In October 1941, officers of the Slovak Army’s Rapid Division (Rýchla divízia) were photographed by war correspondent Jozef Cincík as they strolled, smiling and conversing, along the embankment in Mariupol.Footnote 1 This photograph is emblematic of Slovakia’s involvement in the German-led campaign on the Eastern Front. The city, with its Illich Metallurgical Works and the Azovstal steel complex, represented a strategically significant industrial and transport hub and its capture facilitated Army Group South’s advance towards Rostov-on-Don and the Caucasus. The swift progression of the German Blitzkrieg, supported by allied contingents, reinforced the fascist Axis governments’ expectation that the Soviet Union would fall within weeks. The irony, however, lay in the fact that the Slovak State – established on 14 March 1939 as a dependent satellite of the Third Reich – had maintained formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union until just three and a half months prior to the episode on the shores of Mariupol. As the leadership of one of Europe’s youngest states had already discovered, however, strategic calculations in Bratislava were ultimately subordinate to Adolf Hitler’s decisions.
The Slovak State was a direct product of Nazi aggression and the partition of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. Its subordinate status was codified in the Treaty on the Protective Relationship (Schutzvertrag) of 18/23 March 1939, which obligated Bratislava to conduct both domestic and foreign policy ‘in close harmony with the interests of the Reich’ and, in effect, under conditions of virtually total dependency.Footnote 2 Less than six months later, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact fundamentally reshaped the international environment. The Catholic–nationalist Hlinka Slovak People’s Party (Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana; HSĽS), which still monopolised power in autumn 1938, were now faced with a series of dilemmas. Not only did they have to navigate this altered geopolitical constellation, but they also had to engage with a partner that they had recently condemned as the mortal enemy of Christian civilisation, justify this abrupt reorientation to domestic audiences and, ideally, derive tangible benefits from these new circumstances.
This article re-examines the brief alignment between the ‘double cross’ and the ‘hammer and sickle’. In focusing on this episode, it contributes to broader comparative debates on fascist–Axis Slovakia and Axis regimes by paying particular attention to their paradoxical alliances and pragmatic accommodations.Footnote 3 As the article demonstrates, Slovak foreign policy was categorically non-sovereign and the Slovak State’s external orientation was entirely subordinated to the interests of the German Reich. The trajectory of Slovak–Soviet relations confirms that their very emergence was contingent upon the conjunctural ‘thaw’ in Soviet–German ties following the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Despite this structural dependency, Slovak elites used numerous mechanisms to exploit international conditions with their goal of expanding their own political power. Leaders of the HSĽS, I argue, notwithstanding their ideological hostility to the Soviet Union, invested genuine hope in cultivating a Bratislava–Moscow axis that could partially offset Germany’s constraining grip on Slovak sovereignty.
In addition, the article refines understandings of Slovak–Soviet relations by interrogating the regime’s own claim that rapprochement with the Soviet Union was motivated by a tradition of Slavophilism, in particular a Russophilia. I critically examine whether lofty references to the ‘brotherly Russian nation’, portrayals of the Soviet Union as an exclusively Slavic state and broader ideas of Slavic reciprocity that were rooted in nineteenth-century intellectual currents had any substantive influence on strategic decision-making.Footnote 4 Rather than driven by Russophilia, the HSĽS’s overtures to Moscow primarily reflected their quest to overcome international isolation by opening channels to a second emerging global power centre. While ‘Russophilia’ has often been employed in Slovak historiography as a catch-all label for cultural or political affinities with Russia, this article treats it more narrowly as a discursive resource that was mobilised by political elites, as opposed to a stable ideological position.Footnote 5 In this sense, Russophilia functioned less as a genuine conviction and more as a rhetorical strategy that was mobilised under shifting geopolitical circumstances. By disentangling Russophilia as ideology from Russophilia as pragmatic discourse, the Slovak case illuminates how elites in small states used identity markers to legitimise otherwise paradoxical diplomatic alignments.
Although the article focuses on Slovakia, it offers a new perspective to scholarship on Soviet diplomacy, German foreign policy and techniques of dominance over satellites in this period. Following Gabriel Gorodetsky’s classic account, I suggest that Stalin’s foreign policy was a form of Realpolitik and oriented towards well-defined geopolitical interests.Footnote 6 This rational calculus made space for ideological compromises and accommodation with the Slovak State, which Soviet leadership regarded as largely insignificant. Contrary to Slovak expectations, Moscow regarded Slovakia as only peripherally important from a strategic point of view and never intended to cultivate a substantive partnership. Regarding Slovakia as a German dominion, the Soviet Union pursued no coherent policy towards the country and instead adopted a wait-and-see approach, a pattern Geoffrey Roberts has demonstrated in other arenas where the Soviets lacked pressing strategic interests.Footnote 7 Even the absence of Soviet enthusiasm for this ‘paper friendship’ does not exclude its short-term utility. On the contrary, the seemingly incongruous alignment underscores Ingeborg Fleischhauer’s observation that Soviet decision-making on the eve of war was ‘highly complex and full of contradictions’, shaped not so much by ideological determinism as by pragmatic flexibility.Footnote 8
The article situates the Slovak case within broader debates on the international politics of fascist–Axis regimes and the agency of small states under hegemonic control. Recent scholarship has emphasised that local fascisms were not only domestic ideological projects, but also co-producers of a broader international network that was animated by diverse motivations and ideological compromises.Footnote 9 In this regard, Slovakia offers a revealing example of what may be termed constraint-driven fascism: a political system rhetorically committed to uncompromising anti-Bolshevism, yet compelled by its geopolitical position to engage in opportunistic diplomacy with the Soviet Union.
