In October 2013, the students of Professor Bruce Frier organised a conference in his honour at the University of Michigan, to celebrate his scholarly work and to mark his retirement from the Department of Classical Studies. Eight of the contributions are included in the present volume — papers which aim to match the high standards of Frier's research methods, and his critical approach. The volume starts with a foreword by Susan Martin, followed by a detailed ‘Introduction’ by the editors. Clifford Ando's ‘Afterword’ summarises the main issues of the papers, relating them to Frier's research credo, laid down in his two monographs on Roman law.
Adriaan Lanni (9–31) deals with the archaic phenomenon of collective punishment. In a special historical, cultural or religious context collective liability could promote deterrence more effectively than individual liability. The author raises the question whether collective punishment should be understood as collective guilt — or as a punishment of the innocent along with the guilty. Considering the results of anthropological and sociological studies, she picks out three basic cases of collective punishment at Athens: failure to pay debts owed to the state, serious crimes against the state and the collective liability of boards of magistrates. I doubt if the case of the state debtor is to be considered as an instance of collective punishment. Without any doubt, the heirs were liable for their predecessor's debt. But so long as the original debtor was alive, his heirs suffered no punishment; if the debtor paid, no punishment passed on to his heirs. From a legal point of view, the liability of the heirs was the result of their inheriting an indebted property. If they paid the inherited debt, no atimia could be imposed on them.
David Phillips (46–65) offers a new interpretation of Draco's law on homicide, issued in the late seventh century b.c., mirroring the social and legal culture of his age – and a certain political conflict. The text evokes a ‘strange concatenation of cases’, comprising unintentional and intentional, justifiable or excusable killings; it is difficult to find a unifying principle that governs them. Phillips accounts for it through the doctrine of assumption of risk — borrowed from the modern American law of torts. It states that a ‘person who voluntarily places himself in a situation of known danger cannot recover for harm he suffers as a consequence’ (48). Without any doubt, in some types of athletics, in robbery, or moicheia this ‘intention’ can be implied; but I wonder if ‘friendly fire’ is usually considered as a typical risk in warfare. I tend to accept Phillips’ argument, but I miss an explanation of why the ‘old’ doctrines of self-defence or justifiable killing should not be suitable for interpreting Draco's law. I also wonder if this doctrine will convince non-American scholars, who may be socialised in very different legal traditions.
Michael Leese investigates the economic perspective on marriage alliances (32–45). In ancient societies, marrying for money was a common phenomenon. Marriages were based on existing family alliances or helped to establish new ones; dowries meant a respectable type of property acquisition. Indirectly, a serious dowry could serve also as a ‘surety’, to avoid later divorce: an average husband was not able to repay such a high amount at once.
Marriages are also the topic of Charles Pazdernak's contribution (167–82), which scrutinises the relationship between libertas and marriage alliances in Late Antiquity, dealing with the reform legislation of the emperor Justinian. This particular imperial constitution contains five fragments, dated to 533. The constitution concerned ‘mixed marriages’ between persons of unequal status — a topic that was already discussed by famous jurists in classical Roman law (e.g. Gaius 1.89). According to Pazdernak, there was a direct link between Justinian's foreign and domestic policy and his innovation, the granting of free status to the offspring of unequal marriages.
Dennis Kehoe (105–32) deals with different obligations that serve as a legal framework of agency in Roman law. He focuses mainly on mandatum and negotia gesta (unauthorised administration), listing the relevant sources in Justinian's Digest and Codex (legal documents, wooden tablets and papyri are not included). Both institutions played a central role in Roman economic life, which was based much more on friendship and personal relations (fides, officium and amicitia) than is the case in modern societies. Seemingly, the Roman jurists did not care for agency, and nor did they develop a complex system of representation — although the existence of sophisticated agency relationships is documented in the sources. Slaves and dependencies were often used to carry out business if the service of ‘agents’ was needed (cf. E. Jakab in P. J. du Plessis (ed.), New Frontiers: Law and Society in the Roman World (2013), 123–50). Using the methods of NIE, the author develops new approaches regarding the economic function of these fides-based and also legally valued relationships.
Thomas McGinn (133–66) raises the question whether Roman law served the interests of the ‘wealthy and powerful’. Bruce Frier, Dennis Kehoe and Cynthia Bannon have also recently worked on this topic. Based upon this, McGinn discusses and compares the issues arising from the famous study of Edoardo Volterra (RISG 11 (1967), 239–71). Kehoe and Bannon emphasised that the Roman government and legal system occasionally intervened to protect the rights of small-scale participants in economic activities. Earlier, Volterra had already scrutinised whether the Roman legal system served the interests of large-scale economy, and found no satisfying evidence for it (142). After examining a wide range of sources, the author states that there is no direct link between social status and legal protection in the Roman world (158–9).
Cynthia J. Bannon (66–83) offers a detailed exegesis of an imperial constitution issued in the second century a.d. by Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus (D. 8.3.17, Papirius Iustus). This constitution settled a controversy about water rights regarding the ‘allocation’ of a public river for irrigation. Water was one of the most important natural resources in the Mediterranean world, regulated also by decrees (e.g. the lex rivi Hiberiensis). The author underlines that in water disputes local practices and local decrees also played an important role, and the imperial legislation was willing to apply them. Rescripts are documents of a regular communication between ‘center and periphery’, showing how Roman law operated in a provincial environment.
Lauren Caldwell (84–104) presents passages from Aelian's works On Animals and the Miscellaneous History about the relationship between nature, human beings and justice. The society of bees serves as an example for a ‘good ruler’ or ‘natural justice’; nature is to be admired for its richness and beauty; agriculture acts as the source of valuable ‘culture’. Seeking for the ‘ideal justice’, he states that the ‘natural’ can be used also for the purposes of the powerful against the weak (102). Aelian dwells in his works on the gifts of nature: ‘man … possesses all the other gifts of nature that are his’ (90). It would be interesting to look at Aelian's sources and compare his thoughts with other documents of ancient philosophy (Arist., Pol. 1256a–b; Cic., Off. 1.7; D. 22.1.28.1; Inst. 2.1.37).
The volume can be recommended to scholars of ancient Greek and Roman law, ancient history and economic history. The contributors have succeeded in honouring Bruce Frier with an excellent series of papers, fitting the high value of his many-sided and innovative research oeuvre.
