II. SPIRIT, ESPRIT, SPIRITO

The word spirit—esprit in French (Wade Reference Wade2015), spirito in Italian (Treccani 2009), or geist in German (Blackburn Reference Blackburn2005, p. 148)—was a typical eighteenth-century term, widespread across Enlightenment Europe. The story of this concept is one of the most complicated and articulated in the history of Western ideas. The Greek word πνεῦμα (pneuma), literally “breath” or “air,” referred to the thin material principle of life (Coughlin et al. Reference Coughlin, Leith and Lewis2020). The Stoics adopted it to indicate both the soul of the world—i.e., the finest (like fire) matter that is the principle of motion and life—and the rational principle governing all things (Hensley Reference Hensley, Coughlin, Leith and Lewis2020). Then, two primary meanings emerge in the transition from the Greek pneuma to the Latin spiritus. On the one hand, the spirit is the vehicle of motion and sensibility of the human body. This was the meaning in the medical tradition that goes from Galen to René Descartes, the latter speaking of the esprits animaux of the body conceived as a machine (Goffart Reference Goffart1900). On the other hand, the spirit had a theological meaning related to the Holy Spirit of the Christian tradition, i.e., something that is eternal, immaterial, and indivisible (Ferguson Reference Ferguson2020). The story becomes more complicated because, in the Christian tradition, the spirit was sometimes conceived as something material (or at least an intermediary between body and soul, as in St. Augustine). Specularly, in Descartes’s Meditationes, the Latin mens (intellect and reason) was translated with the French esprit.

The story of the evolution of the French word espirit in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reflects the multiple meanings that spirit assumed in the Western history of ideas. As well reported by Florence Vatan and Anne Vila:

An additional meaning of spirit, which is not to be thought of as a synthesis between the two traditions or as something wholly separated from the two, is the idea of spirit as something that expresses the deep and true nature of a given domain of life. This was the widespread meaning of the spirit in the eighteenth-century European intellectual context. Montesquieu was exposed to this latter meaning of espirit. According to Melvin Richter (Reference Richter1977, p. 106), Montesquieu’s choice of esprit had the following precise meaning: “the essential, underlying, or fundamental meaning of a text, constitution, or set of laws. Often used in the sense of ‘Spirit’ as opposed to ‘Letters’”—the apostle Paul’s usage of the term appears to be echoed here.

Céline Spector (Reference Spector and Stewart2013b) shows Montesquieu’s writings of various meanings of the word spirit. In the The Spirit of Laws, Montesquieu refers to a “general spirit” (esprit general) to signify the unity of heterogeneous causes that constitute a nation (climate, religion, laws, maxims of government, examples of past things, mores, manners): “Mankind are influenced by various causes: by the climate, by the religion, by the laws, by the maxims of government, by precedents, morals, and customs; whence is formed a general spirit of nations” (Montesquieu [1748] Reference Cohler, Miller and Stone1989, p. 310) And yet, the idea that the esprit expresses something essential, that which is at the basis of (in this case) political life, is also recurrent in Montesquieu’s thought: “I do not pretend to treat of laws, but of their spirit; … this spirit consists in the various relations which the laws may bear to different objects” (Montesquieu [1748] Reference Cohler, Miller and Stone1989, p. 7) As proof of the usage of spirit during the French Enlightenment, one can refer to Claude Adrien Helvétius’s De l’Espirit ([1758] Reference Helvétius1810), a book deeply influenced by Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws. Helvétius refers to the “spirit of the age” (p. 43), “spirit of fanaticism” (p. 147), “spirit of trade” (p. 153), “spirit of patriotism” (pp. 169, 188), “spirit of society” (p. 274), and, in a direct and critical dialogue with Montesquieu, to the “spirit of laws” (p. 320).