By situating the Slovak case within discussions of fascist internationalism and the adaptability of ideology to external factors, the article also contributes to recent literature that emphasises the transnational entanglements of fascist regimes over their purely domestic trajectories – studies that, as Raul Carstocea points out, have advanced our understanding of the global fascist mosaic as a creative co-production grounded in symbiosis, rather than on outdated ‘big brother–centred’ comparisons.Footnote 10 The study thereby offers a conceptual lens that highlights how ideological radicalism coexisted with tactical engagement in the context of hierarchical subordination. While analogous patterns of pragmatic accommodation towards the Soviet Union can be observed in other Axis-aligned states – most notably Hungary’s oscillation between hardline anti-Bolshevism and tactical restraint, or Bulgaria’s attempt to preserve formal neutrality towards Moscow – the Slovak case represents an analytically distinct extreme, given the near-total subordination of its foreign policy to German strategic priorities.
Any analysis of Slovak–Soviet relations during the period of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact must proceed from the well-established historiographical consensus that the Slovak State emerged as not a fully autonomous political actor but rather a by-product of Nazi Germany’s dismantling of Czechoslovakia.Footnote 11 This was formalised through the Schutzvertrag of March 1939, which embedded Slovak foreign policy within a framework of institutional dependence to Berlin. This article does not seek to revise that interpretation; instead, it takes the conditional and asymmetric Slovak–German relationship as its starting premise. Slovak elites were acutely conscious of this dependency. Their limited scope for action was shaped by not only the formal restrictions imposed by the Reich but also persistent anxieties regarding Germany’s long-term ambitions in Central Europe, conceptualised by Nazi officials as a Kernraum (core area).Footnote 12 These anxieties were both structural and political. At a structural level, Slovak leaders feared that Hitler might ultimately privilege Hungary – whose territorial claims and strategic value within the Axis remained significant – over continued support for the project of Slovak statehood.Footnote 13 Politically, internal rivalries within the HSĽS further hampered coherent diplomatic action, as competing factions sought to demonstrate loyalty to Berlin.Footnote 14
It is within this context of constrained sovereignty that Slovak overtures towards the Soviet Union should be situated. The brief attempt to cultivate relations with Moscow represented not a viable alternative to German dominance but rather an illusory strategy of diversification pursued under specific conditions. Hopes that engagement with the Soviet Union might partially offset Germany’s hold over Slovak decision-making were not grounded in a realistic assessment of Soviet intentions or power relations. Instead, they reflected a recurring pattern observable in small Axis states that operated under hegemonic pressure: the search for symbolic, cultural or diplomatic counterweights that were capable of marginally improving their bargaining position without altering the underlying structure of dependence.
Framed in this way, Slovak–Soviet relations can be understood as a limited, and ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to mitigate Slovakia’s dependence on Nazi Germany through diversifying its foreign policy alignments through engagement with a power of growing international stature. The temporary rapprochement with Moscow was enabled by a conjunctural alignment of great-power interests, yet its scope, limits and eventual collapse were decisively shaped by Germany’s turn against the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. The Slovak case thus illustrates how gestures of apparent autonomy were themselves conditioned by dependency, which produced foreign policy initiatives that were pragmatic in intent but structurally constrained and ultimately ineffective.
This article draws primarily on research conducted in Slovak archival collections, including diplomatic correspondence of the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, internal memoranda of the HSĽS leadership, police and administrative reports and records of the Slovak legations in Berlin and Moscow. These materials are complemented by contemporaneous press coverage (notably the daily Slovák), personal diaries and memoirs of key political actors and selected Soviet diplomatic documentation where available. By combining official state records with mediated public discourse and ego-documents, the article seeks to reconstruct both the structural constraints shaping Slovak foreign policy and the discursive frameworks through which rapprochement with the Soviet Union was interpreted and justified.
Perceptions of the Soviet Union in Slovak Politics and Society before the Pact
In early summer 1919, the HSĽS newspaper Slovák cautioned its readers: ‘Slovaks, the homeland is in danger – your common patrimony – so hasten to defend it. Do not be misled by the socialists: they are a corrosive element and the seedbed of Bolshevism.’Footnote 15 These warnings reflected the acute anxieties triggered by the advance of the Hungarian Soviet Republic’s forces following clashes with the Czechoslovak Army and by the short-lived Slovak Soviet Republic, an experiment initiated by the Hungarian Bolsheviks.Footnote 16 For the HSĽS – the dominant Slovak political party throughout the 1920s and 1930s in Czechoslovakia and a self-proclaimed bulwark against Marxism – these episodes, together with the Polish–Soviet War (1919–21), crystallised a durable perception of Bolshevism as a destabilising force in Central Europe. For the ľudáci (HSĽS politicians and supporters), Bolshevism came to embody a profound civilisational and political threat, one that was interpreted through religious, national and anti-socialist lenses. This interpretive framework remained remarkably consistent across the inter-war decades, even as the broader European geopolitical landscape was reshaped after Hitler’s rise to power.
