With his book In Defense of Religious Liberty, David Novak continues his monumental effort to demonstrate the relevance of Jewish texts and traditions for contemporary political thought. As one of the few scholars possessing the background necessary for navigating the waters of both philosophical texts and Jewish texts and traditions, Novak deserves a wide audience for his argument for the liberty of religious communities to influence the public square. His argument is impassioned, scholarly, and provocative as he reminds us that the theological-political problem is not merely a historical matter, but is of the utmost significance for the maintenance of liberal democracy. Though Novak speaks, as he puts it, from out of the Jewish tradition, like Moses Mendelssohn and Hermann Cohen he insists that public claims for moral positions must be intelligible to all rational persons. To legitimize his claim Novak locates a strong defense of religious liberty in what he takes to be the complementary ideas of classic natural law and Jewish theology. As in his earlier work, Novak relies upon a concept of natural law in which philosophy and the Jewish tradition are able to meet. Novak thus positions himself in such a manner that he appears to reject the necessity of choosing between Athens and Jerusalem.
Novak's defense of religious liberty, by which he means the liberty of traditional religious communities to make moral claims on the secular polity, is a response to increasing attempts to shrink, or even dismiss, the role of religion in public life. Accordingly, the book begins with a political argument defending traditional views on marriage and family as consistent with a proper understanding of multiculturalism. Novak bases his political argument both on the historical connection between religious belief and political liberty in America and the political need of democratic regimes for a transcendent authority. Yet he goes beyond the obvious historical contribution of religion and the recognition that democratic regimes self-destruct without recourse to a higher authority. He argues that traditional religious groups may properly assert their moral claims in the public sphere by speaking of universal or rationally demonstrable beliefs, even though those beliefs may form only part of the overall normative teaching of any particular tradition. There are, he asserts, normative claims which all religions share and, as such, form the basis for truly multicultural discourse. In support of this he cites Maimonides' prohibition on the shedding of innocent blood as an example of a general principle held by all religions and thus applicable in the public square even though it is no more important than many other prohibitions in the Jewish tradition that cannot be brought into the public square. Opponents of Novak's political conservatism will undoubtedly be exasperated and point out that the increasing political role of right-wing religious advocates testifies to both the strength of traditional beliefs and the unwillingness of many adherents of those beliefs to limit their claims to universally recognizable moral principles. Supporters of his political and moral claims may be equally exasperated by his insistence that their public stance must be in accord with general principles recognizable by all rational people. Those knowledgeable in traditional Jewish texts and traditions will likely be puzzled by his insistence that political advocacy must derive from general principles discernible through reason, and by his novel use of Maimonides to support that notion. Novak himself recognizes that the historical and political needs of a democratic regime do not constitute a philosophic defense of religious liberty and so he turns to a philosophical claim for religious liberty.
In articulating a philosophical defense of religious liberty, Novak argues that particular historical revelations have no place in the public square, so that, as members of a multicultural democracy, no religious group may claim to be a chosen people nor act as if they were. To be sure, members of faith traditions should take their faith seriously, but since theology is about singular events in history limited to a particular people, and philosophy is about nature and the natural processes of the world, a way must be found to speak of God in terms of a philosophically compelling ethics consistent with universal norms. Novak grounds his philosophy in classical natural law theory, beginning with Plato and including other natural law thinkers up to Thomas Jefferson. As he puts it, though, his epistemology is Kantian, and he argues that a philosophically sound idea of natural law cannot be rooted in natural theology. In an age of quantum physics and evolutionary biology it no longer makes sense to construct a moral argument that views human nature as part of nature as a whole, where God is the ordering principle of that whole. Yet in separating natural law from natural theology, he still insists that the best case for universal human rights and religious liberty requires the idea of God. Novak provides what he calls a radical reading of Jefferson according to which the Declaration of Independence includes a philosophical statement presuming a fundamental law, a self-evident truth, recognizing an essential human condition deriving from “nature's God.” This view of human rights does not require proof of God's existence, but rather is a Kantian-type postulate of practical reason where God's general commandment serves as the source of moral law out of which human rights emerge. Human rights are thus neither the consequence of any particular religious tradition nor regarded as innate properties; rather, they are the result of the Creator's universal command to pursue rights.
Novak understands that his Kantian epistemology is not enough to maintain the philosophical assertion that God is the underlying principle of human rights. Rather, his philosophical principle is ultimately rooted in an idea of natural law originating with Plato. Novak argues that the one idea tying together the various approaches in classical natural law theory is the notion that nature is divine since it encompasses the intelligible order of the universe by which all things are governed. This idea of natural law does not require a full-blown natural theology and only presumes that those governing human affairs are intelligent enough to access this higher order of knowledge and transform it into human affairs and manmade law. The importance of this discovery is that it recognizes that the only moral position worthy of human allegiance is one based on nature.
