“My book has told the story of how, long before American political scientists started to explicitly characterize America as ‘liberal,’ they had interpreted America in light of identifiably liberal beliefs, hopes, and fears, and in so doing, acted as agents in the Americanization of liberalism” (p. 281). With these words—and hinting only barely at the riches therein—Robert Adcock concludes his work of extraordinary scholarship, Liberalism and the Emergence of American Political Science. By turns sweeping and detailed, Adcock’s narrative—actually, a pair of twinned narratives—charts the emergence of the discipline of North American political science and the concomitant Americanization of liberalism, more broadly. But the book’s narratives are not narrowly “American” or just about “political science” since they draw into them the transatlantic contributions of political theorists in England, Germany, and France, as well as the kindred discipline of political economy, once part of a “wide” political science and then an independent discipline in its own right.
The coverage of important thinkers and writers is thorough and insightful. Besides figures known mainly to historians of American political science—like Andrew D. White, A. Lawrence Lowell, and Frank Goodnow—the book brings into its twinned narratives figures widely recognized in the broader history of political thought—like Constant, Tocqueville, Guizot, Mill, Maine, Spencer, and Sumner. The political dimensions of science and the scientific dimensions of politics come to light in the methodological debates and practical engagements that move the narratives along.
As a linguistically exacting political scientist and disciplinary historian, Adcock is admirably forthcoming about his historiographical decisions and comparative categories. Nothing is loosely spoken. The most important of these decisions is Adcock’s use of “liberalism” to describe the “political visions” (passim) of American and European political scientists across the century he covers, roughly from 1830 to 1930. He acknowledges that this is not in itself unique, at least regarding the United States. Others have done so, beginning with Bernard Crick in The American Science of Politics (1959), the pioneering work of disciplinary history that stood nearly alone for a quarter century. But Crick threw “liberalism” like a wet blanket over everything American, following the general practice most famously associated with Louis Hartz in The Liberal Tradition in America (1955). Whereas Crick used liberalism as a generalized “context” for political scientists, Adcock insists rightly that political scientists should be seen as “active agents” in the articulation and transformation of liberalism in America—indeed, they were among the agents most responsible for the “Americanization of liberalism.” Adcock further acknowledges that the political scientists across the century in question never themselves used “liberalism” to describe their political visions, something Crick, Hartz, and many others never bothered to explore or explain. However, he shows how they drew directly upon European thinkers who did, when they discussed (and worried about) democracy, individualism, industrialization, and class politics. So, the appellation is legitimate, on that account.
Liberalism turns out to be too capacious or baggy a category when left unmodified, however. It overwhelms and undermines too many points of difference and contestation that are crucial for understanding the history of political science and the Americanization of liberalism. So, again in contrast to the likes of Crick and Hartz, Adcock modifies and pluralizes the different political visions of liberalism at work in his narratives. For him, classical liberalism of laissez-faire individualism was “democratized” when it migrated to America (with Tocqueville, as it were), thus becoming democratized classical liberalism. Over the course of the century, its legacy divided, in turn, into a progressive liberalism of broad state action against which a disenchanted classical liberalism took shape, decrying what it took to be state socialism. Even then there were differences within each of these adjectival liberalisms. So, Francis Lieber’s democratized classical liberalism was a rather “uncompromising” classical liberalism in its hostility to trade unions, whereas his transatlantic pair, John Stuart Mill, was a more “moderate” classical liberal about the rectitude of working-class organization.
Moreover, Adcock identifies the political visions of A. Lawrence Lowell and his British counterpart, Sir Henry Maine, as a “subgenre” in the camp of disenchanted classical liberals because, as he puts it, “they tempered disenchantment with an exceptionalist belief that America was less susceptible than European nations to the drift toward ‘paternalism’” (p. 280). The disenchantment of William Graham Sumner and his Anglo-doppelgänger Herbert Spencer was more dispiritedly pervasive, unalleviated by “American exceptionalism.” In less capable hands, such categories and subgenres might overwhelm the narratives, particularly if even more of them were generated to account for yet finer distinctions among liberals. And are there not always further distinctions to make? But that is not the case here, for Adcock’s is the most thoroughly documented and defended case to date why the history of political science in its first American century should be seen through the refracted rays of the prism of liberalism. Adcock seals the case by concluding his book with examples whereby American scholars, at long last, used the actual term and terminology of “liberalism,” as in The Faith of a Liberal (1924) by Columbia University’s President Nicholas Murray Butler.
One of the most intriguing figures to merit Adcock’s close attention is Francis Lieber. This Prussian émigré (the perfect candidate for the transatlantic theme of the book) lays claim to disciplinary fame by being America’s first officially named political scientist, specifically as the inaugural Chair of History and Political Science at Columbia University. Prior to that elevation, when at South Carolina College, Lieber wrote two of the signal textbooks of nineteenth-century political science, Manual of Political Ethics (1838) and Civil Liberty and Self-Government (1853), each treated to an engaging section in Adcock’s study. Lieber called the former his “book on the State” and in it, the terms of its discourse were explicitly tied to republicanism and nationalism, as well as his stylized versions of “individualism” and “socialism.” (In short, there were lots of -isms in Lieber’s world, including his neologism “internationalism”). In these texts and those more popular ones that followed after the Civil War, Lieber also consciously bridged the ideals of a strong national state with the vision he praised in the papers of The Federalist. He was virtually obsessed with reform and offered novel schema for the transformation of schools, prisons, and legal institutions.
