstances anything like the present we were to tie our hands by rejoining the snake.Footnote 41
The problem was not only the apparent incompatibility between domestic and international policies: a further concern was the lack of adequate support from France and Germany for sterling balances.
There had been a fundamental shift in attitudes to the sterling area in the 1960s. In 1962, the chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald Maudling, remarked that ‘I regard it as a major aim of policy to free the UK economy from the inhibitions of reserve currency status’, and the Bank of England also accepted the desirability of ending the reserve role for sterling while maintaining it as a trading currency.Footnote 42 Of course, the change in status for sterling posed serious problems as a result of commitments to sterling holders, and would take a great deal of skill to negotiate. The process started prior to the devaluation of 1967 and even more in its aftermath when other countries diversified their reserves. The Bank of International Settlements (BIS) coordinated a package of support in the Basle agreement of 1968 which offered guarantees for the value of sterling in return for creditors holding a specified proportion of their reserves in sterling. The result of this agreement was that sterling remained part of the reserves of other countries on a voluntary basis, with joint responsibility for a managed decline in the reserve position of sterling. The British government preferred to proceed through informal multilateral discussions at the BIS (which mainly involved central banks) rather than through the more rigid, interventionist approach of the IMF, which wanted domestic measures to contain demand, limit domestic lending and constrain government borrowing. However, the Basle agreement was coming to an end in 1973 at the very time that Britain was considering its options with regard to the collective float.Footnote 43
Discussions over EMU therefore connected with the need to secure continued agreement to manage the decline of sterling as a reserve currency. The British wanted the Europeans to offer unlimited and unconditional support for sterling, but the Treasury felt that the support fund would not be
large enough to give protection even against a speculative movement unrelated to our true underlying position. Others were going to insist that support was limited in amount, limited in duration and subject to conditions, including moves to constrain our domestic policies. This created a totally different situation from the one in which we were thinking of ‘unlimited and unconditional’ support. Since we would never want to draw on this kind of support . . . we would have to rely on the right to change our parity relative to other EEC currencies.Footnote 44
Not surprisingly, the Treasury's Working Party on EMU reported against joining the collective float:
Until the real conditions for a viable union are met, it would be dangerous and wrong for the UK to surrender any significant degree of its economic autonomy. The real conditions in question are either a very substantial measure of economic convergence between the member countries, or an evident political will to underwrite the massive resource transfers necessary to offset imbalances resulting from different levels of national productivity, inflation etc. Neither of these conditions is even remotely met at present, nor seems likely to be for many years to come. Until they are, the UK government will remain primarily responsible for the economic well-being of the UK, and will need to retain the necessary powers.Footnote 45
Britain did not join the collective float – and in any case it soon collapsed. The snake slithered to an end, starting with France's departure in 1974, and by 1977 only five of nine members of EEC remained within a collective float based on the Deutschmark.
The snake perished as a result of the divergences in the economic policies of its members. Clearly, if two countries wished to maintain a stable exchange rate, they should follow similar monetary policies. However, Germany maintained a tight monetary policy and refused to accommodate the rise in oil prices. By contrast, France opted for an expansionary monetary policy in an attempt to prevent higher unemployment. The result was wide inflation differentials as a result of differing domestic political considerations. Meanwhile, Britain left the snake and declined to join the collective float because of its concern for domestic growth, the need to reduce unemployment, and the desire to boost investment. However, Barber's ‘dash for growth’ proved to be a disaster, resulting not in growth so much as inflation and an increase in the supply of money. Floating had not worked, and neither had the attempt to impose some form of external discipline by joining the snake. By the time that Heath left office in the aftermath of the three-day week and the challenge from the miners, Britain's international economic policy remained muddled and confused. Would the new Labour government have any more success?
