In my paper “Parental Love and the Ethics of Sex Selection,” published in the previous issue of the Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics,1
Herissone-Kelly P. Parental love and the ethics of sex selection. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2007;16:326–35.
First, however, I want briefly to summarize the argument, though I should emphasize that a full understanding of it can be gained only by reading the paper in which it makes its first appearance. At the argument's heart is an analysis of proper parental love, which I call the “any incumbent model.” This model has it that, if A loves B parentally, she loves B just because B is her child. This is to say that B's being A's child is a sufficient condition of A's loving B. From this, it seems to follow that A's parentally loving B commits her to loving any incumbent of the position of her child: If C were to be the incumbent of that position, then A would love C; if D were to be the incumbent of that position, then A would love D; and so on. Significantly, because B's being A's child is a sufficient condition of A's loving B, A does not require B to have any particular personal characteristic or set of personal characteristics in order to merit incumbency of the position of A's child.
This last feature of the any incumbent model of parental love marks a notable contrast with the sort of love that it is proper to have for one's partner. That is, where X and Y are partners, X is not expected to love Y simply because Y is the incumbent of the position of X's partner. On the contrary, it is thought that Y should be the incumbent of that position because X loves him. What is more, it should not be the case that X would love just any incumbent of the position of her partner, regardless of that incumbent's personal characteristics. Instead, Y should be taken to merit his incumbency of the position of X's partner precisely on account of his personal characteristics.
Even from this brief sketch, it should be clear that the any incumbent model of parental love is incompatible with sex selection for (at least) nonmedical reasons. That is, the prospective parent A who goes in for nonmedical sex selection will take a possible future child B to merit incumbency of the position of her child only on the condition that B will possess a particular personal characteristic (namely, being male or being female). Although this attitude of accepting someone as incumbent of a position only on the condition that he or she has a given trait is perfectly appropriate to, and indeed is required of, love of a partner, it is at odds with parental love.
This claim leads us to ask an important question: Why is it acceptable to choose someone to be one's partner on the basis of his or her personal characteristics but unacceptable to choose someone to be one's child on the same grounds? To answer simply by appealing to the any incumbent analysis of parental love is to misconstrue the question's import, because it is intended precisely as a demand for a justification of that analysis. Even if the any incumbent model accurately captures our everyday concept of parental love, the deeper issue is whether that everyday concept is defensible.
The most plausible argument for its defensibility is, I think, one that points to an apparently essential feature of all varieties of love and that we can label “the happening-upon constraint.” For X to love Y authentically, regardless of whether the love in question is parental, romantic, or whatever, X must, so to speak, “happen upon” Y. That is, Y and his personal characteristics need to enjoy a certain independence of X's will. In particular, they need not to be products of X's will; they must not be manufactured specifically in order to match X's desires and preferences.2
I will have cause later on to refine this claim.
Weil S. An Anthology. London: Penguin; 2005:293.
For Y genuinely to qualify as the object of X's love, he must enjoy a certain independence of, distance from, or “otherness” to, X. He needs not simply to exist, or be conceived of as existing, as an adjunct to her. Indeed, we might say that properly loving someone is inextricably tied up with our having a vivid sense of their independent reality. (p. 333)4
See note 1, Herissone-Kelly 2007.
The argument that this essential feature of love justifies the any incumbent model can be set out as follows:
- For A to love B authentically, A must happen upon B.
- Where B is A's child, in contrast to where B is A's partner, A cannot both happen upon and choose B.
- Therefore, where B is A's child, A must not choose B. A must, instead, accept any incumbent of the position of her child.
Premise (1) is simply a statement of the happening-upon constraint. The key premise in the argument, and the one which marks a significant difference between love for a partner and parental love, is (2). That is, if a prospective parent chooses a future child of a certain type, she cannot happen upon him, because her act of choice is responsible for his coming into being. If, on the other hand, she is to happen upon him (if his personal characteristics are not to be products of her will), then clearly she cannot choose him. A parent should, then, be committed to accepting any child who comes along, and this, of course, leads us straight to the any incumbent model, and to a clash between parental love and (at least) nonmedical sex selection.
Medical and Nonmedical Sex Selection: Where Is the Moral Difference?
Perhaps the most obvious question to ask about our argument in support of the parental love objection is this: Why is it only nonmedical sex selection that falls foul of the analysis of parental love on which the objection relies? Suppose, that is, that a parent uses sex selection techniques in order to avoid producing a child with a serious genetic condition that affects only boys. Surely this parent is allowing someone to merit incumbency of the position of her child only on condition that she has the personal characteristic of being female. And I have suggested that such an attitude is in direct opposition to that which characterizes parental love.
