Long gone are the days a quarter of a century ago when the “miracle” of 1989 in Eastern Europe seemed to usher in a new age of universal peace, democracy, freedom, and an acceptance of capitalism that would make all societies prosperous. This was also going to enhance the power of the United States and make it the most admired, powerful, and benign global hegemon in world history. That the Soviet Union collapsed two years later only made this new age seem all the more plausible.
We know this did not happen. Democracy and market-based economic reforms did indeed spread, though quite unevenly, to formerly communist Eastern Europe. It appeared or was consolidated in some important countries in Latin America and Asia, but in others the process has been reversed or never got off the ground. The events of 1989 certainly played some role in South Africa where the apartheid regime came under increased pressure to negotiate its demise once the threat of communism disappeared. Western aid givers insisted that some of their African clients should democratize; however, this did not turn out well in most cases.
Now it would seem that after a few promising developments, democracy has died in Russia, and it never seriously spread to Central Asia or Belarus. In the Caucasus, one could argue that a sort of democracy exists in Georgia, but not in Armenia or Azerbaijan. It does, precariously, in Moldova and Ukraine, though not only are both of these countries menaced by an aggressive Russia that controls parts of the their territories (as in Georgia), but their governing systems are also highly corrupt and largely ineffective.
As for the triumphalism that was so current in the United States after 1989, it has also soured. Ensnared by imperial hubris, the United States responded in exactly the wrong way to subsequent Islamic terrorism. In part this was because American policymakers looked at the overthrow of communism in East Central Europe and concluded that once dictators were out of the way, every society would easily turn to democratic capitalism, build strong civil societies, and cozy up to the United States. Unfortunately, it turned out that invading Afghanistan and Iraq brought them neither democracy nor prosperity, and the United States has hardly made many loyal friends there or elsewhere in Muslim societies. Even a longtime ally like Turkey is now increasingly anti-American, and perhaps not entirely coincidentally religiously conservative and authoritarian.
Mired in hopeless foreign wars, deeply divided with an almost paralyzed government, and unable to solve its own internal problems, the United States is no longer the model it seemed to be in the early 1990s. The near depression that began in 2008 sullied the image of free-market capitalism. The other great example of peaceful democratic capitalism that could be a potential model for the rest of the world, the European Union, has now lost its allure as well and seems unable to revive its economies or to formulate a clear foreign policy of its own.
Even in Eastern Europe—the great success story of 1989 (so long as we overlook the subsequent Yugoslav genocidal civil wars)—there are troubling signs. Hungary is veering perilously close to authoritarian right-wing populism. Romania and Bulgaria are renowned for their corruption, and many Western Europeans now think that it was a mistake to let them into the European Union. If some parts of the former Yugoslavia are now genuinely democratic and stable, others are not. In the former East Germany, a supposedly reformed communist party is doing well. Everywhere there is a pervasive disillusionment because the dreams and idealism of 1989 have not yielded the expected utopian fruits.
Reading the many chapters contained in these three volumes, especially Postcommunism from Within and Twenty Years After Communism, one can feel this pessimistic mood. The third collection of pieces, Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe, includes descriptions of those legacies left from communist days that are also somewhat gloomy. Might it be that in the future we will find ourselves looking back at 1989 in a way analogous to historians’ bleak views of the years that followed the end of the “Great War” in 1918? Then, also, liberation and new democracies spread throughout Eastern and Central Europe to replace supposedly imprisoning, autocratic empires. But aside from Czechoslovakia, democracy had died throughout the region 20 years later. Ethnic and nationalist confrontations pushed regimes to the far right. The Great Depression prevented a full recovery from the chaos of World War I to ever take secure hold. Eventually, German aggression swallowed all of those countries and most of the rest of Europe. The year 1918 had offered a hollow dream that turned into something far more catastrophic than what had existed before 1914. All three of the ancient European imperial dynasties that fell as a result of the war—the Hohenzollerns, Habsburgs, and Romanovs—proved to be less murderous, autocratic, and destructive than what would subsequently emerge.