The HSĽS’s hostility towards the Soviet Union culminated in its vehement criticism of the Czechoslovak–Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 16 May 1935, which formalised diplomatic and military ties.Footnote 17 At its seventh congress in Piešťany in September 1936, the party passed a resolution declaring opposition to ‘materialist ideology and Judeo-Bolshevik anarchy’, symbolically aligning itself with the international anti-communist camp of Christian nations.Footnote 18 While conspiratorial in tone, adopting the antisemitic trope of ‘Judeo-Bolshevism’ – a concept embedded in modern political antisemitism and popularised across Europe amid widespread antisemitic sentiment by authoritarian and fascist movements – this position represented continuity rather than rupture.Footnote 19 The party’s younger generation had long embraced radical and conspiratorial rhetoric, and such language constituted a staple of its political communication.Footnote 20
Few observers could have anticipated the dramatic reversal that awaited the HSĽS within three years, when, as the sole governing party of a nominally independent state, it was compelled to adjust to a reconfigured international order. Recognised by dozens of states but not by Western democracies (including France, the United Kingdom and the United States), the Slovak State entered the diplomatic arena on 14 March 1939. The Soviet Union withheld recognition, interpreting the breaking up of Czechoslovakia as a consequence of German expansionism, and adopted a cautious, tentative stance. Foreign Affairs Commissar Maxim M. Litvinov communicated to the German ambassador to Moscow Friedrich von Schulenburg that the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia and the subordination of Slovakia to Nazi interests violated the ‘true will of the Slovak nation’.Footnote 21 Soviet leaders, however, understood that the fate of small states depended less on popular will than on great-power calculations. Their posture effectively deferred a final decision and preserved the possibility of the eventual establishment of diplomatic relations. Slovak Foreign Minister Ferdinand Ďurčanský’s request for de jure recognition thus went unanswered, though Moscow avoided issuing a definitive rejection.
Public perceptions of the Soviet Union in Slovakia were characterised by ambivalence, but the available sources do not allow for a systematic reconstruction of popular attitudes towards the Soviet Union in a sociological sense. What can be observed instead are mediated representations as they circulated through party-controlled newspapers, administrative and police reports, diplomatic correspondence and retrospective testimonies. These materials capture perceptions that were filtered through institutional and discursive frameworks instead of unmediated social experience. Moreover, as historian Dagmar Čierna-Lantayová has aptly observed, assessing the extent of ostensibly ‘pro-Soviet’, or ‘pro-Russian’, attitudes within society is complicated by the fact that such positions did not necessarily reflect any genuine emotional affinity towards the Soviet Union or its policies. Instead, they often functioned as a symbolic point of reference for resistance to Nazi Germany and for anti-German sentiments, which intensified exponentially from 1942 onward.Footnote 22 Moreover, Slovak society was far from homogeneous. Regional, social, confessional and ethnic differences shaped encounters with political discourse and international developments in uneven ways. Therefore, rather than accurately measuring public opinion, the available sources allow us to examine how state institutions and political elites interpreted, monitored and instrumentalised perceived shifts in attitudes under changing geopolitical conditions.
References to ambivalence should thus be understood analytically, as opposed to statistically. They point to the coexistence of contradictory representations – entrenched anti-Bolshevik hostility, pragmatic accommodation and residual romanticised images of Russia – within official discourse and administrative observation. Acknowledging these limits clarifies the scope of the argument and underscores the extent to which perceptions of the Soviet Union functioned as a political and discursive resource, with limited relation to any stable societal consensus.
Prior to the transformative events of 1938/39, Slovaks’ knowledge of the Soviet Union was mediated mostly through the press. Depending the upon political orientation of a given newspaper, articles included either idealised depictions of the ‘workers’ and peasants’ paradise’ or, conversely, emphasised poverty, repression and the restrictive nature of Soviet society. At the same time, a romanticised nineteenth-century image of Russia as the ‘mighty oak’ sheltering all Slavs persisted in segments of the public imagination and was perpetuated by figures of the Slovak national revival such as Ján Kollár, Ľudovít Štúr and Svetozár Hurban Vajanský, despite the limited empirical basis for such notions.Footnote 23 Slovak discourse on the Soviet Union tended to ignore the country’s multi-ethnic character and regard it as an exclusively Russian or Slavic state. Because of this, certain segments of the Slovak population saw the Soviet Union as a potential leader of a broader protective Slavic alliance against Nazi expansionism.
Beyond governments and political movements, non-party civic associations also played a role in shaping perceptions of the Soviet Union. The League Against Communism, founded in 1928 in Bratislava, functioned primarily in opposition to the Comintern and maintained connections with White émigrés, though its influence gradually diminished.Footnote 24 In contrast, the Union of Friends of the Soviet Union, which was established in 1931 by young left-wing intellectuals of the Dav circle, pursued economic and cultural connections with the Soviet Union.Footnote 25 This was primarily done through the organisation of study trips to the Soviet Union, through which the organisation sought to counter the country’s negative reputation within Slovak society.Footnote 26 Writers such as Ján Poničan, Peter Jilemnický, Vladimír Clementis, Ladislav Novomeský and Eugen Löbl all visited the Soviet Union as part of these trips and subsequently published enthusiastic accounts. Yet these experiences were usually limited to carefully curated stays in Moscow, whereas life in minor towns and rural areas was concealed from the visitors.Footnote 27
Despite these initiatives, the vast majority of Slovaks had no experience of the Soviet Union.Footnote 28 In 1941, only 231 registered Slovak citizens resided in the country and approximately 100 of them ended up in Soviet territory because of the annexations of 1939–40 (eastern Poland, western Ukraine and Belarus, northern Romania and the Baltic states).Footnote 29 A significant portion of this group consisted of Slovak Jews living in multi-ethnic Lviv. Notably, no Slovak citizens were registered in Moscow. There could have been greater numbers of Slovaks living in the country, but those who had migrated to the Soviet Union during the 1920s–30s on the basis of ideological convictions are harder to trace because many became Soviet citizens.Footnote 30 As a result, first-hand experiential knowledge of Soviet realities remained structurally limited and socially fragmented. The small number of Slovaks residing in the Soviet Union, many of whom had become Soviet citizens or found themselves in annexed borderlands, had only minimal capacity to shape perceptions in Slovakia itself. Consequently, Slovak views of the Soviet Union were formed less through sustained social contact and more through mediated representations – travel writing, political journalism and ideological discourse.
