Back in 2004, James Secord made an appeal to historians of science for ‘unifying narratives [with] a sense of large connections’. Histories of science, he argued, had become limited by ‘unconceptualized geographical and disciplinary boundaries’, such that certain fields – eighteenth-century French natural philosophy, for example, or twentieth-century American physics – were studied ‘without [us] knowing enough about what goes on around and just beyond the limits’ (James A. Secord, ‘Knowledge in transit’, Isis (2004) 95(4), pp. 654–672, 656).
John Gascoigne's latest volume, Science and the State: From the Scientific Revolution to World War II, may have been written with that appeal in mind. This book confronts the ‘around and just beyond the limits’ of national boundaries and historical periods in the production of scientific knowledge. Gascoigne takes a broad geographical and long temporal sweep of the history of science, linking the rise of science with the rise of the state. A variety of states is scrutinized, and by offering a multi-scale approach – moving between the local and the global – and by emphasizing circulation – of ideologies, practices and technologies – the author avoids a mere series of national histories, instead arriving at a general survey of the relationship between scientific research and state structures over four centuries.
Gascoigne's structuring argument is that, as modern science and the modern state emerged at around the same time in early modern Europe, so the growth of science and the growth of the state were linked, both drew on each other, and in the process, each was affected by the other – a familiar enough concept to those imperial historians among us. Having introduced his subject, the remainder of the book is arranged according to historical eras and the state structures prevalent within them. This is not a book which challenges traditional historical and science-historical periods, not least of which is the ‘Scientific Revolution’ of the title; rather, it uses these familiar constructs to analyse how scientists have sought to understand and manipulate nature ‘in ways that paralleled the increasingly centralised and ordered character of the state’ (p. 5). Nor is it one in which the perspectives of indigenous peoples are given equal weight with Western ones. Nevertheless, Gascoigne does acknowledge the role of indigenous collectors and forms of knowledge in the production of colonial science, arguing that indigenous culture imparted a new character to some European forms of state, and the role of nations other than colonial territories, such as Japan, creating hybrid structures based on indigenous traditions and European models of statehood (p. 10).
‘The Renaissance monarchy’ (Chapter 2) looks to the early scientific movement and its patrons – the Catholic Church, the aristocracy and the royal courts. What is demonstrated here, and indeed throughout, is the contingency of scientific endeavour – on patronage, on historic moment, on geographical place and on governmental structures – to an extent which has dictated the types of science practised and pursued. A recurrent trope is the enduring relationship between scientific research and the demands of warfare, but equally that between science and exploration, science and colonialism, and science and the government of populations. For all these expressions of state intervention into scientific research, Gascoigne argues, bureaucracies were concomitantly required to raise taxes; to gather, analyse and publish statistical data; to allocate resources; and to implement measures introduced in response to new scientific knowledge.
However, as scientific research became larger and more complex, so scientists needed larger structures in which to practise. This forms the subject of Chapter 3, ‘Absolutism’, which considers those eighteenth-century monarchs who sought to concentrate power in their own hands. This era marked the beginning of state-sponsored science – much of it concerned with the acquisition of new territories and the exploitation of their resources – and the establishment of institutions in which this could take place. Examples are given from Spain, Portugal, the Habsburg Empire, German princely states and Russia.
Absolutism, however, had its rivals, the subject matter of Chapter 4. Chief among non-absolutist states was Britain, where the power of the monarch was restrained through ‘buffer’ structures such as Parliament. The relationship between science and state in Britain was enshrined in the Royal Society, which, in contrast to contemporaneous European academies, was a voluntary body with minimal state funding.
Gascoigne characterizes the long nineteenth century as the age of revolution, and in Chapter 5 he juxtaposes the American, French and Industrial revolutionary periods from 1776 to 1850. Chapter 6 charts the expanding functions of states between 1850 and 1914, driven by increased urbanization, literacy, industry and democratic movements. And whilst Chapter 7, ‘From war to war, 1914–1945’, would appear to be self-explanatory, it does in fact offer new insights into the ‘scientification of industrial [war-time] production’. Scientific disciplines, suggests Gascoigne, are mutable; they wax and wane across time and space. Disturbingly, the period of the world wars can best be characterized by eugenics and nuclear physics. In the final chapter, ‘Science, the state and globalisation’, Gascoigne shifts his gaze to newer world powers such as India, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, China and those in Latin America.
Science and the State is the first in a new series from Cambridge University Press, New Approaches to the History of Science and Medicine – which is targeted at students and general readers – and aims to introduce ‘major questions of historical analysis and debate’. It is an ambitious ‘big-picture’ narrative and a valuable aid to any historian of science seeking to connect the production of science to the terms and conditions of state patronage.
