INTRODUCTION
There can be little doubt that the use of force by police officers is essential in the discharge of their duties, especially in effecting an arrest. It is the use of lethal force that causes much of the controversy and concern in most jurisdictions.Footnote 1 At least 18 people were shot dead by police in Malawi during anti-government protests in July 2011.Footnote 2 An inquiry commissioned by the Malawi Human Rights Commission (MHRC) established that the police had used live bullets in the shootings.Footnote 3 In October 2010, a 16 year old street child was shot dead by a police officer as he tried to evade arrest. He had been suspected of stealing K 20,000 (about USD 71) and a cell phone. Despite the fact that the boy had been shot twice – one bullet hit his hip and the other was lodged in his heart – the incident was described as an accident since the shooting was aimed to disable and not kill.Footnote 4
The Malawian president has since stated that the police would implement a shoot to kill policy for armed criminals. He warned that “[armed] criminals should count themselves lucky if they are found committing criminal acts and come out alive”.Footnote 5 These statements have sparked considerable debate as to the limits of police officers' powers in the use of firearms. Coming against a backdrop of increased armed robbery attacks in the country, the call has found favour with the majority of the populace because it promises “instant justice”.Footnote 6 However, “any suggestion that the police should shoot to kill should be measured against the dictates of the law”.Footnote 7 The crucial question is whether the law permits the police to shoot to kill in the manner envisaged by such a policy.Footnote 8
The shoot to kill policy has gained currency in a number of countries apart from Malawi. For instance, amid criticism that South Africa was not safe enough to host the 2010 World Cup, senior government officials including President Jacob Zuma, Police Commissioner Bheki Cele and the police minister publicly advocated a “shoot to kill” approach to criminals.Footnote 9 The minister remarked that the police would meet the criminals “head on, if it means we kill when we shoot, then so be it”.Footnote 10 Proposals were also made to amend section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act,Footnote 11 which governs the use of force in effecting an arrest.Footnote 12
This article considers the law regarding the use of firearms by the police in Malawi.Footnote 13 It begins with an outline of section 44 of the Police ActFootnote 14 which governs the use of firearms by the police. It then examines the decision in R v Joshua Cheuka, Nicholasi Saidi, James Muhonjo and Jonathan Mlotha Footnote 15 (R v Cheuka), where the Malawi High Court held that it was unlawful for the police to shoot a person who had posed no threat to life. It is submitted that the court misinterpreted section 44 due to its emphasis on the human rights implications of the shooting. In conclusion, it is suggested that a shoot to kill policy is not supported by the Police Act and violates the rights to life, human dignity, a fair trial and access to justice enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi (the Constitution).Footnote 16
SECTION 44 OF THE POLICE ACT
Police use of firearms is generally governed by section 44 of the Police Act, as amended by Act 12 of 2010. The provision is a codification of the common law principles applicable to the use of deadly force. It provides:
“(1) Subject to subsection (2), any police officer may use any firearms against –
(a) any person in lawful custody charged with or convicted of a felony when such person is escaping or attempting to escape;
(b) any person who by force rescues or attempts to rescue any other person from lawful custody; or
(c) any person who by force prevents or attempts to prevent the lawful arrest of himself or of any other person;
(2) For purposes of subsection (1) –
(a) resort shall not be had to any firearm as authorized under paragraph (a) of that subsection unless the police officer has reasonable ground to believe that he cannot otherwise prevent the escape and unless he shall give warning to such person that he is about to use such firearms against him and such warning is unheeded;
(b) resort shall not be had to any firearms as authorized under paragraph (b) and (c) of that subsection unless such officer has reasonable ground to believe that he or any other person is in danger of grievous bodily harm and that he cannot otherwise effect such arrest or prevent such rescue;
(c) no police officer shall, in the presence of his superior officer, use such firearms against any person except under orders of such superior officer; and
(d) the use of firearms under this section shall as far as possible be to disable and not to kill.
(3) The authority vested in a police officer by subsection (1) shall be in addition to and not in substitution for any authority to use firearms vested in a police officer by any other law.
(4) Any police officer, after using any firearm, shall make a report in writing or in the prescribed form to the officer in charge of his police station.”
Sections 44(1)(a) and (b) are applicable to persons in lawful custody. The mere fact of being in police custody does not amount to lawful custody.Footnote 17 For instance, a person who has been kept in police custody for over 48 hours without being brought before a court of law as required by section 42(2)(b) of the Constitution cannot be said to be in lawful custody. Further, a person cannot fall within the ambit of section 44(1)(a) before being formally charged or convicted of a felony.Footnote 18
On the other hand, section 44(1)(b) does not require that the person rescued should have been charged or convicted of a felony. The only requirement is that the rescued person should have been in lawful custody. Therefore, a rescuer is more at risk of having a firearm used against him than a person who is in lawful custody. A firearm may be used against a rescuer who rescues or attempts to rescue a person who is in lawful custody regardless of whether the latter has been charged with a felony or misdemeanour, or indeed charged at all. However, a firearm cannot be used against the rescued person unless he falls within section 44(1)(a). For instance, in a situation where person A rescues person B who is in lawful custody and charged with a misdemeanour, a police officer may use his firearm against A but not B since the use of a firearm against B is governed by section 44(1)(a).