An immediate problem facing Wilson's administration in 1974 was how to respond to the weak balance of payments. Although the Treasury argued for depreciation in order to help export competitiveness, Healey and Wilson were not in favour and the consequent confusion in policy led to a loss of confidence which triggered a capital outflow. The crisis was caused less by the scale of the balance of payments deficit than by uncertainty over the best strategy which would, in the words of Healey, ‘get the economy into balance without social breakdown’.Footnote 46 The cabinet had to choose between two highly divergent approaches: deflation or the Alternative Economic Strategy. A deflationary policy was urged by the IMF which had shifted its policy towards current account deficits, away from the weakening of conditionality that had been adopted in response to the oil shock in order to prevent a serious economic downturn towards stricter conditions obliging deficit countries to resolve their economic problems.Footnote 47 Dennis Healey felt that the government had no option except to follow the advice of the IMF:
Unless we can do this, we shall not be able to cover the deficit at anything like the present exchange rate. Our only course then would be to hope to achieve equilibrium by allowing the rate to fall to levels at which there might be some chance of foreigners stepping in to buy sterling so as to acquire a lot of United Kingdom assets – British firms and property, as well as financial assets – very cheaply. This, despite the effect that the fall in the exchange rate would have on our own cost of living, is still an optimistic scenario. The pessimistic scenario is one of continuous and probably accelerating depreciation, leading to South American-style inflation, with higher import prices feeding through to wages and vice versa.Footnote 48
On his view, floating could lead to a sinking pound and to economic disaster. The general sentiment of the City and industry supported Healey's assessment of the situation.
The opponents of deflation had their ‘alternative economic strategy’ or planned expansion with direct control over imports. Above all, Tony Benn opposed the government's existing policy of controlling inflation and improving the balance of payments through a combination of a social contract with the Trades Union Congress; exchange rate depreciation; growth in manufacturing; borrowing from abroad to cover the deficit; controls on the domestic economy by a tight fiscal policy; a reduction in public spending; and a tight monetary policy. In his view, there were serious flaws in this approach. Exchange rate depreciation might be so fast that it did not achieve the intention of faster growth and a balance of payments surplus but might instead lead to high inflation which would threaten the social contract. Equally, the social contract might collapse as a result of a higher rate of unemployment. A weak home market and high interest rates might mean that investment in industry would not increase sufficiently to stimulate manufacturing output and productivity, and workers would not accept the need to raise productivity when unemployment was high.
In Benn's view, Britain's relative economic decline occurred in the context of trade liberalisation, and other economies achieved faster rates of growth because they rebuilt industry with modern equipment after the war (as in Germany) or developed new industries behind protective barriers (as in Japan). In these countries, strong balance of payments surpluses led to fast growth of output, high levels of investment and improved productivity. The situation was different in Britain, where the capital stock was run down, domestic markets were open to foreign competition and debt repayment, exports and rearmament were given priority over industrial reequipment. In Benn's opinion, the fixed exchange rate and a weak balance of payments led to constraints on growth: output rose only slowly, with little incentive to invest, a high level of import penetration and cumulative economic decline. In order to break out of this downward spiral, Britain needed to raise the growth rate of industrial capacity, modernise its factories and improve the utilisation of labour with more capital per worker. The aim was uncontentious; his solution was not.
Benn aimed to reverse the trend towards trade liberalisation which characterised policy since the war. The Central Policy Review Staff explained his case that attempting to break free of the cycle of economic deterioration
with an open economy in the context of increasing world competition and a slow-growing home market suffering severe import penetration, would be extremely difficult. The weakness of much of British industry, in the face of competition both from more advanced high productivity industries (especially in Japan and some of the countries of the EEC) and from cheap labour countries elsewhere, is now so great that free trade is ceasing to be of benefit to the United Kingdom. It is essential to have a period during which industry can expand and invest without the fears (i) that balance of payments constraints will require the Government to deflate; and (ii) that increasing foreign competition will lead to the continued loss of export markets and higher levels of import penetration will steal the home market. The historical record shows that no country has ever made a major industrial leap forward while, at the same time, leaving its economic frontier continually open to penetration by its more advanced competitors.
