Over the past several years, scholars of American Political Development (APD) have revised their characterization of the early American state. Rather than a “weak” state, recent scholarship demonstrates that the federal government shaped national development and territorial expansion in ways that were often less visible than traditional theories predicted, but were nevertheless quite powerful (e.g., Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight, 2009; Paul Frymer, Building an American Empire, 2017). While this work has dramatically improved our understanding of the early national state, APD has been less attentive to one of the strongest institutions in antebellum America: the US Army.

With the publication of William D. Adler’s excellent book, Engineering Expansion: The US Army and Economic Development, we now have a comprehensive account of the army as an institution of state power from 1787 until the Civil War. Adler analyzes how the army contributed to rapid economic growth by maintaining public order and providing “a variety of collective goods well in advance of market-generated demand” (p. 1). Although this is primarily a work of historical synthesis, Adler skillfully gathers evidence from a variety of secondary sources and legislative records, which he supplements with archival documents from the Office of the Secretary of War.

Adler begins by considering the army as an institution of coercive control in the “core”—the densely settled areas of the East—and the frontier “periphery” of the West and South. He argues that the army preserved order in the core during the fragile early days of the republic by enforcing the rule of law during various domestic insurrections such as the Whiskey Rebellion of the 1790s and Rhode Island’s Dorr Rebellion.

In the periphery, the army expanded national boundaries through territorial conquests, such as the Mexican American War, and through campaigns of terror to dispossess Indian nations of their lands. More, perhaps, could have been said about the efforts of indigenous leaders to frustrate the army’s plans, but it is clear from Adler’s account that the army represented a strong and direct form of state power.

Although much of this history is well known, Adler reveals how the construction and maintenance of military forts were central to this effort. Army forts protected nascent communities from perceived threats, making the frontier a more attractive place for White settlers. These garrisons also supported the frontier economy by purchasing food and supplies from the newly arrived homesteaders. Perhaps most important, the presence of this visible form of state power fostered the loyalty of distant settler communities to national authority in Washington.

Adler is not the first scholar to recognize the importance of forts in the history of frontier settlements, but his careful empirical analysis of their placement demonstrates how these garrisons led directly to settler population growth. As he argues, the War Department “sited forts in locales where no one had yet settled or in strategic locations along routes that settlers might use when heading westward” (p. 97). The army, in other words, largely determined the location of White settlements and trails to the West through the construction of forts, rather than following settlers across the frontier.

The military’s coercive power may be familiar to many readers, but its role as a “socioeconomic actor” probably is not. Even scholars versed in the history of early America will likely be surprised to learn of the army’s central role in infrastructure development. Indeed, the army was the only institution in early America able to provide the technical expertise needed for these projects. As Adler shows, it was the military academy at West Point, not a private institution, that trained most American engineers in the early nineteenth century. These army engineers designed the roads, canals, and harbors that spurred economic expansion in the East and facilitated settlement in the West. Some of these engineers later left the military for private industry and became key figures in the design and construction of railroads.

Adler details how three army bureaucracies, which became redoubts of technical expertise, were largely responsible for this essential infrastructure: the Corps of Engineers, the Topographical Bureau, and the Ordnance Department. The Corps of Engineers managed the construction of canals and bridges, while the Topographical Bureau surveyed vast lands in the West. Its maps plotted the locations for future settlements and identified the mineral resources to be exploited by these new arrivals. Some of the so-called topogs even became famous for their efforts to open new lands for settlement. For example, John C. Frémont’s detailed surveys inspired Brigham Young to bring his followers to Utah. Others followed Frémont’s maps to the Pacific Northwest along a popular route that became known as the Oregon Trail.

It wasn’t only in the periphery that the army contributed to economic development. Army experts also stimulated early American industry. As Adler shows, the leaders of the Ordnance Department began to exercise tight control over arms manufacturing after supply problems during the War of 1812. Their innovations included the use of interchangeable parts in armories, an idea that later contributed to the development of the Colt revolver.

This book also investigates the political control of these highly capable engineering agencies. In doing so, Adler offers a critique of Daniel Carpenter’s (The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy, 2001) characterization of early American bureaucracy as a “clerical state.” By contrast, Adler argues that the army showed evidence of “conditional autonomy,” which he describes “as existing when the principal is either ignorant of or chooses not to become involved in agent actions” (p. 114).

Political control of the army was often tenuous, particularly in the periphery. To be sure, this was mainly due to communication difficulties that required army officers to make decisions without authorization from Washington. But in some cases, officers simply took advantage of this situation to further their own agendas, such as when Andrew Jackson seized Florida in 1818, forcing the Monroe administration to negotiate its transfer to the United States.

Jackson’s actions notwithstanding, the army’s autonomy was rarely due to officers going rogue. Rather, Adler argues, it came from the expertise, reputation, and the long tenure of key figures, especially the engineers and topographers. Chief among them was John J. Abert, who served as the chief topographical engineer from 1829 to 1861.

During his time in office, Abert fought for greater independence from the Corps of Engineers, and he convinced the Secretary of War to give the bureau independent status in the War Department in 1831. Yet this autonomy, Adler shows, was conditional on the topographical bureau’s ability to remain studiously apolitical. After Abert backed a southern route for the transpacific railroad, the topographical corps was drawn into a sectional battle that cost it the support of key members of Congress.

Any scholar of APD, institutional development, or military history will benefit from a close reading of Engineering Expansion. Students, in particular, will find Adler’s book to be an excellent guide to current scholarly debates in APD. Although many questions remain about the army’s role in early America, Adler’s concise volume should inspire further studies of this long-neglected institution of American state building. As Adler demonstrates so persuasively in this fine book, it is time for APD to bring the military back in.