Contemporary democracy, despite all the good it brings, is marred by the constant stream of injuries it perpetrates against the very citizens it aims to benefit. Witness the recent failure of democracies to rein in the forces of unfettered capitalism, the resulting financial crisis, and the human suffering that has followed. Or consider the recurring tendency of democracies toward unbridled militarism at tremendous cost to the human (and animal) lives they claim to be protecting. These are just two among many examples of the damages that result from democracy's daily workings. How can theories of democracy account for, come to terms with, and respond to these persistent and recurring harms?
This question captures the attention of the two works reviewed here. Despite different emphases and concerns, both authors deny that these harms can be viewed simply as failures of democracy in the real world to reach its ideal potential. Both reject the notion that these wrongs are antithetical to democracy. Instead they present them as constitutive of democracy and work to articulate the conception of democratic action that necessarily follows. For John Medearis, the result is a conception of democratic action that involves constant struggle and resistance against these harmful yet inevitable forces. For Steven Johnston, the inevitability of democracy's violence requires us to embrace a tragic public philosophy that appropriately memorializes, accounts for, and responds to these harms. Reading their work in tandem raises pressing questions about the potential for and limits of democratic action in the face of these persistent wrongs.
Why Democracy Is Oppositional. Medearis urges us to think of democracy “not as ideal, de novo decision making but as continual struggle to recapture and redirect many of the institutions and forces we have already created and are always recreating” (91). This puts movements and activism at the heart of democracy and highlights their absence from or awkward fit with other democratic theories. The targets of his critique are deliberative and elitist conceptions of democracy. While Medearis focuses on classic presentations of deliberative theory with little attention to its more recent systemic turn, his argument that the two traditionally opposed conceptions of democracy, deliberative and elitist, share similar shortcomings is largely persuasive. Whether protected from coercion or reserved for elites, Medearis shows how both seek to “wall off” democracy from the actions of movements. Both also conceptualize democracy as an institutional arrangement focused on decision making, despite deep disagreements on the competency of citizens to engage meaningfully in those institutions; this again sidelines and disregards other forms of democratic action and the actions of movements in particular.
In response, Medearis offers a theory of human action and alienation that places movements at the heart of democracy. He draws on Dewey, Bourdieu, Giddens, and Bhaskar to present human agency and action as both reflexive and structured. Human actions for Medearis are not fully planned out; intentions instead arise within a process of critical reflection on already occurring experience. Agency's reciprocal relationship with social structure enables and constrains action while it is at the same time reproduced unintentionally. This unintentional reproduction results in alienation, which for Medearis is a universal phenomenon that all participate in and experience, although they do not contribute to, or suffer from, its consequences equally. Relations of domination, oppression, and exploitation divide agents and situate them differently with respect to alienation. And this, for Medearis, is the source of democracy's inevitable harms as well as the key to democratic action. While he points to Marx and Dewey, who have also stressed a link between alienation and democracy, he is critical of their “utopian temptations” (10). For Medearis democratic action is a constant and never-ending struggle against alienation, not a fight that can ever be won once and for all. But it is one that must be waged nevertheless.
To illustrate his account of alienation and democratic action, Medearis highlights economic alienation and its consequences including the financial crisis, the “Walmart economy,” and the labor practices associated with global production. This is helpful in unpacking the complexity and difficulty of placing blame for counterdemocratic forces in our politics because it shows how widely (even if not equally) responsibility is shared for the reproduction of dominating, oppressive, and exploitative forces in our everyday lives. For example, the financial crisis is the culmination of actions on the part of homeowners, mortgage lenders, financial institutions, regulators, elected officials, and others, but their contributions to, and suffering as a result, are not distributed evenly. Medearis is not so much focused on blame or holding specific actors accountable for these harms as he is concerned with the way these harms limit our autonomy and with the repertoires of action available to reassert democracy in response to them.
Medearis turns to the council movements of World War I to present a model of oppositional democratic action and in so doing makes clear that alienation has more than just an economic face. The councils formed by sailors, soldiers, and workers in Central Europe at the close of World War I worked at democratizing what had become over the course of the war (and importantly, in part as a result of their own action and cooperation) the most hierarchical institutions of society: the military, the bureaucracy, and the factory. In this case, the socially reproduced forces working against democratic self-management take the form of militarization. For Medearis this shows that democratic action works in opposition to these forces not only, or even centrally, through voting and deliberating, but more importantly through “all of the activities that are part of the hard work of resisting alienation, from marching, to agitating, to striking, to building organizations, to publicizing and debating, whether these are undertaken by movements or not” (12). He also shows how his conception of oppositional democracy builds on and departs from participatory, agonist, and fugitive theories.