In Benn's view, ‘the price we must pay for borrowing to finance a free trade policy is too high because it involves unacceptable levels of unemployment, unacceptably low levels of investment and a progressive deterioration of our manufacturing capacity’. In the cabinet discussion of the alternative economic strategy, one minister – probably Benn himself – remarked that ‘the economy was bleeding to death, and that only the adoption of a protectionist policy could save the situation’:
Protectionism had been described as a siege economy; but if this was the case, it would be preferable to have the trade unions inside the citadel during the siege rather than the international bankers. It would not be possible to win the support of the people of the country for policies which were needed simply to satisfy bankers. Protectionism was not an easy course and would involve sacrifices; but it presented the best way to gain support of the British people.
The alternative economic strategy marked a fundamental rejection of the policy of multilateralism pursued since the Second World War in favour of economic autarchy. Benn proposed a national recovery plan based on imposing import quotas on manufactures; exchange controls to prevent speculative outflows; control of capital issues and bank advances. Investment would be directed towards a secure home market made possible by import controls; lower interest rates would provide an incentive to investment and employment; and planning agreements would be implemented with more funds for the National Enterprise Board. Such a policy entailed a fundamental realignment of the ‘inconsistent quartet’.Footnote 49
The alternative economic strategy led to one of the most significant debates in the economic history of post-war Britain. Healey and Callaghan were deeply sceptical of Ben's strategy, arguing that IMF support was crucial: without it, confidence would collapse and there would be an ‘uncontrollable slide’ in the value of sterling which would destroy the social contract. Import controls were illegal under Community law and would also expose Britain to retaliation under GATT. Above all, the strategy would mean a complete volte face in policy:
The whole philosophy behind our international policies – both political and economic – has been based on the assumption that our future lies in membership of the Atlantic Community. This takes the form of membership of the EEC and the free trade and political co-operation which that implies; co-operation in trade and payments policies in OECD; and a major commitment to NATO. A decision to introduce QRs [quantitative restrictions] implies going back on this whole philosophy. It would be damaging to the EEC, damaging to international co-operation in trade and payments policy, and damaging to NATO. Once this damage had been done, it would be extremely difficult to re-establish ourselves in the Atlantic Community. Our former partners would be reluctant to trust so unreliable an ally again, and we would be liable to find ourselves left economically protectionist, and politically isolated.
Healey and Callaghan were far from certain that the alternative economic strategy would work, for Britain could only become more efficient ‘by facing up to the competition’ rather than hiding behind tariff walls. Rather than industrial regeneration might the siege economy lead to industrial ossification? In their opinion, there was no reason to think that protection would lead industry to develop new and internationally competitive products; rather, management and labour could avoid the need to change, becoming more reliant on the home market which had no choice but to accept whatever quality of goods was offered. When import controls were eventually removed, British industry would be just as uncompetitive as in the past.Footnote 50
The outcome was the adoption of the IMF approach, which many commentators saw as the start of monetarism to impose discipline on the domestic economy. But the reimposition of discipline was more complicated than acceptance of the IMF package. Another approach to the creation of stability was the European Monetary System (EMS), an initiative proposed by Roy Jenkins (at this time president of the European Community) in October 1977 to reactivate EMU. His suggestion was taken up by Schmidt and Giscard in 1978, and came into force in March 1979. The initiative rested on joint policies between members of the EEC to use the ecu as a unit of account between themselves, with a European Monetary Cooperation Fund which could intervene against the dollar and other currencies. The aim was to marginalise the dollar and international financial institutions. Both Schmidt and Giscard preferred fixed parities, but at the very least the EMS would reduce fluctuations and discipline national governments and labour and business interests. By fixing exchange rates between European economies, the consequences of high pay settlements would be much more apparent, and inflation would be constrained.Footnote 51
What were British views on the EMS? The case for membership rested on the need to maintain the exchange rate of sterling through wage restraint and control over the money supply; in other words, it imposed external discipline over domestic policy. Not everyone was convinced. Was there any reason for thinking that linking the exchange rate of a high-inflation country such as Britain with a low-inflation country such as Germany would result in convergence on the lower rate? External discipline would not automatically force the government to persevere with unpopular policies designed to create low inflation. Indeed, Callaghan and Healey feared that a strong Deutschmark would force sterling to rise in value, so reducing competitiveness and leading to unemployment and deflation which would be politically disastrous. They wanted symmetrical adjustment for strong and weak economies, and feared that membership of the EMS could impose discipline