I. INTRODUCTION
In the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith identifies two types of consumable commodities: “necessaries” and “luxuries.” Necessaries are, he defines, “not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without.” Everything above this level, he continues, is a luxury ([1776] 1904, V.2, p. 354). Joseph A. Schumpeter commented how, in the eighteenth century, the word (its plural: luxuries) “came more and more exclusively to denote non-necessary commodities,” and luxury was taken to be “consumption exceeding what was later called the ‘social minimum of existence’” ([1954] 1986, p. 325). This was a part of his long and insightful note on luxury; at the same time, however, Schumpeter discarded “as not relevant to our subject” opinions about luxury that are “primarily morally motivated.”Footnote 1 Yet, this was precisely the attitude taken “up until the eighteenth century” towards luxury: while it was recognized as an object of desire, “from the Greeks onwards” this kind of desire “had been deemed pernicious and harmful” (Berry Reference Berry1994, pp. 3–4).
A markedly hostile attitude towards luxury and unnecessary, excessive wealth was taken by a series of authors contributing to the so-called “republican” tradition, which flourished in Europe from the Renaissance until the end of the eighteenth century. Their views about luxury, and wealth more generally, were primarily politically motivated and deeply influenced by their admiration for Sparta and the austerity of the early Roman Republic. Precisely the reading of the ancient writers was the forming force of early-modern republican thought and the key impetus to the “revival” or “recovery” of republican ideas in early-modern times. The leading idea on our topic, which these ancients transmitted, is that unnecessary wealth and, particularly, consumption over a certain limited level, is a pernicious extravagance that harms virtue and leads to corruption of the polity that allows it. This understanding had a major impact on the leading contributors to early-modern republican thought.
Republican thought has so far attracted much interest from historians of political thought; this article focuses on the important economic aspects of the tradition, often forgotten or neglected by the historians of political thought, seeking to offer an account that can provide valuable insights for an economists’ audience.Footnote 2 While early Rome plays a significant yet secondary role, the Lacedaemonian example is pivotal for understanding luxury and wealth in republican thought.Footnote 3 We shall examine the role of Sparta in three key thinkers, sixteenth-century Florentine Francesco Guicciardini, and two eighteenth-century Frenchmen, Montesquieu and Abbé de Mably. Guicciardini, whose Spartan connection was properly emphasized only recently, is a clear choice. Montesquieu is crucial for the eighteenth-century republican debate: we shall demonstrate the decisive ancient influence in his theoretical account of luxury and provide the analysis of his almost unknown work, Dialogue de Xantippe, showing the importance of Sparta for Montesquieu’s idea of republic. In the second part of the eighteenth century, the most extensive influence of the Lacedaemonian example, particularly on the discussion of wealth and luxury, can be found in writings of the great philo-Spartan Mably.Footnote 4 Within a scope of an article, the examination of the three authors offers the best insight on the impact of the Spartan example in early-modern republican thought, in particular its economic aspects.
J. G. A. Pocock’s influential study (1975) dedicated not insignificant attention to the treatment of wealth and luxury in the republican tradition, yet Pocock is focused on the Anglo-Saxon, “Atlantic” trajectories and the influence of the English republicans on the American founders.Footnote 5 French eighteenth-century debates, where the austere Lacedaemonian example was particularly influential, are by and large absent from Pocock’s account.Footnote 6 The other influential historian of republicanism, Quentin Skinner, is focused on the “neo-Romans” and pays very little attention to wealth and luxury. In fact, instead of stressing the danger they present to a republican polity, in the article intended as a statement of the “republican ideal,” he, strikingly, counts “wealth” as one of the “benefits” that the citizens of “free states” enjoy (1990, p. 301).Footnote 7
An important exception amongst the histories of republican thought is Eric Nelson’s study (2004), which argues for the significance of the Greek tradition in early-modern republican writings.Footnote 8 Nelson seeks to distinguish the Greek influence from the Roman, and stresses the importance of the “Greek” view, where one of the leading features is the emphasis on the dangers of extreme wealth and poverty for the commonwealth: Aristotle and, in particular, Plato, shared this view, and strongly influenced the early-modern republicans. The expressions “extreme” or “excessive wealth and poverty” are repeated time and again in Nelson’s study. Nelson provides an interesting account, with a particular focus on property. The aims of this article are quite different. We are interested in the distinction between luxuries and necessities, and their connection with wealth and poverty; the focus is on the Spartan example. But there is a need to introduce the analytical distinction between the Platonic account, where there is a twin danger of both wealth and poverty, for a republic and the pursuit of virtue, and a simpler account, where virtuous poverty is opposed to corrupting wealth. While the latter, simpler account is a standard amongst the Roman writers, it appears, as the important alternative, also amongst the Greeks. Greek sources also praise virtuous poverty, and “the Greek tradition” (where Sparta plays a major role) is more complex than presented by Nelson.Footnote 9 The article stresses the importance of Plutarch, whose account is crucial for the early-modern views of Sparta: in his writings we find both variants—the simple binary opposition and the Platonic account. The distinction is traced in our authors: while the Platonic motif is absent in Guicciardini, both variants can be found in Montesquieu and Mably.
The article wants to trace a particular way of thinking about luxury and wealth in early-modern republican thought.Footnote 10 The fact that Guicciardini’s writings were published only in the mid-nineteenth century, and yet we find quite a number of similar (independently reached) conclusions in Montesquieu and, especially, Mably, demonstrates the importance and influence of their ancient readings. The lack of “continuity” between Guicciardini and the two eighteenth-century Frenchmen, who did not know his (yet unpublished) political writings, reconfirms the appeal of the Lacedaemonian example and the (repeated) impact it had on the early-modern writings on republics. The appeal, however, goes hand in hand with pessimism about the possibility of emulation.Footnote 11 The status of our authors as “proper” republicans is irrelevant for our argument. Some objection can be found for each of them, yet there is no doubt that writings of all three are an important contribution to republican thought.Footnote 12
The article provides also a number of other novelties. Plutarch’s writings and his influence on the tradition are thoroughly examined. Close engagement with ancient sources, while examining our modern authors, is an element lacking in previous studies.Footnote 13 We explore both the direct influence of the Spartan example and the correlative Platonic ideal, inspired by the Lacedaemonians. This allows the reader to understand both the extent and all the complexity of the Spartan influence. A nuanced account of Guicciardini’s and Mably’s Lacedaemonian commitments offers new insights in their political and, especially, economic thought. The article shows the decisive role Plato plays in Montesquieu’s account of luxury, and the key role of Sparta in Montesquieu’s conceptualization of the archetypal republic.
