Kevin Thompson's book is a remarkably clear and precise contribution to Hegelian studies. The main aim of the text is to analyse Hegel's philosophy of right in the light of its systematic framework, dwelling mostly on the paragraphs of the ‘Introduction’ to the Elements of the Philosophy of the Right and the pages of the 1817 Encyclopaedia that provide their systematic background. Even though this is an old problem, in recent years it has been treated only selectively; Thompson, by contrast, analyses the issue in a philologically meticulous and theoretically competent way, providing arguments with which future works on Hegel's philosophy of right must necessarily deal.
Given its purpose, the work focuses mainly on methodological and structural problems. Thompson's intention is to examine ‘the science of right's method of justification and the categories that govern its specific claims and theories’ (3). The book is composed of three chapters, respectively titled ‘Method’, ‘Freedom’, and ‘Right’.
The chapters are preceded by an introduction where Thompson clarifies what he means by ‘normativity’, namely the ‘feature of institutions, principles, practices, and states of affairs that provides us with reasons to comply with what they command’ (4). In light of this, he proposes two main theses: (i) in so far as Hegel's philosophy of right questions the status, source and justification of this binding force, it is a theory of normativity; (ii) this theory is articulated in a systematic rather than representational form. ‘Representation’, Thompson recalls, denotes for Hegel a form of knowledge that takes its method and objects as unproblematized givens. The systematic form, on the other hand, subjects itself and its contents to a continuous work of self-justification, which thus leaves no room for presuppositions. One of the most interesting aspects of these introductory pages—and actually of the whole book—is that Thompson uses this distinction in reference not only to Hegel's philosophy of right, but also to its interpretations: for him, all ‘nonsystematic’ readings, i.e. those that separate the philosophy of right from the overall systematic framework, and ‘nonmetaphysical’ readings, i.e. those that separate the philosophy of right from Hegel's account of the nature of reality, are representational, since they take for granted those historical institutions or linguistic practices that they appeal to in order to interpret Hegel's philosophy. For Thompson, however, ‘it is only by remaining faithful to the core ambitions of Hegel's philosophical project […] that the cogency and value of his claims for us now […] can be properly assessed’ (9).
The three chapters that make up this volume thus seek to develop the ‘systemic-metaphysical’ thesis according to which Hegel's theory of normativity has both epistemological and ontological scope, in the sense that it consists as much in a method of justifying our practical knowledge as in an account of social reality and agency. The first chapter analyses the methodological aspects of Hegel's philosophy of right, which for Thompson can be summarized in three interrelated principles—(i) ‘immanent development’, (ii) ‘necessary entailment’, and (iii) ‘retrogressive grounding’—whose precondition is the demonstration of the systematic approach itself (26). It is on the basis of this account of justification that Thompson reads the philosophy of right as normative in scope. As he sums it up: ‘Normativity, in short, is a product of the systematic structure of the science of right’ (15).
The second chapter can be understood as a more detailed explanation of the latter statement, namely, the way in which the epistemological character of systematicity determines ‘right’ as the ontological ground of freedom. To this end, Thompson focuses on the concept of ‘individuality’, which, for Hegel, is able to realize the two basic conditions of the free will, very aptly called by Thompson the ‘Self-Determination Condition’ and ‘Objectivity Condition’ (46). The structure of individuality thus establishes that ‘the will must, through reflection, posit itself as its own end and express its affections by making freedom itself objective, by making autonomy real’ (48). Thompson analyses this issue, addressing first the ‘motivational’ problem of what drives an individual to act in a certain way (47). Following the ‘moral psychology’ developed in the Encyclopaedia, he identifies practical feelings, impulses and passions as the primary sources of human action. These elements must nevertheless be mediated by the universality of the will. But on what basis can it do this? This is where something comes into play that Thompson calls the ‘measure of freedom’ (53). The main problem is to show that the will, in organizing its sources of action, does not impose itself from outside on a given material, but works immanently. This work consists in a reflexive ‘purification’ of impulses and desires, which overcomes their immediate form, while preserving their normative content (57). Hegel thus conceives of freedom as self-determining will, i.e. as autonomy.