Regional variation further complicates any attempt to generalise Slovak perceptions of the Soviet Union. For example, perceptions differed markedly in eastern Slovakia. This region was characterised by greater ethnic and religious diversity – including sizeable Greek Catholic communities as well as a substantial Jewish population – higher levels of poverty and direct exposure to the consequences of multiple territorial rearrangements. Here, unfulfilled personal expectations, long-term disappointments, layered and conditional regime loyalties and economic and infrastructural marginalisation intersected with local realities that could not be fully subsumed under centrally produced media narratives in Bratislava.Footnote 31
Administrative and situational reports occasionally alluded to such regional differences, particularly in border districts where cross-border contacts, rumours and expectations circulated more intensely. Yet these observations remain fragmentary and shaped more by the priorities of state surveillance than by systematic inquiry. For this reason, the present study does not attempt to reconstruct a regional history of perceptions, which would require a different methodological framework and source base.
Taken together, the available evidence suggests not a coherent or stable societal attitude towards the Soviet Union but rather a spectrum of politically and regionally conditioned perceptions. On the ideological right, entrenched anti-Bolshevism – often couched in civilisational and religious language – framed the Soviet Union as a destructive and alien force. On the left, particularly among intellectual circles, selective admiration was cultivated through curated encounters and mediated representations. Regional and social differences further complicated these perceptions, as borderland experiences, confessional diversity and socio-economic conditions shaped exposure to international developments in uneven ways. Yet despite this diversity, one structural feature remained constant: for the overwhelming majority of Slovaks, the Soviet Union was a distant and largely abstract entity. As a result, the Soviet Union functioned in Slovak public discourse less as an empirically grounded reference point and more as a symbolic construct – alternatively idealised or demonised – onto which competing political projects invested their own ideological expectations.
From Furious Enmity to a New Starting Line
Following the declaration of Slovak independence on 14 March 1939, Slovak diplomacy lacked any coherent policy towards the states to the east. The Schutzvertrag imposed strict diplomatic constraints and the newly created Foreign Ministry was preoccupied with constructing a basic diplomatic network throughout Europe. Consequently, Bratislava followed the course dictated by its protector, which was consistent with the HSĽS’s long-standing anti-Bolshevik position that had crystallised during the preceding decades. Despite differences in the nature of the regimes of the HSĽS and the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP), the two converged on their perception of the Soviet Union as an enemy.
The HSĽS-led regime was established in autonomous Slovakia in October 1938, which at the time was still within the Czecho-Slovak Republic. One of the regime’s first measures was the systematic curtailment of communist influence: the immediate ban on the Communist Party, the prohibition of the communist press and a ban on the screening of almost all Soviet films in cinemas.Footnote 32 In the very first weeks following the establishment of the Slovak State, Bratislava hosted an anti-Bolshevik exhibition, which was attended by thousands of visitors who were exposed to propaganda imported directly from Germany.Footnote 33 The dramatic reorientation of German–Soviet relations in the second half of 1939 therefore generated deep unease. Although preliminary signals had been evident – and the Slovak press, on the Reich’s instructions, had gradually softened its anti-Bolshevik rhetoric over the summer – the announcement of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact nonetheless came as a profound shock. The HSĽS daily Slovák described it as ‘the greatest sensation since 1918’.Footnote 34
Slovák reproduced German communiqués rather than providing its own commentary. On 25 August 1939 it published Joachim von Ribbentrop’s statement on leaving Moscow without comment, declaring that ‘Germany and Russia fared ill when they were enemies and well when they were friends’.Footnote 35 Even Berlin presented the pact as a pragmatic necessity, and in Bratislava it was interpreted as a positive development that might halt the destabilising border revisions that had repeatedly harmed Slovak interests as well as territorial integrity.Footnote 36 Among the advocates of rapprochement was Foreign Minister Ferdinand Ďurčanský, who regarded diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union as a means of enhancing Slovakia’s international standing and mitigating its dependence on Germany.Footnote 37 Soviet diplomats even referred to an informal ‘Ďurčanský group’ around the minister.Footnote 38 Yet despite his intelligence and legal expertise, Ďurčanský’s international inexperience led him to miscalculate. His eagerness to cultivate partners beyond German tutelage – albeit pursued in broader contexts – contributed to the removal of the thirty-three-year-old head of Slovak diplomacy in July 1940.Footnote 39 Nonetheless, the German embassy did not object to the toned-down press image of the Soviet Union, which aligned with Berlin’s own tactical adjustment.