We may be tempted to reply that the parent in our example is not so much selecting in favor of a girl as selecting against a boy. This move, however, would be transparently sophistical, because the actions of the parent who selects for nonmedical reasons could quite legitimately be redescribed in exactly the same way. If this is what is taken to mark the supposed moral difference between medical and nonmedical sex selection, then we are forced to conclude that no such difference exists.
A more promising candidate for a genuine moral difference might emerge from an appeal to the motivation of the selecting parent or to the principle on the basis of which she selects. It is, I would urge, plausible to suppose that the medically sex-selecting parent is—or at any rate ought to be—guided in her choice by what we might call the principle of acceptable outlook (PAO).5
PAO is introduced in Herissone-Kelly P. Procreative beneficence and the prospective parent. Journal of Medical Ethics 2006;32:166–9.
Strictly speaking, what is at issue for the parent who selects in accordance with PAO is not the sex of the child she produces; rather, it is that child's prospects for a life of an acceptable quality. So if, of her prospective children, only a girl will be likely to enjoy a quality of life equal to or exceeding L, she will select a girl; if, on the other hand, only a boy will be likely to enjoy a life at or above L, she will select a boy. We might say, then, that the aim of such a parent is nothing more than to select a child with an acceptable quality of life, and that she selects a boy or a girl only in order to achieve this aim. This is just to emphasize that it is PAO that ultimately guides her act of selection, and not a principle of producing only a boy or only a girl.
The point here is that the parent who selects for medical reasons is, so to speak, not really, or not primarily, concerned with sex selection at all. Instead, she is at bottom concerned only with “acceptable quality of life selection.” But does this really get her off the hook? The argument so far seems to run as follows:
- Sex selection is incompatible with parental love;
- Sex selection for nonmedical reasons is not really sex selection; it is better understood as “acceptable quality of life selection”;
- Therefore, sex selection for medical reasons is not incompatible with parental love.
The problem with this argument is that it is not valid: (3) does not follow from the conjunction of (1) and (2). In order for the argument to work, it would have to be the case that sex selection proper was the only type of selection that could be incompatible with parental love (so that if a type of selection were not, or were not really, sex selection, it would not conflict with parental love). And this is not obviously the case. Indeed, it is obviously not the case. What makes nonmedical sex selection incompatible with the any incumbent model is its allowing, say, B to merit incumbency of the position of A's child only on condition that B possesses a certain personal characteristic. So, selecting for personal characteristics other than sex—for instance, eye color, prospective height, or intelligence—would be equally inconsistent with parental love. We might say that sex selection presents an ethically problematic appearance not because it is, specifically, sex selection, but because it is sex selection; in other words, because it is a species of selection on the basis of personal characteristics.
What reason, then, could we have for exempting selection on the grounds of projected quality of life from the ethical criticism that might seem to attach to other forms of selection? It may be argued that the answer is “none,” because it appears that when A's action is guided by PAO, she takes B to merit incumbency of the position of her child if and only if B will have the personal characteristic of being likely to enjoy a quality of life that is not below L. And this, it might be urged, is straightforwardly incompatible with the any incumbent model.
I think, however, that the appearance is deceptive. That is, it seems to me that we ought to push the question still further and ask what reason we have to believe that, when A selects in accordance with PAO, her selection is driven by judgments about what sort of child does or does not merit incumbency of the position of her child. And the answer to this question, I suggest, really is “none.” It seems perfectly conceivable, for instance, that A should be guided by PAO and simultaneously think that B would merit incumbency of the position of her child whether the quality of his life were likely to fall below L or comfortably to exceed it. As Thomas Baldwin comments, where an act of sex selection for medical reasons proves successful, “the parents will be delighted that the child is free from the disorder; but it does not follow that their love is conditional upon the child's being healthy” (p. 642).6
Baldwin T. Understanding the Opposition. Prenatal Diagnosis 2006;26:637–45.
This is a welcome result, because it seems correct to say that it is precisely because A is committed to loving any incumbent of the position of her child that she adheres to PAO in the first place. A parent who acts in accordance with PAO is determined not to allow any incumbent of the position of her child to suffer unacceptably. This determination, in turn, is founded on her commitment to loving (and so being concerned for the welfare of) any incumbent of that position. And this is just to say that it is rooted in a characteristically parental love.