The new-old meaning of spirit had already influenced the Italian intellectual context. We read in the Italian dictionary Vocabolario della Crusca (1729–38) that spirito meant “dell’Animo, o della Natura inclinata a quella tal cosa [of the Soul, or of Nature inclined towards that particular thing]. Lat. spiritus , genius, afflatus. Gr. πνεῦμα, δαίμων, πίπνοι” (Accademici della Crusca 1729–1738). In his Lezioni ([1765–1767, 1769] 2005), Genovesi refers to the “general spirit” (spirito generale) he read in Montesquieu’s work. More importantly, we will show that Genovesi inherited Montesquieu’s understanding of spirit as the expression of the true and essential nature of something. This is why we now turn to the comparison of their thoughts.

III. MECHANICAL LAWS AND MORAL LAWS

The difference between Montesquieu’s and Genovesi’s approaches emerges from the first note to The Spirit of Laws. Genovesi had two main objections to the affirmation that “laws, taken in the broadest meaning, are the necessary relations deriving from the nature of things” (Montesquieu [1748] 1989, p. 3). The first is the risk of what Genovesi defines as fatalism, i.e., the absence of a creative mind behind the laws that rule the world and, consequently, the risk of atheism. Laws, argues Genovesi, are relations between things, and so “it was needed to demonstrate that relations cannot exist without a primitive reason” (Genovesi [1777] Reference Genovesi1838a, vol. I, pp. 2–3n1 [I,2]). On this point, Montesquieu was accused by many (De Mas Reference De Mas1971), including Genovesi, of subjugating even the divine mind to the necessity of natural laws.

The methodological discrepancy between the two authors lies in Genovesi’s second concern. Montesquieu failed to distinguish the idea of laws as real relations (rapporti reali) from that of laws as possible relations (rapport possibili): “He had to consider possible relations between man and man…. According to the author, laws are only real relations. He failed in distinguishing them from the right of the moral laws” (Genovesi [1777] Reference Genovesi1838a, vol. I, pp. 7–8n4 [I,1]).Footnote ¹² A few pages later, Genovesi will even argue that Montesquieu thought mechanical and moral laws were one thing, failing to distinguish them. What is the reason behind this controversy?

Like Montesquieu, Genovesi considered the empirical observation of reality a steady reference point for every analysis, especially those concerning moral, political, and economic issues. However, reality cannot be reduced to its physical-mechanical components, i.e., the appearances of things and their relations (laws). As far as morality is concerned, this is evident. As Genovesi interpreted Montesquieu, the French philosopher would have argued that moral judgment should stop at the descriptive moment. Genovesi, however, recognized that, in Montesquieu’s account, the intricate interplay of material elements—geography, climate, economic organization, and institutional arrangements—produces a dense network of social and historical complexities. Yet, in Genovesi’s reading, Montesquieu nonetheless insisted that these material conditions remain the primary determinants of all other domains of human life—moral, political, and intellectual alike. Genovesi argued that what we would call the “descriptive” moment is crucial but not enough. Reality is not made just by what happens but also by what could or should happen, so “real relations” must include and presuppose the “possible relations.” The moral and spiritual domains cannot be confined to the mechanical and physical ones. In other words, moral laws are made of, but not entirely reducible to, mechanical laws.Footnote ¹³

Assessing the global validity of Genovesi’s critique is beyond the scope of this paper. What matters is that he believed Montesquieu to have overlooked this critical distinction. Influenced by the Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions (Bruni and Zamagni Reference Bruni and Zamagni2016; Santori Reference Santori2021), Genovesi held that mechanical elements are merely the physical parts of human beings (nerves, physiological processes, sense impressions, etc.), whereas moral actions belong to the realm of spiritual life and virtues—i.e., the cultivation of human character through repeated, intentional exercise, aiming at excellence. In his view, reason (ragione) is more than a cognitive tool; it is the faculty by which humans transcend the merely physical and mechanical. It enables them to apprehend universal moral principles, to will freely, and to act not from automatic necessity but from deliberate intention.

