Introduction
For over twenty years, domestic legal systems have been granting rights to a broad variety of heretofore legal “objects,” from individual rivers, lakes, and lagoons, to certain species such as salmon and wild rice, to, most famously, pacha mama, sometimes translated as “Mother Nature,” in the 2007 Constitution of Ecuador. Over thirty countries have recognized some form of legal personhood for nature, be it through municipal, Indigenous, regional, or national law.Footnote 1 International law has been much slower to join the movement. The major exception is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), which in 2017 stated that human rights protect components of the environment “not only because of the benefits they provide to humanity … but because of their importance to the other living organisms with which we share the planet that also merit protection in their own right.”Footnote 2 In its 2025 advisory opinion on climate change, the IACtHR recognized rights of nature as inherent in the Inter-American system of human rights and effectively invited international law to incorporate rights of nature.Footnote 3 This symposium brings together authors from Europe, Africa, and the Americas to consider this invitation and, more generally, to examine the relationship of international law to this vibrant if still incipient movement.
The symposium steps into a conversation that is in some ways quite mature: there is an extensive body of writing on rights of nature. Within that body of work, the scholarship that explores rights of nature in the realm of international law is more recent and necessarily speculative. Much of it is focused on proposing ways in which rights of nature should be incorporated into international law, providing reasons for doing so, and outlining the pathways that ought to be used.Footnote 4
The symposium advances the recent internationalist turn in the literature in two ways. First, it acknowledges that the IACtHR’s 2025 advisory opinion has changed the stakes. It can no longer be said that “international law remains conspicuously silent on the potential adoption of a RoN [rights of nature] approach.”Footnote 5 It is time to consider arguments grounded in doctrine, examining the American Convention on Human Rights and the Court’s jurisprudence to fully analyze whether and how rights of nature can be further developed within the Inter-American System, and what the ramifications of these doctrines are for the universal and other regional rights systems. Second, the symposium essays, taken together, adopt a more skeptical posture than most of the previous scholarship, which has been largely optimistic, to say the least, about the potential of rights of nature to save the world from man-made harms.Footnote 6 For structural, pragmatic, or legal reasons, a majority of the symposium authors express reservations about the proposal that international law should invest nature with legal personhood. If the movement is to expand beyond the jurisprudence of the IACtHR, it will need to overcome, or at least address, these concerns.
International Law and Nature’s Personhood
Although no other international body has gone as far as the IACtHR, various domains of international law have shown signs of receptiveness to the ideas underlying rights of nature. In international environmental law, the preamble of the Paris Agreement of 2015 notes the “importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems … recognized by some cultures as ‘Mother Earth’”;Footnote 7 the 1992 Biodiversity Convention speaks in its preamble of the “intrinsic value of biological diversity”;Footnote 8 and the 2022 Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework stresses the role of Indigenous peoples and the recognition and consideration of different value systems, including rights of nature “for those countries that recognize them.”Footnote 9 The United Nations General Assembly initiated a dialogue with experts of “Earth jurisprudence” in 2015,Footnote 10 and in 2012, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) created a task force on rights of nature as part of “a process that considers the Rights of Nature as a fundamental and absolute key element … in all decisions taken with regard to IUCN’s plans.”Footnote 11 Most recently, the 2023 High Seas Treaty acknowledges the “inherent value of biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.”Footnote 12
In international criminal law, alongside the negotiation of a treaty codifying crimes against humanity, there is a parallel effort to codify the crime of ecocide by amending the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.Footnote 13 The ecocide proposal does not propose personhood for the environment, but it has renewed debate over whether grave harm to the environment could qualify as an international crime without reference to its effects on human beings.Footnote 14
The relationship of human rights to rights of nature is critical but also contested. In some important respects, human rights law has been employed to support rights of nature. In particular, the rights of Indigenous peoples have been key to the codification of rights of nature in Latin America and New Zealand. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides not only that “indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship”Footnote 15 with their traditionally owned or occupied lands, but also that “States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands … with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.”Footnote 16 Granting rights to natural entities with whom Indigenous peoples live in close relation (or, to use anthropologist Marisol de la Cadena’s term, “earth beings”) is one way of fulfilling this duty: it acknowledges Indigenous cosmovisions, or world views, within national law.
This pluralist path to rights of nature is conceptually and legally distinct from approaches that would recognize the rights of nature, or Nature, as a whole. The IACtHR has suggested in its advisory opinions that human rights law can provide a basis for this broader protection of Nature’s rights. Specifically, it has linked rights of nature to the human right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, which was recognized by the UN General Assembly in 2022 and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2025.Footnote 17 However, to date, the IACtHR’s endorsement of rights of nature stands alone at the international level—neither the General Assembly, nor the ICJ, nor any other international tribunal or intergovernmental body has (yet) followed its lead.
That international law is showing the potential to engage with rights of nature does not in itself indicate that there is something inevitable or universally desirable about natural legal personhood in international law. Rather, the increasing interest in international recognition of rights of nature highlights the need for careful consideration of whether such recognition is appropriate. The essays in this symposium come to widely different conclusions on this question.
Six Takes on Rights of Nature and International Law
The first essay, by John H. Knox, one of the co-editors of this symposium and the former UN special rapporteur on human rights and the environment, starts by emphasizing how much more widely recognized the right to a healthy environment (RHE) now is in international law, compared to rights of nature.Footnote 18 He asks what effect this recognition is likely to have on efforts to achieve similar success for rights of nature. Perhaps counterintuitively, Knox argues that rights of nature may be a victim of the RHE’s success. As the RHE grows in acceptance and scope, it is likely to be interpreted to encompass greater protection of natural ecosystems. A robust RHE may therefore obviate instrumental justifications for rights of nature. Arguments that rights of nature are necessary to fill gaps in anthropocentrically oriented environmental and human rights law will have much less force if those gaps are being closed by expansive interpretations of the RHE, even if those interpretations remain human-centered. As a result, proponents of nature’s rights will have to lean more heavily on ethical arguments that rights of nature should be recognized in order to change the way that we think about nature and our relationship with it.