only on weaker members such as Britain. Perhaps the benefits of price competitiveness from floating exchanges were more important. Of course, the risks of floating downwards also posed a threat of inflation, for a decline in the exchange rate meant that imports became more expensive, and there was less incentive to take politically difficult action to restrain wages since the exchanges could take the pressure. Such considerations meant that the Labour cabinet and party were generally opposed to joining the EMS. Business organisations such as the Confederation of British Industry tended to agree that stable exchanges were less important than a more competitive exchange rate which would allow industry to benefit from lower interest rates and export prices. Jenkins believed that Callaghan still favoured an Atlanticist policy based on the dollar and the pound, working with the IMF, in preference to the EMS.Footnote 52
In the United States, the dollar continued to weaken in the second half of the 1970s, with serious inflationary pressures which led to price and income controls in an attempt to limit political risks, both at home from those who were hit by inflation, and internationally from Germany and other countries who complained of the lack of discipline in American monetary policy. The result was a major shift in American economic policy. On 16 October 1979, the new chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker – a man with deep experience as a leading Treasury official at the time of the Nixon débâcle – embarked on a policy of tight domestic money and high interest rates to stabilise the dollar. The so-called ‘Volcker shock’ squeezed inflation out of the American economy: in 1981, inflation reached 13.5 per cent but by 1983, it was down to 3.2 per cent. However, this reduction of inflation came at the cost of a severe recession and high unemployment at home, and a debt crisis in developing countries. At the same time, the World Bank shifted from funding projects to an insistence on structural adjustments in less-developed countries to allow the repayment of debt and to make economies more competitive.Footnote 53
Similarly, the new Thatcher government in Britain adopted the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) which set firm limits to the growth of the monetary supply. Nigel Lawson argued that the new policy ‘represents a belated unlearning of what were mistakenly believed to be the lessons of the war’ – a rejection of the Bretton Woods consensus that fixed rates were the cure to the problems of competitive devaluation and beggar-my-neighbour policies which had characterised the 1930s. His view, following Friedman's monetary history of the US, was that the real lesson of the depression was that the Federal Reserve made a serious mistake in reducing the monetary supply in 1929–33, so turning a financial problem into a serious disruption of the economy. The correct lesson, he argued, was that the Federal Reserve should have ensured stable monetary growth. After the war, excess monetary growth was held in check by fixed exchange rates and the pursuit of non-inflationary policies in the States, but the strategy was then fatally undermined by floating rates. The solution was not to return to fixed rates in order to reimpose order: it was to return to monetary orthodoxy.Footnote 54 At the same time, the ability of trade unions to demand large wage increases was constrained by higher levels of unemployment and by changes in legislation. The social contract and controls over wages and prices were abandoned and castigated.
By 1985, a renewed effort could be made to balance international stability and domestic welfare. In 1985, the seven leading industrial economies issued a declaration in favour of sustained growth, non-inflationary growth and higher employment. Inflation was at the lowest level for twenty years, interest rates had fallen and their economies were growing. However, there were still serious imbalances in the external positions of their economies as a result of variation in growth rates, the debts of developing countries and the appreciation of the US dollar so that it was now seriously over-valued. Action was therefore needed to adjust exchange markets in order to prevent the revival of protectionism in response to disequilibrium between economies. In the Plaza accord in September 1985, the US, Britain, France, German and Japan agreed on domestic policies to resist protectionism, control inflation through monetary policies, liberalise financial markets and reduce taxation and public expenditure. Above all, they agreed that ‘exchange rates should play a role in adjusting external imbalances. In order to do this, exchange rates should better reflect fundamental economic conditions than has been the case’, and that ‘some further orderly appreciation of the main non-dollar currencies against the dollar is desirable’.Footnote 55 As a result, the dollar did depreciate against other currencies. In 1987, the Louvre accord between the members of the Group of 6 (G-6), including Britain, aimed to achieve sustainable and non-inflationary economic growth through an open economy and stable exchange rates. The realignment of exchanges in 1985 meant that currencies were ‘broadly consistent with underlying economic fundamentals’, and the policy commitments of the members of G-6 should allow this to continue to be the case. The Louvre accord concluded that ‘further substantial exchange rate shifts among their currencies could damage growth and adjustment prospects in their countries. In current circumstances, therefore, they agreed to cooperate closely to foster stability of exchange rates around current levels.’Footnote 56 The aim was to stop any further devaluation of the dollar against the Deutschmark and yen which might threaten economic recovery. Rates would not be fixed but neither should they float in a way that disrupted both international and domestic prosperity.