II. PLUTARCH’S ACCOUNT OF SPARTA
Despite the significance of the influence of Roman writers on early-modern republican authors, the impact of Greek writers on the issues of wealth and luxury is almost certainly greater.Footnote 14 The prime reason for the greater Greek influence is the great classical model-polity: Sparta, with her Lycurgian constitution.Footnote 15 The Lacedaemonian example, a state with no wealth, no luxury—nor, indeed, moneyFootnote 16—played a major role as a source of inspiration—and an object of analysis—in modern republican debates. However, Sparta is not important just per se, but also as the source of inspiration already for Plato: as Montesquieu will later remark on “the laws of Lacedaemonia,” “those of Plato were their correction” (EL, IV.6).Footnote 17
For the purposes of our enquiry, the most significant ancient author is the late first- and early second-century Greek from Boeotia: Plutarch. His extensive extant opus contains not only the biographies of the Spartan legislator, Lycurgus, and of two subsequent reformers of Lacedaemon, Agis and Cleomenes, but also other writings on Sparta, such as Instituta Laconica. (His Roman Lives are also in general unfriendly towards luxury and excessive wealth, and thus, e.g., praise Cato’s frugal ways, and criticize Lucullus’s extravagant lifestyle devoted to pleasure, after his retirement from public affairs.) Essays from his Moralia also contain important early observations on the distinctions between necessities and luxuries. Plutarch was strongly influenced by Plato, and the impact of Platonic dialogues can be often found in his writings.
The crucial account about Sparta is found in the Life of Lycurgus:
Determined, therefore, to banish insolence and envy and crime and luxury, and those yet more deep-seated and afflictive diseases of the state, poverty and wealth, he persuaded his fellow-citizens to make one parcel of all their territory and divide it up anew, and to live with one another on a basis of entire uniformity and equality in the means of subsistence, seeking pre-eminence through virtue alone. (Lyc. VIII.1–2)
The size of allotted slots was set at such a level to provide just for necessary nourishment for a man and his wife. Lycurgus also banished “the unnecessary and superfluous arts,” so that luxury gradually “died away of itself” (IX.3–4). He further “attacked” luxury and “removed the thirst for wealth” by introducing common messes, where all adult Spartiates had to eat together in utmost frugality (IX).Footnote 18 An important detail is repeated in Plutarch’s account of Cleomenes’s reintroduction of the Lycurgian constitution: he wanted “to rid Sparta of her imported curses, namely luxury and extravagance, and debts and usury, and those elder evils than these, namely, poverty and wealth” (Cleom. X.4). This emphasis on the twin dangers of both wealth and poverty for a good polity figures prominently in Plato’s Republic and is repeated in the Laws (Rep. IV.421e–422a; Leg. V.728e–729a, V.744d ).Footnote 19 Plato himself, we should add, held Lycurgus, “a divine hero,” in highest respect (Leg. I.630d-e, III.691e).Footnote 20 Nonetheless, in the same Life of Cleomenes, Plutarch later speaks about his “abolition of wealth and restoration of poverty” in Sparta (Cleom. XVI.5).
Such a positive understanding of poverty is found also in De genio Socratis, a dialogue that contains Plutarch’s only surviving (longer) treatment of Epaminondas, the greatest Greek hero.Footnote 21 A full-scale argument in defence of poverty is pronounced by the model Greek: ironically, Sparta’s greatest enemy, yet the adherent of the same austere ideal. Offered money by Theanor, Epaminondas refuses: “you have come to help us against Poverty, supposing us molested by her; whereas we find her most companionable and a friendly member of our household; no armament of riches, then, is needed against her who gives us no offence” (De gen. Soc. ch. 14 [Mor. 584A-B]).Footnote 22 He then goes on, to defend extreme frugality. Desires are divided into innate (with necessary pleasures as objects) and adventitious (seeking to satisfy “empty fancies”). A disciplined man can abate even many of the innate desires, not to speak of “the intrusive and superfluous” ones, which should be “worn down” and “cut off by letting reason chasten them with repeated repression and restraint” (ch. 15 [Mor. 584D-E]). By resisting “the appetite for riches and money,” including those honorably acquired, a man can train himself “to keep well aloof from all dishonest and unlawful gain” (Mor. 585A-B).Footnote 23
Two of Plutarch’s moral essays are amongst the first known works to explicitly make a sharp distinction between the necessities of life and luxuries.Footnote 24 This is particularly pronounced in On Love of Wealth, where Plutarch distinguishes between what is “necessary and useful” and what is “useless and superfluous” (De cup. div., esp. ch. 2 [Mor. 523F, 524A], 8 [527D], and 9 [527E]). The essay abounds with denouncements of the bad and pernicious effects of wealth and luxury, which infect men with the desire for material goods, “diverting our appetite from the necessities of life to what is difficult, rare, hard to procure, and useless” (ch. 2 [Mor. 523F]). A similar argument appears also in That We Ought Not to Borrow, where Plutarch asserts that loans only distract from what is “useful and necessary”; they are not made “to people in need, but to those who wish to acquire some superfluity for themselves” (De vit. aer. al. ch. 1 [Mor. 827D]). “If we were content with the necessaries of life,” money-lenders would be out of business; “for our debts are incurred not to pay for bread or wine,” but to acquire all sorts of luxury (ch. 7 [Mor. 830D-E]).Footnote 25 While Plutarch apparently does not make a distinction between the necessary and the useful—both concepts seem to be conflated, and jointly opposed to the superfluous/uselessFootnote 26—his general distinction between the necessary and the superfluous luxury commodities is not an insignificant early theoretical contribution.Footnote 27
III. GUICCIARDINI
A decade ago, I uncovered the importance of the Lacedaemonian example and Lycurgus’s constitution in Guicciardini’s early political writings (Regent Reference Regent2008). In the same article I also brought to light the crucial influence that Plutarch exercised here and on Guicciardini’s “polemic against luxury” more generally.Footnote 28 The influence of Plutarch on Guicciardini’s work is, however, not limited only to Sparta—or to Greece—e.g., Plutarch is clearly Guicciardini’s main source and inspiration for his discussion of the suicide of the two great republican heroes of the late Roman Republic, Cato Minor and Brutus (Guicciardini Reference Guicciardini1867c).Footnote 29 It is obvious that Guicciardini was an avid, careful reader of Vitae parallelae. While it is not so clear how well Guicciardini was acquainted with Plutarch’s Moralia, there is no doubt that at least a part of Moralia was available, and read, in Florence in this period;Footnote 30 therefore, Guicciardini might have well been acquainted with some of the essays discussed above.