Finally, Medearis turns to the question of the state and its role in reproducing and challenging alienation. Given that the state is “perennially prone to alienation” (13), how should democratic movements respond? To explore this, and to exemplify yet another face of alienation, Medearis examines the welfare state's propensity to reproduce race and gender hierarchies. He concludes, consistent with his rejection of an ideal/nonideal divide in democratic theory, that oppositional democracy involves struggle both with and against the state; while this will never eliminate the state's alienating role, a direct and contentious orientation towards the state can, at times, compel it towards more democratic social relations. In an epilogue with a notably more pessimistic and defeatist tone, Medearis confronts the alienating power of the contemporary security state epitomized by surveillance practices, drone warfare, and private military contractors. While far less certain that oppositional democracy can overcome the barriers to mobilizing citizens to challenge these forces, Medearis drives home the urgent need to embrace an oppositional conception of democracy that affirms the capacity of citizens to do so.
American Dionysia. Johnston argues that, contrary to conventional perspectives that see violence as antithetical to democracy, violence is in fact constitutive of democracy. Democracy requires a tragic public philosophy to come to terms with this reality and to minimize, or at least better manage, its harmful effects. Johnston turns to Machiavelli, Nietzsche, Weber, and Camus to uncover a largely unexamined tradition that draws attention to “the tragic dynamic at the heart of democratic politics” (20). These thinkers highlight that from the founding of a polity to its dissolution—and everywhere in between—there is a continuous stream of often violent harms that result from the pursuit and achievement of well-intended ends.
Johnston's turn to tragedy is juxtaposed against what he sees as its primary alternative: patriotism. Building on his own earlier work and the disparate perspectives of Simon Stow and Richard Rorty, Johnston offers a scathing critique of the way patriotism operates to render citizens unthinking and blind to democracy's harms or tragic consequences. He reviews an array of well-intentioned but, in his view, ultimately unsuccessful attempts to come to terms with democracy's violence. Among these are theories of constitutional patriotism, Rousseau's reflections on democracy and violence, John McCormick's concept of Machiavellian democracy, John Keane's treatment of violence and democracy, and Danielle Allen on democratic sacrifice. While he draws insight and direction from each, in the end he argues that they all come up short because they do not depart enough from patriotism and therefore fail to fully embrace a tragic perspective.
Johnston illustrates his claims about democracy and violence through a wide range of methods. To illustrate the violence at the root of democratic founding he turns to readings of American Western films like Who Shot Liberty Valance and Shane, and to clarify his conception of a tragic orientation towards democracy's violence in the context of war, he turns to war films as disparate as First Blood and Zero Dark Thirty. His readings of Bruce Springsteen's Wrecking Ball album and tour and the film The East present images of violent reprisal for economic and environmental injustices that stress the potential and pitfalls of democratic violence. He examines American memorials, rituals, and official speeches marking both the Vietnam War and September 11th to expose current practices of narcissism and denial and also to highlight the few available models for an alternative tragic approach (the Kent State memorial, the Thuy Bo memorial in Vietnam). Johnston weaves in comparisons between these more contemporary tragic figures and their ancient Greek precursors (Oedipus, Philocetes, Ajax, Antigone, etc.).
What would it mean for American democracy to adopt a tragic public philosophy? For Johnston this would begin with replacement of its hollow self-congratulatory memorials and holidays with a series of differently framed and conceptualized alternatives. In place of July 4th, America would stage a tragic film festival he calls American Dionysia (inspired by, but distinct in important ways from, its Athenian precursor). In place of Memorial Day, Americans would observe Admission Day, a time to fully recognize the terrible harms done to their own soldiers (human and animal) in war. In place of Patriot Day (September 11), Americans would observe Democracy Day through a series of odes dedicated to appreciating the risks that democracy entails, acknowledging the perspective of and demonstrating respect for the enemy, and celebrating life.
Along with these reconceived holidays would come a new way of memorializing horrors like 9/11 and the Vietnam War. Johnston envisions memorials that celebrate life rather than death (for example by acknowledging that passengers of United 93 acted to save their own lives, not as martyrs for democracy as the current narrative suggests), and have a place where the so-called enemy's perspective and sacrifice is recognized and respected. In addition to new memorials and rituals, Johnston endorses an annual reparations assembly convened to hear from citizens harmed by democracy's policies and practices and seeking to acknowledge and address them without any pretense that they can be eliminated.
