As Rudolf Klein’s masterful chronicling of the NHS, including the essay in this issue, has demonstrated, the history of the institution has been marked by stability and churn. The roots of both trends can be found in the fundamental design of the institution, and of the political system in which it is embedded. In this regard, the evolution of the NHS can be compared and contrasted with those of other national systems – notably one with which it shares a number of key similarities and differences: Canada’s single-payer model. These similarities and differences are sharpest and most consequential in the physician and hospital sectors, and it is to those sectors that the rest of these short reflections pertain.
At the core of decision-making in all health systems sits an agency relationship between individual providers of care and individual recipients, in which recipients delegate authority to professionals who are expected to make decisions in the recipient’s interest. The ways in which various systems of financing and delivery seek to enforce this agency relationship – essentially, the ways in which they seek to countervail the power of individual professionals – gives them their distinctive character. In essence, the mechanisms of enforcement amount to different balances of hierarchical command-and-control, exchange-based contracts and peer influence, and the countervailing power structures strike different balances across the state, the medical profession and private finance. But each of these mechanisms and balances of power is flawed in some way, and so there are always internal tensions and pressures to re-adjust and optimize the balance. The design of the system, and even more important the design of the political system in which it sits, will determine whether those adjustments take the form of cycling within an established policy repertoire – for example, centralization and decentralization within a hierarchically-based system, regulation and deregulation within a market-based system and specialization and integration in a peer-based system – or whether the system periodically lurches from one sweeping overhaul to another. The history of the NHS is marked by both phenomena. The Canadian story, in contrast, is one of continued cycling.
The basic sources of stability in the two systems are similar. In each case, comprehensive, first-dollar (or first-pound) coverage of physician and hospital services through general taxation draws the medical profession into an accommodation with the state – as part of what Rudolf and I have respectively termed the ‘implicit concordat’ or ‘founding bargain’ – that forms the central political axis of the system (see, most recently, Klein, Reference Klein2013: 47; Tuohy, Reference Tuohy2018: 146). (In Canada, where no counterpart to Britain’s parallel private sector for physician and hospital services exists – as yet – this accommodation is even more encompassing than in Britain.) Changes in policy and practice affecting medical care are normally negotiated within this axis. Although these negotiations are not without conflict, over time they work to keep the system within the bounds of arrangements that are acceptable to both parties. The second source of stability is the iconic status that the two systems have acquired in their respective political cultures. A design that places all citizens, formally at least, on an equal plane of access to medical care has become an important symbol of what Banting (Reference Banting2005: 38) terms the ‘sharing community’ in both nations (Klein, Reference Klein2013: v; Tuohy, Reference Tuohy2018: 124–125).
These very features of the two systems, however, have also inclined them toward policy cycling within the parameters of the foundational design. Because of their very comprehensiveness,Footnote 1 they import all or almost all of the tensions stemming from the enforcement of the agency relationship into the profession-state accommodation, keeping that accommodation just unstable enough to generate cycles of centralization/decentralization and specialization/integration in organizational design, and generosity/constraint in remuneration and funding.
In England and Canada, these cycles are also driven by two further similarities in the two systems. With payment for the broad core of services lodged in the public treasury, both systems are vulnerable to broad fiscal swings as the macroeconomic objectives of governments change. In Canada, broad deficit reduction agendas at both federal and provincial levels drove real per capita decreases in public spending on health care in the 1990s, triggering deep public concern as well as catch-up demands from providers as soon as budgets returned to balance, and spending recovered steeply after 1998. Similarly, NHS spending has periodically plateaued in real per capita terms, and a dramatic trajectory of increase from 2001 to 2009 was sharply reversed, and in the following period of austerity it has declined in some years (Stoye, Reference Stoye2017: fig. 2). Similarly, near-exclusive public finance concentrates accountability in the funding government. The resulting inability of politicians to avoid blame for problems in health care delivery is likely to generate a series of disjointed interventions aimed at marginal change, depending on the problem of the moment.
In Britain, another and more disruptive source of churn has been added to this normal policy cycling, Bursts of sweeping policy change, while maintaining the comprehensiveness, first-pound coverage and general-taxation funding of the original NHS model, have nonetheless changed its internal design in fundamental ways. The EnglishFootnote 2 NHS has undergone two such policy bursts since its founding. The introduction of the purchaser–provider split in the 1990s severed the NHS hierarchy into two wings formally linked not by superior–subordinate relationships but by contracts. By constituting providers on a more formally independent basis, these ‘internal market’ reforms began an important shift in the organizing principles of the system. The role of the state began to shift, from that of an owner/operator of a ‘national health service’ to that of a ‘single payer’ of independently constituted providers (a model quintessentially typified by Canada). This shift was taken yet further when the purchasing function itself was assigned to formally independent (though statutorily constituted) consortia of general practices in the Coalition reforms of 2012. Recent experiments with re-integration of the purchasing and providing functions at the local level, while representing another turn in the specialization–integration cycle, nonetheless continue this reconceptualization of the role of the central government as a ‘single payer’ of independent entities.
The occurrence of such policy bursts in England, but not in Canada, is attributable to differences not in the health care arenas but in the broader political systems. The Westminster parliamentary system gives governments in both nations the capacity to act decisively, once they have formed the will to do so, but in Canada’s federal system there are 11 constitutionally sovereign Westminster-style parliaments who must agree to significant changes in the federal framework underpinning the single-payer system. No counterpart to this stymying complexity exists in England. The founding of Canadian medicare occurred in a rare moment in which the interests of federal and provincial governments aligned in the 1960s. Only one such alignment occurred in the next four decades. In 2004, responding to a federal agenda of reinvestment after a period of austerity, provincial premiers unanimously proposed a federal program of prescription drug coverage. Although open to the overture in principle, the precarious minority federal government of the day chose strategically to conclude a federal-provincial agreement at a more rapid pace than such a major policy negotiation would require.
If policy changes in the last 30 years have moved England closer to a single-payerFootnote 3 model, some stark differences from Canada nonetheless remain – principally in the level of detail in the central prescriptions to which local actors are subject. Canadian provincial governments exert almost all of their authority through the budgetary process. (Over the past three decades, even as governments cycled through various forms of regionalization and re-centralization in the hospital sector, this budgetary role remained.) Historically, these budget controls were very blunt: they amounted to negotiated changes in the level of physician fees (though not the structure of the fee schedule, which was left to provincial medical associations) and historically based global budgets for hospitals. In recent years governments have begun to contract with physician groups, especially in primary care, and have experimented with volume-based allocations to hospitals. But these prescriptions are far from the detailed budgetary specifications that have characterized the NHS hierarchy. Recent reforms in England have not so much reduced the level of specificity in central direction as they have changed the form and shifted the aegis of that direction, which now take the form of procurement guidance on the purchasing side and regulatory rules emanating from a suite of quasi-independent agencies on the provider side.
As the NHS marks its 70th anniversary in 2018, and Canadian medicare turns 50, each can look back on a history of resilience in the face of policy cycling and (in the United Kingdom) periodic bursts of policy change. The networks constituted by profession-state accommodations have been an important source of this resilience, by mediating changes in policy logics. In this regard, however, it must be said that the British accommodation has been subject to greater stress tests than its Canadian counterpart.
