The Challenge of Diversity in the Workplace

The notion of diversity describes the composition of a group and the distribution of differences within and across the group (Harrison & Klein, Reference Harrison and Klein2007; Roberson, Reference Roberson2006). It relates to a multitude of attributes or affiliations. At the surface level, demographic characteristics (like age, gender, and ethnicity) are overt; these characteristics have biological underpinnings and are generally immutable (Joshi & Roh, Reference Joshi and Roh2009). At a deeper level, acquired psychological characteristics include personality, attitude, beliefs, values, knowledge, and skills, and in particular, perspective on work—that is, ethos and work ethos (Thomas & Ely, Reference Thomas and Ely1996). These deep-level characteristics are indirectly revealed through behavior patterns and perceived only through extended interaction. They are mutable, and thus allow greater opportunity for change (Harrison, Price, & Bell, Reference Harrison, Price and Bell1998; Jackson, Joshi, & Erhardt, Reference Jackson, Joshi and Erhardt2003). Surface- and deep-level characteristics are interrelated. For instance, surface-level aspects such as gender or ethnicity often carry profound implications for personal and social identity, shaping individuals’ beliefs and perspectives (Carrim, Kwesiga, Anibaba, & Nkomo, Reference Carrim, Kwesiga, Anibaba, Nkomo, Forson, Healy, Öztürk and Tatli2024).

In the face of diversity, the dominant approach is “diversity management,” which focuses on the business case for diversity—that is, the idea that diversity is a positive factor for organizational performance. Diversity management seeks to recognize and develop the value of diversity for the company through a set of organizational systems and managerial practices such as training, selection, and mentoring (Jackson et al., Reference Jackson, Joshi and Erhardt2003; Roberson, Reference Roberson2019)—with a view to achieving economic advantage (Oswick & Noon, Reference Oswick and Noon2014; Trittin & Schoeneborn, Reference Trittin and Schoeneborn2017).

Diversity management has adopted consequentialist utilitarian arguments (Eastman & Santoro, Reference Eastman and Santoro2003; Gotsis & Kortezi, Reference Gotsis and Kortezi2013) wherein the main intention is instrumental (Özbilgin & Tatli, Reference Özbilgin and Tatli2011; van Dijk, Engen, & Paauwe, Reference van Dijk, van Engen and Paauwe2012). From an ethical perspective, it is value-free: it does not assign value to diversity itself, but rather to its business consequences. This approach would thus lose any prescriptive power if the business case were eventually refuted (Joshi & Roh, Reference Joshi and Roh2009; Noon, Reference Noon2007). And it remains unclear whether diversity actually leads to better performance (Gotsis & Kortezi, Reference Gotsis and Kortezi2013; Roberson, Reference Roberson2019). Diversity may engender separation, disparity, or more beneficially, variety (Harrison & Klein, Reference Harrison and Klein2007).

Extending the business case and keeping organizational performance in mind (Bernstein, Bulger, Salipante, & Weisinger, Reference Bernstein, Bulger, Salipante and Weisinger2020), a growing body of research focuses on the concept of inclusion from two complementary perspectives (Adamson, Kelan, Lewis, Śliwa, & Rumens, Reference Adamson, Kelan, Lewis, Śliwa and Rumens2021; Shore & Chung, Reference Shore and Chung2024). First, inclusion refers to the organizational and interpersonal norms and processes that enable the integration of each diverse individual into business practices. It involves removing barriers to participation, fostering engagement and contribution, and supporting each person to perform at their highest potential (Ferdman, Reference Ferdman2017; Oswick & Noon, Reference Oswick and Noon2014; Pless & Maak, Reference Pless and Maak2004; Roberson, Reference Roberson2006). Second, inclusion also refers to an individual’s subjective feeling of belonging (Bryer, Reference Bryer2020; Shore & Chung, Reference Shore and Chung2024). It is achieved when the individual feels both integrated into the group and its key processes, and welcomed and recognized for their uniqueness—that is, when they strike a balance between their need to belong and their need for authenticity (Ferdman, Reference Ferdman2017; Shore, Randel, Chung, Dean, Holcombe Ehrhart, & Singh, Reference Shore, Randel, Chung, Dean, Holcombe Ehrhart and Singh2011; Shore, Cleveland, & Sanchez, Reference Shore, Cleveland and Sanchez2018). This view highlights the active participation of those who are subject to inclusion, alongside those already integrated, in what Bryer (Reference Bryer2020) calls the “work of belonging”—that is, the practical, ongoing construction of belonging (Bryer, Reference Bryer2020; Randel, Reference Randel2025; Shore et al., Reference Shore, Randel, Chung, Dean, Holcombe Ehrhart and Singh2011, Reference Shore, Cleveland and Sanchez2018). In general, this approach to inclusion embraces subjectivism and relativism, focusing on individuals’ subjective experiences (Vu & Burton, Reference Vu and Burton2024), without evaluating their diverse ethical characteristics, and accepting the coexistence of multiple values (Ferdman, Reference Ferdman2017).