Where A's child B does not have any condition that will be unavoidably likely to result in a quality of life that falls short of L (so, for instance, where B enjoys general good health), A will still act on PAO. Her doing so will consist in her making adequate provision for B's needs: endeavoring to ensure a decent standard of food, shelter, education, and so on. But where a prospective child B is, as it were, constitutionally likely to have a quality of life below L, A's adherence to PAO will involve her selecting against B. In either case though, A will be motivated by an other-directed concern for the well-being of any incumbent (possible or actual) of the position of her child, rather than by a “mere” preference for a child with certain personal characteristics. It is this that essentially distinguishes her action from that of the parent who selects for nonmedical reasons.
It is worth noting that the claim that PAO is the principle underlying medical sex selection reveals a certain laxness or inaccuracy in the standard distinction between medical and nonmedical selection (whether for sex or any other reason). That is, it would in principle be possible for someone to be constitutionally likely to have a quality of life below L for reasons that are nonmedical. What our action should be in such cases is an important and particularly thorny question, and one that probably does not admit of a univocal answer covering all cases. It is also one that I do not have the space to address here. In addition, I should stress my opinion that many, and possibly most, genetic conditions will not automatically deliver or be likely to deliver a quality of life that is below any defensible candidate for L. To suppose that they will amounts, so far as I can see, to little more than an unsupported and unsupportable prejudice.
Why Does Medical Sex Selection Not Violate the Happening-upon Constraint?
There may be thought to be a deeper problem here, though. I have said that it is essential to love of any variety that the object or recipient of that love be happened upon: Where someone is not happened upon, he or she cannot be authentically loved. I have also said that it is impossible both to happen upon and to choose one's offspring, and that nonmedical sex selection—being an instance of choosing one's offspring—consequently violates the happening-upon constraint. Indeed, this is what is taken to justify the any incumbent model of parental love; because a parent ought not to choose her children, she ought to be prepared to love any child she may have.
Now, it would seem hard to deny that when, for example, a prospective parent A selects a girl in order to avoid producing a child with a quality of life below L, she chooses a girl (“select,” after all, is simply a synonym of “choose”). That being the case, A surely does not happen upon her child and, so, assuming that the argument I have outlined is cogent, does not authentically love her. Admittedly, it may not have been better for A to have had a child with an unacceptable quality of life whom she would nonetheless have loved. Even so, it might have been preferable for her to have had no child at all than to have a child the nature of whose origin ensures that she cannot authentically be loved.
In addressing this issue, we need to remind ourselves—and seek further to clarify—what it is about the choice of a type of child that makes it incompatible with the “happening upon” that is a necessary condition of authentic love. To do so, we can first of all revisit the question of just why an authentic love is subject to the happening-upon constraint. The thought is that when I do not happen upon someone, in the sense of “happen upon” that is relevant to the constraint, then at least a subset of his characteristics exists as a result of an exercise of my will. If this were all there were to the matter, then medical sex selection would straightforwardly be on an equal footing with nonmedical selection. That is, the prospective parent's opting on medical grounds for a child of a particular sex leads to the production of a child whose characteristic of being, for example, female, exists as a direct result of a deliberate act of will on the part of her parent. But this is not all there is to the matter.
It seems to me that for a child not to be happened upon in the sense relevant to the constraint, something more is needed. We are debarred from happening upon someone in this sense—in the sense, that is, that precludes authentic love—when, and only when, personal characteristics are created specifically to match our own desires and preferences. It is not so much independence of our will per se that is required of any genuine object of our love, then, but independence of acts of will that seek simply to gratify mere desires and preferences.
Of course, it can be objected here that the parent who acts in accordance with PAO fulfils her desires and preferences in doing so. She prefers, for example, that no child of hers should have a quality of life that falls short of L. However, as should be clear from the previous section, the desires and preferences she fulfils are not what I have called “mere” desires and preferences. That is, they are not self-directed, but other-directed. It is for the sake of the possible incumbent of the position of her child that the parent who selects in accordance with PAO chooses as she does, rather than in order to have a child who, as it were, matches her tastes. Insofar, then, as she chooses, she does not choose in a way that violates the happening-upon constraint.