The first symbolic step in recasting the Soviet Union’s public image appeared in Slovák two days before the invasion of Poland in the form of an ode to the Kremlin. The article, effusive in tone, extolled ‘Mother Moscow’, ‘Great Russia’ and the ‘renowned Kremlin’, invoking a vocabulary of civilisational grandeur and cultural continuity. Significantly, the Soviet Union was rhetorically collapsed into ‘Russia’, with little acknowledgement of its multinational composition. This conflation reveals the extent to which Slovak political discourse relied on inherited cultural imaginaries rather than on a differentiated understanding of the Soviet state. Rather than advancing explicit theological arguments, the text mobilised elevated and quasi-sacral imagery that contrasted sharply with earlier portrayals of the Soviet Union as a barbaric and anti-Christian power. The text concluded by recalling that the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact – ‘which stirred the whole world’ – had been signed in the Kremlin and inaugurated a new era.Footnote 40 The results of the pact soon became clear: Poland was invaded by Germany on 1 September and by the Soviet Union on 17 September, with Slovakia contributing militarily in a symbolic fashion.Footnote 41
The HSĽS press reflected this enforced adjustment. On 3 September 1939 Slovák featured Molotov’s speech that justified rapprochement with Germany and cited Stalin’s earlier pledge to consolidate peace ‘with all states’. This superficial reconciliation provided both sides with the opportunity to reconsider their hitherto unestablished bilateral relations.Footnote 42 On 14 September 1939, the Slovak envoy in Berlin, Matúš Černák, acting on Ďurčanský’s initiative, met his Soviet counterpart Aleksandr A. Shkvartsev, who immediately reported to Moscow and requested instructions. The following day Molotov indicated readiness to recognise Slovakia and de jure recognition followed on 16 September 1939.Footnote 43 The protests of former Czechoslovak envoy Zdeněk Fierlinger’s proved futile: his legation was closed, and he was permitted to remain in Moscow only as a private individual.Footnote 44 In the aftermath of Poland’s rapid defeat – an operation in which Slovakia had participated from the outset – few could yet foresee the far-reaching consequences for international politics that would become apparent within two years. The Slovak government publicly celebrated Moscow’s recognition as a diplomatic triumph, despite the persistence of critical voices. Karol Sidor, the Slovak envoy to the Holy See and an outspoken critic of Bratislava’s politics under his former rival Jozef Tiso’s leadership, noted in his diary: ‘And this is called going “in the spirit of Andrej Hlinka” . . .Footnote 45 Now they’re all in the same sack. Their principles have been hung on a peg!’Footnote 46
The unlikely alliance binding together officially Christian and anti-Bolshevik Slovakia with both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union required urgent rhetorical justification. Slovák relied heavily on materials distributed by the Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, Germany’s state press agency. Poland – which had previously been held up as a model under Sidor’s editorship – was now summarily discredited: ‘The Soviet Army marched across Poland’s eastern borders into this country of irresponsible nobles to draw a heavy line under its history . . . . May Slavophiles learn from this fall and cease serving sick, nation-destroying ideas.’Footnote 47 According to this article, responsibility for Poland’s collapse lay not with the aggressors but with the ‘decadent plutocracies’ of the United Kingdom and France, whose alliance system had ‘encircled’ both Germany and the Soviet Union, allegedly forcing them into the ‘logical liquidation of an artificial state’.Footnote 48
HSĽS propaganda further rationalised this paradox through a lucidly antisemitic contribution by Clément Haraoui, a French-Arab professor based in Prague, who argued that the main obstacle to German–Soviet rapprochement had been ‘Jewish Russia’. Only after Stalin’s ‘de-Judaisation’ of the Soviet Union – by which Haraoui meant the removal of leading Jewish communists from their positions – could a ‘rebirth of nationalism’ and hostility towards Russia’s ‘age-old enemies’ (Poles, Britons and Jews) occur.Footnote 49 The replacement of Litvinov by Molotov symbolised this transformation.Footnote 50 In this way, the alliance of a Christian anti-Bolshevik regime, Nazi Germany and the communist Soviet Union was discursively justified. Internal doubts within the ruling elite found no public expression under a system that was premised on the monopoly of a single truth.
Between Enforced Pragmatism and Naïve Russophilism
Once the psychological barriers to rapprochement had been cleared, both sides proceeded with initial practical steps. President Jozef Tiso appointed his cousin, Fraňo Tiso, as envoy to Moscow, where he arrived on 11 December 1939.Footnote 51 On 2 February 1940, Grigorii M. Pushkin assumed his post as Soviet envoy in Bratislava, accompanied by Legation Secretary Kovalev.Footnote 52 At his credential ceremony at the Presidential Palace Pushkin proclaimed that ‘in view of the war in Europe, the establishment of relations between the Soviet Union and Slovakia transcends the interests of our two countries; it serves the cause of general peace and thus the interests of all peace-loving nations’.Footnote 53 The statement was emblematic of the paradox: the representative of a ‘peace-loving’ power – one that had recently invaded Poland (September 1939), attacked Finland (November 1939), and in the months that followed annexed the Baltic states (August 1940), and occupied Romania’s Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina (June–July 1940) – was now received cordially in Bratislava. Pushkin held discussions with leading Slovak officials, including President Tiso and Foreign Minister Ďurčanský, and departed with favourable impressions. He quickly discerned the boundaries of Slovak cooperation: a willingness to cooperate in economic, cultural and select political matters, but the categorical rejection of Bolshevik ideology, especially within a country that Germany regarded as firmly inside its sphere of influence.