Some reject the business case or consider it insufficient, as it cannot give an account of the complexity of diversity—also related to exclusion, inequalities, and discrimination—and the subsequent request for social justice, equality, and empowerment, in particular from minority groups (Nkomo, Bell, Roberts, Joshi, & Thatcher, Reference Nkomo, Bell, Roberts, Joshi and Thatcher2019; Noon, Reference Noon2007; Roberson, Reference Roberson2006; Zanoni, Janssens, Benschop, & Nkomo, Reference Zanoni, Janssens, Benschop and Nkomo2010). Some scholars thus endorse the “legal case” (Özbilgin & Tatli, Reference Özbilgin and Tatli2011), or political case, expecting that the legal enforcement of equality—equal opportunities or even affirmative action—will overcome the negative impact of diversity and empower minority groups (Noon, Reference Noon2007; Özbilgin & Tatli, Reference Özbilgin and Tatli2011). This Kantian or Rawlsian view is grounded in social justice and human rights, and it has a universalist outlook (Özbilgin & Tatli, Reference Özbilgin and Tatli2011). However, it has been a political failure so far (Oswick & Noon, Reference Oswick and Noon2014).

Other scholars have developed a critical approach to diversity and inclusion. They view diversity as “a social construction reflecting existing power relations” rather than “a reality” (Zanoni & Janssens, Reference Zanoni and Janssens2004: 57). They also highlight the inherent power dynamics and ambivalences embedded in diversity and inclusion practices (Adamson et al., Reference Adamson, Kelan, Lewis, Śliwa and Rumens2021). These scholars thus call for a nonessentialist conceptualization of diversity and identities, which are fluid and fragmented (Nkomo et al., Reference Nkomo, Bell, Roberts, Joshi and Thatcher2019; Zanoni et al., Reference Zanoni, Janssens, Benschop and Nkomo2010). They adopt an intersectional approach, in which the multiple characteristics of an individual’s diversity, seen as forms of social inequality, interact to produce a unique experience of marginalization for that individual (Kaufmann & Derry, Reference Kaufmann and Derry2024). This deconstructionist, postmodern orientation rejects the idea of an objective universality (Prasad, Reference Prasad2009; Romani et al., Reference Romani, Barmeyer, Primecz and Pilhofer2018).

Social movements of the early 2020s (such as Black Lives Matter and Me Too) have emerged, particularly in the United States, at the crossroads of the legal-political case and postmodern views, to demand greater inclusion, visibility, and identity recognition for marginalized groups. They have called for a shift in power and emancipation through the dismantling of the structures and practices that they see as contributing to marginalization (Kaufmann & Derry, Reference Kaufmann and Derry2024). Companies and public organizations have responded positively to this call by adopting DEI (Diversity, Equality, Inclusion) policies—these three dimensions have been aggregated to embrace their interdependence (Fitzsimmons, Özbilgin, Thomas, & Nkomo, Reference Fitzsimmons, Özbilgin, Thomas and Nkomo2023). However, this topic has generated considerable debate and tension (Roberson et al., Reference Roberson, Avery and Leigh2024). Diversity fatigue and resistance have emerged in recent years (Carrim et al., Reference Carrim, Kwesiga, Anibaba, Nkomo, Forson, Healy, Öztürk and Tatli2024; Fitzsimmons et al., Reference Fitzsimmons, Özbilgin, Thomas and Nkomo2023), culminating by the mid-2020s in a widespread backlash, particularly driven—in the United States and beyond—by the election and policies of Donald J. Trump (Weber, Reference Weber2025). In response, many companies have withdrawn or significantly scaled back their DEI policies (Murray & Bohannon, Reference Murray and Bohannon2025). One possible interpretation is that, throughout this period, companies entangled in the debate have navigated it using their own compass: the business case. Rather than grounding their actions in normative commitments, many have adopted a relativistic and value-neutral stance—aligning their DEI efforts with shifting public opinion, stakeholder pressures, or political trends, in alternately opposite directions.

