Diplomacy

The non-use of force/peaceful settlement of disputes is one of the AU's core norms (see PSC Protocol Articles 4e, 4f, 4i; Williams Reference Williams2007). Diplomacy is therefore the PSC's first and preferred method for handling conflicts and crises. To facilitate peaceful settlements, the Commission chairperson has the power to select and deploy humanitarian observers, political and fact-finding missions, as well as high-profile individuals to serve as representatives of the AU, including senior leadership teams for peace operations as well as Special Envoys for particular crises or thematic issues.Footnote ³ Thirteen Special Envoys have been appointed since the PSC was established in 2004, nine of which focus on a geographic area while the others work on thematic topics, such as Women, Peace and Security, Children and Armed Conflict, and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The AU has tended to prefer deploying senior statespersons as envoys, which is meant to underscore the importance attached to the conflict in question. But it is also a sign of the AU's scarcity of capable and experienced individuals for these types of missions (Berhe & de Waal Reference Berhe and de Waal2015: 15). Mediation capacity has been a persistent weakness of the AU's diplomacy (Nathan et al. Reference Nathan2015).

Sanctions

Under Article 23 of its Constitutive Act, the AU can impose sanctions on its members for non-payment of dues and recalcitrant behaviour. The AU has usually employed the latter in response to cases of ‘unconstitutional changes of government’ (Engel Reference Engel2010; Omorogbe Reference Omorogbe2011; Dersso Reference Dersso2017).Footnote ⁴ Specifically, the AU has suspended what it considers illegitimate regimes from participating in the Union's formal activities and imposed targeted sanctions upon the perpetrators of unconstitutional actions. This has mostly occurred in response to the 14 coups d’état that took place in Africa between 2003 and 2014.Footnote ⁵ As Nathan has noted: since 2003, ‘the AU suspended the country subject to the coup in 91 percent of the cases and imposed sanctions in 73 percent of the cases’ (Nathan Reference Nathan2017: 2). Significantly, the threat and use of military force was not part of the AU's response in these cases. Burundi is thus a relatively rare case since although there was a failed coup d’état in May 2015, in October the PSC recalled articles 4 and 7 of the PSC Protocol to impose ‘targeted sanctions, including travel ban and asset freeze, against all the Burundian stakeholders whose actions and statements contribute to the perpetuation of violence and impede the search for a solution’ (AU PSC 2015d: para. 12).

Peace operations

Since 2003, the AU has commanded, authorised or endorsed over a dozen peace operations (see Williams Reference Williams2013; Badimus Reference Badimus2015; Williams & Boutellis Reference Williams2014; Williams & Dersso Reference Williams and Dersso2015; Berhe & de Waal Reference Berhe and de Waal2016; De Coning et al. Reference De Coning, Gelot and Karlsrud2016). These operations have ranged from tiny observer missions to over 20,000 troops (in the case of Somalia). They have been conducted by AU forces, regional organisations and ad hoc coalitions of states and have performed a variety of roles including ceasefire monitoring, electoral observation, peace-building, stabilisation and even counter-terrorism. Almost all of these operations were also mandated to engage in civilian protection activities (see Okeke & Williams Reference Okeke and Williams2017). With few exceptions, the complexity and significant costs involved in planning, deploying, sustaining and withdrawing these operations necessitated various forms of external assistance, notably in the areas of training, equipment, logistics and enabling capabilities as well as financial support. The principal external partners for these African peace operations have been the UN, EU, USA, France and the UK (see Gelot et al. Reference Gelot, Gelot and De Coning2012; Coleman & Williams Reference Coleman and Williams2017; Williams Reference Williams2017b).