Pushkin likewise made a positive impression on Tiso. As a Catholic priest, Tiso appreciated that the envoy avoided the rhetoric of militant atheism, promised to abstain from communist propaganda, referred to ‘Russia’ and the ‘Russian nation’ and even delivered several sentences in liturgical Church Slavonic during the meeting.Footnote 54 Yet Pushkin also warned Tiso that the Soviet Union could not be regarded as a genuinely Slavic state, since a notable share of its peoples were non-Slavic, and Slavic solidarity could not provide a foundation for bilateral relations.Footnote 55 Pushkin’s remarks punctured rumours, born of naïve Slavism, that the Red Army intended to seize Carpathian Ukraine (then part of Hungary) and open a ‘Slavic corridor’ to Slovakia.Footnote 56 In reality, Soviet strategic priorities lay elsewhere.
The months immediately following diplomatic recognition unfolded in an almost idyllic atmosphere. Leaders exchanged greetings on national holidays – 7 November for the Bolshevik Revolution and 14 March for Slovak independence – while the Slovak pro-regime press adopted a friendlier tone.Footnote 57 Anti-Soviet polemics largely disappeared, and sensitive aspects of Soviet politics were deliberately downplayed. Beyond elite politics, administrative reports even noted a rise in latent Russophile sentiment among the population, reflecting popular hopes that closer ties with Moscow might counterbalance the ubiquitous pro-German rhetoric of ‘fateful Slovak–German friendship’.Footnote 58
Two main dimensions defined Slovak–Soviet relations under the pact: geopolitics and economics.Footnote 59 On the geopolitical level, Bratislava sought Soviet support in shifting the Slovak–Hungarian border that had been imposed by the First Vienna Award and the so-called Little War armistice of 1938–9.Footnote 60 Ďurčanský again assumed the initiative, urging Pushkin in spring 1940 to consider the Soviet occupation of Carpathian Ukraine, which had been annexed by Hungary in 1938/39.Footnote 61 He argued that a common border would weaken German interference and curb Hungarian revisionism. Such proposals, however, misread Soviet ambitions. For Slovakia, stabilising its precarious international position was a perennial objective. Pushkin summarised Bratislava’s attitude succinctly in a report to Moscow: ‘The Slovaks probably expect more from us than we can give.’Footnote 62 His assessment was vindicated at Salzburg in July 1940, when Hitler, as already mentioned, forced Ďurčanský’s removal from his joint appointment as minister of foreign affairs and minister of the interior. He was replaced by Vojtech Tuka (minister of foreign affairs) and Alexander Mach (minister of the interior). Ďurčanský’s forced replacement marked a tighter alignment of the Slovak State with the Reich, the systematic enforcement of Nazi principles in both domestic and foreign policy and the end of any experiments in multi-vector foreign policy.Footnote 63
Cultural initiatives further reflected unfulfilled hopes for Slavic unity. In January 1940 a Soviet delegation led by Sergei V. Kaftanov, head of the All-Union Committee for Higher Education, attended Tuka’s inauguration as rector of the Slovak University and held meetings with Slovak officials and academics. Kaftanov’s subsequent report highlighted strong Slovak interest in educational and scientific cooperation, exemplified by requests for Russian-language textbooks.Footnote 64 The delegation avoided religious ceremonies but attended a performance of Musorgsky’s Khovanshchina at the Slovak National Theatre – an event that visibly unsettled the German envoy Hans Bernard, who left early.Footnote 65
Economically, relations with the Soviet Union carried symbolic weight. Because trade with the West had virtually been suspended, Slovakia’s commerce was heavily dependent on Germany (and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia as its integral part), which made access to the Soviet market attractive. Negotiations culminated in December 1940 with a trade and shipping agreement and protocols on the exchange of goods. Slovakia committed to exporting cables, electric motors, steel pipes and textiles, while the Soviet Union would provide cotton, grain and phosphates.Footnote 66 A joint trade commission was established in Bratislava. Despite these measures, the volume of trade remained modest: between January and June 1941, Slovak imports from the Soviet Union totalled 60.4 million Slovak crowns (1.7 per cent of overall imports), while exports amounted to only 15.2 million (0.5 per cent).Footnote 67 In practice, Soviet–Slovak economic exchange was minimal.
Slovak–Soviet Estrangement and a Return to Radical Anti-Bolshevism
From late summer 1940, following the enforced reshuffle of the Bratislava government and the Nazification of public life under the National Socialist wing of the HSĽS, Slovak–Soviet relations entered a phase of visible decline.Footnote 68 The Slovak police began to closely monitor the Soviet legation, recording visitors, checking their documents and often summoning them for interrogation days later. Moscow was well informed: in early September Deputy Foreign Commissar Vladimir G. Dekanozov complained to Slovak chargé d’affaires in Moscow Gejza Krno.Footnote 69
These practices marked the first serious rupture in an already-deteriorating relationship. As envoy Pushkin himself observed, the initiative for cooling of relations came from not Bratislava but Berlin, once again underscoring the scale of Slovak subordination. Germany regarded the growth of Slovak–Soviet contacts with suspicion. After the Salzburg humiliation of July 1940, Berlin made clear that the ‘Ďurčanský era’ of attempts at manoeuvring beyond German control was definitively over.Footnote 70 While accommodating Soviet expansion elsewhere during the Pact, Germany considered Central Europe – and Slovakia in particular – its exclusive preserve. Concessions to Moscow were intended to prevent rapprochement with Western democracies and redirect Soviet ambitions towards other regions (notably the Baltics), while discouraging Soviet interest in territories that were deemed to be vital to Germany’s war economy, including Slovakia with its armament industries and refineries.Footnote 71 The Soviet Union, aware of its limited leverage in Central Europe, attempted instead to spread disinformation to foster distrust within the fascist Axis. Soviet ambassador Shkvartsev even warned Černák in Berlin that Slovakia faced imminent threat from its own protector, an unfounded allegation at the time.Footnote 72
Bilateral relations cooled in tandem with a rise in German–Soviet tensions. When the newly appointed Slovak envoy Julián Šimko presented credentials to Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin in Moscow, he could not anticipate that his mission would end almost as soon as it began. The Axis invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 – which Slovakia joined alongside Germany – abruptly terminated his mandate.Footnote 73 Karol Sidor, a keen observer and commentator on international politics, aptly noted in his diary: ‘Today, Sunday 22 June 1941, is truly a historic day. A clash has begun, and no one knows how it will end for both worlds.’Footnote 74
Pushkin had already left Bratislava on 15 June 1941 for consultations and did not return; other staff departed gradually. Neutral Sweden assumed responsibility for Slovak interests in the Soviet Union after diplomatic relations were severed.Footnote 75 The break with Moscow, despite its evident costs, paradoxically brought relief to the Slovak leadership. On the one hand, Bratislava lost the partner that had allowed it to claim a semblance of balanced foreign policy. On the other, it shed the uncomfortable mask of formal comradeship with the ideological antithesis of the regime’s professed identity.