Section 44(1)(c) can only be invoked in the process of a lawful arrest. Section 20A(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence CodeFootnote 19 stipulates that an arrest is not lawful unless the person arrested is informed that he is under arrest at the time of arrest or as soon as practical after his arrest. Where a police officer makes the arrest, section 20A(3) applies even where the fact of arrest is obvious.Footnote 20 An additional requirement of section 44(1)(c) is that the person should have attempted to prevent arrest by force. In terms of this qualification, a police officer cannot rely on section 44 where he uses a firearm against a person who, without force, simply flees arrest. Such a scenario is within section 20(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code which is applicable to both police officers and ordinary civilians. This section provides that, if the person to be arrested forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest him, or attempts to evade it, the arrestor “may use all means necessary to effect the arrest”. This provision seems to apply to the use of force where a person forcibly resists arrest or without force tries to evade it. This includes the use of firearms when it is necessary to incapacitate the person sought to be arrested.Footnote 21 Section 20(4) of the code states that the licence to use force in effecting an arrest does “not justify the use of a greater force than was reasonable in the particular circumstances in which it was employed or was necessary for the apprehension of the offender”. This means that, where a person is killed in the process of arrest, an inquiry into whether the force used was reasonable and necessary has to be made. The defence of self-defence can also be raised by both an ordinary civilian and a police officer faced with a threat of force.
Under section 44(2)(a), which applies to persons in lawful custody, the readiness to use a firearm must be communicated to the person to be arrested. It is only after such a warning goes unheeded that resort can be had to a firearm. In addition, there must be reasonable ground to believe that the use of a firearm is the only means of preventing an escape. Section 44(2)(b) is only applicable to persons falling under section 44(1)(b) and (c), that is, those trying to rescue persons in lawful custody or preventing lawful arrest. In such situations, the law requires that a firearm should be used only when the police officer has reasonable ground to believe that there is danger of grievous bodily harm and that he cannot otherwise prevent the rescue or effect the arrest. No warning is required.
A comparison of section 44(1)(a) and (b) shows that the law grants greater protection to rescuers and persons resisting arrest than those in lawful custody. A firearm may be used against a person who escapes from lawful custody even where there is no danger of grievous bodily harm. In contrast to section 44(2)(b), there is no requirement of danger under section 44(2)(a). The use of firearms in this case is justified once it is the only means that can prevent the escape. Therefore, the killing of a person escaping from lawful custody need not be perpetrated in self-defence. The reason for the difference between section 44(2)(a) and (b) lies in the common law distinction between felonies and misdemeanours which is still recognized under Malawian criminal law. At a time when all felonies (murder, rape, manslaughter, robbery, sodomy, mayhem, burglary, arson, prison break, and larceny) were capital offences, the use of lethal force against fleeing felons “was seen as a mere acceleration of the penal process”.Footnote 22 As Finch wrote:
“It made little difference if the suspected felon were killed in the process of capture, since, in the eyes of the law, he had already forfeited his life by committing the felony. It was also assumed that a suspected felon facing death upon capture was more desperate than a misdemeanant and that greater force was required for his apprehension. Finally, because there was no network of police forces a felon eluding his initial pursuers would probably escape ultimate arrest. Refusal to justify the use of deadly force to arrest misdemeanants was based simply on the inhumanity of killing someone who had committed only a petty crime.”Footnote 23
However, the penal rationale for this framework is now “a blatant anachronism”Footnote 24 and has been greatly undermined by changes in the law. In particular, the creation of new feloniesFootnote 25 and restrictions on the use of the death penalty have not been matched with changes to the law on the use of deadly force. The certainty of death for felons is no longer there.Footnote 26 The distinction between felonies and misdemeanours is not a sufficient guide on the use of deadly force. As explained by the Constitutional Court of South Africa in S v Walters,
“[T]he distinction between felonies and misdemeanours [has become] too blurred and arbitrary to serve as a rational boundary between those who could and those who could not be killed to prevent their escape. Modern firepower [has] also greatly intensified the harshness of the rule while the inviolability of human life [has] enjoyed increasing recognition in modern democracies. As a result different criteria [have] to be evolved for distinguishing between crimes that are sufficiently serious to warrant lethal force being used to perfect an arrest and those where such a degree of force would be regarded as disproportionate to the societal interest in seeing their perpetrators apprehended.”Footnote 27
The focus should be “on a balance of interests: the need to apprehend suspects, the safety of the arresting officers, and the value of human life”.Footnote 28 The use of lethal force should be justified by a “reasonably perceived serious physical injury or death” and not “slippery distinctions between misdemeanours and felonies and different types of felonies”.Footnote 29
A distinction needs to be drawn between section 44 and the common law defence of self-defence. When faced with a criminal charge against him or her, a police officer can claim that he or she acted either within section 44 or in self-defence. There is no burden of proof on a person pleading self-defence; the onus is on the state to disprove such a defence.Footnote 30 This will be the case even where the defence has been not raised but the evidence tendered shows that this was the case.Footnote 31 Self-defence is based on the necessity to protect one's life or limb or that of another.Footnote 32 Therefore, to raise it successfully as a defence, an accused person must show, among other things, that there was an imminent threat to life or body. A pre-emptive strike does not negate the defence.Footnote 33 In other words, the fact that the accused struck first does not negate the defence: one cannot be expected to wait for one's adversary to deal a potentially mortal blow. Thus, a police officer is entitled to kill in self-defence when a suspect approaches him “in a decidedly threatening manner”, provided the killing is proportional to the threat posed, that is, the killing must be necessary to avoid the threat.Footnote 34 Recent crime patterns may also constitute reasonable grounds to believe that there is danger to life or body.Footnote 35 It thus becomes apparent that section 44(2)(b) is in line with the defence of self-defence, if not wider; there is no requirement that the danger posed by the person to be arrested should be actual or imminent. The courts are yet to decide if future danger falls within this provision.