Novak's account of Plato's idea of natural law is so significant to his larger argument that it requires some discussion. Although one can accept that Plato's Socrates presumes a correspondence between human nature and nature writ large, Novak seems to confound Plato's understanding of political need and philosophical argument. Thus Novak presents an account by the Athenian Stranger in the Laws (713c) as evidence that Plato recognizes the political need for a God. Whereas in the Laws this mythic account derives from the political needs of the city rather than a philosophical argument, Novak all too easily allows that political and religious needs provide the ground for a philosophic argument. This is perhaps why he is able to claim that the epistemological divide distinguishing Athens and Jerusalem is not one between reason and revelation, but rather one between nature and revelation. Let us grant that, as Novak says, we are able to reason both about ordinary human experience and revelation. Even so, Novak makes his case about the similarity between Platonic political philosophy and biblical revelation by supposing that not only the Athenian Stranger's myth but also Timaeus's cosmology and Socrates' enigmatic speech about the Good are philosophical supports for a God whose commands are compelling to all rational human beings. To be sure, there is a certain similarity between the philosopher's wonder and the biblical recognition that “fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,” and also between the centrality of law to Platonic political philosophy and its importance in the Torah. Moreover, the problem is not that Novak confounds the God of the Greek philosophers with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The difficulty in Novak's argument lies rather in his understanding of Platonic political philosophy and what this means for developing a natural-law, or philosophical, defense of religious liberty. His understanding of Plato is problematic not only in his glossing over the distinction between myth and reason in the argument of Plato's texts but also in his criticism of the Platonic political paradigm for supposing that “human reason—properly and fully exercised by quasi-divine humans in the right society—by looking to divine nature or natural divinity, can lead society to the end of all ends of all cosmic striving” (159). Does Plato's account of the correspondence and difference between nature and human nature lead him to suppose that human nature is perfectible in any political regime? Or would Plato, recognizing the near impossibility of a wholly just regime, approve of a people who by virtue of its particular claim of chosenness provided a light unto the nations? One could very well imagine that Plato would more likely accept the political necessity of the Jewish claim for chosenness in the public square than he would expect the efficaciousness of wholly rational arguments devoid of particular religious claims.
Novak's most original and important claim is his theological defense of religious liberty from within the Jewish tradition. He argues that it is up to the adherents of faith traditions to provide a better defense of human rights and religious liberty than do secularists, and through his creative use of Jewish texts and traditions he constructs a stunning defense of religious liberty, albeit one that ultimately reads the tradition from a thoroughly modern perspective. Thus Novak's reading of Jewish texts accomplishes his goal, but in a manner such that veracity requires us to admit that the traditional understanding of those sacred texts is hard to discern. His attempt to ground the idea of religious liberty in the Talmud's discussion (Shabbat 88a) of the Jewish people's acceptance of the Torah is based on a well-known discussion of whether and why the Jewish people required coercion to fully accept the Torah when it was first given at Mount Sinai. Here Novak argues that the Talmud presents an opinion leveling a moral complaint against God since his use of coercion at the giving of the Torah is seemingly a denial of true religious liberty. He goes on to argue that the next Talmudic opinion solves the dilemma by arguing that the Jewish people only fully accepted the Torah when they voluntarily embraced the whole of the law later on in exile, when they could have chosen assimilation into the surrounding culture. According to Novak's reading this is relevant for us since the Talmud sees that the proper standard for choosing the covenant requires a wholly voluntary acceptance of the law where choice is possible. He supports this reading by invoking Maimonides' idea of free will, which Novak takes to hold “that being commanded presupposes genuine freedom of choice as its precondition” (66). Now, it is not desirable or possible to set forth all the difficulties of Novak's interpretation of the texts. Suffice it to say that neither a simple reading of the Talmud nor the traditional commentaries convey an understanding of the problem as Novak construes it. We can imagine how he determines that the Talmud lays a charge against God for denying religious liberty, but that would presume a basic misunderstanding of a legal principle to which the Talmud refers. Moreover, the opinion that allegedly resolves the problem is referring to a time soon after an attempt was made to massacre the Jews in exile, hardly a situation free of coercion. It is perhaps understandable that Novak ignores the rich discussions surrounding the very texts he cites since they are irrelevant to his point. It is more difficult to understand why he uses Maimonides' account of free will to support his argument since Maimonides (Mishneh Torah, Laws on Repentance, chap. 5) recognizes that free will presumes that one's freedom to choose still functions under a system of rewards and punishments, again hardly a situation free from all coercion.
Novak is perhaps most interesting and most problematic when he applies his idea of religious liberty as an individual right. He speaks, for example, of contemporary Jewish communities that consider themselves voluntarily subject to governance of the law and insists that apostates have the right, in fact if not in principle, to leave the religion (78). He provides an extensive account of how the Jewish tradition may be said to accept religious diversity when providing a place in a Jewish polity not only to Noahides-gentiles who follow the seven laws that the Jewish tradition believes all people are obligated to uphold but even to atheists who do not commit blasphemy. Novak even goes so far in defense of religious liberty that he denies that the Torah provides any prohibition on idol worship to non-Jews since the “prohibition of idolatry and the numerous admonitions about it are all directed to Israel” (178). Novak's novel use of Jewish texts will prove interesting to those who wish to advocate for a more open Judaism where creative textual interpretation will justify more religious liberty than the texts and traditions allow. Ironically, those traditional Jews who would approve of his political conservatism will find little of value in his exegesis of the texts. Too often he ignores clear biblical prohibitions, for example, the multiple admonitions against allowing idolatry in the land of Israel, and while his liberal defense and acceptance of apostasy may provide the grounds for rooting religious liberty in Judaism, it is not a Judaism bearing much resemblance to the tradition.
Ultimately Novak's attempt to supplant the liberal social-contract ideal with a more powerful liberal ideal of covenant theology as a means of defending religious liberty may find the approval of those seeking to ground modern morality in some type of natural law philosophy. We doubt that those who live within the tradition will recognize their own commitments as a voluntary expression of religious liberty, or that Novak has provided an argument for making their moral teachings known in the public square. It is difficult to imagine American Jews constructing an argument for Israel's existence and continued support devoid of any sense of the particular revelatory claim of the Jewish people to the land of Israel.