It would be overreaching to claim that something like this could happen again. Vladimir Putin is not Hitler, and despite its nuclear weapons, Russia is no longer as great a military threat as either Germany was in 1939 or the USSR was later on at its height. Germany itself is not a threat. The economic crisis that afflicts Europe is not as bad as the Great Depression of the 1930s, at least not yet. There is some nostalgia for the security and seeming egalitarianism of communism, but in Eastern Europe, unlike in Russia, it seems unlikely that this will completely erase all the bad memories of the oppression and unpopularity of communism as it actually was.
Nevertheless, clearly, there is much to worry about. The direction of change is now negative, and it could get worse.
There are two distinct questions to ask about this unfortunate turn of events. First, why did so many analysts and Western, most of all American, policy experts and leaders get lured into being so overly optimistic about the future? A second, very different question: Have things really turned out all that badly throughout postcommunist Europe? In other words, if a lot of hopeful forecasting from the early 1990s was overly optimistic, could it be that the pervasive sour mood among many analysts, including most of the ones in these three volumes, as well as among much of the East European populations, be just as exaggerated? I think the evidence suggests that it is.
Jan Kubik’s introductory essay in Postcommunism addresses the first question. He tells us that the wave of scholarship that came to be called “transitology” (analyzing the transition from communism to democratic capitalism) turned out to be shallow and mistaken because too much of it, particularly in the immediate aftermath of 1989–91, was done by scholars who did not examine the whole of what was going on, and more egregiously, by nonspecialists who latched onto the latest news to come to grandiose conclusions. Ideological considerations prompted Western European and American policymakers and compliant scholars to accept the most welcome and superficial analysis, and so to assume that they did not need more thorough knowledge. Instead, Kubik writes, we should be turning back to more nuanced local analysis, as the many countries of Eastern Europe had different precommunist histories and cultures, varying experiences with communism itself, and now quite distinct adaptations to the postcommunist world.
In the same volume, Ivan Szelenyi and Katarzina Wilk’s chapter contends that the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe caused a drastic decline in the standard of living and a huge rise in inequality. Yet for the region as a whole, the Gini coefficients they report suggest that aside from Russia, in the other countries inequality only increased to a range broadly similar to that in Western Europe and less than in the United States. The chapter is perhaps misleading; the Gini coefficient was so low in communist times because so many of the privileges and benefits that came with one’s occupational status were not monetized. For example, the head of the prestigious Romanian research institute to which I was assigned in 1970 as a visiting researcher had a beautiful, spacious apartment for which he paid (at official, not black market, exchange rates) $15 a month. Someone I knew who lived in a miserable, tiny apartment paid one-third of that. In a market economy, the price difference would have been much greater. And so it went with the availability of lodgings in different vacation resorts, health-care facilities, kinds of shops, and many other goods and services. This was common practice throughout the communist world, so that once more market-based pricing came into being, measurable inequality automatically increased. There is no doubt that it did in a real sense, but probably not as much as Szelenyi and Wilk suggest. On the other hand, it may well be, as they suggest, that in Russia, a much greater increase in measurable inequality has been real. Also, the question they pose is a good one: Why were there so few protests in the 1990s as unemployment rose and chaotic change lowered living standards, but many more in the 2000s when the situation in most of Eastern Europe actually improved significantly? The answer they give is that market reforms in the 1990s did not, by and large, eliminate the state-supported welfare benefits that had been fairly generous, and so discontent was contained. But by the 2000s, the original euphoria over the end of a hated system was over, and populations expected much more.
There are many other essays in Postcommunism, but they do not provide as much actual data as Szelenyi and Wilk do. Some, such as the essay on social justice by Thomas Wolf and John Pickles, or the one on feminist theory and Eastern Europe by Joanna Regulska and Magdalena Grabowska, offer more of a postmodernist perspective than actual empirical analysis. Predictably, they decry Western liberal hypocrisy, find the European Union’s attempt to incorporate East European women to be a shield for imposing new controls to replace the communist ones, and generally more or less dismiss liberal Enlightenment values as appropriate guidelines for the future. It is sometimes worth exposing some liberal platitudes as covers for less benign forms of control, but such criticisms can go too far, as they tend to downplay the failures of the prior communist regimes.