The self-defence principles regarding onus of proof should also apply to a police officer invoking section 44. That is, the onus should be on the state to show that he or she does not fall within the provision, and not on the accused to show that he or she does. This is consonant with the presumption of innocence which entails that a person is innocent until proven guilty. Since an accused person who acts in accordance with section 44 does so lawfully, his or her guilt can only be established if it is shown that he or she did not act in accordance with the section. It is the duty of the state to prove this beyond reasonable doubt. Once this is established, the accused bears the evidential burden of showing otherwise. In the context of section 44, the state must show that the accused had no reasonable cause to believe that the use of a firearm was the only means by which a suspect could be apprehended, that there was danger to life or limb, and that the shooting was aimed to kill and not disable.
A more controversial aspect of the use of force by the police is section 44(1)(d), which provides that the use of firearms “shall as far as possible be to disable and not to kill”. Section 44(1)(d) specifically applies to the use of firearms under section 44. It does not apply to other situations in which the police are authorized to use firearms. How does one determine whether this provision has been complied with? Does it affect the legality of the use of a firearm? There is very little case law from which a principle can be propounded and, as will be discussed below, the test used by the court in R v Cheuka appears to be unsatisfactory.
THE DECISION IN R V CHEUKA
The case of R v Cheuka involved four police officers deployed to the then 997 Rapid Response Department.Footnote 36 On the fateful day (12 August 2008), they were involved in a police chase of a lorry carrying loads of charcoal.Footnote 37 Realizing that the driver had no intention of stopping, the third accused fired his gun at the lorry which ended up colliding with a minibus ferrying passengers. The lorry driver and two passengers in the minibus died on the spot. Post-mortem results indicated that the driver had died due to a fatal bullet that had entered his chest through his back and caused excessive bleeding in the chest and that his death had occurred before the collision.
The four police officers were charged with three counts of manslaughter contrary to section 208 of the Penal Code to which they all pleaded not guilty. The defence argued that the aim of the shooting was to bring the lorry to a stop by deflating a tyre. It was explained that the bullet hit the driver only because the lorry swerved and the road was bumpy. In other words, the third accused shot the deceased “in due execution of police duties to effect an arrest”.Footnote 38 The court had to determine three issues: that the deaths of the three had occurred; that the accused persons had caused the three deaths; and that the accused persons caused the deaths by an unlawful act.
The MHRC was admitted as amicus curiae [friend of the court]. The court, in dismissing objections from the defence to the application, ruled that the MHRC would be performing “an important public duty” by bringing to the court's attention the “serious and novel human rights issues involved” in the case.Footnote 39
The court found that the driver had died due to a bullet fired by the third accusedFootnote 40 and that there was “a causal connection” between the deaths of the two passengers and the lorry driver; the passengers had died as a direct result of injuries they sustained in the collision attributable to the fatal shooting of the lorry driver by the accused.Footnote 41 However, it held that the first, second and fourth accused did not cause the deaths, since it was only the third accused who had fired at the driver and the doctrine of common purpose did not apply to the other suspects.Footnote 42
The third issue to be determined by the court was whether the use of lethal force by the police officer responsible amounted to an unlawful act. The court noted that, while the police have a duty to protect life and property, “[i]n terms of value, it is life that is of greatest value and it is the duty of the police to attach the greatest value to human life”.Footnote 43 Accordingly, law enforcement officials should take cognizance of the importance of human life, and exercise greater vigilance in giving it the protection and respect it deserves. “Doing the contrary would render an act that takes away life [unlawful].”Footnote 44
In determining whether the three deaths had been caused by an unlawful act, the court had to consider whether the third accused had acted in self-defence or in the defence of another in imminent threat of death or serious injury as envisaged in section 44(1)(b) of the Police Act.Footnote 45 It observed that, at the material time, the driver did not fall within section 44(1): he was not in lawful custody; he had not been charged with or convicted of a felony; he was not an escapee or rescuer; and he did not resist his arrest by force.Footnote 46 In enunciating the principles that govern self-defence in the context of the use of firearms, the court relied on international human rights law which it found “illuminating…, useful and important in complementing the local laws”.Footnote 47 In particular, reference was made to the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (UN Basic Principles)Footnote 48 and the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (UN Code of Conduct).Footnote 49 Citing these instruments, it was held that:
“Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force or firearms. Whenever lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials must exercise restraint and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objectives to be achieved. Regarding self-defence, law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or in the defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape. The … intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.”Footnote 50
In terms of foreign law, the court considered the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. The first case was Leonidis v Greece Footnote 51 where it was held that firearms should only be used where a suspect poses a threat to life and where he is alleged to have committed a violent offence, and that police officials should refrain from using lethal force even if it means losing the opportunity to arrest the suspect. The second case was Nachava v Bulgaria Footnote 52 which limited the use of firearms against armed suspects.
