Americans are fascinated with their own bad politics. The sad state of public discourse inspires books and books about a “divided America,” our inability to “get along,” and the bleak prospects for the “culture wars.” Finding a way to recover civility has become the greatest task of contemporary political thought, which summons the complete devotion of great thinkers like John Rawls, Martha Nussbaum, and Ronald Dworkin. These are legitimate concerns, of course: public life has become quite unable to live up to the expectations of democracy. Few people can muster an appreciation for opposing ideas, or find a willingness to scrutinize their own. But why is that? Can we really blame it on the media and education, or are those merely symptoms? Why are we so unable to talk meaningfully about the most important things?
Stephen D. Smith's new book, The Disenchantment of Secular Discourse, is yet another attempt to answer that question. Smith's work will disappoint those looking for a new theory for cultural peace. But for those who wish to understand the more fundamental reasons for our shrill, painful, depressing political condition, his inquiry offers some golden insights. Max Weber made much of the “disenchantment” of the modern world, and the general despair that it causes. But what does it mean for public discussions about morality?
Secularism means far more than the absence of religion. Modern America after all is as religious as it has always been, and faith plays a strong role in the way people explain their values. Secularism is instead the total lack of transcendence to anything beyond the city; it is the complete enclosing of man's mind within the world. It makes politics supreme over philosophy, and makes the few remaining philosophers wholly devoted to politics. Once, moral reasoning was about how to live in accordance with a certain order of nature, and our ability to see public life in light of much greater things than itself. But if that view of nature is forgotten, or if appeals to it are forbidden, then “moral reasoning will no longer be possible,” Smith writes. “Anything that goes on under that label will be something quite different—and probably, if it fails to recognize this revolutionary change, something profoundly confused” (63). Indeed, modern liberal democracy does not seem able to justify itself, or even explain why it is preferable to tyranny.
Secularism cuts itself off from its own essential trait: the ability of citizens to reason together. There is, of course, the Rawlsian idea of “public reason,” that is, the ability of an overtly secular society to deliberate well entirely on its own terms. But Smith insists that the Rawlsian project succeeds precisely because it aims to “keep public discourse shallow—to keep it from drowning in the perilous depths of questions about the ‘nature of the universe,’ or ‘the end and object of human life’” (17). It must stay shallow because exploring the depths is dangerous. If we dig down beneath the surface of our morality, though, what do we find?
Many thoughtful people realize that there is a “strong incentive not to raise that question,” Smith observes. “The incentive derives from the specter of moral nihilism … that lurks in the corners of modern philosophical discussions of the nature of morality.” There is a frightening possibility that “all of our talk about morality and justice and rights might be a sort of elaborate sham,” meaning it is wise to “refrain from asking troublesome questions. And indeed, some modern thinkers have advocated a course of cultivated silence on these questions” (170–71). Those who most strongly advocate “morality” and “freedom,” or fight for “rights” and “equality,” are usually quite suspicious of philosophy, even though philosophy might strengthen their arguments or give a firmer grounding for their views. Many view it as the trickery of those who might subvert social evolution with silly “meaning of life” questions or expose the groundlessness of our most sacred priorities.
Smith traces the problem back to the Enlightenment, which featured the “hope that human beings, once brought into the light of reason, could be persuaded to live in that unblinking glare rather than retreating back into the dark, warm, womb-like cave of religion and tradition” (19). Rather than settle for the limitations of human opinion, we could give total supremacy to scientific truth. In this, we could free ourselves from a fallen human condition and become more like angels. But it soon became clear with the Romantic Movement and much nineteenth-century philosophy that such an undertaking came at a tremendous cost: we traded a view of man as “intrinsically normative or purposeful” for “a world viewed as complete in its empirically observable, naturalistic, or physical dimension.” God would be, not denied, “but excluded from scientific explanations and, later, from public political justifications” (21–22).
But Smith reminds us how secularism was greatly indebted to a much older Western heritage. Jesus Christ was not a legislator in the style of Moses or Solon or Hammurabi, so Christianity did not come with a new divine law for a new chosen people. Christianity instead opened up a secular space for how communities could order their lives together by their own judgments of what was good for society and for individual persons. It recognized that there are indeed two realms—heavens and earth, soul and body, ecclesiastics and civil magistrates. “Separation of church and state” was preceded by centuries of careful thinking about what “church” and “government” actually meant, and the distinct nature of each; the greatest Christian minds always acknowledged that the political realm could indeed be understood on its own secular terms, in light of faith but still apart from it. The disenchanted secularism that Smith studies is in fact the result of secularism's rejection of itself—not an abandonment of heavenly philosophic questions, but an attempt to bring the heavens and the earth together into one tiny little universe, which came to be known as the State.
But this inevitably suffocates public discourse, which explains much about our cultural illness. We use words that hold immense emotional weight, yet they are totally severed from any meaning outside of very immediate political priorities; our words “are too truncated to express the full range of our values, intuitions, commitments, or convictions” (24). How is it, then, that public discourse continues? Why do people not recognize the void beneath their most sacred values?
In a land so overtly hostile toward the idea of human purpose, Smith points out how often we “smuggle” in many aspects of human ends to justify our views. We must find a way to say that “freedom” and “equality” are good things which everyone ought to prefer—without ever letting on that those notions are derived from man's ultimate purpose, which we were supposed to have grown out of. It would require looking beyond the realm of immediate political priorities, toward the universal truths about what it means to be human. It would require us to admit that the autonomy involved in doctor-assisted suicide only makes sense when we recognize the obligation to preserve life; that “human rights” only matter when they are seen in light of natural rights; that “doing no harm” only makes sense when we acknowledge the need to “love thy neighbor as thyself.”
Shameful as it is, smuggling “allows modern discourse to function and to provide a measure of rationality and sense to our normative affairs.” Ending that smuggling would “have the effect of paralyzing normative evaluation and leaving the public square vulnerable to openly cynical politics—or brute force” (34). So we wisely look the other way.
For a book on public discourse, Professor Smith's work lacks a few vital topics: while whole chapters are devoted to doctor-assisted suicide and religious liberty, he gives scant attention to more pressing issues like abortion, bioethics, or gay marriage. But a point-by-point treatment of these issues would most likely devalue his teaching and make his work a mere product of its time. Like all trends, those too will pass. The question is what they will pass into: Will values and goals of the next generation be more attuned to timeless and eternal truths about what is good for human beings, or will they continue to smuggle until the source of all that is right and good vanishes from our view, and we can finally say, like Alexander Pope, “whatever is, is right”? Smith's work is an excellent guide for those willing to face that kind of question.