Meanwhile, Lawson was reconsidering his economic policies. By October 1985, he was disillusioned with monetarism and announced the end of the MTFS, for the appreciation of the pound was harming manufacturing industry, and the monetary targets were in any case difficult to hit. He saw the attractions of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) as a way of linking Britain to low-inflation countries, disciplining financial policy and reducing exchange rate variability. In 1987, Lawson opted to ‘shadow’ the Deutschmark without informing Thatcher, not as a step towards eventual membership of the ERM so much as to provide a sense of commitment to the exchange rate in anticipation of any future pressure on the pound. The experiment did not last long, for Lawson cut interest rates in response to the stock market crash in late 1987 which led to a return of inflation. The policy of shadowing the Deutschmark was abandoned, and interest rates were raised to reduce consumer spending and contain inflation.Footnote 57 Subsequently, the pound was pegged to the ERM in 1992, a short experiment which came to an ignominious end on ‘Black Wednesday’ (16 September 1993) when even an increase in interest rates to 15 per cent could not stop the pound from falling below its lower margin with the Deutschmark. Pegging is only a ‘conditional commitment’, and markets realised that it would be broken when the cost of defending the exchange rate was larger than the cost of realignment – and the British authorities were reluctant to raise interest rates sufficiently early or by a large enough amount, so that when action was taken, it smacked of panic. Further, Britain could not use capital controls: these had been almost entirely removed within the EC, and were no longer available to protect the currency. As we know from the analysis of the trilemma, an autonomous domestic monetary policy is not compatible with pegged exchanges in the absence of capital controls – and 1993 is a clear example of the proposition. In 1992/3, British commitment to pegged exchanges lacked credibility, and Britain returned to floating the pound, where it remains.Footnote 58
The two episodes of pegging the pound against other currencies in 1987 and 1992 failed for the same reason: managing the exchange rate entailed domestic economic policies that were inconsistent with domestic political needs. In the first episode, shadowing the Deutschmark stimulated a domestic boom; in the second, Britain was obliged to follow a tight monetary policy as a result of Germany's need to deal with the problems of reunification, which intensified the recession. The attempt to create stability in the exchanges back-fired, for in both cases the result was increasing domestic instability. Eddy George, the governor of the Bank of England felt that the issue was not merely the choice of the rate at the time of British entry into the ERM; it was a wider problem involving any attempt to peg the currencies of countries with different domestic policies. His assessment of the different approaches to domestic economic stability and the exchange rate regime – whether floating, an adjustable peg, a fixed rate or monetary union – was that there was no ideal solution. Floating seemed to offer the advantage of a buffer to insulate the domestic economy from shocks from abroad; but he pointed out that the floating rate could reflect market sentiment rather than the real economy, with serious consequences for costs and prices, and for the competitiveness of domestic and foreign goods and services. In autumn 1996, for example, the pound appreciated by 20–5 per cent against European currencies as a result of market concerns about the single currency, which hit exports of British goods. Consequently, ‘the insulation provided by a floating exchange rate may prove to be more apparent than real’. The governor was also wary of full membership of the European Monetary Union: it might allow more efficient allocation of resources throughout Europe, but might equally force Britain to follow a European monetary policy that did not meet its domestic needs. His conclusion was sensibly pragmatic, that ‘there is no clear best solution, applicable at all times for all currencies, to reconciling the inherent problem of potential conflict between the needs of domestic and external stability’. In his opinion, floating was applicable to an economy with
a small tradeable sector relative to the size of its domestic economy, but in that case it will need an effective nominal domestic anchor, such as a money supply or inflation target; and it will need an institutional structure – typically an independent central bank – to reinforce the credibility of the commitment to that nominal anchor.