Globally, views on diversity—especially, what differences matter, and how to address them—vary across groups, countries, and regions, shaped by demographic composition, social identities, and structural and cultural patterns (Carrim et al., Reference Carrim, Kwesiga, Anibaba, Nkomo, Forson, Healy, Öztürk and Tatli2024; Fitzsimmons et al., Reference Fitzsimmons, Özbilgin, Thomas and Nkomo2023). These patterns are dynamic and historically rooted. For instance, diversity ideologies in Global South populations have been and continue to be shaped by colonial domination, leading to calls for decolonizing mentalities and business structures (Carrim et al., Reference Carrim, Kwesiga, Anibaba, Nkomo, Forson, Healy, Öztürk and Tatli2024). While diversity issues are raised differently in different locations, and diversity policies are often tailored to local contexts, multinational corporations occupy a unique position to address these issues. They can standardize and disseminate their practices globally, albeit imperfectly (Ferner, Almond, & Colling, Reference Ferner, Almond and Colling2005). This creates an opportunity to translate universal views of diversity and inclusion into local contexts, but also carries the risk that corporations impose their (Western or otherwise, “postcolonial”) definitions of culture and other social differences (Fitzsimmons et al., Reference Fitzsimmons, Özbilgin, Thomas and Nkomo2023).

The Need for an Ethical Case for Diversity and Inclusion

The business, legal, and critical cases certainly have ethical implications. However, the ethical case for diversity, which focuses on the normative foundations of diversity and inclusion, is still largely missing and requires further investigation (Böhm et al., Reference Böhm, Carrington, Cornelius, de Bruin, Greenwood, Hassan, Jain, Karam, Kourula, Romani, Riaz and Shaw2022; Fitzsimmons et al., Reference Fitzsimmons, Özbilgin, Thomas and Nkomo2023; Fontrodona & Melé, Reference Fontrodona and Melé2022; van Bommel, Hubers, & Maas, Reference van Bommel, Hubers and Maas2024).

A fundamental question concerning this ethical case is whether it is possible to take diversity into account within a universalist framework (Ferdman, Reference Ferdman2017; Frémeaux, Reference Frémeaux2020). Mere observation reveals that beliefs and behaviors vary across individuals and groups. This factual recognition of diversity is referred to as “descriptive relativism.” The ethical ambiguity it creates—regarding how to address this diversity and the factual relativity of viewpoints—cannot simply be ignored (Donaldson, Reference Donaldson1996; Schwartz, Reference Schwartz2017). However, descriptive relativism should not lead us to be “morally blind” (Donaldson, Reference Donaldson1996: 49) and overlook what can be called “descriptive universalism”: the observation that there is a consensus or convergence among human groups around a common set of core values (Dahlsgaard, Peterson, & Seligman, Reference Dahlsgaard, Peterson and Seligman2005; Schwartz, Reference Schwartz2005, Reference Schwartz2017). Moreover, descriptive relativism has no normative end in itself, and does not entail moral value judgments; it could very well serve as a starting point for evaluating competing values and behaviors, in order to distinguish the right from the wrong and the universal from the relative (Demuijnck, Reference Demuijnck2015). However, some jump from this descriptive view of relativity to the normative consideration that there is no attainable universal and objective ethical truth—referred to as “meta-ethical relativism.” Ethical truths are privatized and reduced to the expression of a preference or feeling—that is, a subjectivism—or anchored in specific cultural conventions (Dancy, Reference Dancy2006; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, Reference Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner2012). Today’s main discussion on diversity and inclusion—presented above—is informed by this relativism, and flourishes in this relativist tendency and ethical withdrawal at the individual and subjective levels (Koenig & Naughton, Reference Koenig and Naughton2024).