In the same volume Laura Lovin’s chapter on Romanian women also does not take into account how bad it was under communism. Instead it focuses on post-communist Romania’s failure to make much progress toward feminist goals while hoping that new organizations springing up will do better. But it was in Romania, more than anywhere else in the region, that women were the most oppressed under communism. Not only did they work and do most of the child rearing and housework, as well as suffer from a blatantly patriarchal culture that tolerated a lot of abusive male behavior, but if they were in the large working class, they were subjected to humiliating attempts to force them into having more children. They were also denied the protection of contraception and abortion, both of which were available to families of party elites. This led to untold numbers of tragedies. At least that has changed, even if the general culture has not and progress remains slow.
The unstated and perhaps forgotten truth in the volume by Kubik and Amy Linch is that if it had not been for the widespread belief by East European intellectuals in the promise of the liberal emancipation, the acceptance by most of the population that this was desirable, and the realization by the controlling Communist Party elites that perhaps this was correct, these systems would never have collapsed so quickly or with so little resistance in most instances. In other parts of the world where there has been far less of an intellectual base of support for democracy and freedom, and where elites have retained belief in the legitimacy of their right to rule, the East European miracle of 1989 generally has not been replicated.
A comparison of per capita Gross National Product adjusted for prices (PPP, or Purchasing Power Parity in 2013 U.S. dollars) for Eastern Europe today shows that the situation is not so dire. (These data are for 2013 and calculated from each of the country pages in The Economist 2014):
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Czech Republic: $26,320
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Estonia $21,990
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Hungary $21,650
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Lithuania $21,460
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Poland $21,070
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Romania $15,970
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Bulgaria $15,110
To compare, some Western European figures are as follows:
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Switzerland $51,290
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Netherlands $42,770
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Sweden $41,470
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Germany $39,450
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France $35,120
So, yes, former communist countries in Eastern Europe are poorer than the richer countries of Western Europe, but still well ahead of China ($8,420), Turkey, except for Romania and Bulgaria ($17,127), and Brazil ($11,640), all countries deemed to have had spectacular economic growth in the first decade of the 2000s. They are in the same range as Russia ($21,940), again except for Romania and Bulgaria, though none have the tremendous advantage of huge exportable natural resources that Russia has, and all have far less measurable inequality. That Greece’s per capita GNP adjusted for PPP in 2013, after years of crisis and decline, is $25,840, considerably higher than its Balkan neighbors, is testimony to the advantages of having been considered part of the West rather than of the Soviet sphere.
An interesting side note is that according to Andrew Janos (2000, 130 and 136), in 1910 the order of Eastern European countries, as measured by per capita GNP, was the same as it is now, with the Czech part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire way ahead of the others, followed by Hungary and Poland (but only the part then in Russia), with Romania and Bulgaria at the bottom. (It is impossible to get separate estimates for the Baltic countries at that time.) And yes, Western Europe was ahead, though at that time Sweden was one of the poorest Western European countries and at almost the same level as Bohemia-Moravia. Direct comparisons are unreliable because boundaries have changed greatly, wars affected different countries in diverse ways, and even communist rule was quite different in all of these cases. But the similarity in rank order, while not surprising, also tells us something about historical legacies.
The question of legacies is what the fascinating volume edited by Mark Beissinger and Stephen Kotkin is about. In their Introduction, the editors warn that sometimes a too facile use of that notion can be misleading. There may be entirely functional reasons why certain existing institutions and habits are similar to ones that existed in previous times, or why in other cases, what look likes similarities are only superficially so. For clarification, they asked the authors of the various chapters to concentrate on relationships between communist institutions and postcommunist ones to see if there is evidence of direct connections.
Grigore Pop-Eleches’s chapter, for example, seeks to explain why public opinion in Eastern Europe, but much more in Russia and the former Soviet countries, has not been as democratically oriented as one would expect from the high level of education and the general tendency of more educated societies to be more democratic. The explanation lies in the fact that higher education was concentrated on technical fields, leaving out social science and the humanities. This is interesting for us in the West as well, and perhaps a warning about the persistent downgrading of the humanities we now find. Nevertheless, of course, in reaction against communism and Russian domination, most of Eastern Europe did become democratic, though now some of those gains are at risk because of the “democratic deficit” noted by Pop-Eleches.
