The argument of the book is easily surmised from its title. The author claims that the nature of power in international politics has changed. In language highly reminiscent of that employed by the “interdependence” theorists of the 1970s, he argues that “the post-modern international system emphasizes markets, trade and technology, all bound together in a new system of interdependence in which force has lost much of its utility, and may even be counterproductive” (p. 10). The European Union is uniquely well placed to profit from this new world, because “the nature of the international system today is more suited to a new model of superpower, one that prefers to avoid military solutions to problems, that prefers to achieve its objectives through influence rather than coercion, and that prefers to lead by example” (p. 6). Consequently, the EU has acceded to the rank of superpower. The argument is carried forward in chapters dealing sequentially with the historical emergence of the EU onto the international stage, the nature of the Union's civilian power, its economic strength, and its political and cultural impact in world politics.

This is an interesting, challenging, and ambitious book. The author displays an impressive knowledge of the literatures of relevance to the various issues he tackles. Herein also, however, lies its core shortcoming, in that it reads more like a review of those literatures than a reasoned case in defense of a provocative argument. It is disappointing that we do not hear more of the author's voice. It would have been particularly useful to have more in the way of clarification of key notions such as “latent or unconscious power” (contrasted with the “visible and deliberate power”; p. 4) traditionally deployed by the United States.

The United States, in fact, looms large in this account. John McCormick seems as concerned with charting its decline as he is with illustrating the rise to superpower status of the EU. Few would deny that the EU is becoming a serious challenger to the United States in the areas of trade or standard setting in international environmental affairs. Yet the book goes further, portraying the “development of a post-modern European Union that has so pointedly and effectively illustrated the declining relevance of the American model of great power politics, and is itself now taking the lead in redefining the international system” (p. 34).

This is an ambitious claim, and a questionable one. For one thing, in an attempt to talk up the power of the EU, McCormick on occasion conflates it with the member states. Thus, he asserts (wrongly) that “through Britain and France [the EU] has significant nuclear capability” (p. 71). Similarly, while the Union might lack serious military capabilities, to infer from this that the “Europeans have tired of violence and conflict, and have chosen instead to emphasize the economic, political, cultural, technological and moral dimensions of power” (p. 14) seems at best strange at a time when so many member states are engaged in high-intensity conflict in either Afghanistan or Iraq, or both. “Europe” and the EU are conceptually distinct. Member states and the EU do different things in different ways. And not all European states are members at all.

Second, the author exaggerates the degree to which the Union has successfully deployed economic tools to exert international influence (p. 116). Certainly it has successfully done so—with enlargement being a hugely successful case in point (pp. 124–29). Yet enlargement cannot continue forever, and the increasing opposition to further expansion may indicate that it cannot continue at all. McCormick's claims regarding the impact of the EU's “soft power” become much more tendentious when discussing its attempts to influence its neighbours to the south and east using incentives short of membership (pp. 129–30).

Nor have recent EU efforts to halt Iran's nuclear program done much to illustrate that international influence flows from the provision of economic incentives. The reactions of the Tehran regime have been instructive. A summary dismissal of European economic inducements has been accompanied by equally clear indications that what Iran's political leaders want is direct dialogue with the United States—the only country able to provide them with a credible security guarantee.

In making his case, McCormick exaggerates not only EU influence but also American decline. On occasion, his argument is redolent of the classic Monty Python scene in which the question is posed: “What have the Romans ever done for us?” Thus, the “US still has the world's biggest national economy, the biggest multinationals, the favourite currency, the best universities, the most Nobel Prize winners, and the most rapid technological advances, but …” (p. 84). The “buts” relate to deficit spending, national debt, and a reliance on foreign energy. Yet it is difficult to see this as a picture of terminal decline.

Indeed, the fact that the book is so heavily based on comparison with the United States is itself somewhat curious. As the author himself admits, “we do not yet even have a noun to describe the EU. It is less than a state but more than an international organization, so we are forced to use clumsy terms such as ‘actor’ or ‘entity’ or ‘multilevel governance’ in our attempts to pin down its character” (p. 15). If this is so, comparing the Union so explicitly with the United States smacks of a category error. The Union is a different form of political organization from traditional nation-states. Consequently, it is inappropriate to compare it to a nation-state using concepts derived for nation-states.

None of which is to deny that this is a book that merits serious attention. It is interesting, engaging, cogent, and highly provocative. I enjoyed it enormously, even if I was not convinced by its arguments.