Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 March 2005
According to Glannon and Ross, for an act to be considered altruistic, it cannot be obligatory nor motivated by expectation of self-reward. Given that parents are obligated to help their children and stand to benefit greatly from donating, the authors conclude that parent to child organ donation is not altruistic. Are they correct? I am not sure. In my view, this is a semantic question and the answer depends upon how one defines altruism. Altruism is a complex subject that means different things to different people. If we say that an altruistic act is one that is performed voluntarily, is risky or costly to the actor, and is designed only to benefit others with no expectation of self-reward, then it may be difficult or impossible to identify any such acts. When one risks her own life to save a stranger, others may ask: “Did she really act solely to benefit another or was she motivated, at least in part, by a need to satisfy her conscience or a desire to feel good about herself?” This question is relevant to the motivation of living organ donors. In contrast to the authors' answer that strangers who donate organs do so only out of concern for other people, Carl Fellner argued that many living organ donors, even those who are not related to their recipients, act to benefit themselves. If Fellner is correct, and if organ donation by parents is not altruistic because of the possibility of self-reward, perhaps the same is true of organ donation by strangers.
According to Glannon and Ross, for an act to be considered altruistic, it cannot be obligatory nor motivated by expectation of self-reward. Given that parents are obligated to help their children and stand to benefit greatly from donating, the authors conclude that parent to child organ donation is not altruistic.1
Glannon W, Ross LF. Do genetic relationships create moral obligations in organ transplantation? Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2002;11:153–59; Glannon W, Ross LF. Motivation, risk, and benefit in living organ donation: A reply to Aaron Spital. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, this issue, 191–4.
Fellner CH. Organ donation: For whose sake? Annals of Internal Medicine 1973;79:589–92.
Let us suppose that the possibility of self-reward does not exclude an act from the realm of altruism. In this case, parental organ donation would still be in the running except for the fact that it may be obligatory. But why must we insist that obligation is fatal to altruism? Glannon and Ross point out that although a stranger “may benefit as a consequence of donating, this is not her reason for donating” and therefore does not eliminate anonymous organ donation from the sphere of altruism.3
See note 1, Glannon, Ross, this issue.
Peters DA. A unified approach to organ donor recruitment, organ procurement, and distribution. Journal of Law and Health 1989–90;3:157–87.
Spital A. Intrafamilial organ donation is often an altruistic act. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2003;12:116–8.
Parker I. The gift. The New Yorker 2004 Aug 2:54–63.
Finally, Glannon and Ross suggest that “What makes [altruistic] acts laudable or praiseworthy is that they are freely chosen at some cost or risk of harm to oneself and are directed at individuals to whom one stands in no special relationship.”7
See note 1, Glannon, Ross 2002.
In their commentary, Glannon and Ross note that my view that donor benefit is the key to justified living organ donation8
Spital A. Donor benefit is the key to justified living organ donation. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2004;13:105–9.
The Ethics Committee United Network for Organ Sharing. Ethics of organ transplantation from living donors. Transplantation Proceedings 1992;24:2236–7.
More importantly, Glannon and Ross disagree with my position. They argue that even if there is no expectation of donor benefit, living organ donation may still be ethically acceptable and that when “potential donors are denied the opportunity to donate, the reason should be that the risk of harm to the donor is too high or that the probability of physical benefit to the recipient is too low.”10
See note 1, Glannon, Ross, this issue.
As previously emphasized, living organ donation can only be effected with the help of physicians. Therefore, the donor's physician is a moral agent who must not only consider the donor's welfare but must also share responsibility for the outcome. As Carl Elliott points out: “If a patient undergoes a harmful procedure, the moral responsibility for that action does not belong to the patient alone; it is shared by the doctor who performs it.”11
Elliott C. Doing harm: Living organ donors, clinical research and The Tenth Man. Journal of Medical Ethics 1995;21:91–6.
In my view it would be difficult if not impossible for physicians to fulfill their special fiduciary responsibility to their patients if they were required to balance the risks for one patient against the welfare of another.12
See note 8, Spital 2004.
The Authors for the Live Organ Donor Consensus Group: Consensus statement on the live organ donor. JAMA 2000;284:2919–26.
If we accept the view that each potential living donor should be evaluated by a physician who has no ties to the recipient, how can the donor's physician decide if “the risk of harm for the donor is too high”? I have already argued that this determination cannot be based on the relative probability of donor harm and recipient benefit. Rather, it should be based on the same yardstick used for determining the acceptability of risky procedures or treatments for all patients. That is, do the benefits of the procedure for the patient outweigh the risks for the patient?14
See note 8, Spital 2004.
Ross LF. Solid organ donation between strangers. Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 2002;30:440–5.
See note 1, Glannon, Ross, this issue.
See note 1, Glannon, Ross, this issue.
Admittedly, estimating donor benefit is difficult. In my previous editorial on the subject I tried to provide a method for doing this that I will not repeat here.18
See note 8, Spital 2004.
Spital A. Ethical issues in living organ donation: Donor autonomy and beyond. American Journal of Kidney Diseases 2001;38:189–95.
See note 1, Glannon, Ross, this issue.
Glannon and Ross also claim that by requiring donor benefit my proposal would reduce the number of acceptable organ donors. I have two responses here. First, although this is possible, so far there are no data to support this claim. In fact, some observations suggest that this fear is unfounded. For example, as previously noted, there is some evidence that many living organ donors (including unrelated ones) donate at least in part to benefit themselves,21
See note 2, Fellner 1973.
Sadler HH, Davison L, Carroll C, Kountz SL. The living, genetically unrelated, kidney donor. Seminars in Psychiatry 1971;3:86–101.
Butterworth VA, Simmons RG, Bartsch G, Randall B, Schimmel M, Stroncek DF. Psychosocial effects of unrelated bone marrow donation: Experiences of the National Marrow Donor Program. Blood 1993;7:1947–59.
One final note. Glannon and Ross state: “The number of transplanted organs from living donors has now surpassed the number of organs from cadaveric donors.”24
See note 1, Glannon, Ross, this issue.