Steven Wright's book is more and less than its title suggests. It is more because it includes a chapter on U.S. foreign policy in historical and ideological perspective and a chapter on the origins and variations of political Islam. The book is less than a reader would expect from the title because its analysis is restricted to U.S. security policy toward Iraq and Iran. There are no chapters on Washington's Saudi Arabia policy or its relations with the five other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. That is disappointing because Steven Wright, a professor at Durham University and Qatar University, is a noted specialist on Bahrain and Qatar.
Wright's book is in many ways impressive and worthy of serious attention by academics, policymakers, and advanced students. It is likely to be too much of a challenge for the uninitiated general reader. Among the book's impressive characteristics are a twenty-two-page, single-spaced bibliography rich with respected academic references as well as copious U.S. government and United Nations document citations. It also features an excellent ten-page index, and each chapter is documented in great detail with scores of endnotes that are valuable to other scholars (included in the notes are references to the author's telephone interview with Anthony Lake, President Clinton's national security adviser).
In Wright's own words, “the purpose of this book is to provide an examination of U.S. foreign policy and its success in achieving geopolitical security in the Persian Gulf region from the post-Cold War era to the era of the War on Terror” (p. 1). Indeed, Wright examines U.S. policy well into the “era of the War on Terror” and develops throughout the book his central hypothesis that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted a fundamental revision of U.S. grand strategy and, in particular, its strategy for Persian Gulf security.
During most of the Cold War as well as the decade of the 1990s (under presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton), the American strategy for maintaining security and stability in the Gulf, and thereby maintaining U.S. access to oil and markets, was through a balance of power approach and deterrence of aggression by would-be Gulf hegemons or external actors. Wright's organizing thesis is that the essence of the transformation in U.S. strategy toward the Gulf, wrought by 9/11, was the strategic shift from balance of power realpolitik to a policy of democratization and U.S.-induced domestic reform within Gulf states. This post-9/11 strategy is premised on the assumption, according to Wright, that the “root cause” of the terrorist attacks, and indeed of Islamic extremism in general, was the lack of political participatory institutions within the Middle East and elsewhere, resulting in religious fanaticism as the only outlet for dissent. Because democratization would combat the root causes of terrorism, nothing less than a complete reordering of the political environment of the Middle East could provide for regional stability in the long term, though in the short term insecurity and instability are likely as transitions to democracy occur. In Wright's words, “For Bush, the 9/11 attacks marked an opportunity to restructure the world order” (p. 44). Wright acknowledges that this vision is exceptionally optimistic and ambitious and that a Wilsonian-style global moralism might prove counterproductive. Nevertheless, “the Bush Doctrine saw the promotion of liberal democracy as a national security requirement . . . because it was the very lack of democracy and freedom in given countries that resulted in the rise of political extremism and terrorist action” (p. 43).
The chapter on political Islam is arguably the most insightful and illuminating in the book. Wright surveys the often contradictory academic literature on the origins of political Islam and examines at length the question of whether Islam and democracy are compatible. The “accommodationist” school of analysis avers that the answer is yes but distinguishes between moderate and radical Islamists. The “confrontationalist” school, in contrast, sees inherent tension between democracy and Islam and indeed that Islamic political movements pose an existential threat to Western civilization. The author then considers evolving U.S. official perspectives on the question of compatibility, which have generally sided with the accommodationist school, though there have been ambiguities and inconsistencies in attempts to distinguish moderate Islamists from extremists and ambivalence over how to deal with the imminent or actual Islamist takeover of a democratic government by democratic means. Turkey is many analysts' favorite example of the compatibility of Islam and democracy. The tougher variant is an Islamic theocracy, as seen in Iran for example. Indeed, Wright ends his book on a cautionary note that “the greatest potential challenge faced in the Persian Gulf revolves around the Islamic Republic of Iran” (p. 207). Wright, of course, finished his book well before the Iranian election of 12 June 2009, but there are reasons for optimism that democracy (and moderation) can thrive, even in theocratic Iran.
The chapters on President Clinton and his administration's policies toward Iran and Iraq are thorough, detailed, and unlikely to stir much controversy. President Clinton fares rather well in Wright's estimation. However, the chapters on President George W. Bush's Iran and Iraq policies are more provocative demurrals—especially with respect to Wright's account and explanation of the Bush administration's decision and rationale to go to war against Iraq. Wright implies that the Bush administration knew that Saddam Hussein did not have a nuclear capability but nevertheless engaged in “scaremongering” to press the case for war. Even many of President Bush's detractors admit that there was a consensus among Western intelligence services that between 1998 (when U.N. inspectors were expelled from Iraq) and 2002 (when inspectors were readmitted) there was a strong likelihood and circumstantial evidence, including Saddam's own machinations, that Saddam had reconstituted his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and stockpiled nonconventional weapons (p. 175). Moreover, Wright implies that the most important Bush consideration in going to war with Iraq was not the putative WMD threat but the new Gulf strategy to defeat Islamic extremists by first democratizing Iraq: “the grand strategic premise of the United States was to promote democracy and liberalism as a means of countering extremist political Islam and terrorism . . . this was a key strategic objective which was arguably of more importance than the need to act preventatively against Iraq” (p. 178). Wright seems to be arguing that President Bush authorized the invasion of Iraq in order to set up the first “democratic domino” in the Middle East rather than out of an abundance of concern over a strongly suspected WMD threat. Yet there is a body of convincing evidence suggesting that President Bush went into Iraq precisely for the reason stated—to find and destroy WMDs—and that when such weapons were not found, the Bush ex post facto justification for the invasion was the overthrow of the tyrant Saddam and the establishment of freedom and democracy in Iraq, not some grandiose new democratization strategy for defeating Islamist terrorism.
In conclusion, Wright's central thesis regarding a “new definition of Gulf security” strikes this reviewer as overblown. No longer, apparently, are the instrumentalities of balancing power and deterring destabilizing actions to be relied upon for security in the Gulf. Rather, the:
prospects of achieving this new definition of Gulf security . . . revolves around the question of political reform in this region. The extent to which states reform themselves is thus the benchmark for . . . judging how much progress has been made towards achieving this new regional order of security and countering the challenge posed by radical Islam in the long term. Security in the region has thus descended to the domestic political level in the individual Gulf countries (p. 205).
Maybe “in the long term” is the key qualifier in the Wright quote. Meanwhile, perhaps Wright will agree that the way to promote Gulf security is both through balance of power/deterrence and democratization—but democratization achieved gradually, not by toppling governments. The United States cannot, or should not, take on any more Iraqs.