According to Genovesi, reason plays a crucial role in grounding human freedom: It is through reason (together with free will) that moral experience becomes possible. Natural impulses, mechanical sensations, and physical stimuli may trigger sensations and desires, but unless reason intervenes, those remain at the level of the material. Reason allows the human being to evaluate, compare, judge, and choose. It is reason that establishes fixed and evident principles that make this moral world intelligible and actionable.Footnote ¹⁴

The contrast between Genovesi’s and Montesquieu’s methodologies becomes particularly evident in their accounts of the human condition in a state of nature—a point that is also crucial for understanding their perspectives on the spirit of commerce. Both thinkers depart markedly from earlier interpretations. For them, the pre-political condition or state of nature is not a Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes, nor, as in John Locke, merely a realm plagued by “inconveniences” threatening peace, nor, as for Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a domain inhabited by the solitary “noble savage.” Genovesi contended that human sociability is not an artificial product imposed by institutions but rather an intrinsic aspect of human nature, rooted in reason, free will, and an innate disposition toward assistance and cooperation. This understanding of human nature, encapsulated in Genovesi’s motto homo homini natura amicus (echoing Thomas Aquinas’s naturaliter homo homini amicus est; see Santori Reference Santori2021), suggests that the state of nature is fundamentally peaceful. Although he agrees with Montesquieu on this peaceful character, their explanations for its persistence and underlying causes differ substantially.

Montesquieu argues that in the state of nature, human beings have no knowledge, just the capacity to know, and each of them is interested only in their self-preservation: “Such a man would at first feel only his weakness; his timidity would be extreme…. Each feels himself inferior; he scarcely feels himself an equal. Such men would not seek to attack one another, and peace would be the first natural law” (Montesquieu [1748] 1989, p. 6). Mutual fear, conceived as the consciousness of reciprocal weakness, brings people into society together alongside other physical causes: sexual attraction, pleasure deriving from intellectual exchanges, and knowledge formation. These are the ingredients that, according to Montesquieu, explain the origin of society.

Genovesi disagrees on the levels of both mechanical and moral laws (Genovesi [1777] Reference Genovesi1838a, vol. I, p. 11n1 [I,1]). On the first level, Genovesi argued that Montesquieu’s description was inaccurate. Influenced both by the Aristotelian and Thomistic lessons (and probably Giambattista Vico’s) on the social nature of human beings (Bruni and Santori Reference Bruni and Santori2022) and by Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury’s view on the natural affection of one person toward another (Guasti Reference Guasti2006), Genovesi believed that what unites us is not mutual fear but a common sentiment: “When two men meet, one unknown to the other, the first movement of their mind is reciprocal observation; the second, recognizing each other with mutual pleasure, where the appearance does not excite suspicion; mutual fear and caution inspire suspicion” (Genovesi [1777] Reference Genovesi1838a, vol. 1, p. 13n2 [I,2]). In another note to chapter 2, Genovesi comments on Montesquieu’s sentence: “fear would lead men to flee: but the signs of a mutual fear would force them to approach each other in a few hours” (Genovesi [1777] Reference Genovesi1838a, vol. 1, p. 15 [I,1]). Genovesi’s comment is, “It is not mutual fear that unites them, but the common” (Genovesi [1777] Reference Genovesi1838a, vol. 1, p. 15n2 [I,1]). Here, the adjective common, chosen by Genovesi, is different from mutual fear, because common indicates a perception of something shared (fear) that brings humans together rather than dividing them—comune comes from the Latin cum-munus, i.e., reciprocal gift. In contrast, mutual implies that each person considers only the object of fear (the chances of another person’s attack and the potential physical harm) without recognizing that the other person experiences the same fear. We read in another note that “it is not mutual fear that unites men, but the common consciousness” (Genovesi [1777] Reference Genovesi1838a, vol. I, p. 16n1 [I,2]).