A particularly useful piece by Clifford Gaddy points out that in Russia, the nature of industrialization, which prioritized the settling of strategically useful zones, pushed a lot of industries into very cold, physically more hostile areas than was warranted. Stalin’s Gulag, designed to produce goods with forced labor, made this situation even worse. This spatial misallocation of resources, once done, is hard to overcome, even if the Gulag is long gone and the original reasons behind settlement of the coldest part of the country no longer exist.
Béla Greskovits’s chapter explains that postcommunist foreign direct investment in industrial production worked best where there already existed sufficient human capital, that is, useful skills. Also, if there had been partial market-based reforms in late communist times, as in Poland and Hungary, this was also seen by foreign investors as an advantage. But this foreign investment has raised the question concerning whether or not it only replicates an older relationship that made Eastern European economies dependent on Western European ones without ever giving them a chance to catch up. This is part of an old argument about whether or not Eastern Europe is fated to remain a “periphery” of the West, as Ivan Berend has claimed (1996). Only time will tell, though the history of this region indicates that the more Western involvement there was, the better off the economy. Not catching up is not the same thing as remaining poor and making little progress (Chirot Reference Chirot1986).
The risks of just assuming legacy as an explanation is shown by Timothy Fry’s examination of the corrupt monopolization of energy firms by the state and its friends in Russia. This may look like a legacy of communism, as Putin’s KGB friends and old associates have benefited, but Fry shows that the largest such firm, Gazprom, actually behaves just like Pemex has for decades in Mexico. Communist legacy or not, there is more at work here than what is left over from the Soviet past.
Fry’s chapter in the Historical Legacies volume takes us to another crucial postcommunist issue, corruption. There is a lot of it, but how much is a legacy effect? In the Kubik and Linch volume, a chapter by Alena Ledeneva goes over the various definitions given to that term, and then combines the measures used by various organizations to produce composite scores (305). Not too surprisingly, the “stans” of Central Asia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Russia come out as the worst. Without democracy, there is no way for public anger about the abuse of those in power to express itself, or even to perceive the full extent of predation going on. The Baltic countries do well, especially Estonia, and so does Slovenia. The Czech Republic and Slovakia also rank well. Surprisingly, by this account, Romania and Bulgaria are far from the worst, though they are at the bottom of the scale for countries in the European Union. Here, a logical but still very important finding is that all of the worst cases are not in the EU, including the most corrupt former Yugoslav states. (Slovenia is in the EU.) For those who somehow still think that the EU, weakened as it may be, has not done a lot of good, this is something to reflect upon. Democracy and the attempt to adhere to Western notions of honesty have somewhat curbed historically notorious Romanian corruption, even if they have hardly brought it down to Scandinavian levels.
There are other legacies of communism mentioned in the Beissinger and Kotkin volume. Brian Taylor discusses the continuing tendency of the Russian police to be excessively brutal, and this fits well with Alexei Trochev’s account of the way that judges in Russia still almost always agree with prosecutors, so that acquittals are exceedingly rare. Surprisingly, this remains the case in most of the postcommunist countries, including those that have become genuinely democratic, like Poland. Arguably this is clearly a communist legacy that seems to be reproducing itself.
There is chapter in Historical Legacies on the influence of religion in postcommunist countries by Anna Gryzmala Busse, and another on the legacies of Soviet nationality policies by Volodymyr Kulyk. Poland is the country where religion has the strongest effect on politics. There, the Catholic Church retains its influence, and for those who did not know the history of how this happened, Busse’s chapter tells us about one of the most ironic of communist legacies. Before World War II, the Polish Catholic Church was not that powerful, but it gained stature during the war because it was so persecuted by the Nazis, becoming an important resistor. After the war, it refused to compromise with the communists and turned into a crucial supporter of independent civil-society activity. Its alliance with Solidarity and the role played by Pope John Paul II were crucial in precipitating the demise of communism. As a result, the church retains its prestige and much of its power. This is unique in the communist world. In Russia, Putin uses the Orthodox Church to support his corrupt autocracy, but there is little evidence that it has nearly as much legitimacy as Poland’s Catholic Church.