Meta-ethical relativism raises questions of logic, as relativists paradoxically adopt the normative position that there cannot be any normative position (Demuijnck, Reference Demuijnck2015; Duska, Reference Duska1991). Moreover, it brings ethics into a deadlock. If there is no common truth, but only diversity of private and discrete opinions and behaviors, and any opinion is acceptable, thus not debatable, then there is no possibility for discussing behaviors, rejecting some and commending others, or criticizing the values of a group (including one’s own group). There would thus be no basis for teaching ethics nor for striving toward ethical progress (Demuijnck, Reference Demuijnck2015; Duska, Reference Duska1991). Within firms, ethical decisions and codes would lose the legitimacy that only universally accepted values can offer (Schwartz, Reference Schwartz2005).

Relativism is thus hardly tenable in (business) ethics. However, universalism is not devoid of tensions. Universalism can be arrogant (Demuijnck, Reference Demuijnck2015) or absolutist to the point of rejecting diversity, a channel used to impose cultural domination (Prasad, Reference Prasad2009). It may thus preclude—just as much as relativism—learning from others and other cultures (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre and Brinkmann1999b). Universalism is blind if it does not acknowledge some sort of diversity.

This is why a comprehensive approach to diversity and inclusion must be grounded in a universalism that is open to diversity: “Coping with diversity on a normative level means exactly this: recognizing difference while looking for the common bond” (Pless & Maak, Reference Pless and Maak2004: 131; see also Ferdman, Reference Ferdman2017).

Virtue Ethics in the Face of Relativism

Virtue ethics has been presented as a promising approach for advancing the ethical case on diversity and inclusion (Böhm et al., Reference Böhm, Carrington, Cornelius, de Bruin, Greenwood, Hassan, Jain, Karam, Kourula, Romani, Riaz and Shaw2022). To date, it has rarely been used to account for these issues. Among the few exceptions (like das Neves & Melé, Reference das Neves and Melé2013; Fowers & Davidov, Reference Fowers and Davidov2006; Gotsis & Kortezi, Reference Gotsis and Kortezi2013; van Dijk et al., Reference van Dijk, van Engen and Paauwe2012; Warren & Warren, Reference Warren and Warren2023), many have overlooked the possibility that virtue ethics could provide a universal foundation. Some have even accepted the de facto relativism that stems from multiculturalism, excessive contextualism, and narrow focus on contingency (Fowers & Davidov, Reference Fowers and Davidov2006; van Dijk et al., Reference van Dijk, van Engen and Paauwe2012). Virtue ethics has even been praised for offering a form of relativism in a globalized world where diversity has become central (Chun, Reference Chun2019).

In general, virtue ethics enjoins moral agents to cultivate virtues that enable them to flourish, live a good life (Aristotle, Reference Rackham1934), and develop in their own practice or community (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre2007). But the multiplicity of practices and cultures makes any list of virtues—and therefore any approach to virtue ethics—diverse and thus susceptible to relativism (Demuijnck, Reference Demuijnck2015; Hursthouse & Pettigrove, Reference Hursthouse, Pettigrove, Zalta and Nodelman2022). Virtue ethics tends “to be provincial and ethnocentric” (Solomon, Reference Solomon1992: 324), dependent on the narrative of the tradition the moral agent inhabits, which would mean that the same trait could be considered a virtue or rejected depending on the moral agent’s way of life or culture (Dawson & Bartholomew, Reference Dawson and Bartholomew2003; MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre2007). From this perspective, practical wisdom only relates to the particular, while theoretical wisdom refers to the universal (D’souza & Introna, Reference D’souza and Introna2024).

For virtue ethics, as for ethics in general, the challenge of relativism is related to the meta-ethical problem of its justification and foundations (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, Reference Hursthouse, Pettigrove, Zalta and Nodelman2022). Virtue ethicists risk falling into relativism regarding the necessary virtues if their justification relies solely on practices that are situated and limited in time and space, or if they neglect this question of foundations. MacIntyre (Reference MacIntyre1999a) himself acknowledged the mistake he made in After Virtue (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre2007) when he attempted to give an account of the place of the virtues that was relative to particular settings and disconnected from reflection on our common humanness.