Guicciardini’s first known political treatise, Discorso di Logrogno, completed in August 1512 while Guicciardini was on a diplomatic mission to Spain, proposes a detailed, carefully balanced constitution to order a “popular government”—i.e., a republic—in Florence.Footnote 31 The end of the treatise offers crucial remarks on wealth and luxury. While the modi ed ordini he proposed would heal many defects and ills of the community and government in Florence, to achieve a more perfect republic, weaknesses of human nature should also be corrected. One has to “reach the root of delicacies and softness of our souls” that make men effeminate and cause so much harm (1932c, p. 257).Footnote 32 The great esteem and reputation given to riches should be cut out; “the immoderate appetite” for riches “removes the desire from the real glory, alienates the souls from seeking virtue and introduces them to a thousand transgressions and to a thousand dishonesties” (p. 257).Footnote 33 Such disorders are universal and spread throughout the world, not just in Florence; one can find little else but “an ardour to enrich [oneself] or to use riches for evil purposes and luxuriously [delicatamente]” (p. 257).Footnote 34 Guicciardini observed earlier in the Discorso how in Florence money is greatly revered by everyone; it is, “as it is said, the second blood” (p. 232).Footnote 35 But it is the bad effect that wealth and luxury have been causing for centuries in the world, that is so damaging; this corruption has been detested and condemned already by ancient writers (p. 257).Footnote 36
Whilst there might be some remedies to moderate those ills (p. 257),Footnote 37 the corruption caused by excessive wealth and luxury is a true disease (malattia). If one wants to achieve true health, a most radical cure is needed:
. . . a disease so universal, so old and deep-seated in the minds of men. It would be required to be cut out with a knife of Lycurgus, who in one day extirpated from Lacedaemon all the riches and sumptuousness, accumulating together possessions of everybody, dividing them then in equal parts, forbidding the money, removing all the uses for which riches are desired, of sumptuousness, of banquets, of abundance of servants, of beauties of cloths and furnishing. Surely an awesome thing, to what self-restraint, and to what ardour for virtue and low esteem for goods he led in one day his city, and with how many beautiful and glorious practices he endowed it … in a way that the orders and the laws it had lasted many hundreds of years.… It was easier for him to reduce it in one act than it was for Plato, Cicero and many most learned and most prudent men to put it in writing… (pp. 257–258)Footnote 38
As I have shown, the origin and inspiration for Guicciardini’s argument are Plutarch and his biographies of the Spartan reformers. Indeed, the crucial expression, “the knife of Lycurgus,” originates from the Comparison of Agis and Cleomenes and the Gracchi (Regent Reference Regent2008). However, the radical changes that Lycurgus introduced made Guicciardini conclude that, even if the reform was a magnificent and most laudable thing, “this disease is so difficult that it is impossible to extirpate it” (1932c, p. 258).Footnote 39 It is not licit even to hope to do it “in one act.” For this would also require an instant removal of all the purposes for which wealth is desired, exactly as it was done in Sparta, and the softness of men in Guicciardini’s time does not allow it (p. 258).Footnote 40
Why did Guicciardini think that it is impossible to follow the Spartan route and emulate Lycurgus? His discussion of Sparta in a not-well-known treatise on progressive taxation, La Decima scalata, helps us to get an answer.Footnote 41 The speaker in the second of the two discorsi, evidently Guicciardini’s mouthpiece, sums up the key features of the Laconian state, so cherished in the republican tradition:
At Lacedaemon it is true that the possessions were divided, because who ordered that Republic had another object, and wanted to accustom it to arms and to poverty; so they had no other thought but to exercise themselves in arms and in virtues; and hence they removed also money, merchandise and trades of earning, and all the comforts and pleasures for which riches are used; creating a rough and severe community [vivere]. (1867a, p. 374)Footnote 42
Such a result should not be reproached, the speaker continues, his own reverence (reverenza) for this republic does not allow him. The Spartan case is, however, unique: either because of the difficulty of this sort of life, or because the planned fruits did not follow, “amongst many Cities and Republics that existed in many centuries, there was perhaps never any other to take this route” (pp. 374–375).Footnote 43 A highly important lesson for the present follows:
And in our times it would be impossible to reduce men to a similar community [vivere], which if one wants to imitate it requires the abolition not only of possessions, but also of money, merchandise, foreign commerce and every humanity; and it does not stop with possessions only, because if this example is to be valid, it is necessary to follow it in full or not even mention it; and he who would want to keep this route, is required to have arms in hand as they did, otherwise, believing you are doing good, you would do bad. (p. 375)Footnote 44
Guicciardini’s mouthpiece concludes that, as the Florentines did not “give [themselves] to arms,” and it would be difficult to persuade them to leave their mercantile ways and ancient mode of life, how can they “defend [their] State if not with riches”? Being bad in arms, these riches provide for foreign soldiers and provisions essential for the defence of their dominion and their liberty (p. 375).Footnote 45
Now we can better understand the moderate proposals Guicciardini made at the very end of the Discorso di Logrogno. He proposes “giving the city to the arms” and thus “opening the way to become glorious with them” (1932c, p. 258).Footnote 46 It is clear that this should be a gradual process, which may eventually lead (Guicciardini must have had a vague hope in those early days) the Florentine republic to a path of austere virtue of the Spartan type. The militarization will simultaneously assist the important goal stressed at the end of the treatise: that less esteem is given to riches (p. 258).Footnote 47 The other proposed measure is to limit and moderate “as much as possible” the ornaments and the sumptuousness of dresses: they make the difference between the poor and the rich visible, and thus inflame men’s hearts for accumulating wealth, including by unpraiseworthy and illicit means. This is all incompatible with the establishment of a republic in which the desire for riches should be removed (pp. 258–259).Footnote 48 Finally, Guicciardini also proposes a limit to dowries, which will greatly aid virtuous but poor men to marry off their daughters (p. 259).
It is clear that the Discorso di Logrogno is deeply influenced by the classical republican example of Sparta. Virtue is harmed by the excessive appetite for wealth; it directs the souls of men from seeking virtue to seeking how to enrich themselves. A set of measures sketched at the end of the treatise tries to offer a solution on how to expel luxury and give wealth less esteem, gradually turning the Florentines to a far nobler pursuit of arms and glory. Guicciardini’s admiration for Lycurgus should not be doubted; he supports the use of “Lycurgus’ knife” as the instrument, too: the little known treatise Delle buone leggi e della forza (1867b), the subtitle of which asks “Is it licit to lead people to good laws by force if it is not possible to do so otherwise,” answers a clear yes.Footnote 49 Nevertheless, Guicciardini is always keenly aware of the prevailing conditions and circumstances, and even in his early days rejects a more radical plan as inappropriate for Florence. Later, Guicciardini will settle for Venice as the more applicable republican model; indeed, the increasingly pessimistic admirer of Plutarch later in his life will become the first ‘Tacitist’ (Pocock Reference Pocock2003a, p. 268; cf. Momigliano Reference Momigliano1990, p. 122).