Applying these authorities, the court held that the accused had not acted in self-defence since the deceased was not armed nor had he posed an imminent threat to the life of the accused or any other person.Footnote 53 Further, there was no evidence that the use of the firearm was the only means to stop the deceased if indeed he had been escaping, and there was no warning about the readiness to use a firearm. For the purposes of a warning, “it is not enough merely to see that a police officer one is dealing with has in his or her possession firearms. Probably a shout, some visible signal capable of being interpreted as a warning and nothing else and the firing of [a] warning shot in the air would suffice”.Footnote 54 Therefore, the manner in which the firearm had been used in this case was inconsistent with the authority vested by the act.
The court emphasized that law enforcement officials must exercise restraint and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objectives to be achieved when the use of firearms is “strictly unavoidable in order to protect life”.Footnote 55 The court found that it had not been “strictly necessary” to fire at the deceased.Footnote 56
The court then turned to the question of whether the shooting had nevertheless been aimed to disable and not to kill as required by section 44(2)(d). According to the court, it was inconceivable that such a provision would be in place in the absence of proper training for police officers on the proper use of firearms. The judge opined that, before an officer is allowed to use a firearm, he must have received thorough training on its use, including knowledge “as to what parts of the body of a human being when fired at would only result in the person being disabled and not killed, and what parts of the body when hit would result in loss of life more or less instantly”.Footnote 57 The judge continued:
“I am reinforced in this view by the evidence of Dr Charles Dzamalala [a pathologist who conducted a post-mortem on the deceased] when he talked about preferential sites of the body in a suicide. He indicated to this court that research has revealed that there are seven preferential sites of the body for a suicide using firearms. I would imagine that any person serious about a suicide would not shoot his leg or arm unless he is banking on a huge loss of blood. In fact, what would disable an escapee and stop him or her from escaping are the body parts that are used in escaping such as legs if running or hands if driving. Shooting at a person in the chest, whether from the front or the back, or shooting through the head of an escapee, though it may achieve the halting of the escape, cannot be said to have been intended merely to disable and not to kill … There is nothing to support a conclusion that the use of the firearms by the law enforcement official in this case was to disable and not to kill.”Footnote 58
The court thus placed reliance on the positioning of the bullet to determine the purpose for which the firearm had been used. Dismissing the third accused's story that the fatal bullet was a stray bullet targeted at a wheel of the lorry, the court concluded that the fact that the deceased had been shot in the chest indicated that the shooting was not intended to disable but to kill. In other words, one cannot claim that one's intention was to disable and not kill when shooting someone in a place where death is likely to result, such as the chest. The court further held that “[t]he positioning of the bullet hole at the back of the lorry was quite revealing” on the question of whether the target was to shoot the deceased or the wheel of the lorry.Footnote 59 The “bullet hole [was] far removed from the wheel that could have been aimed at. [Its positioning] right behind the driver's seat must have been as a result of a targeted bullet”.Footnote 60
Having reached these conclusions, the court convicted the accused of manslaughter on each count and sentenced him to three concurrent terms of 12 years' imprisonment with hard labour. The court took due account of the “unnecessary loss of life” and the fact that the actions of the convict “had overshadowed the excellent work” of the entire 997 Rapid Response Department in preventing and responding to violent crime.Footnote 61
APPRAISAL OF R V CHEUKA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE USE OF FIREARMS IN MALAWI
R v Cheuka is undoubtedly a significant decision so far as the legitimate use of firearms by law enforcement officials is concerned. It emphasizes that the law restricts the use of firearms to situations where one's life is in danger. It reveals the importance that the courts attach to the right to life and calls on law enforcement officials to make the preservation of life their highest priority. The importance that R v Cheuka places on the due process of law and its characterization of the third accused's action as “summary justice” is a warning that the killing of suspects by police officers will not be taken lightly by the courts. This position is crucial in light of section 4(d) of the Police Act which includes “the protection of life, property, fundamental freedoms and rights of individuals” as a general function of the Malawi Police Service.
Admission of the MHRC
While it is trite that the admission of amici curiae in civil and constitutional litigation is usually permissible provided there is sufficient standing, the same is not true in criminal cases. The court supported its ruling by stating that the MHRC had acted as amicus curiae in many other cases. However, none of the cases cited are criminal trials. Although the case of Evance Moyo v Attorney General Footnote 62 arose from the criminal trial of the applicant, the court admitted the MHRC when it was dealing with the constitutionality of the penalty imposed on him. Similarly, a constitutional challenge to section 44 could warrant the admission of the MHRC. The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code does not provide for the admission of amici curiae and there is no local case law on the matter.
There are policy reasons for not admitting amici curiae in criminal proceedings. The South African Supreme Court of Appeal has warned that a criminal court must be careful not to allow the amicus curiae “to stack the odds” against the accused person; the court must consider the fairness, equality of arms, and public interest.Footnote 63 It is generally accepted that, in an adversarial criminal justice system like that in Malawi, the duty is squarely on the state to prove its case against the accused and for the court to determine if this duty has been discharged. R v Cheuka no doubt raised novel human rights issues regarding the use of lethal force by the police. However, a criminal trial was not the proper forum for determining such issues, especially since the constitutionality of section 44 was not at issue. Most, if not all, crimes involve violating the human rights of the victims.Footnote 64 Where should the line be drawn? What interest could the MHRC have had in the guilt of the accused? Therefore, the human rights implications of an accused person's actions cannot justify the MHRC's admission as amicus curiae.