For this reason, prominent neo-Aristotelian thinkers suggested that a sound understanding of human virtues should be grounded in the notion of human nature, since virtues are precisely both the means by which humans flourish qua humans and a constitutive part of that flourishing (Anscombe, Reference Anscombe1981; Foot, Reference Foot2001; Geach, Reference Geach1956, Reference Geach1977; MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre1999a, Reference MacIntyre and McLean2000; Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1988, Reference Nussbaum1992, Reference Nussbaum, Altham and Harrisson1995). It is this approach that I now aim to explore, to anchor virtue ethics in a universalism that is open to diversity.

The Universal and Diverse Meaning of Human Nature

Living beings (human and nonhuman) of the same species or category share a “nature,” a specific form of life—that is, the typical set of characteristics and operations favorable or necessary for their survival, reproduction, development, and flourishing (Foot, Reference Foot2001; Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1988, Reference Nussbaum, Altham and Harrisson1995). Human nature encompasses and integrates all dimensions of our life, biological, psychological, relational, historical, and so on (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum, Altham and Harrisson1995). Socially acquired habits are also part of it, as a “second nature” (Aristotle, Reference Rackham1934: 1103a). Therefore, an integrated and comprehensive account of what it means to be human should draw on the contributions of physicists, chemists, biologists, behavioral and brain scientists, as well as philosophers, anthropologists, historians, economists, sociologists, and others, representing competing traditions in their respective fields (De Los Reyes, Kim, & Weaver, Reference De Los Reyes, Kim and Weaver2017; MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre2009; Sadler-Smith, Reference Sadler-Smith2012).

Human nature is rational, which means that for any action, even merely responding to bodily needs, “to be human at all, to be part of a human life, [this action] would have to be done according to, or not without, some reasoned plan” (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum, Altham and Harrisson1995: 115). Humans are also essentially social animals (Aristotle, Reference Rackham1944: 1253a), “like elephants and wolves and unlike polar bears” (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, Reference Hursthouse, Pettigrove, Zalta and Nodelman2022), that is, before any rationalization about the utility of others or social contracting. They naturally tend to behave altruistically and cooperatively and form attachments—they need or aspire to belong (Baumeister & Leary, Reference Baumeister and Leary1995). This sociability permeates and shapes our entire life: our own flourishing is interdependent with that of others, it is also a common good (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre and McLean2000). Humans are embedded in groups and networks that confront specific contexts and issues, have reached varying levels of development, and have shaped their own culture accordingly. It is only from this social conditioning, and in relation to it, that they develop and express their rationality, that they experience, interpret, and give meaning to their common humanness and their individual life experiences (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1988). This diversity of cultures is a constitutive experience for any human, as a “historical animal, an animal of culture” (Maritain, Reference Maritain and Brazzola1986: 189). Nature and culture simply cannot be separated in the human being (Aristotle, Reference Rackham1934: 1103a).

Another central feature of our humanness is our separateness. We are individuals and proceed on our own separate paths through the world:

We are, essentially, separated from others—in our body, feelings, experiences, reasoning, and life—so that our perception of our human life can only be a single one. Diversity is thus an inescapable characteristic of humanness. However, this does not imply that it is necessarily a beneficial experience for humans and communities. Diversity is ambivalent, like separateness: it is both a capability through which we aspire and a limitation against which we press (like bodily limits, fragility, or death) (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1992). A difference from another or other humans—whatever its intrinsic ethical value—may weaken social ties, limit our capacity for affiliation, and represent a source of vulnerability internalized by the agent or externalized in their social and political relations. This vulnerability is intrinsic to our human social experience: humans are, by nature, dependent animals (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre1999a).