The Slovak government and press immediately adopted the Nazi explanatory framework. The invasion was presented as necessary to counter an alleged existential threat posed by Soviet policy and ‘subversive communist agitation’.Footnote 76 As in September 1939, roles of aggressor and victim were inverted: Germany and its allies were portrayed as waging a preventive, defensive war to forestall imminent Soviet aggression. This posture was echoed in official diplomacy: President Tiso telegraphed Hitler, pledging Slovakia’s participation in the ‘fateful struggle of the European community for justice and civilization’, assuring fidelity and invoking divine blessing.Footnote 77 Like other client regimes, the HSĽS framed Slovakia’s entry into the war as a prerequisite for participation in the post-war, German-dominated Neueuropa.
In the short term, the regime appeared comfortable in the role of victorious co-aggressor. Even if some leaders did not regard the war as their own, they embraced its civilisational framing. The notion of a ‘crusade against the Bolshevik hydra’ resonated with the Christian nationalist policy orientation cultivated by the HSĽS. The trope of a war against ‘Judeo-Bolshevism’ dovetailed with the regime’s escalating anti-Jewish policies and provided a rhetorical and moral justification for measures clearly contrasting the declared Christian values.Footnote 78 The logic was straightforward: if the struggle against ‘Judeo-Bolshevism’ was deemed legitimate on the Eastern Front, then so too was the fight against its supposed representatives at home – Jews and ‘Bolsheviks’. This logic culminated in the 1942 deportations, the renewed transports after autumn 1944 and the killings perpetrated by Einsatzkommandos and Slovak Hlinka Guard emergency squads following the suppression of the Slovak National Uprising.
The HSĽS regime’s decision to join the June 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union had multiple repercussions. Over the next three years, roughly 100,000 Slovak soldiers (out of a population of 2.6 million) rotated through the Eastern Front.Footnote 79 Upon their return, they disseminated first-hand accounts of what they had witnessed. Many described the horrors of Bolshevism – abandoned corpses of prisoners and civilians executed by retreating NKVD units – but more frequently emphasised extreme poverty: peasants living in near-medieval conditions, destitute civilians and barefoot children begging for coins or selling wild berries to survive. Deeply religious Slovaks were also disturbed by the sight of Orthodox churches converted into communist culture houses, with icons replaced by portraits of Lenin, Stalin, Marx and Engels.Footnote 80
Although difficult to establish empirically, such oral testimonies may have shaped the political behaviour of the Slovaks in the post-war period. In the last free elections before the communist coup held on 26 May 1946, the Democratic Party secured an overwhelming victory in Slovakia with 61.43 per cent of the vote, far ahead of the Communists (30.48 per cent).Footnote 81 In contrast, the Communists triumphed in the Czech lands, where the population had not undergone this kind of direct ‘contact with Bolshevism’ (the Protectorate’s government army, considered unreliable by the Germans, had not served on the Eastern Front).
Slovak soldiers also bore witness to another dimension of violence that was suppressed by regime propaganda: the beginnings of the Holocaust by bullets prior to the introduction of industrialised extermination in gas chambers. Beyond mass executions of Jews, they could not ignore atrocities committed against local Slavic populations – peoples who had initially, paradoxically, welcomed the invaders as liberators. Such genocidal practices against fellow Slavs raised profound questions about the credibility of the proclaimed ‘new just Europe’ and whether the Nazi Übermensch project might one day turn against the Slovaks themselves. Reports from the period suggest that Slovak society gradually recognised the discrepancy between the rhetoric of ‘friendship for all time’ and the assimilationist logic underpinning Hitler’s vision for Europe after the purported Endsieg.Footnote 82
Conclusion
The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union cemented Slovakia’s dependence on Nazi Germany more profoundly than ever before. The vision entertained by some HSĽS elites of creating a ‘second Switzerland’ in both economic and foreign policy terms proved entirely illusory.Footnote 83 Moscow never renewed relations with Bratislava; a temporary suspension became permanent. Less than a month after Operation Barbarossa started, on 18 July 1941, the Soviet cabinet recognised Edvard Beneš’s Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London and the legitimacy of the so-called Provisional State Establishment (Dočasné státní zřízení), thereby formally nullifying its earlier recognition of the Slovak State on 16 September 1939.Footnote 84 In 1945, the war’s conclusion brought down HSĽS rule and restored the Czechoslovak Republic, re-establishing its state authority in practice.
