Few would deny that Simone Weil is an enigmatic, though fascinating, figure both in the history of philosophy and in Christian thought – if only because she is all of the following: mystic, factory worker and resistance fighter in the Second World War; Platonist, labour thinker and materialist; Christian (though unbaptised), Jew and admirer of eastern thought; ethical idealist, social activist and social pessimist. And there is considerably more to this woman whose life was tragically short. Equally, few have taken her seriously in either philosophy or theology as a part of the canon of their discipline. This is a considerable shame in my view, though it is understandable.
Reading Weil's written output – which is large – can be hard work. She strikes me as less a systematic thinker than an exploratory thinker who has a broadly Greek, and in particular Platonic, intellectual framework and is engaged by her contemporary environment and the great issues of her day – and, indeed, many of ours as we settle into the next period of the last few hundred years’ experiment with capitalism. Add to this her preferred literary forms – a few treatises, numerous essays, several meditations and voluminous notebook entries – and the effect can be dazzling: she often speaks with the power to convict of one who ‘has authority’; for one who is no ‘post-modernist’ thinker, she offers frequently penetrating and disarmingly ‘post-modern’ insights into power and into the nature of certain kinds of institution (but without much of the guff and cant of ‘Postmodernism’) – both in the religious world and the broader society; one learns much about the true meaning of certain kinds of experience and idea from her reflections; and her range of discussion is breathtaking: from mathematics to the intimate connection between creation and the cross, from the intellectual's (all too frequently ignored) obligations to Truth, to the crushing effect on the body and spirit of unrelieved physical work in the factory system of production. The fragmenting effects of the conditions under which she wrote (the Second World War, moving frequently, being financially strapped much of the time) magnify the piecemeal and ununified impression one can get of her thought. There is much of great value in this anthology to relieve the burden of understanding Weil's thinking, the originality of her mind and greatness of her soul.
This volume is a welcome addition to the small but developing body of literature on Weil's thought. It brings together the most important strands of recent North American and French scholarship on Weil, but ignores that in the Analytic tradition in such figures as Winch, Rush Rhees and a handful of other analytically orientated philosophers. All the essays are in English, quite a few translated. Some, like Gabellieri's, expand on themes raised in earlier long works. Despite the common ground shared by the authors, most essays stand independently.
There are twelve papers and an orientating introduction to the collection treating comprehensively the topics and texts in Weil's corpus. There is considerable agreement among the essays on the basics of interpreting Weil. Each essay takes a particular angle or topical focus in developing the central themes around the nature of Weil's appropriation of Plato and the character of her Christian understanding and practice. The first three essays (Dupré, Narcy and Ross) discuss in various ways the nature of the influence of Plato on Weil's thinking, addressing such issues as the influence of Gnostic ideas on her, whether her Platonism is primarily ‘ethical’, what her real relation to Aristotle is and how distinctive her Platonism is compared to her teacher Alain. Two papers (Chenavier, and Patterson and Schmidt) are focused on Weil's materialism. In the latter paper, illuminating as it is, I think an opportunity has been missed to make the connections between Weil's notion of divine decreation and her speculative materialism. There follows Vance Morgan's most illuminating paper on the place in Weil's metaphysics of the Pythagorean notion of ‘mediation’ between incommensurable numbers. Florence de Lussy and Emmanuel Gabellieri expound the notions of ‘betweenness’ or ‘relationality’ as the central idea of Weil's account of being. De Lussy's interpretation relates Weil's discussion of perception, what she learnt from Buddhism, her use of mathematics, her engagement with Kant and her ultimate thought that the materialist reality of our situation finds its redemption in the transcendent mystery of the material realm of necessity's coincidence with Providence, the transcendent Good/the Trinity being the only ‘really real reality’. Gabellieri emphasises the formative place of Christian doctrine in this metaphysical scheme and argues that it is a fecund alternative (to Lévinas' and Blondel's) reply to the impasse into which the rejection of metaphysics in Continental philosophy has got itself. Essays 9–11 engage Weil with other Christian writers on various themes: Boethius (Andic), Girard (O'Regan) and Augustine (Springsted) respectively. The general theme here is that, despite some important differences, there is a deep consonance between the chosen historical figure and Weil on the nature of freedom (Boethius), the diagnosis of the human condition in terms of violence and its remedy (Girard) and the nature of the spiritual knowledge/goodness/attention that redeems human life (Augustine). The final word is David Tracy's excellent paper, which in effect represents a well observed connecting of her ideas with her life. In particular, what is uncommon among Weil-boosters, to his great merit, he confronts the, at least apparent, strand of anti-Semitism in Weil's thought. All these papers deal with important issues in understanding and evaluating the importance of Weil for contemporary Christian thought in response to the challenges of our age. If I have one complaint about the collection, it is that there is no comprehensive bibliography at the end of the book to which to refer as one studies the frequently important endnotes to the essays.