In the already mentioned La Decima scalata, the second discorso argues against progressive taxation in Florence. The view is plainly endorsed by Guicciardini himself. The existing Florentine stratified society that preserves men in their rank and property is defended against a redistributive populist policy proposed by the first speaker. But it is not inconsistent that Guicciardini’s mouthpiece admires Sparta while at the same time preferring a conservative to a populist egalitarian regime in Florence, if a Lycurgian republic is unachievable: such a populist redistributionism wants to promote a better life for the multitude and equality as an end in itself, rather than aiming for virtue.Footnote 50 In fact, as one of the Ricordi clarifies, while “the appetite for goods” is a sign of low character, in corrupt modern conditions wealth is required for the one who seeks virtue and greatness: with goods “the virtues shine and are appreciated, which in a poor man are little esteemed, and even not recognized” (1933, I.141; 1857, CCCLXIII).Footnote 51 Indeed, “nowadays” virtuous men are forced to seek riches—not immoderately, but to a level sufficient to keep their “reputation and authority” (1933, I.18; 1857, CCXL).Footnote 52 However, the speech that Guicciardini composed for the first populist speaker of La Decima scalata constructs an opponent’s standpoint with remarkable exactitude, and simultaneously introduces the distinction between the three types of expenses—and interrelated desires (or wants).Footnote 53
It should be noted how Guicciardini, though strongly influenced by the Greek authors—at least Plutarch—nonetheless does not seem to pay any attention to a Platonic distinction where both poverty and excessive wealth are harmful:Footnote 54 Lycurgus is thus described as the man who wanted to accustom Lacedaemon to poverty, which is a great stimulus to a life of virtue.
IV. MONTESQUIEU
Born more than 200 years after Guicciardini, Montesquieu is the most influential political thinker of the eighteenth century. Montesquieu’s work, in particular his magnum opus, De l’esprit des loix, has a certain ‘proto-sociological’ quality.Footnote 55 He tries to offer an impartial analysis and to systemize; his personal preferences on a certain issue are therefore not always easily discernable. Various interpretations have thus appeared, claiming that he prefers a “liberal” monarchy to a republic, that he is a “liberal republican,” etc. None of these interpretations, including those that explicitly argue that Montesquieu is not a republican,Footnote 56 are relevant for our present analysis, for it is beyond doubt that he made a major contribution to modern republican thought and analysis of republics.Footnote 57 Indeed, he exercised a major influence on eighteenth-century republicanism: “Montesquieu … set the terms in which republicanism was to be discussed” (Shklar Reference Shklar, Bock, Skinner and Viroli1990, p. 265); “De l’esprit des lois, more than any other text, provided the ideological structure for eighteenth-century French republicanism” (Nelson Reference Nelson2004, p. 176). It is clear that Montesquieu highly appreciates the ancient virtue (which is the republican “principle”), but it seems that he is not convinced that such arrangements are applicable and should be emulated in his own times. Indeed, in his (more private) Pensées he is very explicit about not wishing to live amongst the squabbles of a “free state.”Footnote 58
Montesquieu is well aware of the advent of commerce and wealth, and the contrast between the ancients and the moderns. A famous quote from De l’esprit des loix strongly emphasizes the difference between the ancient man and Montesquieu’s contemporaries: “The Greek political men who lived under popular government recognized no other force that could sustain it than that of virtue. Those of today speak to us only of manufacturing, of commerce, of finances, of riches, and even of luxury” (EL, III.3).Footnote 59 Montesquieu’s discussion of the damaging effects of wealth, as well as his most interesting theoretical contributions on luxury (and necessities), are both an integral part of his analysis of (predominantly) ancient republics. The aims of De l’esprit des loix are much more ambitious and all-encompassing; Footnote 60 here, we shall concentrate on republics, and two specific issues: (i) the role of Plato’s “corrected” Spartan model in Montesquieu’s analysis of luxury, and (ii) the key role of Lacedaemonia in constructing the archetypal republic, where citizens living in frugal conditions pursue virtue.
Montesquieu’s most important contribution to the discussion of luxury and necessities, both in general and in the context of republics, can be found in De l’esprit des loix, especially in book VII. Montesquieu starts with a discussion of luxury:
Luxury is always in proportion with the inequality of fortunes. If in a State riches are equally divided, there will be no luxury: for it is founded but on the comforts that can be given to oneself from the work of others. For riches to remain equally divided, it must be that the law gives each one only the physical necessities. If it goes beyond that, some will spend, others will acquire, and inequality will be established. (EL, VII.1)Footnote 61
Montesquieu continues on how to calculate luxury. If one assumes that “physical necessities” equal to a certain sum, for those who possess only the necessary, luxury will be zero. The man who has double the necessary will have a luxury that equals one; one who has double the possessions of the previous man, three; one who has once more double of the preceding individual, seven, etc. Presuming that each man has double the amount of goods than the previous one, “luxury will grow by double plus one unit, in this progression 0, 1, 3, 7, 15, 31, 63, 127” (VII.1).Footnote 62
What Montesquieu actually proposes here is a sequence, and, moreover, a sequence specified by recursion. Written formally, the formula for the sequence would be:
a n = 2 a n–1 + 1, with a 0 = 0. Footnote 63
Luxury is thus measured in terms of the necessary, and assigned a numerical value equal to the number of times it surpasses the mere satisfaction of necessities. Montesquieu was evidently inspired by Plato’s Laws, for he immediately continues with a remark about how “in the republic of Plato, it was possible to calculate luxury accurately” (EL, VII.1).Footnote 64 Plato introduced four levels of census: “The first was precisely the point where poverty ended; the second was double the first; the third, triple; the fourth, quadruple of the first” (VII.1).Footnote 65 In the first, luxury was zero; in the second, one; in the third, two; in the fourth, three.Footnote 66
We can here clearly see a repetition of the Platonic motif that both poverty and excessive wealth are harmful for a republic; “that greatest of plagues … in a State,” as Plato remarked in the same place that Montesquieu discusses here (Leg. V.744d). In a summary of the ancient republics’ fate in Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur decadence, Montesquieu speaks about the appearance of the rich and the poor only once the original equal land distribution was uprooted ([1734] 1854a, III). However, otherwise he also often uses the term “poverty” in a more conventional sense, particularly to describe the exemplary republican conditions of the early Romans. Thus, poverty is often associated with frugality as the defining feature of the early Romans; e.g., “the time when frugality, parsimony, and poverty made the distinctive character of the Romans” vs. “the time when their luxury was carried to excess” (EL, XXVII).Footnote 67 In Rome, poverty was in fact a public virtue ([1734] 1854a, VIII).Footnote 68 When Carthage made war “with her opulence against the Roman poverty, [she] had, by that very thing, a disadvantage” (IV).Footnote 69 Indeed, almost all the states pass “from poverty to riches, and from riches to corruption” (I);Footnote 70 in the case of republics, the early phase obviously overlaps with poverty.