The brief 1939–41 episode of Slovak–Soviet relations did not originate in genuine bilateralism. Rather, it was the product of German strategic design and not the free choice of two equal actors. Formally independent, Slovakia’s foreign policy most clearly revealed the structural limits of its sovereignty and the extent of its subordination to the German Reich. The relationship with the Soviet Union, awkward from the outset, collapsed before it could assume a substantive form. Its trajectory illustrates the theatrical nature of Slovak diplomacy: the decision to establish relations with Moscow, the scope of their limited development and their abrupt termination were all dictated by German foreign policy. This corroborates contemporary assessments within the Slovak Foreign Ministry that ‘Berlin counts on the stability of the Slovak State and cares about it’, yet such ‘stability’ was defined exclusively in accordance with German, not Slovak, interests.Footnote 85
The case of Slovak–Soviet wartime relations underscores the validity of the rebus sic stantibus principle: international obligations remain binding only insofar as the conditions under which they were concluded persist. The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact enabled Slovak–Soviet recognition, but once it collapsed, so too did the bilateral relationship. The Slovak case demonstrates that for small states whose very existence was derivative of great-power arrangements, the durability of international agreements was especially tenuous. Recognition, trade agreements and diplomatic rituals proved meaningful only while the continental geopolitical constellation sustained them. When those conditions shifted, Slovakia’s commitments were rendered void practically overnight. This episode also raises broader questions about fascism as both ideology and practice in the context of small-state dependency. The HSĽS, a ruling party of Axis Slovakia, defined itself ideologically as an uncompromisingly Christian, anti-Bolshevik and nationalist movement and, from the summer of 1940 onward, also nominally aligned itself with National Socialism. Yet within months, the same leadership celebrated diplomatic alignment with the Soviet Union (an openly atheist and internationalist power), invoked a vocabulary of Slavic reciprocity and muted its anti-communist rhetoric. The paradox illustrates the pliability of fascist ideology when confronted with the imperatives of survival under hegemonic domination. The anti-Bolshevik paradigm was not dismantled in 1939 but merely bracketed under conditions of German–Soviet rapprochement. Its rapid and almost frictionless restoration after 22 June 1941 demonstrates that the ideological core of the regime had remained intact throughout the period of diplomatic accommodation.
At the same time, this pragmatism entailed tangible costs. The attempt to reconcile ideological hostility with opportunistic engagement exposed the regime’s vulnerability and its lack of autonomous agency. For a satellite state, the official ideological positioning operated less as a coherent doctrine and more as a flexible tool for mobilisation and legitimisation. The Slovak case thereby illuminates the enduring tension within pro-fascist Axis regimes between doctrinal purity and political expediency. In practice, ideological rigidity yielded to strategic fluidity, revealing its capacity to accommodate pragmatic compromises even with ideological opponents.
In a comparative perspective, Slovakia can thus be regarded as a prime example of a regime whose pro-Axis orientation was shaped by structural dependency and external constraints: a regime rhetorically committed to civilisational struggle (or, in Jozef Tiso’s words, into Adolf Hitler’s ‘great family of nations’), yet compelled by its structural position to engage in opportunistic diplomacy with its proclaimed mortal enemy.Footnote 86 This duality – ideological radicalism combined with pragmatic accommodation – was not a contradiction but rather a constitutive feature of politics in some other small states aligned with the Axis, too.
The Slovak State was not unique in its oscillation between ideological hostility and contingent friendship towards the Soviet Union.Footnote 87 Hungary, while retaining greater sovereignty, likewise oscillated between anti-Bolshevik radicalism and concessions under German pressure. Bulgaria attempted to preserve neutrality in its relations with Moscow, revealing yet another modality of dependency politics.Footnote 88 Romania and the Independent State of Croatia, in contrast, displayed more openly hostile positions towards the Soviet Union.Footnote 89 In this comparative light, Slovakia may be considered a control case: a satellite with virtually limited sovereignty, where ideological flexibility was most clearly dictated by external imperatives. Such a juxtaposition underlines the diverse strategies through which small or dependent states navigated the paradox of fascist ideology and diplomacy in the Axis orbit.
By framing the Slovak case as an instance of constraint-driven fascist–Axis regime, this article demonstrates that ideological rigidity was a malleable repertoire that could be adjusted to survive under conditions of submission.
This case study thereby refines prevailing understandings of fascism and small-state politics. First, it demonstrates that fascist ideology in satellite regimes was not a fixed set of immutable principles but a flexible political toolkit: capable of recalibrating from uncompromising anti-Bolshevism to diplomatic accommodation of Moscow without undermining its self-image and ideological continuity. Second, it reveals that even heavily constrained small states exercised modest but genuine agency. Slovak elites experimented with multi-vector strategies and discursive resources in order to expand their autonomy. Third, the article reconceptualises ‘Russophilia’ as not a stable ideological commitment but rather a pragmatic and fluid discourse that was mobilised to legitimise paradoxical alignments. Finally, in comparative perspective, Slovakia functions as an example that highlights how structural dependency shaped the oscillation between a hardline stance and adaptive diplomatic behaviour more clearly than in many other Axis satellites. Taken together, these arguments demonstrate that ideological flexibility and politics were not anomalies but rather constitutive elements of transnational fascist interactions.
Competing interests
This work was supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency under the Contract No. APVV-24-0359.
