You might think we have problems—a global pandemic, climate change, vast inequalities in and between states, widespread mistrust in government institutions, etc.—but Marc Stears has a solution: “The answer lies in a politics of the everyday” or what he also calls “a politics of ordinary people” (163, 132). You may wonder who these folk are or where the lesser spotted ordinary person is to be found. Stears may even be one of them himself. Autobiographical reflections throughout the book make the case for his ordinariness (he drinks coffee, visits the bakery, and does school pick-up), but as a practicing academic and former speechwriter for the Labour Party, he is always liable to appear like an extraordinary person: that is, an intellectual, expert, or wonk. These are the great scourge of ordinary folk, it seems. The more arresting premises of Britain's Brexit debates—“People in this country have had enough of experts” etc.—shape the rhetoric of this book and its sense of what is required: people need “to be given some kind of control of their own destiny again, rather than leaving everything in the hands of the elites of politics” (161). The book is a lament for local communities and civic friendships that exceed the state and its bureaucrats. It is also a rallying call for their reconstruction.
Stears is hardly the first to make the case for a lost ordinariness or a moral community that operates at a remove from the bureaucratic structures of a centralized state. In the nineteenth century, Ferdinand Tönnies noted that the organic bonds of Gemeinschaft were being supplanted by the infrastructures of Gesellschaft. Habermas worried about the ways in which modern communicative and administrative systems operated independently of the lifeworld that they were supposed to service. But the arcane register Habermas used to make the case was always liable to send the lifeworld scampering for the hills. Stears adopts a much homelier language, and it seems important to his argument that the ambassadors for this self-consciously unofficial form of politics are not official politicians, professional theorists, or policymakers. They are citizen-artists of the 1930s and ’40s: the writers George Orwell and J. B. Priestley, the poet Dylan Thomas, the painter and thinker Barbara Jones, and the photographer Billy Brandt.
These figures did not function as a connected group, yet they sponsored, we are told, a common set of aims: a vision of community grounded upon a love of the local and the small; a respect for traditions and memories that underpinned the social bond; a rootedness that gave people the security to embrace political change; a civic confidence that allowed the ordinary Jill to regard herself as an agent of such change. But virtue, according to Stears, need not preclude pleasure. He cites the Festival of Britain in 1951 as a moment where citizenship and joy traveled hand in hand. This may have been a state-sponsored jamboree, but it involved more than 1,700 events in twenty-three towns and cities. For Stears, such local activism, creativity, and civic pride epitomized the kind of political vision set out by Orwell, Priestley, and Thomas. Moreover, its grassroot qualities served as a corrective to the kind of condescension practiced by Atlee's Labour government—what Stearns elsewhere describes as “the belief that experts, officials, and politicians knew what the country really needed and how it should get there, and ordinary people did not” (114).
There is no doubting the sincerity of Stears's vision or his deep enthusiasm for Orwell, Thomas, and co. But his attempts to talk up their achievements sell others short. He declares, for instance, that their focus on “the everyday experiences of ordinary people . . . was breathtakingly countercultural in the 1930s” (36). However, this overlooks the slew of literary and anthropological studies of “ordinary” people—not least the Mass Observation Project initiated in 1937—that was produced throughout the decade. Instead, we are helped to some superb generalizations: “The vast majority of socialist intellectuals at the time had no interest in real life” (36). Here and elsewhere—when, for instance, he criticizes those who “criticize and condemn the lives of ordinary people” (176)—Stears proves himself to be a keen weaver of straw men. The lack of evidence provided for these positions may be expressive of their anti-wonkishness, but it is liable to lead to serious error. Stears, for instance, reprimands Orwell for being “entirely unaware” of the existence of Dylan Thomas. But Orwell wrote an admiring review of Thomas in 1940, discussed his work on radio in 1942, and commissioned Thomas to read one of his poems on the BBC a year later. Mistakes of this kind may attest to the nonacademic nature of Stears's enterprise (as he points out, the book is not intended as “a deep scholarly exploration”), but even ordinary people do homework.
Stears sentimentalizes his apostles of ordinariness and never doubts their ability to represent it. He also extends to them an improbable purity—in their thought and work we find “an entire absence of cynicism or contempt towards one's fellow human beings” (3). A glance at Orwell's writing—from his dismissals of “Nancy Poets” to his attacks on middle-class do-gooders who “flock to the smell of ‘progress’ like bluebottles to a dead cat”—reveals a considerable capacity for contempt. Stears fails to note how such cussedness—alongside a very libertarian conception of liberty—qualifies Orwell's emphasis on “brotherhood.” Admittedly, Orwell tried to combine liberty and solidarity in an idealized vision of patriotism: an Englishness founded on a collective respect for individual freedom and difference. This is a model of nationhood to which Stears is deeply drawn, though it triggers another round of underevidenced generalization (“Within much of the dominant discourse of left-leaning academia, celebrations of nation are routinely denounced as essentially xenophobic” [6]).
Orwell's brand of patriotism extols the “privateness of English life,” but it is not clear whether this privacy represents a politics of the everyday or an attempt to keep the everyday free of politics (Orwell after all was writing in an age where “totalitarianism” seemed to be calling for the politicization of everything). His account of a hobbyhorsical people—“a nation of flower-lovers, . . . stamp-collectors, pigeon-fanciers, amateur carpenters, coupon-snippers, darts-players, crossword-puzzle fans”—suggests that Britons had opted for the “freedom of moderns” over the “freedom of the ancients,” to invoke Benjamin Constant's celebrated dichotomy. This was the freedom to be left alone and to do one's business undisturbed by the rigors of citizenship. Constant's distinction is overdrawn, but Stears never pauses to wonder if the unofficial culture that he glorifies may come at some cost. It surely presupposes leaving some political responsibilities to others.
Stears clearly wants to bring the passion of the amateur back into political life and he deeply resents the “rampant professionalization of party politics” (160). But such professionalization would also seem to be a structural feature of modern life. When Adam Smith first presented the division of labor as the engine room of social progress, he remained alert to its civic consequences: it risked stupefying workers and alienating them from the social whole. Stears is right to insist that ordinary people are not stupid and should not be condescended to by elites. However, modern representative democracy is founded—and still flounders—upon a basic social fact: the division and delegation of labor. This may produce a bad “compromise between administrative despotism and the sovereignty of the people”—as Tocqueville once put it—but Stears makes no serious proposals for structural reforms of this system. The disengagement and mistrust that democracy currently generates will not be solved by shrill denunciations of elites or by the sentimentalization of ordinariness. Evidently, venture capitalists and asset strippers have ordinary lives, and their decisions have a huge bearing on the daily lives of others. However, paeans to everydayness do little to address these imbalances of power and risk repressing them altogether. Stears insists that the politics of ordinary people should take priority over economics—“even the kind of economics that pursues greater equality” (132)—but surely the problem of equality lies at the heart of ordinary politics.