In the introductory, general chapter on luxury, Montesquieu adds a few more wide-ranging observations on the subject, clarifying that luxury is not only proportionate to the inequality of fortunes, but it exists in a compound ratio of fortune inequalities, the wealth of the state and the density of population. But in the very next chapter he focuses on the relationship between luxury and a republic:
[I]n republics where riches are equally divided, there can be no luxury … this equality of distribution made the excellence of a republic, it follows, that the less luxury there is in a republic, the more perfect it is. There was none among the first Romans; there was none among the Lacedaemonians; and in republics where equality is not altogether lost, the spirit of commerce, of work and of virtue makes that everyone is able and that everyone wants to live from his own goods, and that as consequence there is little luxury. (EL, VII.2)Footnote 71
When luxury arrives to a republic, the spirit gradually turns to the interest of the individual, substituting that of the state. “For people who have to have nothing but the necessities, nothing is left to desire but the glory of the fatherland and one’s own [glory]. But a soul corrupted by luxury has many other desires: soon it becomes an enemy of the laws that hamper it” (VII.2).Footnote 72 Luxury corrupts, and desires of the population become immense: nobody thinks of virtue or public good any more. For luxury and excessive wealth run counter to the assumptions on which republics are founded—indeed, against the very principle of a republic: virtue.Footnote 73
What is virtue in a republic? It is “a very simple thing,” love of the republic (V.2).Footnote 74 And love of the republic is (in a democracy) love of democracy. Love of democracy is, in turn, love of equality, and also love of frugality. The common frugality assures that everyone will have “the same happiness and the same advantages,” taste “the same pleasures” and have “the same expectations” (V.3).Footnote 75 “Love of frugality limits the desire to possess to the mindfulness required by that which is necessary for one’s family”; the superfluous is reserved for the fatherland (V.3).Footnote 76 Wealth gives power and can offer pleasures that a citizen cannot use for himself, as it would go against equality.Footnote 77
Conditions of frugal equality limit “ambition to the single desire, to the single happiness, of rendering to one’s fatherland greater services than other citizens” (V.3).Footnote 78 This is a crucial statement: it indicates where all citizens’ attention is devoted in a well-functioning republic. And it comes straight from Plutarch’s writings on Sparta: asked “what he thought to be the best form of government,” the Spartan Charillus answers, “That in which the greatest number of citizens are willing, without civil strife, to vie with one another in virtue” (Apophth. Lac. Charillus, 4 [Mor. 232C]).Footnote 79 Rarely remembered by, or even unknown to, the majority of commentators,Footnote 80 Montesquieu’s short Dialogue de Xantippe et Xénocrate offers not only a first-rate insight into the extent of le Président’s admiration for the Spartan system, but it also shows how important Lycurgus’s state was for Montesquieu’s analysis of the republic’s features in De l’esprit des loix. It is also in line with the statements found in De l’esprit des loix about “all those heroic virtues which we find amongst the ancients, and which we have only heard in speech” (III.5),Footnote 81 or about the ancient virtue and “things [which] were done that we no longer see today, and that astonish our small souls” (IV.4).Footnote 82 Note that the Dialogue de Xantippe is a more mature work, written in Montesquieu’s late thirties, not a youthful piece like his earlier panegyric on Cicero ([c. 1717] 2002).
Xanthippus, the Spartan general who saved Carthage in the First Punic War by defeating the Romans, is the hero of the Dialogue: in Montesquieu’s treatise he becomes an idealized representation of the Spartan virtue.Footnote 83 Montesquieu’s Xanthippus shows what kind of men Lycurgus’s system was able to produce. Yet, he also demonstrates the influence of the frugal Lacedaemon on Montesquieu’s conceptualization of a democratic republic. “I love only my Country; I fear only the gods; I hope only for virtue,” states Xanthippus in a fragment discarded from the Dialogue and found in the Pensées (2012, § 358). Xanthippus, in Montesquieu’s dialogue expelled from Sparta, nevertheless wants to show his virtue for the glory of Lacedaemon, so that she “can learn with pleasure that the citizens which she had degraded have always preserved the noble ambition to render themselves worthy of her, and that, if I have not been able to work for her happiness, I, at least, work for her glory” ([c. 1727] 1892, p. 101).Footnote 84 Xanthippus acts from a “duty,” even if it is that the foreigners’ liberty is in question (p. 100), and subsequently leaves Carthage not to burden, as a “liberator,” that republic with his presence (p. 101).Footnote 85
Lycurgus gave such harsh rules to Sparta, Xanthippus tells his interlocutor, to form outstanding men: “If he had thought only about his city, I do not believe at all that he would have submitted her to such a severe discipline; but he wanted to form extraordinary men, who watch over the interests of all humans” (pp. 100–101).Footnote 86 An utmost obedience to laws and frugal customs is required in Lacedaemon, Xanthippus emphasizes. “Without it, birth, genius, talents, brilliant actions cannot render a citizen more illustrious, but render him more infamous”; if the conquering King Agesilaus did not, on the day of his return from Asia, come to eat a “frugal meal” and mix with his citizens, “the last Lacedaemonian” would blush because of his victories (p. 104).Footnote 87
The Dialogue de Xantippe certainly gives an idealized picture of Spartan virtue and frugality;Footnote 88 nevertheless, it reconfirms in very strong terms the importance of Lacedaemon in Montesquieu’s theoretical constructions.Footnote 89 Xantippe is his first work where we find a depiction of a “properly republican virtue” (Platania Reference Platania2007, p. 94). In the text we can observe the “first recurrence” of the specific idea of republican virtue; moreover, here is the place where the expression “virtue,” used in a specific republican sense, apparently appears for the first time: “vertu, virtus, vertu républicaine” (pp. 95–96).Footnote 90 Sparta provides the original model for it; as Marco Platania points out, in his subsequent reflections, “Montesqueiu will often come to grips with the dilemma whether to extend this model also to the other poleis, or whether to deprive Sparta of her own exemplarity” (p. 96). A critical remark by Helvétius reinforces such a conclusion: “If virtue be, as he [Montesquieu] says, the active principle in republics, it is at most only in poor and warlike republics. The love of gold is that of commercial republics” ([1773] 1810, vol. 1, II.XI, p. 313n). Sparta is the key—and the original—example of the former.