Of most relevance to our study are cases where peace operations involved the threat or use of military force against an incumbent regime. So far, the AU has only endorsed such action in two cases and neither invoked Article 4(h): the Comoros (2008) and Gambia (2016/17). In March 2008, the AU launched Operation Democracy in the Comoros to end the illegitimate rule of the incumbent regime on the Comoran island of Anjouan. Spearheaded by troops from Tanzania and Sudan the operation forced the incumbent ruler Mohammed Bacar to step down after he had organised an illegal election in order to cling onto power. In this instance, the AU used military force to restore constitutional governance. The other case came in The Gambia in December 2016 following the electoral defeat of the ruling autocrat Yahya Jammeh. Here, the AU endorsed an ECOWAS military operation, ECOMIG, to ensure the election results were upheld and implemented, and that Jammeh's incumbent regime was replaced by the democratically elected president Adama Barrow (Williams Reference Williams2017a). In contrast to both the Comoran and Gambian cases, as we discuss below, in Burundi, the PSC's threat was made not to restore or protect constitutional governance but in order to protect civilians and prevent the escalation of armed conflict. The PSC's threat was to deploy a peace operation to Burundi under the command and control of the Eastern Africa Standby Force, but that decision was not implemented.

Article 4(h) intervention

When the AU adopted a qualitatively different approach to state sovereignty from its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Union entered into uncharted waters for deciding on the limits of sovereign responsibilities, the nature of non-interference, and the prerogatives of external actors. This was reflected in the AU's unofficial slogan, moving from an era of ‘non-intervention’ to one of ‘non-indifference’ to the continent's peace and security challenges (Williams Reference Williams2007; Sturman & Hayatou Reference Sturman, Hayatou, Engel and Porto2010). As part of this shift, and after protracted and controversial negotiations among African states, Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act granted the Union's Assembly of Heads of State and Government the right to militarily intervene in a member state in ‘grave circumstances’, defined as cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (Haggis Reference Haggis2009; Kuwali & Viljoen Reference Kuwali and Viljoen2014). Authorising an Article 4(h) military intervention requires the support of two-thirds of the member states in the AU Assembly.

Legally, Article 4(h) remains controversial. The AU's lawyers claimed it broke new international legal ground (Kuwali & Viljoen Reference Kuwali and Viljoen2014) and one prominent external analyst saw it as ‘a clear legal statement that sovereignty is to some degree subordinate to the authority of the AU’ (Hurd Reference Hurd2014: 251). Yet it appears to directly contradict established principles of the international law on the use of force, notably Article 53 of the UN Charter. It also generated political controversy within the AU, particularly concerning debates about how to respond to violence against civilians in Darfur (2004) and Libya (2011). In both cases, the AU decided not to invoke Article 4(h) despite recognising the existence of relevant crimes in both conflicts. Before the Burundi case discussed below, the only time Article 4(h) was invoked by the AU Assembly was to support the trial of the former President of Chad, Hissène Habré, on charges of political killings and torture of thousands of civilians between 1982 and 1990 (AU 2006). The PSC's threat to invoke Article 4(h) in relation to the crisis in Burundi in December 2015 thus remains a unique case.

The build-up to invoking Article 4(h)

Since at least late 2014, the AU engaged in preventive diplomacy to tackle what it saw as a foreseeable crisis in Burundi. This included several visits from the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui to discuss the country's upcoming elections (AU 2014; Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 2015: 7). The AU also supported the creation of a joint East African Community (EAC)-Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Panel of the Wise to defuse tensions (Nantulya Reference Nantulya2017). In March 2015, the Chairperson of AU Commission, Dlamini-Zuma visited Burundi and authorised the deployment of a high-level delegation, chaired by former OAU Secretary-General and former Togolese prime minister, Edem Kodjo, a member of the AU's Panel of the Wise, and former Senegalese foreign minister Ibrahima Fall (AU 2015a). The delegation was deployed in May (AU PSC 2015a; ISS 2015).