Yet tragic democratic responsibility requires more than ritual, memorials, and reparations. In additional to policy prescriptions directly relevant to the harms he examines in depth (specifically he proposes both the return of conscription and banning the use of animals in war to counter the brutality of militarized conflict), Johnston endorses “tragic experiments” in economic restructuring which put constitutional limits on, and require more progressive redistribution of, income. Although these latter proposals get limited attention, they clarify that the scope of Johnston's concerns (like Medearis's) extends to democracy's economic as well as military harms.
Finally, Johnston endorses “tragic democratic activism,” including sabotage, intimidation, and strategic violence aimed at balancing the scales against democracy's villains, who would otherwise perpetrate great harms with impunity. He argues that “democratic violence can attain legitimacy to the extent that it is democratically inspired, executed, and productive” (186). It is here that we come to understand that Johnston finds violence constitutive of democracy in two ways. First, it is an inevitable but regrettable result of democracy's well-intended workings (democracy's violence). Second, and more surprisingly, Johnston suggests it can be a legitimate part of the remedy to these harms when it helps to make democracy serve the needs of the many (democratic violence).
Democratic harms, democratic action. Both Medearis and Johnston frame their work as direct interventions into democratic theory, but what, if anything, about the harms they vividly describe are specific to democracy? At times both theorists seem to conflate the ills of states, capitalism, militarism, and patriotism with democracy proper. Democracy may fail to appropriately challenge or rein in these harmful forces, but this does not make them inherent to democracy. Given the potential for states, capitalism, militarism, and patriotism in the absence of democracy to do equal if not greater damage, it is hard to convincingly call these harms “democracy's violence,” as Johnston does. Medearis's account of alienation offers a more elaborate theory of the source of these harms and their relationship to democracy. While alienation is not inherently a product of democracy, it presents a unique challenge to democracy because of the way it can undermine democratic principles and aims in the forms of domination, oppression, and exploitation. The realization that democracy will never fully insulate against these harms, and the recognition that they are generated by common actions that democracy may enable, are indeed transformative insights for democratic theory; but it is also necessary to distinguish these insights from the more dubious claim that these harms are somehow produced directly and uniquely by democracy itself.
A related concern is whether the rejection of an unattainable and counterproductive ideal of democracy in favor of the clear-eyed acceptance of its inexorable mixed record might have its own counterproductive consequences. For Medearis, this is presented as a rejection of the ideal/nonideal divide in political theory. While deliberative theory has coveted the ideal, elitist theory has embraced the nonideal, both to their detriment. Medearis seeks to hold a conception of democracy that does neither and to “directly theorize what is deeply unsatisfying about contemporary political life without giving up on profound democratic aspirations or consigning democracy to the status of a remote ideal” (51). Despite his claims that this conception places the work of democratic movements at its heart, it fails to address the practical problems of motivation and mobilization for movements in the absence of an ideal. As remote and unattainable as democratic ideals may be, they can help to generate the solidarity needed to engage in emancipatory collective action, likely far better than an embrace of the democratic struggle as nonlinear and never-ending. Johnston wrestles even more directly with the risk of complacency when he acknowledges that “it would be understandable, once the multifarious consequences of action are reckoned, that passivity or paralysis set in when faced with the need to act” (41). Johnston claims that embracing a tragic sensibility would generate the sense of obligation needed to respond to these consequences and to make ourselves worthy of them. Yet his argument betrays an ambivalence about whether acknowledging the balance of harms and goods should be pursued simply for the sake of authenticity or if it actually has the potential to reset, if never entirely right, the balance. In the absence of the hope generated by the latter, the risks of complacency seem to remain quite high.
Finally, bringing Medearis and Johnston into conversation reveals a deeply unresolved problem about the place of violence as a tool of democratic struggle. Medearis stresses that democratic action is not reducible to movements, and that other forms of political organizing, voting, and deliberating all have their place in opposing alienation. But while Medearis insists that coercion must be accepted as a form of democratic action, he argues that movements adopting violence “disqualify themselves from earning the ‘democratic’ label” (229). Medearis is therefore vulnerable to Johnston's critique that democratic theorists have weakly theorized the boundaries between democratic action and violence. For Johnston, the rush to condemn violence closes us off to considering that it might be capable of advancing democratic goals. Yet Johnston is equally unconvincing in his insouciant defense of violent reprisals pursued by so-called democratic activists. Though he acknowledges the profound ethical dilemma posed by such tactics, he offers little in the way of guidance for how to determine their proper place. In the end, while acknowledging that democracy's harms are constitutive of democracy itself improves our understanding of democracy, both oppositional and tragic conceptions point to unsettling implications about the potential and motivation for contemporary democratic action.