The legality of the shooting for the purposes of manslaughter and its legality for the purposes of constitutionality are two separate issues. The former cannot be informed by the latter, unless the statute can be reasonably interpreted in line with the Constitution. Where this is not possible, the statutory interpretation should be applied in the criminal trial despite its inconsistency with the Constitution. For instance, according to section 208 of the Penal Code, “[a]ny person who by an unlawful act or omission causes the death of another person shall be guilty of the felony termed manslaughter.” Whether the act of shooting at the lorry driver in R v Cheuka is unlawful cannot be a constitutional inquiry in the face of section 44 of the Police Act and other laws governing the use of force in effecting an arrest.Footnote 65 That is, a criminal court cannot look to the constitutionally acceptable circumstances in which lethal force can be used to determine whether an unlawful act was committed for the purposes of manslaughter when there are specific legal provisions applicable to that question. As a result, a person can be found to have acted lawfully but not necessarily constitutionally. For instance, a person can comply with section 44 and yet not act constitutionally because the statute is unconstitutional to begin with. In such a case, the violations of human rights occasioned by the accused should not be the basis of a conviction; violating a constitutional provision does not in itself give rise to criminal liability. It thus appears that the court misdirected itself by perceiving the case as a human rights matter and admitting the MHRC. The judge could have referred the matter to a different court to determine the constitutional implications of section 44.
The use of international law
R v Cheuka confirms that the police are bound by international human rights law. Section 211(2) of the Constitution makes international law part of the laws of Malawi. In this regard, the court held that law enforcement officials must abide by the law and international human rights instruments, including the UN Basic Principles and the UN Code of Conduct.Footnote 66 While it is commendable that the use of force must comply with international law, it is rather worrisome that the court imported principles from foreign jurisdictions that had no support in Malawi. It uncritically applied jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which “in itself is curious in that Malawi, for obvious reasons, is not bound by the [court]”.Footnote 67
The uncritical adoption of foreign jurisprudence made the court stretch the scope of section 44. This stifles the development of local jurisprudence.Footnote 68 For instance, the Police Act does not require that the suspect must be armed. There is also no requirement that the use of lethal force should be proportional to the seriousness of the offence, let alone that it should be used only against suspects of violent crimes. The statute does not place a duty on a police officer to refrain from using lethal force if this is the only means to effect a lawful arrest or prevent an escape. In respect of escaping suspect felons, the act allows the police to shoot even when the suspect poses no danger to anyone. The commentary to article 3 of the UN Code of Conduct stresses that firearms should only be used where the suspect offers “armed resistance or otherwise jeopardizes the lives of others and less extreme measures are not sufficient to restrain or apprehend the suspected offender”. There is no doubt that the principles summarized by the court are more consistent with human rights than with section 44.
However, it was not for the court to interpret the statute in a manner that is consistent with international human rights law at the expense of what it expressly provided for. This goes against the principles governing the interpretation of statutes and the principle of legality. A criminal provision should be construed strictly and any doubt as to its scope should be resolved in the accused person's favour. Although “[c]ourts are entitled to have regard to all sorts of international law norms including those not ratified by Malawi and soft-law norms”,Footnote 69 by virtue of section 11(2) of the Constitution, it is essential to bear in mind that this relates to the interpretation of constitutional provisions, and not criminal provisions where the guilt of an accused person is to be determined.Footnote 70 International law can be used to determine the constitutionality of criminal provisions. Any resulting changes should apply prospectively if they are to the detriment of the accused.Footnote 71 An accused person should not be penalized for acting in accordance with an unconstitutional provision.
The case of R v Cheuka serves to show that the law as it stands is draconian and in need of revision.Footnote 72 It is inconsistent with international human rights law. The proportionality requirement is crucial in this respect. As it stands, section 44 allows the shooting of a fleeing unarmed and non-dangerous person suspected of a non-violent crime.Footnote 73 Proportionality is central to the justifiable limitation of rights under section 44 of the Constitution. The use of force can only be justifiable if it is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances.Footnote 74 It can therefore be argued that section 44 of the Police Act is unconstitutionally permissive as it allows the use of excessive force, that is, the use of lethal force against a non-dangerous suspect. However, this is a matter which cannot be fully explored in this article. Suffice to say that “[t]here is virtual unanimity that deadly force may not be used to effect the arrest of misdemeanour non-violent suspects” who pose no serious threat to life.Footnote 75 The felony / misdemeanour distinction manifest in section 44 is pertinent in this regard.Footnote 76 This is buttressed by the emphasis that R v Cheuka places on the right to life. The court sent a clear message that the first duty of police officers is to preserve life, stating that firearms should only be used to protect life. This duty is apparently negated by section 44(2)(a).
Shooting to disable and not to kill
If R v Cheuka is anything to go by, the state can easily show that a shooting was aimed to kill and not disable. It is questionable whether the test of determining an intention to disable or kill as set out in R v Cheuka is appropriate in deciding whether a shooting is aimed to disable or to kill. It creates an almost irrefutable presumption that a bullet always hits the intended target. This assertion has both logical and legal problems. It is illogical to say that a bullet always hits a target, especially where the target is at a distance and in motion. From a legal perspective, it has serious implications for the presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent. It places the onus on the accused to prove a defence. As discussed above, the onus is on the state to disprove a defence. Presuming that a bullet hit its intended target relieves the burden of proof on the state by making the death of a victim and the fact that a bullet is lodged in a potentially fatal area of the body prima facie evidence that the shooting was aimed to kill and not disable. An accused would undoubtedly face an uphill battle in rebutting such a presumption.Footnote 77 On the other hand, a fatal shooting can easily be justified if a bullet is lodged in the deceased's leg. This is an untenable position.