V. MABLY
Montesquieu’s work, in particular De l’esprit des loix, in a way summed up preceding republican thought: his systematic analysis sought to identify all the key features of this type of government.Footnote 91 When Montesquieu writes about republics, he usually has in mind the ancient republics; Sparta and Rome, and often Athens, appear as key examples, from the study of which he tries to isolate the crucial characteristics of this type of polity (even if Sparta is the ur-model). But Montesquieu is also well aware of the realities of his own time, the contrast between the ancients and the moderns: the contrast between virtue and commerce, wealth, luxury.Footnote 92 While he undoubtedly has sympathies and highly respects the ancient virtue (this also includes frugal life as a necessary condition for its achievement),Footnote 93 Montesquieu is wary to suggest its emulation to his contemporaries; indeed, he personally seems to be quite content to live in a moderate monarchy. Nonetheless, the effect of his work might have been quite different: “Whether he wanted or not, Montesquieu draw water to the mill of ‘republicanism’ with his depiction of ‘gouvernement monarchique’” (Guerci Reference Guerci1979, p. 45).Footnote 94
Montesquieu’s younger contemporary Abbé de Mably was quite a different sort of animal. Mably was one of the last old-fashioned, austere republicans, keen on promoting virtue; he adored Sparta and her legislator, Lycurgus, and was eager to advance the cause of the frugal ancient republics in corrupt modern times. Nonetheless, there are many similarities between his analysis and that of le Président, but, instead of an effort (and tone) of impartial examination, we often encounter impassioned praise and disparagement. Mably was obviously strongly influenced by Montesquieu’s work,Footnote 95 but he also sought to actively promote the republican cause in his writingsFootnote 96—even if he was very pessimistic about the feasibility of a more radical, antiquity-inspired republican program for his corrupted modern European contemporaries. Due to the complexity and wide scope of Mably’s writings, there have been numerous interpretations of his work, varying from a utopian socialist, a reactionary, to a “classical” republican.Footnote 97 While nowadays scholars would hardly deny the republican elements of his thought, some recent work emphasizes the complexity of Mably’s ideas, stressing the non-republican elements: e.g., the influence of John Locke, Mably’s “realpolitik” and his commitment to “commerce in the service of the people.”Footnote 98 Such complexity of views of a certain thinker should not be surprising; indeed, as we have mentioned, some of Guicciardini’s ideas at first may seem internally inconsistent. However, Mably’s own writings on the ancient republics, and the dangers of luxury and wealth for the citizens’ pursuit of virtue, are very consistent, and are central for understanding his political and economic thought.
Mably’s observations about luxuries and necessities might be perhaps less theoretically insightful than Montesquieu’s. However, he played a major role in the French eighteenth-century luxury debate, and, inspired by Richard Cantillon, tried to offer a rejection of David Hume’s positive views on luxury, which, after Hume’s Political Discourses were translated into French, exercised an important influence on that debate.Footnote 99 There is a complex relationship between Mably’s ideas on luxury and commerce, in particular in his writings more concerned with contemporary eighteenth-century problems. It is outside the scope of this article to engage with these issues in greater detail. In line with our aims, we shall focus on the ancient influences and Mably’s views on the dangers that wealth poses to the key republican value, virtue. Mably’s writings on the pernicious influence of luxury and wealth allow us to fully grasp the importance of the issue in republican thought; besides, his great partisanship for Lacedaemon demonstrates just how extreme the impact of the Spartan example of severe austerity could be in the whole tradition.
Mably’s Observations sur les Grecs, published a year after De l’esprit des loix, firmly established the author as the foremost advocate of the Lacedaemonian example in republican thought.Footnote 100 Lycurgus is the great hero of this work.Footnote 101 Courageous, he engaged in “the daring project,” to mold the Spartans into a new people ([1749] 1770, p. 11).Footnote 102 Combining the best elements from different modes of government, Lycurgus established a wise political system; yet, he “regarded it as a tottering edifice, till his regulations had strengthened its foundation in the morals of the people” (p. 13). The manners are as important as the laws; they should mutually support each other, so that the whole institution, the state, is perfected. Mably asks a rhetorical question: “What indeed availed the establishment of order, if avidity for riches, and its inseparable companion luxury, the sources of inequality among citizens, making some tyrants, others slaves, were suffered, by insensible degrees, to interrupt the harmony of the state?” (p. 13). Lycurgus introduced a “perfect” equality in fortunes and possessions, but did not limit himself to a redistribution of lands. For if only an equal land distribution had been done, soon the things would have changed. As nature granted individual Spartans different passions and different industry, from the equal paternal inheritance unequal results would have soon followed: the avaricious and acquisitive citizens would accumulate property, gaining it from the indolent and the prodigal (p. 13).
The problem strongly preoccupied Mably, and he states it in more general terms in Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen, written some nine years later: “With whatever equality that one divides initially the goods of a republic, be certain … that equality will not reign amongst the citizens in the third generation” ([1758] 1792c, p. 352).Footnote 103 A remedy to this problem was implemented in Sparta; the wise “state-physician” LycurgusFootnote 104 found a solution:
To prevent such consequences, Lycurgus prohibited the use of gold and silver, and circulated iron money in his republic. He prevailed with the Spartans to dine at public tables, where every citizen was obliged to give a constant example of the strictest temperance. No other tools were to be used by mechanics, in the furniture of houses, but the saw and the hatchet. In a word, he bounded all desires by the indispensable demands of nature; interdicting all commerce with foreigners. From this period the luxurious arts fled from Laconia; the inutility of riches rendered them contemptible; and Sparta might be considered as a fortress inaccessible to corruption. ([1749] 1770, p. 14)
Though Mably speaks about the Lacedaemonians’ devotion to “the severely rigid institutions of Lycurgus” (p. 25), he has not a single doubt about the good effects of the great legislator’s reform: “he made his compatriots the most virtuous and the happiest people of Greece” ([1758] 1792c, p. 268).Footnote 105 His laws were observed “with the most religious fidelity” for six hundred years ([1749] 1770, p. 148); wealth and luxury were kept outside Sparta, and had no chance to disturb the virtue of her citizens or their system of equality. Mably’s admiration for Lycurgus’s creation is boundless: “Surely no institution ever presented human reason with a more noble or more sublime spectacle than the republic of Lacedaemon!” (p. 148).