In his discussion of common consciousness, Genovesi moves from the physical to the moral dimension, which, he believes, Montesquieu mistakenly overlooked. He argues that while mutual fear may prevent unification, individuals can still recognize each other as equals because they share the same vulnerabilities and needs. This recognition is not automatic; it requires a deliberate moral choice, one that promotes peace and enables harmonious social coexistence. People must actively choose to live together peacefully; this choice is guided not by instinct or raw emotion but by reason. For Genovesi, education plays a central role in this process: It cultivates rational reflection, teaches individuals to deliberate on their actions, and strengthens their capacity to act morally. Education is, moreover, a key marker of the transition from the state of nature to civil society (Villari Reference Villari1970). Beyond the emergence of organized political structures, the creation of an educational system that prepares citizens for reasoned deliberation and moral judgment is, in Genovesi’s view, a defining feature of a civilized society—a perspective that reflects his Napoleonic-inspired Enlightenment thinking and reformist vocation (Agrimi Reference Agrimi1967). Through such education, individuals learn to exercise reason and achieve peaceful, mutually advantageous, cooperative relations properly. The following section will elucidate how these dynamics influence commerce and international relations.

IV. SPIRITS OF COMMERCE

The second chapter of Book 20 of The Spirit of Laws contains many ideas. For the purposes of this essay, we are interested in three of Montesquieu’s theses: 1) the natural effect of commerce is to bring peace because its spirit unites nations; 2) this unity is valid between nations, not between individuals; 3) between individuals, the spirit of commerce is opposed to moral virtues. As a reference for the third thesis, Montesquieu, in a footnote, writes significantly about “Holland,” referring to the Dutch Republic (as Smith). This creates tension within Montesquieu’s thought, especially if we relate this thesis to what he writes in the sixth chapter of Book 5:

The relationship between commerce, luxury or frugality, wealth, virtue, corruption, republican government, and expansionist foreign policy (that is, “conquest”) is far from simple. Yet, at first glance, there appears to be a tension—if not an outright contradiction—within Montesquieu’s treatment of commerce and virtue. In Book 20, commerce seems to undermine moral virtue among individuals, fostering self-interest and materialism. However, in Book 5, Montesquieu writes that when a democracy is founded upon commerce, this very spirit can sustain civic virtue through frugality, moderation, and order. How can commerce simultaneously corrupt and preserve moral life?

This contradiction can be reconciled if we interpret Montesquieu’s analysis through the lens of his method, which always integrates material and physical causes—climate, geography, population density—with moral causes such as laws, mores, and manners. Based on our interpretation of Montesquieu’s ideas, moral causes stem from physical and material factors but can also interact with and influence these physical causes. We acknowledge the complexity within Montesquieu’s concepts; however, we focus on the material and physical roots of spiritual, moral, political, and cultural aspects. As Judith Shklar (Reference Shklar1998) observed, Montesquieu does not treat commerce as intrinsically virtuous or corrupting; rather, its moral and political effects depend on the institutional and social context, which in turn is explainable by material and physical elements. Commerce aligns with virtue in small, egalitarian republics—where material equality and the spirit of frugality are preserved—but it undermines virtue when excessive material inequality arises, as in the case of the Dutch Republic. In this sense, the Dutch example, which Montesquieu himself cites in a footnote, functions as an empirical limit to his theory: Where commerce generates great disparities of wealth (a material element), it also erodes the moral dispositions necessary to sustain republican virtue (a moral element).

Thus, there is no genuine contradiction once Montesquieu’s methodology is taken into account. The apparent inconsistency between Book 20 and Book 5 reflects not a flaw in his reasoning but the complexity of his causal analysis: The effects of commerce among individuals vary according to the nature and principle of each government. When commerce operates within a balanced democratic framework that limits inequality, it remains compatible with virtue; when it exceeds those bounds, it produces the very corruption Montesquieu warns against. That said, the bottom line is that everything can be explained in terms of material and physical elements and their complex interactions.