The court in R v Cheuka appears in effect to have placed the onus on the accused to establish what his intention was. The prosecution did not lead any critical evidence as to what the intention of the shooting was. The only evidence on this point was that of an expert witness from the firearms and ballistics branch of the Malawi Police Headquarters. This witness defined a stray bullet as one which is “fired from a gun aiming to [sic] the real target but missing the target. He identified a bullet hole on the vehicle and bullet holes on the driver's seat. He said the holes [in the driver's seat] were of direct bullets and not stray bullets.”Footnote 78 It is uncertain what criterion was used to describe the hole as one of a “direct bullet” and not a stray one. It is also not clear whether the court adopted this definition in reaching its conclusion.
The court's assumption that police officers undergo rigorous training on the use of firearms appears to have been the basis upon which such a high standard of expertise is required. In the mind of the court, a trained police officer is expected to aim accurately for his or her target, and no excuses can be made for inaccuracy. By using a firearm, a police officer puts himself forward as a qualified user. As such, the defence of “missed target” is unlikely to be persuasive. This appears to be an idealistic assumption. Indeed, even where an officer is properly trained, errors or misjudgements cannot be ruled out altogether. It is for this very reason that police officers are required to apply “careful reasoning and good judgment”Footnote 79 before using a firearm. The law “does not protect trigger-happy law enforcement officials who easily get excited about a situation and pull the trigger, be it aimlessly or on target”.Footnote 80
A more appropriate expectation is that a police officer will use reasonable care in the use of firearms depending on the actual level of their training. It is untenable to assume like the court did that police officers receive the highest quality of training to enable them to comply with a statute and hence always hit the intended target. There was no evidence laid before the court on police training. “Sometimes, rather than highlighting problems with individual police officers the review of uses of force might highlight problems with training.”Footnote 81 Indeed, the prosecution failed to produce evidence of rules that govern police use of firearms.Footnote 82 It was for the state to show that the accused had been sufficiently trained to the standard set by the court. In any case, it is unrealistic to set a blanket rule as to the accuracy of a bullet. It is one thing to argue, or find as the court did, that the chest is a potentially fatal area, and quite another to state that a shooting is intended to kill and not disable simply because the fatal bullet struck the deceased in the chest and not his arm. The former is hardly debatable while the latter inquiry must be determined by the circumstances of each case.
In actual fact, the court ignored the fact that the road was bumpy, that the shot was fired at a distant moving target, and that there were metal barriers between the driver's seat and the back of the lorry (hence the deceased was not as visible as the judgment appears to suggest). It is therefore mistaken to draw parallels between a person committing suicide and the shooting of the deceased. There is little room for a person committing suicide to miss his target; he can accurately aim at his head or chest without much difficulty. The same cannot be said of a police officer shooting an alleged suspect, more so where a moving target is involved. Of course, the third accused should not have fired in these circumstances. However, the court should have considered whether the defence had raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the intention was to disable or kill the deceased. The duty on the defence is to lay the factual foundation for a defence. On the facts of the case, this question would have been answered in the affirmative.
This conclusion is supported elsewhere in the judgment. The prosecution witnesses had testified that there were three bullet holes in the back of the driver's seat and in his body.Footnote 83 Indeed, three deformed bullets were tendered in evidence. However, there was only one bullet hole at the back of the cabin. One witness had suggested to the court that the three bullets had entered through the same hole. The state thus submitted that the accused had shot at the deceased three times. In rejecting this position, Mzikamanda J could “not imagine that the third accused was so accurate as to make three bullets go through the same hole when he was also travelling on the bumpy road with the lorry swerving as it sped down the road”.Footnote 84 It was thus held that the accused had fired one shot. In coming to this conclusion, the court clearly took cognizance of the fact that, irrespective of his skill and expertise, the circumstances under which the shooting had occurred could have affected the accuracy of the bullets. It was therefore inappropriate for the court to expect that the accused should have shot the deceased in the leg or arm.
In this regard, the court's interpretation of section 44(2)(d) is rather problematic. The provision clearly states that the police should “as far as possible aim to disable and not to kill”.Footnote 85 It does not appear to give sufficient attention to the phrase “as far as possible”. The use of these words implies that the fact that the victim died as a result of the shooting does not in itself render the shooting unlawful. Thus, the section does not prohibit a police officer from killing while using firearms.Footnote 86 On the contrary, the section allows a police officer to kill, but only in circumstances where simply disabling the victim is impossible. In other words, deliberate killing should not be the primary aim of shooting at an individual.Footnote 87 An inquiry must be made to determine whether the police officer in fact did his best only to disable the deceased and whether death was inevitable. Admittedly, this is a difficult inquiry; how far is “as far as possible”?