Simultaneously with praising the Spartans, Mably repeatedly criticizes other, less virtuous behavior, particularly that of the Athenians: their “scandalous depravity in the morals” (p. 76) and their luxury, sloth, avarice and pleasure (pp. 76, 92). And he is upset when examining how luxury ultimately arrived to Sparta, and what were its effects (pp. 76–77). Once transfer of inheritance had been allowed, avarice prevailed, and citizens by-and-large lost their patrimonies; “vices of the great became necessary to the subsistence of the multitude; … hands destined by Lycurgus to wield the sword and lance, and manage the buckler, were debased in using the implements of arts which luxury introduced into Laconia” (p. 77). And though Mably undoubtedly strongly prefers a republic to a monarchy, he declares Alexander “an extraordinary hero,” for his valor, virtue and impetuosity.Footnote 106 Yet, after defeating the Persians, Alexander succumbs to the riches and luxury he seized. Mably’s comment captures in nuce his idea about wealth and its effect: “The seeds of corruption become matured by the sunshine of prosperity” (p. 112).
Mably’s criticism of luxury and excessive wealth goes hand in hand with his admiration of a frugal life and poverty, which provide the appropriate conditions for the flourishing of virtue. Mably is full of admiration for the poverty of illustrious ancient republics, Sparta in particular. He praises “the love of poverty” amongst the Lacedaemonians ([1749] 1770, p. 14, cf. p. 68), and reveres “Sparta, armed with virtuous poverty”—a defining feature, closely connected with “her justice, moderation and courage” (p. 16). Describing how Lysander tried to undermine the Lacedaemonian constitution, Mably notes how “his poor co-citizens and content in their poverty, would have no interest to ruin the laws and to sacrifice the state to their domestic fortunes” ([1764a] 1792e, p. 102).Footnote 107 In his Observations sur les Romains, Mably compares the Romans with the Spartans; unsurprisingly, the former cannot match the latter: “the Romans, amongst whom the love of poverty had never been a real passion, as amongst the Spartans” ([1751] 1792a, p. 268).Footnote 108 Spartan citizens’ strong commitment to “their old contempt for the riches” is highlighted, in contrast to the Romans, who were much less attentive to take precautions against the “attractions of avarice” (p. 268).Footnote 109 Mably also speaks with appreciation about Epaminondas and his “philosophic poverty” ([1749] 1770, p. 70).
There is no doubt that Mably highly admires the “virtuous poverty” of the ancient republics, and closely follows his ancient sources who are often full of praise of such poverty, particularly in Sparta. But what is also clear is that this understanding of poverty assumes that all necessaries are covered and all basic human needs are provided for. What is above that level is luxury. Poverty is thus understood as something good, and an important condition for republican virtue: Mably evidently here follows one version of the ancient view, where beneficial poverty is opposed to corrupting wealth—in contrast to Plato’s formulation, with the twin dangers of both wealth and poverty. Such poverty is clearly very different from a poverty where necessaries are often not provided for, and population is exposed to a threat of hunger.Footnote 110 We should not, however, be surprised to find also a Platonic formulation in Mably’s oeuvre; we find it, e.g., as part of his recommendations for more contemporary circumstances, in Le droit publique d’Europe, “if a country has laws which prevent a citizen from being either too poor or too rich” ([1764b] 1792f, v. 6, p. 323).Footnote 111 Indeed, in the same work he simultaneously criticizes both luxury and poverty as “extremities that announce the ruin of a people” (v. 6, p. 316).Footnote 112
For all his great appreciation of Lycurgus and Lacedaemon, Mably is pessimistic about the possibility of emulating Sparta when the citizens are too corrupted and external political circumstances unfavorable. Published fourteen years after the Observations sur les Grecs, Mably’s Entretiens de Phocion make an argument strikingly similar to the conclusions reached by Guicciardini two and a half centuries earlier. Towards the end of the dialogue, Phocion “sadly” observes how “there is no more time to hope, if a Lycurgus will do us a saintly violence, and snatch us by force from our vices” ([1763] 1792d, pp. 193–194).Footnote 113 His interlocutor, Aristias, nevertheless urges him to “be our Lycurgus” and try to repeat Lacedaemonian miracle in mid-fourth century BC Athens (p. 195).Footnote 114 But Phocion, despite his respect for the Lycurgian project in Sparta,Footnote 115 remains unconvinced by such urging, explaining that such a revolution would be highly damaging. Any such attempt would see an upheaval, with corrupt Athenian citizens, emboldened by their jealous and worried neighbors, crying “tyranny,” and only providing a pretext for Philip the Macedon to intervene in Attica (p. 196).Footnote 116 Athens would merely fall under foreign dominion; we see a very similar type of concern to those earlier expressed by Guicciardini.