Montesquieu is well known for distinguishing republican, monarchical, and despotic governments (Yoon Reference Yoon2023), asserting that democracy represents a republican form in which all citizens hold power. Furthermore, the republican government encourages a spirit of commerce that aligns with virtue. For Montesquieu, this form of government is better suited to what he calls commerce “founded on economy, as positively opposed to that “founded on luxury” (Montesquieu [1748] Reference Cohler, Miller and Stone1989, p. 340). Montesquieu further connected commerce and its spirit to their positive (peace) or negative (war and competition) consequences, linking them to material and tangible factors like the type of government.Footnote ¹⁵

As noted earlier in this paper, Genovesi challenges this view and asserts that commerce does not naturally lead to peace. The spirit of commerce does not prevent war; conversely, as we mentioned at the beginning of the paper, when “two nations trade together for reciprocal needs, these needs are in opposition to war, not the spirit of commerce” (Genovesi [1777] Reference Genovesi1838b, vol. 2, p. 273n1 [XX,2]). Having examined Genovesi’s methodology and perspective on the state of nature, we can now interpret this passage. Trade for reciprocal needs does not naturally express the spirit of commerce, which, within Montesquieu’s framework, would lead to peace among nations. Instead, in Genovesi’s view, such trade for reciprocal needs can arise only when people and nations make a conscious choice to see the commerce as mutually beneficial. In simpler terms, it is not commerce as a mere concept or its spirit that counters war and ensures peace; that would create a cycle of fear and conflict. Rather, it is a refined form of commerce that is founded on the conscious and intentional pursuit of reciprocal needs; this refined spirit of commerce can combat war and promote peace. How do nations promote this commerce based on mutual needs?

In Genovesi’s thought, the promotion of commerce based on mutual needs depends fundamentally on education, both rational and moral. In his Lezioni, commerce does not automatically generate peace or virtue; rather, it must be guided by enlightened citizens educated in the principles of civil economy (Bruni and Zamagni Reference Bruni and Zamagni2016). Genovesi viewed education as the means through which individuals learn to align private interest with the common good, transforming mere exchange into a moral and civic practice. For Genovesi, rational education (educazione razionale) provides citizens with the intellectual tools to understand the interdependence of nations and the benefits of cooperation. Moral education (educazione morale), on the other hand, cultivates virtues such as justice, benevolence, and amore della patria—the love of one’s country, understood also as participation in the universal community of humanity (Genovesi [1766] Reference Genovesi1853). Together, these two dimensions of education form the basis of what he called civil economy (economia civile), in which commerce serves mutual benefit and moral progress rather than domination or exploitation.

Thus, the fundamental difference between Genovesi and Montesquieu lies in Genovesi’s inclusion of individual moral and rational behavior alongside physical and mechanical factors to explain reality rather than reducing the former to the latter. Key elements like commerce, war, and international peace cannot be fully understood through climate, soil, wealth, and government alone; individual and collective behaviors, along with the education influencing them toward spiritual life and rational reflections, are crucial factors as well.

Our explanation aligns with Genovesi’s anthropology and view of the market as a place of mutual assistance (see Bruni and Sugden 2008).Footnote ¹⁶ As previously argued, Genovesi supports the idea that humans are social animals and adds something important: “Man is a naturally sociable animal: goes the common saying. But not every man will believe there is no other sociable animal on earth…. How is man more sociable than other animals? … [It is] in his reciprocal right to be assisted and consequently in his reciprocal obligation to help us in our needs” (Genovesi [1765–1767, 1769] Reference Genovesi and Perna2005, p. 283). By employing the language of rights and obligations, we are beyond mechanical elements constituting human behavior; we are in the realm of the “right of the moral laws” (Genovesi [1777] Reference Genovesi1838a, vol. 1, pp. 7–8n4 [I,1]) that Montesquieu, according to Genovesi, failed to notice. Thus, the market exchanges among individuals are not merely a by-product of their individual needs. In Genovesi’s civil economy, participants in market transactions can deliberately pursue their own benefits while also considering the well-being of the person they are engaged with. This approach reflects the “qualified” sociability of human beings.