It should be noted here that it is inadvisable to shoot at a distant moving target. Subject to its level of accuracy, when a gun is used against a distant moving target, “the target will probably be hit, but not where the gun was aimed. Therefore, [a] police officer should not think he is going to inflict a non-fatal wound by shooting at an arm or leg. He should fully expect the shot to be fatal.”Footnote 88 “If the circumstances would not justify killing, there must be no attempt to stop a suspect by shooting merely to wound him … the goal is total and immediate incapacitation … [W]ounded offenders may still pose a significant danger [to others] … [A] significant number of [suspects fired upon] are unlikely to survive.”Footnote 89 In the South African case of Govender v Minister of Safety and Security, it was held that “[t]he firing of a shot … is potentially fatal, and the lawfulness of the act does not depend on the more or less fortuitous result thereof”.Footnote 90 In light of this, section 44(2)(d) should not affect the lawfulness of the conduct of shooting. Lawfulness should be determined by whether the decisions leading up to the use of a firearm are consistent with the law.Footnote 91 The use of lethal force in arresting a suspect may not necessarily result in death; [t]he bullet may wound, graze or miss entirely and still effectively stop” the suspect.Footnote 92 However, the state “should be required to assume that death will in fact result” when it seeks to justify the use of lethal force.Footnote 93 It follows that it would have made no difference if the court in R v Cheuka had concluded that the shooting had been to disable and not to kill; the decision to fire was unlawful in itself. The proviso is therefore unnecessary.Footnote 94
This interpretation is desirable as it overcomes dubious claims by police that the death of a suspect was accidental as the shooting was done with the aim of disabling and not killing. For instance, police gunned down four suspected robbers in Limbe in December 2011.Footnote 95 It is reported that the police received a tip-off that night that robbers were planning to break into a shop. Upon arriving at the scene, police indeed found what they described as “an unknown number of robbers who started running away”.Footnote 96 The police opened fire “with an aim of disabling them”,Footnote 97 killing four suspects in the process. Should it be said that the use of lethal force was lawful and justified in this case simply because it was aimed to disable and not kill? Surely, such a conclusion runs counter to the spirit of the Constitution which protects the right to life? The correct approach would be to ask whether the decision to shoot was itself lawful to begin with.
On the facts of R v Cheuka, the accused clearly discharged his firearm recklessly and unlawfully. He also did not take into account the safety of innocent members of the public. The area in which the shooting took place is a high density residential area and the possibility that the fired bullet would harm bystanders was very high. While it is important to prevent the escape of dangerous suspects (which in this case the deceased was not), this interest “does not take precedence over the need to protect innocent members of the public from harm”.Footnote 98 Police officers have a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid causing harm to innocent persons lawfully in the vicinity.Footnote 99 The use of a firearm to bring a moving vehicle to a halt is not only ineffective in itself but also poses a risk of injury to other members of the public if the driver is killed in the process.Footnote 100 This is well illustrated by R v Cheuka. Additionally, if the bullet misses its intended target, it may move on to hit another person.Footnote 101
The court in R v Cheuka rightly emphasized the need for a warning to be given before a firearm is used and tried to suggest what form it should take. According to the court, a warning shot fired in the air would suffice.Footnote 102 It should be mentioned that this may not be appropriate in view of the danger it may pose to the public, depending on how high the shot is fired. Indeed, most police agencies discourage the use of warning shots on this basis.Footnote 103 Shooting without warning breaches the duty to exercise reasonable care in the use of a firearm.Footnote 104 The issuing of a warning may be dispensed with when it is not feasible to do so. One would imagine that, in a situation where the police are in hot pursuit of a distant moving vehicle, a warning would be impractical unless perhaps the officers have a megaphone to use. This is not the case in Malawi.
Section 20 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code
Upon deciding that the deceased did not fall within section 44 of the Police Act, the court in R v Cheuka should not have proceeded to consider whether the accused could claim the defences under it. Instead, it could have considered section 20 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code in light of the accused's contention that the shooting had been done “in due execution of police duties to effect an arrest”.Footnote 105 The accused had not specifically invoked section 44 in his defence. Under section 20 of the code, the defence should have shown that the shooting of the deceased was reasonable and necessary in the circumstances to apprehend the deceased. A determination as to whether the shooting was reasonable and necessary as required by section 20(4) would have been made.Footnote 106 As noted earlier, this provision justifies the use of force against a person who attempts to evade arrest. Although the caveat of danger to life is not provided in this section, it is important from a practical and constitutional perspective. Indeed, the danger posed by a suspect is a factor in determining the reasonableness and necessity of the use of force.
Unlike section 44 of the Police Act, section 20(4) of the code can be read in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution. The requirements of reasonableness and necessity in particular circumstances must be informed by constitutional values.Footnote 107 Considerations of proportionality between the force used, the offence allegedly committed and the threat posed by the suspect would be relevant factors. The use of the words “reasonable and necessary” implies that the use of force in effecting an arrest may at times be unreasonable and unnecessary, and thus unjustifiable. What better yardstick to use in determining the justifiability of the force used than the Constitution? It is worth noting here that the defence of self defence would not be available to the accused in this scenario since the escaping suspect did not pose an imminent threat to life or limb of the police officer or another person.
Section 44 does not permit such an interpretation. Its wording specifies the considerations that must be taken into account when a police officer decides to use a firearm. In keeping with the principle of legality and proper interpretation of statutes, it can safely be argued that the considerations listed in section 44(2)(a) and (b) are exhaustive.