In general, humans share rationality, sociability, and separateness, along with many other features, such as embodiment, mortality, pleasure and pain, progressive child development, and so on (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1988). They share needs, from the need to sleep to the need to belong. This description of humanness imposes itself on human beings: it is essential and unchanging rather than accidental, preexisting the individual. It shapes human experience, “presenting certain possibilities and foreclosing others, our sphere of hope and finitude” (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum, Altham and Harrisson1995: 120–21), so that, said concisely, “some forms of life are open to us and others not” (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum, Altham and Harrisson1995: 120). The role of human reason is therefore not to invent and decide what our nature and the purpose of our life could be, but to understand the meaning and content of human nature, and to explore how to inhabit and flourish within that form of life—as will be shown in the next section (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre and McLean2000; Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum, Altham and Harrisson1995). Reason certainly plays an important role as a measure of our nature and actions, but it is itself first measured by who we essentially are (Foot, Reference Foot2001; Maritain, Reference Maritain and Brazzola1986; Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum, Altham and Harrisson1995).

This perspective thus contradicts the postmodern primacy given to the subject’s individuality and capacity for self-specification, beyond any conditioning (Foucault, Reference Foucault2001 [1984]; see Anscombe, Reference Anscombe1981; MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre and McLean2000). Rejecting this subjective view is necessary to achieve ethical universalism, which:

At the same time, by acknowledging that social and individual diversities are intrinsic to human nature and to the universal human experience, this approach avoids an absolutist form of universalism and leaves room for local interpretation. The description of human nature necessarily remains vague, as it can take various competing specifications in accordance with our natural singularity and diversity (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1988, Reference Nussbaum1992). It provides a basis for discussion and the possibility to “agree broadly on what shall be done [even if] there will of course be marginal … disagreements” (Geach, Reference Geach1977: 13).

Human Nature as an Ethical Compass

Recognizing human nature as the form of life which is open to us (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum, Altham and Harrisson1995) invites us to consider how to “function” well in accordance with this nature, how to inhabit this form of life, and flourish within it. Our flourishing, the fulfillment of our human capacities, thus becomes the purpose of humans qua humans. Consenting to our nature guides us toward this objective, or natural, purpose, and toward the conditions required to achieve it (Geach, Reference Geach1977). This approach is teleological: it holds that the telos or purpose of beings is to fulfill their nature, to flourish qua their species. If plants and nonhuman animals spontaneously strive toward the fulfillment of their nature, humans experience this spontaneous inclination toward flourishing within their own form of life—that is, by giving salience to reason in the practical world, and especially to ethical reasoning, about what should be done (Foot, Reference Foot2001; Maritain, Reference Maritain1995).

The notion of “goodness” precisely assesses the extent to which a being has achieved or flourished in its own nature. It is an evaluation of the adequacy between this being and its nature (Geach, Reference Geach1956). An action, behavior, or trait is good for a being to the extent that it is needed for this being’s flourishing; it is perfective or completing of this being qua its own nature (Geach, Reference Geach1977). As “good” describes or assesses a fit between a being and its nature, it thus also incorporates a prescriptive dimension, in terms of a reason for action. Humans ought to do what is good according to their nature, or else they are defective—bad—as humans. If they do not do what is good according to their nature—unless they have, and give, a good reason for not doing it—their action loses intelligibility, as though they said: “It is good and best for me here and now to act in such and such a way; but I shall act otherwise” (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre and MacIntyre2006: 64).

“Ought” and “good” do not take on a moral meaning here, but rather an essentialist and practical meaning (Maritain, Reference Maritain and Brazzola1986). We can say, for example, that a person is a good burglar, or that a burglar ought to be agile—assertions which obviously do not have moral content. Goodness and badness could be replaced by words with no moral connotation, such as strength and weakness, or health and disease. And the moral “ought” could be replaced by the practical “should” or even “need” (Anscombe, Reference Anscombe1981; Foot, Reference Foot2001; Geach, Reference Geach1977). These words take a moral meaning only for free beings who can make a choice: it is because we can choose not to do what is good (what we need or should reasonably do) that we morally ought to do it (Maritain, Reference Maritain and Brazzola1986). Ultimately, “good” and “ought” / “should” / “need” are first descriptive of our humanness, thus rationally prescriptive, and finally (for human beings, as free) morally binding.