Genovesi also opposed Montesquieu’s second and third theses. Genovesi believed that the relation between the spirit of commerce and moral virtue cannot be explained exclusively by referring to certain physical or mechanical conditions—such as equality or the form of government. For him, the decisive factor is whether individuals within a nation have received a rational and moral education that allows them to conceive of commerce as mutual assistance rather than competition or domination. This is why Genovesi entitled his treatise on civil economy Lezioni di Commercio o Sia di Economia Civile: The title itself signals that commerce is not automatically civilizing. Rather, it can become a source of civilization only in its most stable, durable, and truly civil form, when understood through the lens of moral and rational education.

In part, commerce does contain the seeds of civilization—it encourages exchange, interdependence, and communication among peoples. Yet, for Genovesi, these effects reach their full potential only when commerce is consciously guided by the educational formation of citizens who interpret economic relations as forms of mutual service and cooperation. The “lezioni” thus serve not merely to instruct in economic mechanisms but to cultivate civic and ethical awareness. Education transforms the market from a sphere of self-interest into one of shared humanity. If people learn to understand and embrace their commercial interactions as mutual assistance at the interpersonal level, they will be prepared to extend the same moral understanding to relations between nations—a micro- and macrocosmic vision of peace through reciprocity. In the absence of this shared moral and rational foundation, however, the spirit of commerce easily degenerates, inciting conflict and undermining the very peace it might otherwise sustain.

Genovesi also disagreed with Montesquieu’s analysis of the physical and mechanical factors that drive commerce. Opposing the view that only a republic can have commerce based on economy, Genovesi wrote, “It was not because of the constitutions that these republics gave themselves over to the trade of economy, but because of the soil” (Genovesi [1777] Reference Genovesi1838b, vol. 2, p. 276n1 [XX, 4]). Moreover, in his Lezioni di Economia Civile, Genovesi spent many pages arguing, against Montesquieu, that commerce can flourish either in monarchies or republics: “There are those who believe that commerce can only take place in the popular republics alone…. They add that the spirit of monarchies is the spirit of nobility and militia; both conflict with the spirit of commerce. However, this opinion is somehow contradicted by facts” (Genovesi [1765–1767, 1769] Reference Genovesi and Perna2005, p. 337).

This is part of a bigger critique that Genovesi brought against Montesquieu. The French author was guilty of having taught that virtue is required only for the good functioning of republics, not for monarchies. Genovesi replied that virtue, intended as love for the common good, is also necessary in monarchies. Enrico De Mas (Reference De Mas1971, p. 113) convincingly showed that this critique failed to consider the distinction made by Montesquieu between moral and political virtues (Dornier Reference Dornier and Stewart2013), the latter of which is necessary only in a republic. In our investigation, it’s essential to recognize that these discussions focus on physical and mechanical aspects. We have demonstrated that Genovesi believes this level must be transcended when it comes to commerce and peace. We have illustrated the importance of moral and rational education for Genovesi, emphasizing its significance in his views on trade and war in contrast to those of Montesquieu.

To recapitulate this section’s findings, we have shown that Genovesi envisaged a “qualified” spirit of commerce that fosters peace. Still, this spirit is tied to the moral development and behavior of the people living in the trading nations. Conversely, the spirit envisaged by Montesquieu cannot lead to peace but rather to its opposite, rooted in the level of facts and mechanical laws of reality. In the next section, we examine the internal development of Genovesi’s thought on the spirit of commerce, which is frequently equated with the spirit of conquest.