Given these and many other accomplishments, it is surprising if not scandalous that Lieber’s only proper biography, coming up on its seventieth year, is Francis Lieber: Nineteenth-Century Liberal (1947) by Frank Freidel. Despite the subtitle, there is no index item for “liberal” and scarcely any discussion in the text why Lieber was to be understood as a liberal. Adcock, for reasons already given, has now remedied that. Moreover, Adcock pays due accord, as other disciplinary historians have not, to Lieber’s antiprotectionist political economy and his antipathy to organized labor. He gives only passing notice to Lieber’s contribution to the methodology of interpretation, Legal and Political Hermeneutics (1837/1839). Given Adcock’s scrutiny of the methodologies of his various liberals—in Lieber’s case a philosophical precursor of “developmental historicism”—it is something of a missed opportunity not to hear how this pioneering work fits (or not) the narratives of political science and Americanized liberalism.
Lieber first broached methodological questions about interpretation and hermeneutics in the Encyclopedia Americana that he edited in the 1820s and 30s. Adcock attends carefully to the Encyclopedia, taking good advantage of the entry “Liberal,” which he claims, I believe correctly, is “perhaps the first characterization of ‘liberal’ in political terms for an American audience” (p. 17, n. 4). Adcock breaks further scholarly ground by attributing to Lieber several other entries in the Encyclopedia that until now have remained anonymous.
“Lieberian” political science had legs going into the final quarter of the nineteenth century, as Adcock skillfully traces it. At Yale, Cornell, Johns Hopkins, and Columbia, the legacy of Lieber’s view of the public tasks and methodological footings of a “wide” political science took on new shape, as “democratized classical liberalism” itself morphed. Vignettes and longer assessments of Theodore Dwight Woolsey, John W. Burgess, White, and (most intriguingly) Sumner come into view and serve as a bridge to later scholars, like Albert Shaw and Goodnow, as well as their transatlantic counterparts, not least James Bryce. The latter group championed the professionalization and specialization of political science at the turn of the twentieth century, and introduced a conception of “the system” of political institutions (half a century before the conception became fully famous in the work of David Easton). The echoes of Lieberian political science became harder and harder to hear.
If we, looking back, return Lieber to antebellum South Carolina College, however, some themes and questions emerge in light of Adcock’s categories and narratives. This college was not a research university. But American colleges, like South Carolina, were nonetheless the pedagogical seedbeds for “the science of politics,” then a part of moral philosophy, running back before the American Revolution. Being in the South, moreover, gave an increasingly urgent agenda to the public questions of union and of slavery. Once in New York, Lieber was a loud abolitionist, but he was virtually silent about slavery in South Carolina in the 1840s and 1850s, when teaching moral philosophy in one of the most virulent slaving soon-Confederate states. And he owned domestic slaves while there. Slavery was surely the most illiberal institution of all. This appears not to have been something that many Southern political scientists worried much about, in part because they were happily not liberal (pace Hartz), more proud of an Aristotelian and aristocratic European heritage. This can be seen most dramatically in the works of George Fitzhugh, not least Sociology for the South: Or, the Failure of Free Society (1854), as well as in James Henry Hammond’s Slavery in the Light of Political Science (1845/1860). Unlike their northern counterparts, their methods embraced and adumbrated a southern nationalism and approached slavery accordingly.
Here, in short, are further illustrations of the themes of Adcock’s book—competing liberalisms (if not their antitheses), practical concerns, and historicist and other methods, harkening to European authorities, and all in an academic setting. While Adcock does not discuss southern political science and its “peculiar” projects—nor need he have, given his purposes and the space of one volume—his orientation provides a framework for taking them on more directly. In short, we have as a consequence an ongoing research agenda in the history of political science, in all its byways, methods, and practical concerns, strange or malign as they may now appear in hindsight.
Liberalism and the Emergence of American Political Science is a hugely intelligent, and important book. It immediately joins the very best of its kindred studies (in a growing body of literature) on the history of political science (and cognate fields). Yet this is not its only or maybe even most important contribution to contemporary political science, writ large. The book’s commentaries about the American side of the Atlantic ledger make it an instant candidate for inclusion in the (equally growing body of) literature on American political development. Given its comparative focus and Adcock’s evident command of comparative-historical methods, it helps launch further studies in comparative political development. And since it scrutinizes the institutionalized discipline of political science, now running back a century to the formation of the American Political Science Association, it directly poses the question about the aspirations of the discipline, historically and forward looking, to be an institution of direct political engagement.
While progressive liberalism and disenchanted classical liberalism, in the book, begin their descent in the 1930s, they have descendants and would-be inheritors among us still. All we need do is look about. To allow Adcock’s categories a longer life, something like a “chastened progressive liberalism” survived through the twentieth century into our own time, as “we” political scientists, rather cautiously, continue to research and sometimes encourage state action to address pressing social and political problems. Outliers (of course) and expressions of nonpartisanship or ethical neutrality notwithstanding, such chastened progressive liberals might well count as the majority among political scientists today. (Political scientists are certainly characterized or demonized in something like these terms by the ideological critics of the academy, of which there are now loudly many). To understand “ourselves” in these terms, then, requires a better understanding of “how we got here.” There is nowhere a better place to begin delivering on this requirement than in the pages of this excellent book.
