Fiorenzo Mornati’s second installment in his three-volume intellectual biography of Vilfredo Pareto covers a short but crucial period in the noted economist’s career: the years from 1891 to 1898. Over that septennium, Pareto abandons definitively his professional engagements as a capable engineer and a controversial manager in Italy’s growing heavy industry, keeps alive his political activism qua vocal proponent of free-trade liberalism and chastiser of corruption in public affairs, and enriches further his publishing record in economics and the social sciences at large.
These are the years in which Pareto gives birth to some of his most famous conceptual and formal contributions to economics, such as ophelimity (pp. 83–90) and optimality (pp. 116–121), as well as his theories of business cycles (pp. 168–171) and income distribution (pp. 191–201). The originality and significance of these contributions of Pareto’s were quickly acknowledged by his contemporaries and, especially after the publication of his two-volume Cours d’économie politique (1896–97), they attracted the attention of the international scholarly community at the highest level. Among others, Maffeo Pantaleoni, Irving Fisher, John Bates Clark, Knut Wicksell, Georges Sorel, and Francis Edgeworth are shown to have reviewed Pareto’s work or engaged in public and/or private epistolary exchanges with him (pp. 219–237).
These are also the years in which Pareto ascends to a new professional echelon, thanks to his appointment as successor of Léon Walras at the University of Lausanne. The details of Pareto’s unexpected, almost casual call to Switzerland, the bureaucratic and institutional controversies surrounding his employment, Pareto’s own shrewd bargaining for extra benefits and personal control over the choice of teaching assistants and his own successor, and the crucial role played by Pareto in establishing the local École de Sciences Sociales are all presented accurately and on the basis of a remarkable wealth of original documents, some of which were never published before (pp. 1–31).
In the same septennium, Pareto begins formulating reflections on social equilibrium and political conflict, prefiguring the theories that he will articulate fully in his pivotal contribution to modern sociology: namely, his 1916 Trattato di sociologia generale, better known to the Anglophone public as The Mind and Society (pp. 203–217). A staunch opponent of Marxism, Pareto seems to have studied the economic and political doctrines of socialism to a great extent, distinguishing carefully among streaks and brands thereof (pp. 173–184) and sympathizing with the libertarian and morally noble elements contained therein (pp. 56–59). Mornati’s painstakingly referenced account substantiates, therefore, the notion of Pareto as being an informed and sophisticated critic of the then-growing socialist camp, rather than a dogmatic and trenchant one.
If any dogmatism is to be found in Pareto’s work, then Mornati’s book would subtly point to the fundamental assumptions of political economy that, once formalized by way of “mathematical method,” are easily or conveniently hidden from view and forgotten about (p. 76). Specifically, the abstract and improbable philosophical anthropology of the human person qua individual “pleasure machines” (p. 83) simplifies enormously the economist’s and social scientist’s job, by reducing all social entities (e.g., families, clans, tribes, nations) to aggregates of atomic units, whose only motive for action is the self-interested satisfaction of their wants qua “perfect hedonists” (p. 80) in “competition” with one another (p. 121).
Pareto seems aware of the inherent limitations of this approach, which, for one, ignores ab initio the many other motives that can lead to human action (e.g., “feelings, prejudice, passions” [p. 205], and “habit” [p. 80]), as well as the historico-systemic intricacies of social bodies and the ways in which individuals are subordinated to them, whether consciously or unconsciously, and made into “civil peoples” to begin with (p. 112). As he had already done in his youth, Pareto warns about the “metaphysical” pitfalls awaiting any economist who should put too much faith in “mathematics” (p. 81) or forget about the hypothetical character of the “axioms” of the discipline, its being limited to “investigating only part of the real phenomena,” and the overall need to “be very cautious and resort continuously to experience” for verification and falsification (pp. 75–76).
However, when the time comes for policy recommendations about international trade (pp. 123–139) or monetary policy (pp. 141–155), the warnings and qualifications of the self-styled “most positivist of the positivists” (pp. 207–208) are ignored, whereas strong assertions against State intervention and in favor of the inevitably beneficial virtues of free trade are the norm. Having invested an enormous amount of energy and ingenuity in devising novel and complex mathematical studies of human affairs, Pareto becomes unwilling or incapable of taking seriously his own warnings and qualifications.
Strong assertions against State intervention and in favor of laissez-faire remain the norm even when the contradictory or paradoxical limits of the assumptions of political economy manifest themselves in Pareto’s own writings (p. 112). For example, when those assumptions are applied to the Malthusian issue of balancing population and resources, it would be economically rational to destroy the unproductive members of society, such as the elderly, but then “moral duties” have to be brought back into play as a sort of deus ex machina (p. 158), in a much-needed yet methodologically unwarranted way, given also Pareto’s declared inability to provide a “rational ethics” (p. 208). Similarly, when an economic crisis occurs, the State should intervene and ease the cycle by issuing “paper money” for “a very short time” (p. 170), despite Pareto’s repeated claims that “governments’ interference in issuing money is always harmful” (p. 43).
On a broader scale, public authority is said to be an “absolute” precondition for social life, the alternative being ruinous “anarchy,” in spite of Pareto’s unceasing jibes at the political class and at “actual … governments” (pp. 211–212). Pareto attacks them endlessly for being dishonorable, corrupt, and self-interested, vile masters in “the art … of alienating rather than protecting the citizens’ goods,” which is, however, the obvious implication of the philosophical anthropology that he himself adopts as an economist (p. 213). At the same time, Pareto remarks on the differences in fiscal integrity and efficiency between the Swiss and the Italian governments (p. 163), as well as the different effects of the diverse constitutional arrangements of “France and Italy … Germany … Switzerland … England … [and] the United States” (p. 214), all of which go to show that the State may not be bad per se, but rather turns into a better or worse tool, depending on who uses it and on whether those who use it are actually capable of acting upon motives that are not sheer hedonistic self-interest.
Sparse all over a great wealth of genuine mathematical genius and keen human insight, these contradictions and paradoxes are a testimony to Pareto’s own burning political passions. Combined with the sense of certainty that abstract formalized deductions can elicit, Pareto’s lifelong liberal convictions eventually pierce through his own better judgment, which he fails to suspend in light of his own prior methodological warnings and qualifications, and which he does not reform in light of successful experiments in “mixed systems” of the economy (p. 183; e.g., the democratically chosen State monopolies over currency and railroads in Switzerland, pp. 61–66), life-enhancing State intervention (e.g., German social security legislation, p. 69), or life- and self-destructive logical implications and historical manifestations of laissez-faire (e.g., “cut-throat competition,” “slave economy,” “professional illnesses and physical deformations,” “monopoly power,” pp. 228–233). Such are, in all probability, liberty’s “illusions and delusions”—rather than mere ‘disappointments’—at which the book’s subtitle hints.