V. SPIRIT OF COMMERCE, SPIRIT OF CONQUEST, AND THE TELOS OF THE MARKET

Genovesi’s assessment of the spirit of commerce varied in his works. In the draft treatise of 1757, Elementi di Commercio, his view seems to be very similar to Montesqueiu’s, i.e., endorsing the thesis that commerce brings peace and good customs among nations:

There is no direct reference to Montesquieu (even if, in the Elementi, Montesquieu’s work is quoted and discussed at length). However, this passage has a striking similarity to another in Lezioni di Economia Civile, where Montesquieu is directly referenced:

If one refers to these two passages, Genovesi’s view seems unaltered. Yet the first traces of his transformed position emerge from the last sentence of the quotes above from Lezioni. Genovesi adds, “It is also true that not infrequently, jealousy of gain and the power of the sea arm nations and lead them to war; but the interest of trade disarmed them in a short time” (Genovesi [1765–1767, 1769] 2005, p. 553). Here, jealousy of gain is disarmed by interests. Is this always the case?

In the Lezioni, Genovesi refers to the same topic in the incipit of chapter 17 of the first book. Here, specific affirmations shed light on how his conception of the spirit of commerce moves from a positive assessment in his first work to a more critical evaluation in his latest,Footnote ¹⁸ as the spirit of commerce becomes almost a synonym for “spirit of conquest”: “The spirit of commerce is that of conquest. Among the barbarians, people and lands are conquered; among the peoples who traffic, riches” (Genovesi [1765–1767, 1769] Reference Genovesi and Perna2005, p. 523). Genovesi argues that commerce among nations (as it was conducted under the mercantilist system) was generally not an expression of reciprocal advantage or assistance but of unilateral exploitation. This interpretation runs through all of chapter 17 of Lezioni.

It is interesting to compare some passages of the first edition of the Lezioni (1765–1767) with the second Neapolitan one (1769). In the second edition, Genovesi added a very telling footnote (b) to the first paragraph of chapter 17 (which discusses “the spirit and freedom of commerce”): “Many have considered it odd that I call the spirit of commerce the spirit of conquests. They should say: why do we trade if not for conquering?” ([1769] Reference Genovesi and Perna2005, p. 523). He develops a similar thesis in paragraph 29 of chapter 8 (Book 1), added in the second edition. This is to say that the significant shift in Genovesi’s attitude towards the “spirit of commerce” emerged very late in his life, specifically between the first edition of his Lezioni (the first volume was published in 1765) and the last (1769).Footnote ¹⁹

Also very telling in this respect is the distinction that Genovesi made between the “spirit” and the “aims” of commerce. Reviving Jean-François Melon’s thesis, he argues that the latter are those of “promoting and feeding the population with the comforts of life” (Genovesi [1769] Reference Genovesi and Perna2005, p. 522, whereas the former is equated with the spirit of conquest. As Albert Hirschman reported, Melon famously argued that “the spirit of conquest and the spirit of commerce are mutually exclusive in the same nation” (Melon in Hirschman Reference Hirschman1997, p. 80). Genovesi agreed. The spirit of commerce seems inexorably connected to war. The contents of conquest changed, but that jealous, aggressive, and rapacious attitude that characterized war remained. The risk of jealousy and war is always on the horizon.

Melon’s Essai politique sur le commerce (1734) provides a crucial link between the optimistic doux commerce tradition and the critical reconsiderations advanced by Genovesi. Melon was among the first to conceptualize commerce as an ambivalent force: capable of generating wealth and refinement, yet equally prone to foster rivalry, jealousy, and imperial ambition. This duality deeply influenced subsequent Enlightenment reflections on trade and morality. Montesquieu partially inherits Melon’s insight but reframes it within a broader philosophical anthropology—arguing that the “spirit of commerce” naturally inclines men toward peace, provided that institutions moderate passions and convert self-interest into civility. Genovesi, however, reads this optimism through a more skeptical lens. His later writings reveal an awareness—akin to Melon’s—that commerce, when driven by unrestrained interests, can easily become an instrument of domination rather than a vehicle of peace. By acknowledging Melon’s intermediate position, we can better grasp why Genovesi distances himself from Montesquieu’s mechanistic interpretation of social harmony: Both Melon and Genovesi recognize that moral and spiritual dimensions cannot be reduced to the mechanical calculus of interest. In this sense, Melon anticipates Genovesi’s philosophical concern that the spirit of commerce may generate the very “jealousy of trade” Montesquieu sought to overcome, revealing a persistent tension between material progress and moral peace at the heart of Enlightenment civil economy.