Despite this preventive diplomacy, the AU refrained from making any official statement against the Burundian President's run for a third, contested term in office. Although Burundi's Constitutional Court ruled in favour of Nkurunziza's third term in early May 2015, in a televised interview three days later, Dlamini-Zuma expressed doubts about the judgement and noted that it went against most other interpretations made of the Constitution and the Arusha Peace Accords (Vandeginste Reference Vandeginste2016: 7). But the AU did not officially subscribe to such an interpretation. Meeting on 14 May in the midst of what would be a failed coup attempt in Burundi, the PSC echoed the EAC's call to postpone elections (made at its Extraordinary Summit in Dar es Salaam that same day). The PSC also planned to deploy human rights observers and requested that the AU Commission undertake contingency planning for possibly deploying a peace operation to protect civilians in Burundi (AU PSC 2015b).Footnote ⁶ The force would become known as the African Protection and Prevention Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU) and was to be the AU's fallback option if the coup-related violence escalated into more significant armed conflict (Senior AU official, 5 January 2016, Int.).

Continuing with its initial diplomatic approach, the AU appointed a member of the former high-level delegation, Ibrahima Fall, as its Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region and head of a strengthened AU Liaison Office in Burundi (AU 2015b). However, the AU soon took a more critical tone towards Burundi's government. The PSC's next communiqué called for the immediate deployment of AU human rights observers and military experts (AU PSC 2015c) and the AU criticised Burundi when those observers were unable to deploy (AU 2015d). The delay was due to the Burundian authorities demanding special entry visas for the AU observers and experts (AU 2015e). As a result, the small, starting team only arrived in Bujumbura on 22 July. Meanwhile, on 28 June, the AU decided not to deploy election observers to Burundi, stating that ‘the necessary conditions are not met for the organization of free, fair, transparent and credible elections’ (AU 2015c).

Burundi's government ignored the calls to postpone the elections further and instead held them on 21 July. However, it was not until mid-October that the AU shifted from diplomacy to imposing sanctions. On 17 October, the PSC deplored the absence of an agreed Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and the Burundian authorities regarding the deployment of human rights observers and military experts, whose authorised number was increased to 100 (AU PSC 2015d). It also imposed targeted sanctions against Burundian stakeholders contributing to violence and requested vetting of Burundian defence and security forces that were participating in AU-led peace operations. In addition, the PSC demanded the African Commission on Human and People's Rights conduct an in-depth investigation of human rights violations within 45 days. It also ordered the AU Commission to finalise contingency planning for MAPROBU. It was this gradual transition from diplomacy to sanctions that opened up the option of invoking Article 4(h) once other instruments had been exhausted. We argue that this represented a new type of coercive diplomacy for the AU, which nevertheless faced significant challenges.

Coercive diplomacy: delivering an ultimatum

After using diplomacy and targeted sanctions, on 17 December 2015, the AU PSC (meeting at the ambassadorial level) delivered an unprecedented ultimatum to Burundi's government, backed by the threat of resorting to military force (AU PSC 2015e). However, Burundi's government rejected the PSC's ultimatum and within two months it was clear that the AU would not resort to military force. Instead, the PSC reverted back to utilizing a mix of diplomacy and targeted sanctions and the UN was given a larger role in dealing with the situation.

The 17 December PSC communiqué broke new ground by authorising a 5,000 strong peace operation – MAPROBU – to protect civilians in Burundi without first gaining the host government's consent. Specifically, the PSC issued an ultimatum to the government of Burundi: consent within 96 hours to MAPROBU's deployment or face the scenario of the PSC recommending that the AU Assembly deploy the force anyway under Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act. As with all PSC communiqués, this one was binding on all AU members (as set out in the AU Constitutive Act). Although Burundi was a member of the PSC at the time – and actually its designated chair for December 2015 – the council invoked Article 8(9) of the PSC Protocol (2002) to ask the Burundian delegation to remove themselves from the chamber during the substantive deliberations on the issue (Williams Reference Williams2015).

As noted above, Article 4(h) had previously only been invoked in support of the trial of the former President of Chad, Hissène Habré (AU 2006). Until the Burundi case, discussions of Article 4(h) in relation to military intervention had been rare and proved so politically toxic among African governments that the AU had never invoked it. The two most relevant previous cases where Article 4(h) ‘grave circumstances’ might have been used to justify military intervention were Darfur (2004/05) and Libya (2011). In both cases, powerful international actors raised the prospect of conducting a military intervention for civilian protection purposes without the host government's consent. In both cases, however, the AU Assembly refused to invoke Article 4(h) and responded via other mechanisms.