If this response is thought a little obscure, we might make substantially the same point in the following way. Take again the example of a parent who, guided by PAO, selects in favor of a girl. It seems to me that we can, without misrepresenting the facts of the matter, say that there is an important sense in which she happens upon the girl she produces. That is, she was perfectly happy to have either a boy or a girl, but circumstances dictated that she should have only a girl, and these circumstances were beyond her control (they lay outside the ambit of her will, as it were). We might say, indeed, that she happened upon the circumstances, and so happened upon the child that the circumstances dictated she have. As we sometimes say about situations of this type, the choice was made for her. That is, her choice was determined by the obtaining of the circumstance that any boy she could produce would be likely to have an unacceptable quality of life—that circumstance, so to speak, morally demanded a particular response. There is a significant difference between this state of affairs and one in which a parent chooses on the basis of a mere preference for one sex or the other.
Is a Parent's Happening upon a Child Really Incompatible with Her Choosing That Child?
The cornerstone of the parental love objection to nonmedical sex selection is the claim that parents are unable both (in the relevant senses) to happen upon and to choose their children. If a child is chosen (in this sense), he is not happened upon, and if he is happened upon (in this sense), he is not chosen. This, it will be recalled, is one of the contrasts between parental love and partner love, because it is perfectly possible both to happen upon a partner and to choose him as incumbent of the position of one's partner on the basis of his personal characteristics.
There is, of course, a type of case in which it is uncontroversially possible both to choose and to happen upon one's child: namely, the case of adoptive parents. Such parents are able to choose their children without intentionally bringing into being any of their personal characteristics, just as one is able to with a partner. Indeed, given the argument I have presented in support of the parental love objection to nonmedical sex selection, this fact is of some interest. That is, I have the impression that there is no generally held pretheoretical objection to adoptive parents choosing a child according to his or her personal characteristics, including sex. Adoptive parents who select, say, a girl are not pilloried for doing so, and there appears to be no appetite among the public for debate about whether those who adopt should be allowed to make decisions of this type. This might seem to lend weight to the notion that the public's distaste for nonmedical sex selection is indeed rooted in the happening-upon constraint (though, of course, it does no more than lend weight to it—it is very far indeed from conclusive evidence).
However, it could be argued that there is a sense in which even nonadoptive parents are able both to choose and to happen upon their children. That is, if, for example, a prospective parent selects a boy, this action does not by any means eradicate the element of reproductive happenstance. In using sex selection techniques to choose a boy, she is not deliberately setting out to have a particular boy. She is happy to have any boy, and whichever boy she has, she will be prepared to love.7
I am grateful to Neil Manson for making this point.
This, of course, is not parental love as we have analyzed it: A parent who selects in this way is willing to accept any male incumbent of the position of her child, rather than any incumbent at all. But we need to remember that the any incumbent model is supposedly justified solely on the basis of the happening-upon constraint, and now it seems that the happening-upon constraint may be rather more relaxed than we initially took it to be. It appears, that is, that we might be able within certain wide parameters both to choose and to happen upon our children, because our choosing a child of a particular sex still leaves us with a very high degree of happenstance. Why, then, should the parent who will love any boy not be regarded as parentally loving the male child or children she selects?
It can be conceded, first of all, that the parent who holds the “accept any boy” principle does allow a high degree of happenstance to enter into her production of a child. The question is whether it is happenstance of the right kind. Once more we need to revisit the issue of why the happening-upon constraint is a constraint or to specify again the sort of happening upon that is taken to preclude authentic love.
As I maintained in the previous section, A fails to happen upon B in the sense relevant to the constraint if and only if at least some of B's characteristics are deliberately created in order to match A's mere (non-other-directed and non-PAO-related) desires and preferences. As I explained in my previous paper, to do this is to allow insufficient “distance” between parent and child for the former properly to love the latter. Now, although the parent whose choice is guided by the “accept any boy” principle does in a sense happen upon her child—because her choice does not determine which boy she will have—it should be clear that she does not happen upon her child in the sense relevant to the constraint. That is, despite her commitment to a high degree of happenstance, she nevertheless aims to bring about a child with characteristics that match her mere desires and preferences. If the happening upon constraint is justified, then our parent will be unable authentically to love any of the full range of boys she is willing to accept.
Is the Any Incumbent Model Too Strong?
Against the argument for the incompatibility of parental love and nonmedical sex selection, it may be argued that the any incumbent analysis of the former is just too strong to be plausible. Why, in order for A to count as loving her actual child B, would she have to have loved any other child (C, D, or whoever) that she might have had? Might it not have been possible for at least one of those other potential children (for instance, C) to have been just so thoroughly unpleasant that A would not have found it possible to love her? If so, why should that disqualify her from authentically loving B?8
I am indebted to Rachel Cooper and Alison Stone for this objection.