This change in Genovesi’s perspective aligns with our interpretation and what we read in the note to Montesquieu’s Book 20. Only the moral and spiritual development of people through education can separate the aims of commerce and its beneficial effects from the spirit of conquest and its deplorable effects. Not by chance, we read in the quote above that war cannot be continued where “commerce is loved.” This love expresses the attitude of mutual assistance that people should adopt towards trade, which should characterize nations’ behavior. In synthesis, if we distinguish the telos from the spirit of commerce, we could affirm that the telos is mutual assistance, but the spirit is conquest. Without making a clear distinction between the natural spirit of commerce—that is, the instinctive drive toward acquisition, competition, and domination that historically accompanied commercial expansion—and the qualified spirit of commerce—that which emerges only when individuals and societies undergo moral and intellectual refinement through education—Genovesi’s thought might appear internally inconsistent. It would seem to waver between accepting Montesquieu’s view that commerce naturally softens manners and promotes peace, and, on the contrary, suggesting that it can also foster greed, inequality, and new forms of conquest. By introducing this distinction, however, Genovesi reconciles these opposing tendencies: Commerce in itself contains both potentials—the impulse to conquest and the possibility of mutual assistance. Only when human beings are educated to virtue does the telos, or true purpose (true nature, raison d’être), of commerce reveal itself as cooperation and the pursuit of the common good, rather than domination and self-interest. In this sense, the transformation of the spirit of commerce depends not on economic mechanisms alone but on the ethical and cultural development of humankind.

Therefore, a fair assessment of Genovesi’s mature position would be the following: Mutual assistance (consciousness of reciprocal needs and the mutually advantageous nature of commerce) in commerce is easier between individuals than nations; for mutual assistance between nations to emerge, the moral and rational education of people has to be widespread; when this is absent, the spirit of commerce is reduced to the spirit of conquest. This, finally, leads to war.

VI. FINAL REMARKS

We suggested that to understand Genovesi’s note to Montesquieu’s doux commerce, it is necessary to analyze their different methodological approaches. On the one hand, Montesquieu executed a descriptive analysis of the physical and mechanical elements of reality, which led him to argue that commerce and its spirit promote peace among nations. On the other hand, Genovesi agreed that the spirit of commerce can foster peace and impede war among nations as long as the people of the trading nations are well educated through reason to see commerce between individuals and nations as a place of intentional mutual assistance and cooperation. The qualified spirit that expresses the aims of commerce can emerge only through individual and collective moral behavior, caused, in turn, by rational reflection prompted by education. If not, the spirit of commerce will naturally coincide with the spirit of conquest.

We hope to have achieved both our aims. First, we have shown that Genovesi’s civil economy-based perspective on mutual assistance can be applied to trade between nations, despite Genovesi’s somewhat suspicious view of such transactions. This is an important addition to the growing literature on the Neapolitan philosopher and economist. Second, we have shed light on the hidden and obscure meaning of Genovesi’s note to the admired Montesquieu, and perhaps offered some insights for undressing the difference between the different spirits of commerce in promoting war or peace. At present, the spirit of commerce promotes peace and well-being when it embodies human sociability, creativity, innovation, and moral virtue. But it becomes a significant catalyst for war when it is aligned with greed or the lust for power, leading to oppression and links with organized crime. Distinguishing between the positive and negative aspects of trade, which still exist in our twenty-first-century global marketplace, is essential. We believe our historical research will resonate with academics, politicians, and social activists who are dedicated to promoting peace and working towards a world with fewer conflicts.