Unlike many contemporary constructivist readings of Hegel's philosophy of right (such as those of Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard), Thompson argues—in my opinion, correctly—that for Hegel ‘autonomy alone is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of freedom. To be truly self-governing, the will's determinations must be objective as well’ (63). The third chapter of the book is therefore dedicated to the concept of ‘right’, understood as the space within which freedom is realized objectively. Again, Thompson's analysis appeals to Hegel's conceptual tools to define the interpretive model to be employed. In particular, he criticizes some influential readings of the philosophy of right, here labelled as ‘culturalist’ (67), which conceive of objective spirit in terms of shared linguistic practices or intersubjective conditions of mutual recognition; in so far as they presuppose the existence of society and its rules, these readings are for Thompson representational. Hegel's philosophy of right, on the other hand, is a systematic theory. This is further clarified by the analysis of two central issues of his philosophy of right, which Thompson calls ‘the Axiom of the Hierarchy of Right’ (AH), and ‘the Master Argument of the Science of Right’ (MA). AH summarizes the idea that the more a determination of right realizes freedom in a concrete and universal way, i.e. enables an agent to self-determine herself in society, the higher its normative position, namely its binding force. It is for this reason that the domain of ethicality has a superordinate function. But what justifies this hierarchical order? The answer is provided by MA, which shows how the unfolding of the concept of right must first lead to the domains of abstract right and morality, and, because of their contradictions, finally be realized in ethicality.
In the ‘Conclusion’, Thompson tries to show how the distinction between representational and systematic accounts of normativity can also be relevant for the elaboration of a critical theory of society. To this end, he affirms that it is possible to differentiate between ‘systematic and extra-systematic functions of reason’ (86); the latter of which can be identified in several prefaces and introductions, where Hegel's writing is primarily polemical and propaedeutic. The aim of these texts is to familiarize the reader with those universal principles and cultural-historical issues that are essential for systematic understanding. Thompson's conclusions can be summarized in two points: first, in the prefaces and introductions, Hegel takes on the role of ‘public philosopher’; and second, by this role he adopts ‘a clearly reformist, rather than revolutionary or conservative, approach’ (90). Thompson thus means to demonstrate that Hegel's philosophy of right can be conceived of as a ‘hermeneutic critique’ (95) according to which social reality is evaluated on the basis of its capacity to promote freedom, so that, in cases where the historical conditions are not up to this critique, the public use of reason can propose necessary reforms.
To conclude this overall reconstruction, I would like to focus on two issues. The first concerns the fact that Thompson (like Robert Brandom) assumes a strictly deontic interpretation of normativity, namely as a ‘binding force’ that determines ‘our moral, legal, and political duties’ (4). But he thereby neglects its axiological dimension, that is, the values and goods that agents and institutions must pursue. In my view, Hegel's account not only implies both of these dimensions (after all, one of the key notions of his philosophy of right is that of the ‘living good’, i.e. the whole of social reality, which constitutes the ‘foundation’ and the ‘motivating end’ of individual agency). It also combines them in an extremely interesting way that deserves further examination.
A second issue concerns Thompson's ‘use’ of Hegel's philosophy of right. As stressed above, one of the main merits of the volume lies in the fact that it turns Hegel's arguments against current interpretations. However, the analysis and argument would have been more effective if this same strategy had been used towards some contemporary philosophical problems beyond the Hegelian debate. Thompson's strategy offers a completely immanent reading, which takes Hegel's account of rationality as valid and then tests its coherence within his philosophy of right. In my opinion, a valuable opportunity is missed to prove not only the consistency of Hegel's practical thought, but also its efficacy for current philosophy.
Nevertheless, I believe that these limits do not compromise the argument's power provided in this volume, which is a work of undoubtedly high profile. The clarity and readability of Thompson's prose, as well as the detailed reconstruction of notoriously difficult texts, make it a valuable contribution not only for Hegel scholars, but also for all those interested in what we could call practical meta-philosophy.