If Mably thought poorly of the ancient Athenians, he had even less respect for his contemporaries: he regarded them as weak and spoilt by luxury, avarice, softness and love of money ([1758] 1792c, p. 425).Footnote 117 “Encourage avarice and luxury, under the pretext of favouring commerce,” he warned them, “and I predict that all the laws which you make for affirming your liberty will not prevent you from being slaves.” Taken by vice, what republic can escape the corruption that spoilt even Sparta and Rome (p. 350)?Footnote 118 Yet, in the same treatise, Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen, Mably admitted his wish to establish an ideal republic modeled on Sparta, if only that were possible anywhere:
Never do I read in some traveller a description of some desert island where the sky is serene and the waters healthy, that I am not taken with the desire to go there to establish a republic where all are equal, all rich, all poor, all free, all brothers, our first law would be not possessing anything of our own. We would take to public warehouses the fruits of our works; there it would be the treasure of the state and patrimony of every citizen. Every year the fathers of each family would elect the économes charged with distributing the necessary things for the needs of each individual, assigning him the work task which the community requires from him, and maintaining the good mores in the state. (p. 355)Footnote 119
Nevertheless, this is a fanciful, highly unrealistic construction, devoid of any relevance for the actual, corrupted European circumstances. Mably explicitly rejects such utopian constructions in very clear terms: “Cicero somewhere blames Cato of talking to the Romans of his time, as he were in the republic of Plato: let us not deserve the same reproach any longer, and be wiser than Cato” (p. 358).Footnote 120 The “grand question” today is, he continues, whether the peoples of Europe, who have lost their liberty, are able to recover it and preserve it (p. 358).Footnote 121 The English interlocutor in the dialogue, milord Stanhope—a representative of the old-fashioned, “commonwealthsmen” republican traditionFootnote 122—later in the debate praises his French interlocutor as “a republican as proud and as zealous as any which I know in England” (p. 458).Footnote 123 However, he immediately adds: “but nonetheless let us respect the thrones, and try not to run after a chimerical good, as we did two days ago, when you wanted to embark to go to my desert island” (p. 458).Footnote 124 The desert island republic is only a chimera;Footnote 125 milord clearly also refers to his earlier, ambiguous plea: “should we not aspire to this happy community of goods … which Lycurgus had established at Lacedaemon, which Plato wished to revive in his republic, and which, thanks to the depravation of manners, can no longer be but a chimera in the world?” (p. 352).Footnote 126 The sad conditions in Europe dictate the need to accept royalty as necessary for a nation, even if it is a vice in governing a country—for the original, “primitive” simplicity and equality are irretrievably lost, and cannot be recovered. With unequal distribution of ranks, titles, wealth, fortunes and dignities, found in large European monarchies, it is not possible to think “as one thinks in Switzerland” (p. 458).Footnote 127 Switzerland is a modern exception, we learn in De l’étude de l’histoire, an admirable republic, comparable to the ancients ([1775] 1792h, pp. 102–103), which with its lack of riches follows “the precept of Lycurgus” (p. 130).Footnote 128 For the large European states Mably offers a thoroughly Montesquieuan conclusion: “In nations rich, powerful and spread throughout great provinces, one cannot have the civic moderation which is the soul and the support of liberty” ([1758] 1792c, p. 459).Footnote 129
The reluctant approval that milord Stanhope gives for the existence of the current royal houses of England and France is because they actually save the enlarged state from the much worse evil: otherwise, they would certainly get a despot and “we would inevitably experience the fate of the Roman Republic” (p. 459).Footnote 130 The analysis offered in Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen is in line with what Mably concluded in Observations sur les Grecs: “A free people, once corrupted, becomes familiar with, and then fond of vice” ([1749] 1770, p. 83). Therefore, it is unsurprising that Mably is skeptical about any ambitious republican program in the prevailing circumstances of eighteenth-century France,Footnote 131 and that in Des droits he has in mind a limited, gradual reform, which he termed “une révolution ménagée” ([1758] 1792c, p. 405).Footnote 132 Wealth is harmful, virtue is good: these are crucial ancient lessons, relevant also for a kingdom.Footnote 133 Mably is, however, deeply pessimistic about the possibility of emulating illustrious ancient republics, despite being Sparta’s most ardent admirer amongst modern political thinkers. Or, indeed, that any corrupted republic can be successfully renewed.Footnote 134 As Luciano Guerci put it (1979, p. 277), “even an intransigent philo-Spartan as Mably did not delude himself that Sparta could be revived.”Footnote 135
VI. CONCLUSION
The influence of the ancients casts a long shadow on early-modern republican writings. The economic aspects of the tradition were particularly influenced by the example of Sparta and her Lycurgian constitution: the frugal conditions allowed her citizens, isolated from the corroding influence of wealth and luxury, to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of virtue. Plato also had an important influence (also indirectly, via Plutarch). Plato himself was the first to take Lacedaemon as a model for an ideal republic, and provided the influential account of the twin danger of excessive wealth and poverty—often used in republican writings simultaneously with a simpler, binary opposition.
Nevertheless, despite the outstanding appeal of the Lacedaemonian austerity, feasibility of a full-scale—or even limited—emulation amongst by-and-large corrupted moderns usually did not seem particularly high. As we have seen, Guicciardini and Mably independently reached very similar conclusions about the feasibility of a more radical reform in their own times. Guicciardini makes a striking observation at the start of his Dialogo del Reggimento di Firenze. “It is a very beautiful, very honourable and magnificent thought to reflect about the public governments, on which depends the well-being, health and life of men and all the illustrious actions done in this world below,” that such reflections have a value which is independent from their feasibility. For, as Guicciardini adds, “even if one would have no hope whatsoever that what is thought or designed could ever succeed, it cannot be said that he does not deserve to be praised who applies his soul and consumes also some of his time in the contemplation of such an honest and such a deserving matter” (1932a, p. 3).Footnote 136 A remarkable statement follows:
If we already do not believe that Plato, when he thought and wrote on the republic, did it moved by hope that that government imagined by him had to be introduced and followed by the Athenians; who in his time became licentious and insolent in their ways, so, not that he attempted to make them receive a good administration, but, as it is found written in one of his letters, despairing that they will ever again govern themselves well, he never wanted to mix up with or get troubled about their republic. (p. 3)Footnote 137
The feasibility of one’s plans in the prevailing circumstances is clearly not the deciding element in a thinker’s writings; indeed, as Guicciardini argues, already the first great thinker who used Sparta as a model for his republic, Plato, took such a position. Yet, in a striking contrast to Guicciardini, who without a doubt would be eager to reform the Florentine commonwealth in line with his ideas, if that were possible, Montesquieu, keen to keep his impartiality in the analysis of republics, and wary of deducing any contemporary lessons,Footnote 138 wrote in his Pensées: “I am not among those who regard Plato’s Republic as an ideal and purely imaginary thing, whose execution would be impossible. My reason is that Lycurgus’s Republic seems to be {just} as difficult of execution as Plato’s, and yet it was so well executed that it lasted as long as any republic we know of in its vigor and splendor” (2012, § 1208). The juxtaposition of the two statementsFootnote 139 confirms once again the complexity of republican thought, when the feasibility of plans and the impact of the ancients are concerned.
The Spartan example had a major impact on the economic thought of the early-modern republican writers, and their attitude towards wealth and luxury. Their ancient reading shaped their political (and moral) values, which dictate their attitude towards economic matters. (In Montesquieu’s case, he at least takes a specific standpoint as appropriate for republics, and for their analysis.) Our thinkers take a particular Weltanschauung as a basis of their reflections on economic issues; the latter are not important “per se,” but rather as an instrument in arranging the body politic to sustain an appropriate way of life, which has virtue as its goal.Footnote 140 In contrast, the new view, embodied in the eighteenth century by the new discipline of political economy—conspicuously associated with Smith (but also other late eighteenth-century authors)Footnote 141—advocated a very different Weltanschauung: that wealth and its increase is in general a good thing.Footnote 142
The contrast between the ancients and the moderns, between virtue on one side and commerce, wealth and luxury on the other, which Montesquieu famously emphasized, captures well the difference: (modern) political economy clearly goes with the latter. Indeed, from when the latter type of view was firmly established in the first part of the next century to this very day, there are very few proponents of egalitarian theories who are not interested in enriching the population and removing poverty (with an ever increasing lower threshold), rather than promoting a frugal, austere life with few necessities. Our republican authors, inspired by Sparta, offer a peculiar, nowadays unusual, perspective: a point of view where everything is subdued to virtue and exercising virtue.