As for Soviet nationality policies, they were adopted in the 1920s by the Soviets to try to control Russia’s many ethno-national groups, appearing to be more tolerant than the late tsarist regime. Ultimately, of course, this led to all sorts of contradictions as many ethnic non-Russians became Russian speakers, and migrations mixed populations more than ever, leaving a confusing and difficult legacy not only in Ukraine but also throughout the former Soviet Union after its breakup. Tito’s adoption of similar policies in Yugoslavia also contributed to the subsequent Yugoslav tragedy.
The final chapter in the Legacies volume, by Jessica Pisano, is different. It tells the story of one event, when a cardiologist speaking directly to Vladimir Putin on a TV call-in show criticized his hospital for having faked a public show of high efficiency at the time of Putin’s visit in 2010. This presentation of a deliberate false front on the occasion of an official visit by the leader has a rich tradition in Russia, and even a special term, pokazukha. There is some of this everywhere, but it was particularly prevalent in Russia, as well as in other communist countries. (In Romania, a special herd of well-fed sheep would be rotated to various collective farms before Nicolae Ceauşescu’s visits, but as a former village boy who had once taken care of sheep, he could actually tell one from another and once got angry as he recognized a particular sheep he had just seen in another farm.) The term “Potemkin Village” long predates communism. What Pisano does, however, is to explain that this was a put-up job that allowed Putin to respond favorably to the cardiologist’s complaint in a way that would show him to be a “benevolent tsar” able to help commoners against “selfish boyars.” This was very much a communist and indeed precommunist legacy. On the other hand, of course, most autocratic rulers who want to shore up their legitimacy with the masses practice the same tactics: Blame underlings for what is wrong, and make a show of stepping in to improve things, thus showing that the system really works.
It is with the discussion of symbolic actions and attempts to legitimize political regimes that the various essays in the volume edited by Michael Bernhard and Kubik, Twenty Years After Communism, take on more meaning. Pierre Nora’s now classic Les Lieux de Mémoire (1997) discusses how various kinds of French historical memories and sites shape current understandings of the past as well as the present. It has become the key theoretical base for a whole new kind of history. The contributors to the Bernhard and Kubik volume use memories and celebrations of 1989 (and 1991 in the former USSR) on the twentieth anniversary to illustrate and explain both the past and the present nature of postcommunist regimes.
The year 1989 is remembered very differently in the various countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR, thus confirming the fact that both their late communist systems and their postcommunist experiences have not been as uniform as some past analyses suggested. But if there is one commonality, it is, as the editors’ Introduction suggests, that by 2009 there was a lot less enthusiasm about how wonderful 1989 really was than seemed present at the time.
Aida Hozić’s chapter’s title gives us the essence of the celebration of 1989 in most of the former Yugoslavia, “It Happened Elsewhere.” The celebrations that took place were mostly financed by German organizations and by the European Union, which insisted on commemorating the reunification of Europe under democratic rule. Given what subsequently happened in Yugoslavia, there was relatively little local enthusiasm for this anniversary.
Similarly, Oxana Shevel shows that in Ukraine, where the key year was 1991 and the twentieth-year commemorations were in 2011, memories of “liberation” were less than celebratory. What happened in 1991 was not a movement to break away from the USSR but a collapse of Soviet authority, followed by the decision of Ukraine’s communist elite to pull out in order to save themselves from the uncertainties and disorder emanating from Moscow. Ninety percent of the population voted in favor, including most Russian speakers, in the hope that this would lead to a better economic situation. Unfortunately, by 2011 the corruption, incompetence, and domination by their own oligarchs had already left a sour taste and made many question the wisdom of the break. Reading this essay, it becomes clear that Ukraine’s contemporary problems are not simply a function of Russian aggression but an entirely justified disillusionment that deeply divided the population.
