Should we approach peacebuilding with great expectations, or should we expect “postconflict” societies to remain mired in partisan division, self-interest, and distortions of the past? Comparing Austria, Germany, and Japan after World War II, this book tries to explain why countries show such different capacities to accept responsibility for crimes committed during war. It also considers whether there is any special value in having societies forced to face up to their pasts—whether there is a moral gain from accepting their guilt. The greater part of this book is devoted to the first question; in “The Tragedy of Transitional Justice,” the conclusion discusses the second.
The three cases are Germany: the Model Penitent; Austria: The Prodigal Penitent; and Japan: the Model Impenitent. (West) Germany has come to be seen as a model for the way in which a tarnished society should accept responsibility for its past, and as an example of how its democratic credentials were enhanced by that acceptance. Germany is now the leading European democracy. Its acceptance of wartime guilt compares well to the denials in Austria or Japan. Austria, due to Allied propaganda that labeled it “the first victim of Nazism” was at first able to avoid responsibility for its comparable role in the Holocaust. This is despite the fact with only 8% of the Third Reich’s population, Austria contributed 13% of the Waffen-SS, 40% of the staff of the concentration camps, and over 70% of the camp commanders (p. 84). Japan, despite American occupation and demilitarization, has also been slow to own up to its past, and has never satisfactorily done so in the eyes of China and South Korea.
The penultimate chapter is devoted to the international politics of East Asia since 1945, the important point being that the increased openness to the past in Austria and Germany also reflects the growing interdependence of European countries. Japan was under much less pressure to mend relations with its former enemies. Moreover, the Japanese state was never really purged after 1945; the degree of elite continuity was overwhelming.
Thomas Berger is a realist. His approach to The Model Penitent is deconstructive; the reader is left in no doubt that the vista of any society voluntarily acting on a sense of guilt at the end of a war simply due to the demonstrable suffering it has caused others is largely an illusion. In all of these cases, there were strong tendencies toward denial, toward reducing the circle of empathy to those who were of the same ethnicity or nationality, and the acceptance of guilt was fulsome when it coincided with foreign policy aims. As Berger admits, what defines the subject of postwar atonement is how memory and interest interact at a given time (p. 3). The two European cases reveal an underlying tension in the analysis. On the one hand, only a multifactor approach can explain why the Germans have—over time—become far more accepting of wartime guilt: The student movement in the 1960s, Ostpolitik after 1969, and Germany’s role in the European Union all played a role. Yet there is equifinality in the sense that the pattern in both Austria and Germany has been toward more repentance, and the squalid compromises of the postwar years—made imperative by the need to reintegrate the old elites—no longer sufficed. Berger acknowledges the tension: “[I]t is still difficult to say to what extent the commonalities we have observed in the politics of history in Austria and the Federal Republic—the patterns of the suppression of guilt followed by eventual acceptance of responsibility, the impact of increased integration, and of international normative shifts—are the results of these similar preconditions or whether they are reflective of broader dynamics common to the politics of historical responsibility” (p. 122).
In a world more contrite than ever about past misdemeanors, where official apologies have become common, we are in need of theoretical tools to study the politics of guilt. And, indeed, the great strength of this book lies in the theoretical discussion. Berger continually moves from context-specific analysis to theoretical reflection; the result is a deeply meditated analysis of the politics of history. The subject can be studied through three prisms. The first is that of historical determinism, where what actually happened in the past is the foremost constraint on the policies that are developed later on (“History Creates Historical Memory”). The second Berger calls Instrumentalism, an approach suggesting that political actors can manipulate the past to advance their own interests (“Politics Creates Historical Memory”). Finally, there is the view that individuals are embedded in webs of meaning that shape the formation of historical memory (“Culture creates Memory”). These perspectives help link the different chapters, but the author says that there is no a priori reason to favor one over the other: The uses of history in any context will be shaped by an interaction among all three (p. 30).
The book’s introduction expresses the ambition to develop the intellectual resources to help people decide when and why it is appropriate to devise alternative approaches toward the past. There is an important meta-level to the analysis that is relevant to recent work on reconstruction, reconciliation, and transitional justice. Yet this is a comparison of state policies: Bottom-up forms of atonement and reconciliation are not the concern. The author focuses on five dimensions of the official narrative: the rhetoric of political leaders, the establishment of commemorative sites and practices, educational policy, and lustration policies—war crimes and amnesties, purges, limitations on freedom of speech, and various forms of compensation or restitution for groups defined as victims.
There is a sense in which so much theory testing is being done on the basis of too few cases. Nonetheless, for its detailed case studies, comparative reflections, and circumspect realism, War, Guilt, and World Politics after World War II is a welcome addition to a subfield of conflict studies, a field where normative preferences lead us to approach dealing with the past with great expectations. However, if states can recover from conflict without transitional justice, if reconciliation is pursued for reasons that have little to do with justice, and if states can get along fine for long periods without such measures, the case for realism is strong. In all three cases the pursuit of historical justice was appealing on moral grounds; in all three it failed on its own terms (p. 240). Nonetheless, despite their moral shortcomings, all three became peaceful democratic countries in a short period of time. Their histories do not (for Berger) justify George Santayana’s dictum that those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it, or (for collectivities) the Freudian thesis that an unprocessed trauma will simply return in a new form.
Many committed peace processors will not like Berger’s conclusion that only in time will societies have the capacity (or the luxury) to deal with the past properly. This view makes transitional justice a noble but impractical undertaking: a field whose normative ideals are ultimately vulnerable to the simple insight that dealing with the past is a case of mixing memory with self-interest.