In the Burundi case, the communiqué set out MAPROBU's mandate as follows:

1. (a) prevent any deterioration of the security situation, monitor its evolution and report developments on the ground; (b) contribute, within its capacity and in its areas of deployment, to the protection of civilian populations under imminent threat; (c) contribute to the creation of the necessary conditions for the successful holding of the inter-Burundian dialogue and to the preservation of the gains made through the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi; (d) facilitate, in collaboration, as appropriate, with other international actors, the implementation of any agreement the Burundian parties would reach, including, but not limited to, the disarmament of militias and other illegal groups, the protection of political personalities and other actors whose security would be threatened; and (e) protect AU personnel, assets and installation. (AU PSC 2015e: para.13.a.ii)

The main drivers behind the timing of this communiqué were the reports of escalating violence that the AU was receiving from Burundi. These came from the AU human rights observers in Bujumbura and the returning fact-finding mission of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), which visited Burundi from 7–13 December (see ACHPR 2015). There was also growing anxiety inside the AU that the existing mediation plan was failing to produce the desired progress (Senior AU official, 5 January 2016, Int.).

Perhaps most importantly, on 11–12 December opposition forces attacked three military installations in Bujumbura and subsequently fled into various nearby neighbourhoods. Government forces followed them and carried out extrajudicial killings of numerous young men, some of whom they claimed were the attackers. There were also reports of several acts of sexual violence committed by the Burundian security forces. Estimates suggested that at least 87 people were killed (Amnesty International 2015; ACLED 2016). This was, by far, the single worst incident in terms of fatalities since the start of the crisis and raised the AU's concerns that a spiral of violence would escalate and increase the need to protect local civilians.Footnote ⁷

In this turbulent context, the PSC's principal goals in taking its 17 December decision were to facilitate a political settlement to Burundi's ongoing crisis and reduce the threat of armed conflict and violence against civilians. Importantly, the AU had no official rule on the issue of term limits for African presidents. Indeed, the AU cannot stop one of its members changing its constitution and the Union has banned only unconstitutional changes not consensual ones. As a result, the AU Commission decided not to focus its efforts on the issue of the presidential term. However, the AU was one of the guarantors of the Arusha Accords and so had a responsibility to help implement that peace agreement. The PSC also has a mandate to prevent armed conflict across Africa. The AU Commission therefore decided to focus on making sure that any attempts to change term limits in Burundi did not lead to violent conflict, which would trigger an AU role in terms of conflict prevention and civilian protection, but not necessarily from a desire to push democratisation (Senior AU official, 5 January 2016, Int.).

The threat of Article 4(h) intervention is abandoned

The PSC's 17 December communiqué represents a case of coercive diplomacy, i.e. it was a threat rather than a decision to launch a ‘humanitarian military intervention’.Footnote ⁸ The credibility of such threats can be enhanced if they are communicated clearly and consistently (the more actors voicing their support, the better), if the coercer has a reputation for following through, and if they possess the required material capabilities (see George Reference George1991; Byman & Waxman Reference Byman and Waxman2002; Art & Cronin Reference Art and Cronin2003). The AU struggled on each of these criteria and so the threat of an Article 4(h) intervention was always going to prove difficult to implement.

First, this was the first time the PSC had threatened to use military force against the wishes of a de jure host government in the name of protecting civilians and preventing the escalation of violence. Consequently, the AU did not have a strong reputation for carrying out such an unprecedented threat in Burundi.

Second, the threat was not communicated with complete consistency and clarity because the PSC failed to maintain a public show of unity. Perhaps most notable were the divisive public remarks of Tanzania's foreign minister, Augustine Mahiga. Before signing onto an AU press release supporting MAPROBU on 8 January 2016 (AU 2016a), Mahiga had publicly broken ranks with the PSC's 17 December decision, arguing that his country preferred a political settlement over the deployment of troops, which he believed would escalate the current crisis (Mwangonde Reference Mwangonde2015; Ubwani Reference Ubwani2015). In addition, in the midst of the AU Assembly meetings in late January 2016, Ibrahima Fall also shattered the PSC's public unity by arguing that the AU had never intended to forcibly intervene in Burundi and that the entire concept had been ‘unimaginable’ (New Vision 2016).