Hume (Reference Hume2007) objects against naturalism, with the idea that we cannot deduce an “ought” from an “is”—that is, a moral precept (or value judgment) from an objective description of natural facts (or judgment of fact). His noncognitive approach leads to the view that “ought” emerges only from our subjectivity or emotions and is thus relative to each person’s individuality. However, it makes no sense to say that a person ought to act in a specific way without at least attempting to justify why this is so (Foot, Reference Foot2002a, Reference Foot2002b; Goldstein, Reference Goldstein2021). Foot (Reference Foot2002a) takes the example of someone who considers that torture is morally acceptable; in any case, this person could not decide that torture is beneficial to the person undergoing it. There is an objective connection between certain facts and moral judgements. Following Hume, Moore’s (Reference Moore1992) “naturalistic fallacy” development is based on the idea that “good” is ineffable and cannot be reduced to natural properties. However, the adjective “good” does not have one specific meaning when we use it in day-to-day language (unlike, for example, the adjective “yellow,” which has a consistent meaning whether attributed to a book or a car). “Good” takes on a different meaning each time it qualifies, for example, a lion, an eye, a soccer player, or a human (Geach, Reference Geach1956). Both “ought” and “good” are internally related to their object, and their evaluative meaning cannot be understood independently of the object to which they are attached (Foot, Reference Foot2002b).

The Local Interpretation of Universal Virtues

In their ethical quest to flourish in their humanness, human beings need to develop the character traits that enable them to achieve this purpose and enhance their capabilities (Geach, Reference Geach1977). These character traits are excellences—arete, in ancient Greek, generally translated as “virtue”—in that they perfect the human being. They are the means by which humans achieve the perfection—the flourishing—of their nature; but they also partly constitute that perfection. They are both means and ends of human flourishing—that is, substantial means. Conversely, vices are character traits that are natural defects and take away from human goodness (Foot, Reference Foot2001; Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1988).

The list of virtues does not emerge from the preferences of specific cultures or practices, but rather from the needs of humans qua humans (Dahlsgaard et al., Reference Dahlsgaard, Peterson and Seligman2005; MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre1999a). For example, “Truthfulness, justice and loyalty … are ethical values tied to the goods of true knowledge and sound social life. Without these values social life deteriorates and trust—a cement of social life—is destroyed” (Melé, Reference Melé2005: 103). The other way around, we could imagine—as a thought experiment—a culture or group that does not emphasize, or even refuses, the cultivation of virtues like courage, honesty, or kindness, to recognize how this would prevent human development (Peterson & Seligman, Reference Peterson and Seligman2004).

Human virtues are therefore not relative. However, the same virtue can be expressed in different genuine ways, depending on the context and the interpretation of the group or individual (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, Reference Hursthouse, Pettigrove, Zalta and Nodelman2022): “There may be, and usually are, various competing specifications of what acting well, in each case, in fact comes to” (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1988: 35).

The description of humanness, which includes the fundamental experiences of separateness and diversity, leads us to investigate what it means to act well in the face of these experiences (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1988): how do we engage well with different—and sometimes conflicting—beliefs and values? How do we deal well with diverse individuals in a way that respects their shared human goodness? The virtues that enable us to act well, appropriately, when confronted with these human experiences, and thereby advance our human goodness, are discernment, hospitality, and benevolence.

Evaluating Differences^: The Virtue of Discernment

In the human-nature approach, cultural norms, values, beliefs, and expectations—that is, deep-level characteristics—and the subsequent behaviors are not value-neutral: they take on meaning and value in their capacity to express or specify human goodness, and in their consistency with the human form of life. Relativists offer no reasons why we could not consider that some interpretations or behaviors are better aligned with the full scope of human experience and more promising for human beings than others (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1992). Diverse beliefs or behaviors may be genuine or, conversely, misaligned with human goodness. They may, for instance, be the consequence of clouding or misinterpretation of human goodness, because of emotions or wicked habits and cultures (das Neves & Melé, Reference das Neves and Melé2013; Maritain, Reference Maritain and Brazzola1986).

The fact that different beliefs or cultures do not all hold the same ethical value requires an ongoing process of refinement and correction, and the “ability to criticize local and traditional moralities in the name of a more inclusive account of the circumstances of human life” (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1988: 39), including one’s own morality. This is a process of discernment. Etymologically, “dis-cern” means to filter, sort, and separate (different) things (Gaffiot, Reference Gaffiot2016). Differences require sorting, to be filtered through a common sieve—the sieve of human goodness.