By contrast, fixed rates made more sense in
smaller, more open, economies or where a credible domestic macro-economic framework is difficult to establish, for example, for historical or political reasons. But in this case it is crucial to recognise that domestic policy must be totally and unreservedly committed to maintaining the fixed exchange rate.
As he pointed out, other options between the two poles of an actively managed float and pegged rates should be rejected as an ‘unviable middle ground’, lacking ‘sufficient discipline on policy’ and serving ‘to intensify market tensions when a divergence between the policy needs of domestic and external stability does in fact arise’.Footnote 59 These words sum up the debate over fixed and floating rates, and their implications for domestic monetary policy, capital controls and trade policy over the century and a half covered by these lectures. The certainties of the gold standard and of Bretton Woods have given way to a sense of flux and uncertainty.
As I revise this lecture for publication, the Group of 20 has just met in London, and the themes I have considered in these addresses are more relevant than anticipated at the time I decided on the subject of my Presidential adddresses in 2003. What seemed then to be a technical and rebarbative subject is now the topic of daily news broadcasts and conversation on the future of the world economy and domestic prosperity. The governor of the Central Bank of China has recently called for a new supra-currency to replace the dollar somewhat on the lines of Keynes's ‘bancor’ that was rejected by the Americans in the negotiations leading to Bretton Woods. The plea implies criticism of American handling of dollar's position as the world's reserve currency.
Indeed, there has been talk of ‘Bretton Woods II’, a fundamentally misguided historical analogy. Unlike in 1944, there is a lack of expert consensus, for not everyone agrees on the solution to be pursued. In the opinion of some commentators, international regulation is not possible, for clever financiers will outwit regulators; others feel that improved, even international, regulation is imperative. This lack of consensus is a major difference from the 1940s when experts were broadly in agreement over the solution, especially through the work of economists attached to the League of Nations. Neither is it clear who can provide leadership. The Bretton Woods agreement of 1944 was the result of a deal struck by Britain and the USA, which was then accepted by the other forty-two countries meeting in 1944. Although the Keynes and White schemes had different assumptions, there was also considerable common ground – and the US had the financial power to impose its own views. There were serious failings with the Bretton Woods agreement, and it was modified after the war in the light of economic realities, but it did provide a basis for post-war financial recovery. The prospects for an agreement are now very different.
The US is widely seen as the problem and not the cure, and consequently has problems in providing leadership. China is the world's major creditor, but its currency is not fully convertible and cannot as yet provide an alternative to the dollar; if it were to become convertible, it would probably appreciate which would reduce its export markets with serious domestic consequences as well as difficulties for the world economy. Equally, if the US took action to improve its balance of payments, reduce its budget deficit and improve domestic savings, it would buy fewer Chinese goods: ending American import-led growth would damage Chinese export-led growth. In both countries, readjustment poses serious domestic problems and could provoke protectionism. Can the Americans and Chinese reach agreement on how to manage this disequilibrium without mutual recriminations; and if they can, how can their decision be legitimated given the ‘democratic deficit’ in international bodies? Whether international bodies can provide a solution to the financial problems of the world is open to question, and at the very least raises issues about their representation of all interested parties. Will the G-7's Financial Stability Forum be forced to widen its membership to emerging countries; can G-20 find agreement among its own members and secure support from those who are not represented? At present, the signs are as much of tension as agreement.