Third, the PSC's threat was weakened still further because of the complex layers of decision-making involved. Specifically, the PSC could only recommend that the AU Assembly consider authorising an Article 4(h) intervention. In addition, even if the AU Assembly had authorised such an intervention, in order to conform with existing international law on the use of force it would have required a UN Security Council resolution passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This is made clear in Article 53(1) of the UN Charter, which sets out the role of regional arrangements in the UN system, and Article 103 which establishes the UN Charter's standing over other international agreements, such as the AU Constitutive Act. This added yet another layer of uncertainty into the decision-making process: would the AU Assembly carry out what would probably be seen as an illegal use of force if it did not obtain UN Security Council authorisation?

Fourth, it was not clear that the AU could quickly generate and deploy the proposed MAPROBU force, which was authorised to consist of 5,000 military, police and civilian personnel (for general discussions of the challenges see Apuuli Reference Apuuli2016; Darkwa Reference Darkwa2017). This was partly because to deploy into Burundi, the EASF would obviously not be able to use the pledged units from Burundi (one infantry battalion and a formed police unit). Moreover, for political reasons, Rwanda's pledged infantry battalion, special forces, and some 260 police officers would also be unavailable (EASF 2014: 15; Wilén Reference Wilén2016b). There was also the problem that Tanzania's foreign minister had come out against deploying MAPROBU and Uganda and Kenya were already stretched, committing a combined total of over 10,000 soldiers to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Finally, there were also concerns about the AU's lack of finances, enablers and logistics capabilities, which were reflected in the PSC explicitly asking the UN for such support even in the event of a consensual MAPROBU deployment let alone a non-consensual one (AU PSC 2015e: para.13.a.iv).

Given these factors, it was not surprising that the AU Assembly decided not to employ the threat of force issued earlier by the PSC. This outcome unfolded in a series of meetings that led up to the 26th ordinary session of the AU Assembly in Addis Ababa, 30–31 January 2016 (see Dersso Reference Dersso2016).

The first relevant decision took place on 28 January, when the AU Executive Council oversaw Burundi's re-election to serve another two-year term on the PSC. Along with Chad, it was central Africa's uncontested choice for that two-year seat. This was an important barometer of the opinion of the region's governing elites (see below).

The next important meeting was on 29 January when the PSC met at the level of heads of state and government (AU PSC 2016). The meeting considered three issues: terrorism in Africa, and the crises in South Sudan and Burundi. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also attended the open session where he stated that the authorisation of MAPROBU had ‘sent a strong signal to the entire continent and the world that you will not stand by while the violence escalates and human rights abuses continue unpunished. I commend your decisive leadership’ (UN 2016). Most member states on the PSC, however, took a different view. The majority of them now deemed it inappropriate to send troops to Burundi without the government's consent and agreed it was prudent not to force the issue. Gambia's President Yahya Jammeh and Tanzania's Foreign Minister Mahiga made particularly strong statements against the need for MAPROBU, reflecting the majority view in the room (AU official, 4 February 2016, Int.; Dersso Reference Dersso2016: 7).

On 6 February, after more than a week of additional discussion between senior AU Commission personnel and the PSC members, the AU released the final text of the PSC's decision (AU PSC 2016). Having taken note of the Burundi government's rejection of MAPROBU, the heads of state at this meeting emphasised the importance of continuing the inter-Burundi dialogue under East African Community mediation led by Uganda but with AU support. The PSC decided ‘not to deploy MAPROBU because it considers it premature to send such a force to Burundi’. Instead, the PSC decided to dispatch a high-level delegation ‘to hold consultations’ with the Burundi government ‘as well as other stakeholders … on the inclusive Inter-Burundian Dialogue’.Footnote ⁹ Significantly, the delegation's mandate was expanded from a sole focus on the inter-Burundi dialogue – as expressed in the PSC communiqué of 29 January (AU PSC 2016) – to also include ‘the deployment of the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU), if accepted by the Government of Burundi’ (AU 2016b).