I will finish by making a couple of comments on important themes in Weil and their relation to the collection. Aside from the general theoretical challenges raised for Christian thinkers by the intellectual power of contemporary materialism both in the hard sciences and in the philosophy of mind, one of the greatest challenges to the Christian ethical-cum-spiritual worldview is the reality of dumb luck and the significance of its impact on human life, both in its arbitrary provision of external goods and ills and its power over deeper things in life that go to the individual life's meaning and point. Weil never resiled from a clear-eyed grasp of this ‘dominion of chance’: as a number of writers in the collection rightly emphasise, for Weil, there is no arena of human life that is not vulnerable to the potential impact of luck. However, aside from one and a half pages in Gravity and Grace, to my knowledge Weil's remarks on this idea are scattered and her thought to be gleaned from things she says about other topics, especially the irreducible place of tragedy in human life, most fully exemplified in the cross. Yet, there is far too little attention to the impact of luck on life in Weil's thinking as a Christian Platonist. Most discussion that nears the mark concerns the (mathematical) necessity that governs the material world. However, this is not luck, for if there is one thing that ‘la chance’ is not, it is not necessary. What is due to luck does not have to be at all. This seems to me a genuine lacuna in the examination of Weil's thinking as a resource for Christian thought's authentic and convincing engagement with contemporary intellectual life.
Finally, the great merit of this collection is its interest in Weil's notion of attention. Modern conceptions of human psychic life typically enforce a division between the capacities of intellect and those of desire and emotion. With this, a public conception of reason (as what all rational intellects determine it most plausible to believe) requires a division between the deliverances of reason and those of feeling and aspiration. This persistent line of thought in modern and contemporary intellectual life has odious consequences, not least in the persistence of non-cognitivist ideas about the nature of morality, religion and the spiritual generally (even about reason itself!). Where reason is ‘value free’ and public, persistent controversy in ethics and about religion and so on indicates that, ‘at the end of the day’, there is no room for reason in such domains.
One response has been to assert the prerogatives of traditions of moral and religious practice as being as coherent and well-ordered as any, especially those of science, once understood aright as neither being as ‘value-free’ nor as innocent of tradition as modernism had assumed. Instead, just as agnostic or atheistic scientistic liberalism is itself a tradition, so too is, say, Christianity, or some variant of it, and as such, it deserves its place in the sun too. Another response has been to argue that the alleged challenge that the scientific way of looking at things represents to traditional religion is, in fact, old hat. Science is coming around to seeing things in more religious terms. Where the first response tends towards a silly relativism, the second tends towards a misappropriation of science. These charges, of course, need argument. Either way, though, the now traditional divide between reason and feeling/being moved to action/desire is generally assumed: the task is to show that the paradigm of reason, science, is no better off or on the same intellectual wavelength as religion, etc. This does violence to both sides of the comparison.
Weil's notion of attention is a valuable antidote to this division in the human soul. Christian thinkers worried about the existence of a form of rational understanding different from scientific knowledge and enquiry, but that reveals real goodness and real depth in and further to human life, as well as a selfless grasp of the world as it is, though without the tendency towards scientism or reductionism, often assumed that notion has to have, will do well to attend to Weil's notion of attention. This collection would be a valuable place to start reflection in this direction for Christian thinkers with such concerns.