Would the court in R v Cheuka have reached a different conclusion under section 20? In light of the court's reasoning, it is likely that it would have held that the aim was to kill the driver and not arrest him. Therefore, it would have found that the accused had used his firearm contrary to section 20(4) of the code: the arrest of the driver could not have been effected by killing him: “[y]ou cannot arrest a corpse”.Footnote 108 Consequently, the force used was neither reasonable nor necessary in the circumstances; hence it was unlawful.
“ROVING EXECUTIONERS”?
The very implementation of a shoot to kill policy is, therefore, inherently unlawful because the police have no authority to do so unreservedly. Further, the policy does not envisage the scenarios stipulated under the Police Act; it is directed at persons who are not in lawful custody, let alone charged with or convicted of a felony, contrary to the dictates of section 44(1)(a). Thus, the law does not permit the police to act as “roving executioners”. As noted in R v Cheuka, justice must be done through due process in a court of law.Footnote 109
International law becomes relevant in assessing the legality of a shoot to kill policy. Malawi is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, both of which have provisions on the right to life and are applicable in Malawi. The shoot to kill policy also endangers the lives of juvenile suspects as they too may fall victim to it. This will automatically bring into play Malawi's obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child which forms part of the country's domestic law.Footnote 110 The government and its agencies are under an obligation to comply with Malawi's international obligations through its laws, policies, practices and procedures. In its commentary to article 3, the UN Code of Conduct emphasizes that every effort should be made to exclude the use of firearms, especially against children.
Section 44 of the Constitution requires that any limitation on human rights must be recognized in international human rights law. It is doubtful that a shoot to kill policy would pass this threshold. It would be difficult to justify the limitation that it would place on the right to life, dignity, the presumption of innocence and the right to access justice. The court in R v Cheuka observed that it is not the place of police officers to “exact summary justice” by arbitrarily taking away life in a brutal manner as the third accused had done.Footnote 111 It pointed out that, although a suspect may deserve to face justice, this should be achieved through the due process of law in the courts.Footnote 112 This is in keeping with the right to be treated with dignity, to have access to justice and to have a fair trial. The right to life and human dignity demands that the police respect the lives of every person. Section 15(1) of the Constitution obliges police officers, as agents of government, to uphold the rights and freedoms of every individual, including suspects.
The shoot to kill policy is an obstacle to the recent efforts to reform the Malawi Police Service aimed at reinforcing respect for human rights. It does not address the root causes of crime: poverty, unemployment, inequality and imbalances in resource sharing, corruption, the proliferation of illegal firearms and other social evils in society.Footnote 113 Indeed, in a country where the presidency has refused to sign death warrants for convicts who have been sentenced to death by a competent court of law, the implementation of a shoot to kill policy which effectively “[signs] death warrants in advance for unconvicted criminals … [is but] cheap politics”.Footnote 114
CONCLUSION
The law on the use of lethal force as stipulated in section 44 of the Police Act grants the police very wide powers to use firearms in a manner that is not supported in international human rights law. It allows the police to shoot at non-dangerous, fleeing suspects. In addition, the law and jurisprudence flowing from it is not clear as to how one can determine whether the aim of the use of a firearm was to disable and not to kill. There is a need to revise section 44 of the Police Act accordingly. Nevertheless, even in its current form, it does not allow the implementation of the shoot to kill policy now being advocated and, as current events show, practised in Malawi. “Police must use minimum force to deal with citizens and let the law take its course rather than go on a mission of killing Malawians.”Footnote 115 The use of firearms should be the exception and not the rule.Footnote 116 Persons suspected of having committed crimes should be given the opportunity to face the law as required by due process. The fact that they are suspects does not devalue their lives so much that the police should be licensed to shoot and kill. The shoot to kill policy could turn the police into “roving executioners” tasked with executing anyone suspected of having committed a crime. Oppressive policing is likely to be counterproductive; it undermines public confidence in the police and reduces cooperation from the public.Footnote 117 The government should aim to empower law enforcers to deal with crime and violence professionally.Footnote 118 The way out is not to give police wider powers to use lethal force, but to train them to “make better judgments in cases where they find themselves in stressful and potentially dangerous situations”.Footnote 119 Restraining the use of force in this way will boost public confidence.
ADDENDUM
Since this article was written, there have been a few political changes in Malawi. Following the death of President Mutharika in April 2012, Malawi now has a new president, Joyce Banda. She has issued a directive “reversing” the shoot to kill policy and appointed a new inspector general of police, Lot Dzonzi, who has pledged to ensure that the police uphold human rights. He has emphatically spoken against the shoot to kill practice. However, there is confusion within the police service and amongst the public in general. The reversal of the shoot to kill policy is seen as condoning criminal activity that compromises the safety of both police officers and the public. This is apparently because Dzonzi's stance has been taken to mean that the police are prohibited from shooting altogether, an indication that there are no clear guidelines in the police service on the use of lethal force. Even more confusing is the statement made by the minister of home affairs and internal security to the effect that the onus is on the people of Malawi to decide whether the shoot to kill policy should continue or not (about 80 per cent of Malawians are reportedly in favour of the policy). In addition, the reversal of the policy is seen as nothing more than cheap politics and Dzonzi's support for it as a quest to keep his new job. More importantly, the current turn of events simply shows that there is an urgent need to clarify the use of lethal force. Public podia and press conferences are not the right fora to effect changes in this regard; change must start with relevant amendments to the law followed by the adoption of proper policies.