Hence by the time of the main event of the summit, the AU Assembly meeting which convened 30–31 January, the Assembly had decided the conditions in Burundi did not warrant the threat or use of force under Article 4(h). The necessary majority of member states against an intervention had formed during the informal consultations that took place in closed sessions involving heads of state and their small entourages.

Providing peacekeepers

Two days after the PSC invoked Article 4(h), the Burundian government organised a public campaign against MAPROBU arguing that deploying a peace operation could destabilise Burundi's sovereignty. Moreover, the government claimed that since Burundi provided thousands of peacekeepers to other countries it was an exporter of peace and not in need of foreign peacekeepers on its territory (Mbazumutima et al. Reference Mbazutumima, Bigirimana, Madirisha, Shaka, Hakizimana, Nkuruziza and Ngendakumana2015). The Burundian government also framed the AU intervention force as being about the Burundian military's capacity to protect its population, thus directing attention to the army, rather than the government. During several weekends, the ruling party CNDD-FDD held demonstrations in all provinces to ‘support the Burundian army’ and resist any foreign intervention (Madirisha Reference Madirisha2016). The army's peacekeeping role at home was also central in the Minister of Public Security's rejection of MAPROBU: ‘Burundi is one of the troop contributing countries in Africa and elsewhere … this is why Burundi is capable of ensuring the security of its population’ (Mbazumutima et al. Reference Mbazutumima, Bigirimana, Madirisha, Shaka, Hakizimana, Nkuruziza and Ngendakumana2015).Footnote ¹⁰

This was not the first time during the crisis that the Burundian government deployed this tactic. In May 2015, just days after the failed coup attempt, President Nkurunziza used the country's provision of peacekeepers to the African Union to divert attention from the political turmoil. Specifically, he claimed that owing to its peacekeepers in Somalia, Burundi faced a specific threat from the Somali Islamist movement al-Shabaab. This generated a derogatory response from an al-Shabaab spokesman who called the remarks ‘dumbfounding’ and denied any plans for attacks against Burundi (BBC News 2015b).

The Burundian government also clearly benefitted from its provision of peacekeepers to AU and UN operations, both economically and politically (Wilén et al. Reference Wilén, Birantamije and Ambrosetti2018). Economically, Burundi's peacekeepers generate important revenue through reimbursements for an otherwise impoverished army, especially in the current economic climate (International Crisis Group (ICG) 2017). The fact that the Burundian government has continued its regular deployment of troops in AMISOM in spite of the withdrawal of pre-deployment training from its bilateral partners France and the USA is evidence of the importance tied to its troop contribution (Reuters 2015). Politically, providing peacekeepers remains Nkurunziza's most important card against any foreign intervention force. First, it made the AU and other external actors reluctant to intervene in a country that maintains approximately 5,000 troops in AMISOM. Second, the AU is also unlikely to withdraw the Burundian troops because of the considerable security risks related to sending them back home during a period of domestic crisis. Perhaps most notably the army could fray along ethnic lines and soldiers would face economic hardship given their lost allowances from AMISOM (Wilén Reference Wilén2016b).

Burundian civil society, which has largely opposed the government, has also attempted to politicise Burundi's peacekeeping contributions. One example was a campaign on social media entitled ‘#bringbackoursoldiers’, which asked for the return of Burundian troops deployed to AMISOM (Ubwani Reference Ubwani2016). Launched on platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, its initial aim was to get peacekeepers to return home in order to protect the civilian population. However, as civil society continued monitoring domestic repression by the army and the police, the aim changed to asking the UN and the AU if these soldiers (who allegedly committed crimes in their own country) were appropriate for the task of restoring peace and stability in other states (Wilén et al. Reference Wilén, Birantamije and Ambrosetti2018). In response, the UN repatriated, for example, Colonel Baratuza, spokesperson for the FDN who had been appointed Deputy Spokesperson for the UN peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). This followed civil society organisations contesting his nomination to the UN mission based on his declarations related to the attacks on military camps in Bujumbura on 11–12 December 2015 (Fouchard Reference Fouchard2015).

