Larry Siedentop informs his readers at the beginning that he will “tell a story about how the ‘individual’ became the organizing role in the West—that is, how the ‘civil society’ which we take for granted emerged, with its characteristic distinction between public and private spheres and its emphasis on the role of conscience and choice” (2). By the end of the book, the story has unfolded, and it is one of the inextricable links between the invention of the individual and the Christian tradition. “Christian moral intuitions played a pivotal role in shaping the discourse that gave rise to modern liberalism and secularism” (359). In between the beginning and the end of this provocative and masterful work, Siedentop's story covers the Christian break from classical Greek philosophy, the formative doctrine of Paul, the development and splinters of Christian theology through a thousand years, the impact of shifting patterns of papal authority, and the material transformations of rural and urban life in the medieval ages. Siedentop wants to persuade his readers not only of the incontrovertible connection between Christianity and modern liberalism, but to dispel the conventional understanding that “the Renaissance and its aftermath marked the advent of the modern world” (338). In Siedentop's story, by the fifteenth century, “canon lawyers and philosophers had already asserted that ‘experience’ is essentially the experience of individuals, that a range of fundamental rights ought to protect individual agency, that the final authority of any association is to be found in its members, and that the use of reason when understanding processes in the physical world differs radically from normative or a priori reason. These are the stuff of modernity” (338).
The eleventh through the fourteenth centuries clearly are captivating to Siedentop, because he finds in this latter stage of the medieval period a powerful coincidence of papal reform and the emergence of fledgling democratic institutions. Siedentop argues, contrary to most interpretations of the hegemony of the Roman Catholic Church, that the universal church and its centralized authority freed up the political realm for a more popular and inclusive kind of self-rule. The paradox of the papal revolution was that by proclaiming the church's independence from secular government, it helped to create more democratic institutions. By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, independent charters had emerged in the boroughs of England and Germany, charters that affirmed self-government, a formal equality for citizens, and popular assembly (274). In general, Siedentop suggests that throughout the Middle Ages a “universalism of Christian aspiration had a subversive potential. … A new sense of social justice was being born” (176).
In his analysis of the thinkers who he regards as central to the symbiosis between Christianity and modernity, Siedentop clearly plays favorites. He writes of two dominant strains through the Dominicans and the Franciscans, and points out that from both we can extract a “radically individualist framework” (291). But he prefers the Franciscans with their roots in Augustine and, further back, in Plato to the Dominicans and their allegiance to Aquinas, moving back to Aristotle. The Franciscan tradition “held that belief in moral equality entailed humility in the use of reason. For if humans are equal, they are also equally fallible. The duality of moral experience led Franciscans—following Augustine—to pay closer attention to the nature of human agency. … Humans are free and endowed with rationality. But an upright will also depends on the support of revelation to supply motive force” (300). Through the Franciscan narrative, which culminates in Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, Siedentop proclaims that this narrative “put into place the basic building blocks of modern secularism. In refining the idea of Christian liberty… they prepared a revolution in the understanding of the ‘proper’ ground of authority. They moved from an aristocratic towards a more democratic idea of authority” (296).
Moving backwards through Siedentop's story, to his opening chapters on the Christian break from classical philosophy, we see that for the author, the potential for modern liberalism existed in nascent form at Christianity's inception. Paul's “great discovery, his mystical vision of the Christ,” leads to a premise of “moral equality” and a “human will that is in a sense pre-social” (67). Whereas ancient philosophical argument had “privileged identity of the family and the polis over the individual” and cast some people as “by nature slaves or ‘living tools,’” and furthermore, “presented the higher faculties of the mind as making possible a liberation from the physical world into a superior realm of pure ideas” (114), in Paul's vision of Jesus, we find a “new moral reality” that puts the individual front and center in relationship to God, dispenses with natural hierarchy, and transforms worthiness from the capacity for reason to the universal capacity for faith. “Is it fanciful to suggest,” Siedentop asks, “that the individualist implications of Christian moral beliefs had the potential to change not only the prevailing conception of society but that of the physical world as well, ‘nature’ as well as ‘culture’?” (114). Apparently not.
If Siedentop's story is persuasive, and our contemporary understandings in the West of liberalism and individualism, society, culture, and nature are fundamentally Christian derived, where does that leave us? Jean Vanier has been awarded the 2015 Templeton Prize, an award given to one who has made an exceptional contribution to life's spiritual dimension. It carries with it a monetary value of $1.7 million. Vanier is a Canadian who began his professional career as a professor of philosophy—principally the philosophy of Aristotle—but gave up that career to dedicate himself to the severely intellectually disabled. Vanier founded L'Arche, beginning in France when Vanier invited two disabled men to live with him, and culminating today in an international network of a hundred and forty-seven L'Arche communities in thirty-five countries. Vanier is absolutely committed to the Christian idea that each and every human being is of equal worth and dignity, and I find it hard to disagree with him (or Siedentop) that without the legacy of Christianity, this deep commitment to the integral worth of every individual would not exist in the world.
But another, perhaps more troubling thought, is one that Siedentop invites explicitly in his book. The detachment of secular liberalism from its religious foundations in Christianity threatens the future of the West (though for reasons there is no space to elaborate here, he identifies the threat as more acute in Europe than in the United States). “By identifying secularism with non-belief, with indifference and materialism, it deprives Europe of moral authority, playing into the hands of those who are only too anxious to portray Europe as decadent and without conviction” (360). More pointedly, Siedentop declares: “We are in a competition of beliefs whether we like it or not” (1). If this is true, Siedentop's book and Vanier's prize may not help us much. One of the best clusters of words in Siedentop's book captures the Christian turn. “The desert rather than the amphitheatre was the setting for victory. The audience was God rather than the crowds. An inner voice rather than outbursts of applause was the medium of success” (87). Machiavelli anyone?