The point here is that we can imagine a possible world in which A remains fundamentally the same sort of person as she is in the actual world and yet has the child C instead of B. And whereas B (A's child in the actual world) is entirely innocuous and unexceptionable, C is a truly horrendous child, with positively diabolical personal characteristics. In the world in which A gives birth to C, she finds herself incapable of loving the incumbent of the position of her child. C is simply so awful a child that he defeats A's capacity to love him. Why does that mean that in the world in which A has B—the actual world—A cannot authentically love B?
I want to be clear about what this objection maintains, even at the risk of laboring the point. The claim is not simply that a parent could, as a matter of fact, have a child so profoundly unpleasant that she would find herself incapable of loving him. This, I take it, is uncontroversially the case, for some conceivable parents and some conceivable children (no pun intended). Rather, the objection holds that this being true of a particular parent A ought not to be taken to disqualify A from authentically loving any child she has who does not possess such a monumentally foul nature. If the objection is justified, then, it will be the case that I can authentically love my actual child without being committed to loving any child that I might have or that I might have had. And from this, it will follow that the any incumbent model is an inaccurate account of parental love.
In responding to this objection, I need to point out that nothing I have said so far entails that the parent A who would not love a possible child C is unable to count as authentically loving her actual child B. So long as A has happened upon B, the only necessary condition of her authentically loving him has been met. However, she cannot count as loving B just because he is her child—at best, she will love him because it is true both that he is her child and that he is nonmonstrous or of an acceptable temperament. And, according to the any incumbent model, she therefore cannot be said parentally to love him. To repeat: Only if A had deliberately chosen B's characteristics to match her mere desires and preferences would she be unable authentically to love him at all.
Of course, at this point our objector can simply modify her complaint. She can ask either (1) why, in our example, the epithet “parental” should be withheld from A's love for B or (2) assuming the epithet is to be withheld, why it should matter that A's love for B is nonparental, provided that it genuinely is love. Let us consider each of these modifications in turn.
First of all, I take it that a feature of any love that can qualify as parental is that it should be entirely reliable: A parent ought reliably to love any child she may, as a matter of fact, have. It might seem that there are two ways of ensuring such reliability. First, some way could be found of ensuring that parents only have children of a type that they feel able to love (for example, only boys, or only temperamentally innocuous children). Secondly, parents could be willing to love and accept any child who comes along. Now, as we have seen, if the happening-upon constraint is justified, the first of these options appears not really to be an option at all. That is, if a parent attempts to ensure the reliability of her love by creating children to match her (mere) preferences, then in the very act of doing so, she undermines her aim: It is impossible authentically to love a child brought about in this way. The only hope, then, for guaranteeing reliability of a parent's love—and so for having a love that is genuinely parental—lies with the second option. Parental love is to be understood as conforming to the any incumbent model. This is why, when A loves B but would not have loved C, A's love for B is not parental.
Our objector's second modification asks why this last fact matters. That is, let us grant that A does not love B parentally if it is the case that she would not have loved C. Having conceded this, we may feel inclined to shrug our shoulders and ask “So long as A really does love B, where is the problem?” which is equivalent to asking why a parent's love for her child ought to be a distinctively parental love9
By this, I mean that the question is why a parent's love ought to conform to the any incumbent model and so to parental love as I have analyzed it. Clearly, there is a trivial sense in which a parent's love ought to be parental love, given that parental love has been explicitly defined as the sort of love that a parent ought to have for her child. That, however, is not the sense intended here.
The answer once more appeals to the notion of reliability. Because parents are, given the happening-upon constraint, forbidden in the relevant sense to choose their children, they must happen upon them. And because (a) parents ought to happen upon their children and (b) parents' love for their children ought to be reliable, it follows that parents' love for their children ought to be parental. That is, parents ought to be committed to loving any incumbent of the position of their child.
Concluding Remarks
My aim in this paper, and in the paper that preceded it, has been to do no more than ask whether a coherent argument can be formulated in support of the intuition that sex selection for nonmedical reasons is in some way incompatible with parental love. I have produced an argument that seems to me to meet that aim, though I should emphasize that I do not necessarily want to present it as an argument to which I personally subscribe. Some of its implications seem unacceptably harsh: In particular, it would feel presumptuous and potentially unjust to declare to a parent who had selected a child for, say, reasons of family balancing that she does not authentically love him. Having said that, the argument does strike me as at least plausible, and there are facets of it that I find more than appealing. It very probably could be further refined, and it is certainly the case that further objections to it could be raised and would need to be addressed by anyone wishing to defend it. I think that the argument carries sufficient interest for the effort required to carry out these tasks to count as well spent.