The regional dimension

Burundi's location in a region where leaders have repeatedly ignored term limits undoubtedly strengthened President Nkurunziza's hand and reinforced the decision to reject MAPROBU. In particular, the appointment of President Yoweri Museveni as the EAC's mediator in Burundi gave an indication of how its members saw Nkurunziza's bid for a third term. Museveni, East Africa's longest-serving head of state, who changed Uganda's constitution in 2003 and banned regulations on presidential term limits, won a contested fifth term in early 2016, extending his 30-year rule (BBC News 2016). It was thus clear from the start that Museveni was unlikely to tackle the root of Burundi's current crisis and question Nkurunziza's right to a third term in power. However, it is notable that a leaked report from a meeting between the EAC attorneys and ministers of justice and constitutional affairs on 15 May 2015 stated that ‘Nkurunziza is not eligible to seek re-election for another term’ (The Insider 2015). The EAC members never publicly addressed the findings of that report.

Interestingly, Rwanda's president, Paul Kagame, initially implicitly advised Nkurunziza to step down and refrain from a third term at a symposium in Switzerland in early May 2015 (Kenya Today 2015). But as discussions intensified regarding a possible change of the Rwandan constitution authorising Kagame to stay in office until 2034, Kagame stepped back from discussions regarding Nkurunziza's third term and was also absent from the second EAC meeting in Dar es Salaam following the failed coup attempt in Burundi in mid-May (RFI 2015). Discussions about the forthcoming Rwandan referendum regarding the constitutional change took place amidst accusations of Rwandan support and training of Burundian rebel groups (Buchanan Reference Buchanan2015; Kelley Reference Kelley2015). While tensions between the two countries grew, the question of Nkurunziza's third term was carefully avoided. Indeed, the accusations of Rwanda's support for Burundian rebels increased Nkurunziza's leeway because it diverted attention from his government's role in the crisis while simultaneously providing justifications for suppressing internal opposition groups. That President Kagame's alteration of Rwanda's constitution following a contested referendum (McVeigh Reference McVeigh2015; Rwanda Constitution Art. 172) and then an equally flawed electoral victory (BBC News 2017) drew no significant criticism from African states underlined the region's disregard for presidential term limits.Footnote ¹¹

The two remaining members of the EAC, Tanzania and Kenya, kept relatively low profiles during the crisis, despite Tanzania becoming host to more new Burundian refugees than any other country (Essa Reference Essa2015). Initially, President Kikwete called on Burundi to abide by the Arusha agreement that limited presidents to two terms in office before Nkurunziza announced his third term (Nimubona Reference Nimubona2015). However, in late May, the Tanzanian leader changed position, pushing instead for a government of national unity (Kendemeh Reference Kendemeh2015). This new, conciliatory approach was maintained and most likely reinforced by the new President Magufuli's increasingly autocratic rule in Tanzania (Jennings Reference Jennings2016). Kenya remained silent on Burundi's crisis, largely because of Nairobi's other priorities, notably concerns about stability during its upcoming elections and its war against al-Shabaab and other militant organisations.

In neighbouring DR Congo, President Kabila successfully delayed elections using various stalling tactics from early 2015 (ICG 2015; Allen-Ebrahimian 2017). He also avoided commenting on the Burundian crisis. Indeed, Kabila's effort to retain power benefitted from Burundi's crisis, which diverted significant international attention during a crucial period of election preparations in DR Congo (Anderson Reference Anderson2017). Silence from the neighbouring leaders on the principal cause of Burundi's crisis is further evidence of the regional trend of autocrats refusing to give up power (Wilén Reference Wilén2016a).