One would think that at least in the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland, and Germany, 1989 would be celebrated as the wonderful year that it was, but even there this is not so clear. According to David Art’s chapter, whereas the memory of the fall of the Berlin Wall is still important for Germans, the West Germans remain preoccupied with the Nazi past, while in the East there is considerable nostalgia for the fallen communist regime, or at least enough dissatisfaction with the (purely relative) backwardness of this region compared to the West. Conor O’Dwyer tells us that much of the Czech public, particularly the young, were disgusted in 2009 with the state of Czech politics, and were not in a celebratory mood. Bernhard and Kubik’s account of Poland highlight disputes between left and right about how to interpret Poland’s escape from communism, but in Poland, at least, there seems to be widespread appreciation of what a good thing that was, and how much better off Poland is now than it was under communism.
In the Baltics, while the ethnic majorities in each of the countries are pleased by their inclusion into Europe, the memory of 1939 when they were first handed over to the Soviets, and the traumas that followed during the German occupation and then the return of the Soviets, remain controversial, not least because there was considerable collaboration with the Nazis. Nationalism, controversies over how to interpret World War II, and the problem of dealing with the large Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia, according to Daina Eglitis and Laura Ardava, shape the memory of events from 1989 to 1991.
Chapters about Romania by Pop-Eleches and Bulgaria by Venelin Ganev also show differences. In both countries, the commemorations of 1989 revealed justifiable dissatisfaction that greater reforms have not taken place. In Romania, different interpretations of the Revolution of 1989, the only one that involved significant bloodshed, became a tool used by competing political forces rather than a genuine celebration shared by the entire nation. In Bulgaria, which has fared even worse, by 2009 the memory of 1989 was that it was not a big deal after all.
So all in all, the celebrations of 1989 and 1991 in 2009 and 2011 reflected the fact that by then, political divisions, disappointments, and contemporary problems had reshaped what once seemed like a wonderful miracle.
Indeed, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that most of the Eastern European and former Soviet countries are deeply depressed societies. Their fertility rates, even Catholic Poland’s, are astoundingly low. Unlike the richer Western European countries with low reproduction rates, however, they cannot count on immigration to make up for some of this population loss, as they are also places from which many of the most energetic and talented young people leave.
Could it have been different? On the one hand, there were too many hopes placed on the miracle of 1989. On the other hand, at least in the parts of Eastern Europe that have been incorporated into the European Union, there is more prosperity and far more freedom than before 1989. Many of their problems are those of Europe in general. If the EU’s leading nations can recover their economic dynamism, create a more harmonious union, and instill fresh hope in their people, then Eastern Europe will benefit greatly and be carried along. If not, it will be difficult for them to overcome their divisions and problems. So, perhaps ironically, once again, as in precommunist times, the fate of Eastern Europe will depend on what happens in Western Europe. If things go well, 1989 will one day be celebrated more joyously than in our own days.
That is not so terrible. Aside from a few of those states not included into the EU that are directly menaced by Russia, at least Eastern Europe is dependent on a relatively benign set of European nations committed to Enlightenment liberalism. For Russia, Central Asia, and areas in Russia’s orbit, there is no such hope.
With their varying chapters and approaches to the problems raised by communism’s collapse in Europe, these volumes offer more than useful information. They remind us that without the detailed historical and cultural knowledge possessed by area specialists, theorizing political and social change can veer off the tracks. The enthusiasm engendered among many policy specialists, even some sophisticated academic ones, by the “miracle” of 1989 led to many mistaken assumptions about the ease and inevitability of democratization. More subtly, the very diversity of styles in these works shows the importance of methodological and theoretical pluralism. Quantifiable facts are necessary, but so is something that postmodernism, despite its frequently blatant political bias, can offer. Constantly reshaped memories that reinterpret the past trump reality in forming much public opinion. Pierre Nora’s widely heralded work on historical memory is something we all need to know about. Without this, it is hard to explain the variation in the interpretation of 1989 in Eastern Europe and the former USSR, and why the dimming of the triumphalism that once prevailed has greatly contributed to today’s pessimism. Without such hard-to-quantify knowledge, we risk trying to explain away the gap between what seems to be material reality and actual political ideology by twisting the meaning of rationality. That is a mistake nicely avoided by the three reviewed volumes.