The next two essays focus on the Inter-American System in the wake of the IACtHR advisory opinion on human rights and the climate emergency. Jorge Calderón Gamboa and Julie Diane Recino, both former lawyers at the IACtHR, argue that the advisory opinion marks a paradigm shift from an anthropocentric to an “ecosystemic” approach, enabling preventive protection and ecosystem-focused reparations regardless of harm to humans.Footnote 19 Recognition of rights of nature, they write, is the legal expression of this shift. Further, they propose doctrinal pathways anchored in the American Convention and the OAS Charter for operationalizing rights of nature in future cases. They close by positing the Court as a key actor in developing an “ecosystemic” human rights jurisprudence.
Taking the opposite tack, former Inter-American Human Rights Commissioner Dinah Shelton argues that the emerging claim that nature possesses “human rights,” including in recent IACtHR jurisprudence, is both conceptually mistaken and legally unnecessary.Footnote 20 Human rights treaties, she stresses, protect human beings—not ecosystems—and existing environmental law, constitutional protections, and doctrines like the public trust already provide effective, if imperfectly enforced, tools for environmental protection. The essay further criticizes the IACtHR’s expansion of environmental rights as going beyond treaty limits and soft law sources, warning that recognizing nature as a rights-bearing subject risks doctrinal confusion and overextension of human rights law.
In a similarly critical vein, Professor Julien Bétaille, of the University of Pau and Pays de l’Adour, turns to Europe to argue that rights of nature does not provide a meaningful or necessary alternative to contemporary environmental law, at least in jurisdictions, such as European states, whose legal environmental frameworks are already effective.Footnote 21 He critiques the concept as rooted in natural law and radical environmentalism, which misdiagnoses European environmental law as overly anthropocentric. In reality, he argues, European Union (EU) law already recognizes intrinsic ecological value and provides tools for ecological repair, just as the European Court of Human Rights is able to protect environmental rights without personification of nature. Bétaille argues that the priority should be to defend and strengthen existing environmental laws, especially in the face of political backlash and regulatory rollback.
Moving to the African human rights system, Professor Godwin Dzah, of Peter A. Allard School of Law, provides a more critical take on existing environmental law regimes.Footnote 22 He argues that the longstanding nature-culture divide in Western thought has shaped international environmental governance by inscribing it with a limiting biophilia-biophobia framework that treats nature as an object of either admiration or fear, but one always defined in relation to human interests. Dzah shows how this divide is embedded in key international environmental law instruments, from early colonial treaties in Africa to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Against this backdrop, the essay highlights recent resolutions by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights as a promising alternative. By emphasizing sacred natural sites and reciprocal human-nature connections that are rooted in culture as well as biology, these resolutions move beyond the biophilia-biophobia binary, and offers a path for reimagining environmental law and repositioning the environment as a subject of international law.
The symposium closes with a reflection on the connection between animal rights and rights of nature. Anne Peters, Director of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, argues that the rights of nature and animal rights movements, though historically separate and grounded in different intellectual traditions, are increasingly converging in ways that could strengthen both.Footnote 23 She contends that rights of nature have achieved greater legal traction globally—partly because they avoid confronting the politically difficult issue of domesticated animals—while the animal rights movement has developed more sophisticated thinking about the moral consideration of individual non-human beings. By engaging one another, each can overcome key blind spots. Although animal rights are not recognized in international law, Peters’s argument has significant implications for the evolution of rights of nature in international law, and points to a pathway through which animals could achieve international standing.
Conclusion
This symposium brings together contributors from multiple continents, legal traditions, and intellectual lineages, including established voices as well as scholars entering the field. That diversity is intentional, and it reflects the genuinely global character of contemporary debates over the rights of nature. The essays also seem to reflect a divide between the Global North and Global South on rights of nature: the writers from Europe and the United States are more skeptical of arguments for rights of nature. Of course, there are thinkers on both sides of the debate across the North/South divide; overall, however, legal systems in the Global South (including Indigenous jurisdictions within the United States and Canada) have been more receptive to recognition of rights of nature.
At the same time, the symposium is necessarily incomplete. It does not include perspectives from important regions and countries that have vibrant rights of nature movements, such as South Asia, Australia, and Aotearoa New Zealand. Further, the symposium pays more attention to the rights of nature writ large than to rights of individual rivers and other components of nature in light of Indigenous legal traditions and legal pluralism. As noted above, this is largely because the path charted by the IACtHR toward inscribing rights of nature in international law has itself focused on broader fields of recognition, using as its vehicle the RHE. Future research should consider how these two lineages work together, both doctrinally and as social movements.Footnote 24
Taken together, the essays invite a more fundamental reflection on the place of humanity in international law. Writing abounds on the different ways in which the international legal order constructed at the close of World War II is currently unraveling. A hallmark of that legal order was precisely that it prioritized the individual human being within a system previously ordered more exclusively around state sovereignty.Footnote 25 The essays add a new angle to the debate by illuminating the doctrinal spaces in which that anthropocentric foundation is being reconsidered. It is not just populist nationalism, authoritarianism, and growing contestation between hegemons that challenges our geopolitical order; it is also the environmental crises we face.