The task of finding a solution to the international financial crisis is difficult enough, and will only be compounded by attempting to deal with trade at the same time. The financial deal at Bretton Woods was easier to strike than a deal on trade. Bretton Woods dealt with a more technical issue and the agreement was determined by two countries; the conference on trade was much more problematic, running from the initial proposals at the end of 1945 to the closing of the Havana conference in 1948 and the subsequent failure of the International Trade Organization (ITO). Many other countries had voice, and there were deep divisions over issues of development and distributive justice in the world economy which led to the failure of the ITO. Is there any reason to think that agreement will be easier to reach in the near future? In fact, there might be reasons for thinking it might be harder to achieve, despite the promises to restart the stalled talks of the Doha round of the World Trade Organization. By mixing together financial reforms and trade, it might be more difficult to resolve either set of problems: might it make more sense to compartmentalise them? Or does the financial crisis provide the incentive to resolve the deadlock at Doha and to prevent the emergence of protectionism which most countries see as a serious problem?
There are grounds for pessimism. The financial crisis has led to disillusion with open world economies and has intensified anti-globalisation sentiments. Joseph Stiglitz's critique of the Washington consensus in Globalization and its Discontents argues for reform of international economic institutions such as the World Bank and World Trade Organization which will be fairer to developing countries. He argues that institutional reform should be complemented by a shift in the ‘mindset’ of globalisation to take more account of cultural identity and values, in order to create ‘globalization with a more human face’. More recently, he has argued for a new approach to debt and a system of global reserves, proposals derided by his critics as utopian and implausible.Footnote 60 At the very least, these wider concerns will make solution of immediate issues very difficult. A serious recession threatens to intensify economic nationalism: a FT/Harris poll in July 2007, even before the crisis became so acute, found that in every country surveyed – whether liberal market economies in the US and the UK or in more controlled European economies – more people felt that globalisation was harmful than positive, with the possibility that populist politicians could exploit anti-globalisation rhetoric.Footnote 61 The main ground for optimism is that politicians will realise the dangers posed by a collapse of the global economy; it remains to be seen if their actions follow their statement of good intent.
In the first of these four addresses, I referred to the question of whether globalisation might go into reverse in the future as it did between the world wars. Commentators noted various concerns. Might currency misalignment between China and the US lead to the same sort of problems as occurred in 1971 when the dollar was out of line with the Deutschmark and yen? Was there a need to pay more attention to issues of global justice and to reforming the institutions of the IMF and World Bank, and World Trade Organization? Might economic nationalism again appear as a result of widening income inequalities? The general view of commentators when I started these lectures in 2004 was that there was no imminent prospect of a collapse of globalisation as occurred between the wars. Most economists were sanguine that international institutions would stop the worst excesses of beggar-my-neighbour policies which characterised the 1930s. They argued that there was nothing like the coherent oppositional ideology to globalisation of the interwar years, and no Asian equivalent of General De Gaulle who might use financial power to undermine the dollar. But were they being too confident? What Greenspan saw as creating more efficient markets – securitisation and financial liberalisation – has actually spread problems throughout the world and might lead to a backlash of economic nationalism. Larry Summers talked of the balance of financial terror: American budget and trade deficits and lack of savings were made good by Chinese holdings of US Treasury bonds. An optimist might hope that the Chinese holdings of American Treasury bonds are on such a scale that China could not allow the dollar to collapse, and the two countries might cooperate in action to resolve the problem by revaluing the Reminbi and reducing the American budget deficit and increasing domestic savings. But Summers was concerned that the trade deficit might lead to protectionism in America and to dependence on the political discretion of another country. The stakes in this game are now higher than ever, for China fears a loss of its export markets and consequent social instability; and the US has still greater problems in balancing its budget. Will mutual interest lead to a cooperative solution, or might there be a return to economic nationalism? Summers warned in 2004 that American reliance on import-led growth could not continue indefinitely, and hence the export-led growth of other countries could not continue. He warned that ‘the consequences of these adjustments being mismanaged are likely to be profound for the global integration process’ – and his warning is even more relevant as I deliver this lecture. What the outcome will be remains a topic for future members of this Society to consider.Footnote 62