This discernment, this sifting of differences, proceeds from the general to the particular, from the basic characteristics of our humanness to their translation into more precise precepts and specifications adapted to particulars and circumstances (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre and MacIntyre2006; Melé & Sánchez-Runde, Reference Melé and Sánchez-Runde2013). We must first acknowledge the main characteristics of humanness—including rationality, sociability, embodiment, separateness, and so on—and then translate these characteristics into general precepts. For example, embodiment implies the need for physical integrity, safety, and the ability to move; rationality implies the ability to exercise autonomy, engage in critical reflection and find meaning in one’s work. These general precepts then serve as a basis for evaluating more specific cases and related beliefs and behaviors. For instance, women, as human beings, cannot be deprived of freedom of movement or autonomy; therefore, they cannot be forbidden to travel unaccompanied or to participate in business discussions and decision-making. In some cases, discernment sets thresholds below which a proposed way of life is not truly good, or even not human at all (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1992). A particular work organization, regardless of its cultural or ideological underpinnings, can be rejected if it fails to provide workers with sufficient physical safety and integrity, or meaning in their work; a form of sociability can be rejected if it excessively separates men and women.

This latter step of discernment eliminates many possible specifications as inconsistent with the general principles. A (maybe small) plurality of specifications remains acceptable, leaving room for local traditions and individual tastes to be incorporated into the final decision. In some cases, local conditions may even favor the selection of a specification better suited to those circumstances (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1988, Reference Nussbaum1992).

Moreover, goods interact and sometimes conflict or compete—for example, the good of bearing and rearing children with the good of having a stimulating job—requiring each person or group to discern for themselves how to balance or prioritize these goods, including occasionally foregoing one in favor of another (Foot, Reference Foot2001).

What is more, while human essence is stable, it interacts with the context we experience, which evolves throughout cultures and history (Maritain, Reference Maritain1947; Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum, Altham and Harrisson1995) and allows new possibilities to emerge (Maritain, Reference Maritain and Brazzola1986). For example, the threshold of what we expect from a good job in terms of worker safety has steadily risen over decades. Thus, discernment is an ongoing and dynamic process.

The virtue of discernment combines theoretical and practical intelligence, since it is practical reasoning based on a general understanding and knowledge about humanness. It makes a judgment of wisdom, avoiding superficial representations and stereotypes about cultures and beliefs, and guarding against prejudice or judgments that are too situated—that is, derived from a specific culture rather than from human nature itself. This exploration of one’s nature involves introspection, self-reflection, or collective reflection on one’s inclinations and life experiences (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1992), and requires that no one take their position for granted. This could be related to Gu and Neesham’s (Reference Gu and Neesham2014) proposition for (management) students to self-reflect on their engagement with certain ethical traits—a teaching method that has been shown to help students develop their ethics (Arce and Gentile, Reference Arce and Gentile2015).

This capacity for judgment is universal—the content of human nature is universally accessible to any ordinary person, directly and immediately, through natural inclination and common sense (das Neves & Melé, Reference das Neves and Melé2013; Foot, Reference Foot2001). It is not restricted to philosophers or people immune to bounded rationality (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre and McLean2000). Not only can everyone participate in these reflections and deliberations, but everyone should do so in order to flourish both in their rationality—“the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man” (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre2007: 219)—and in their sociability, as members fulfill their need to belong through active participation in collective discernment.

Welcoming Diverse Individuals: The Virtue of Hospitality

Our experience of a shared human condition leads us to perceive the Other as, fundamentally, a Same, an alter ego: we could have been them, and their characteristics (particularly differences and vulnerabilities) could have been ours (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre1999a). As we share human nature, our separateness does not fully separate. However, it prevents our human interactions from being experiences of fusion. They are rather experiences of responsiveness, where the agent receives and responds to the other’s presence and needs (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1992).

Two human needs call for such responsiveness, in relation to diversity and inclusion: the need to be welcomed and included (based on our vulnerability and dependence on others) and the broader need to flourish alongside others (based on our fundamentally social nature). The virtues that enable appropriate responsiveness to these needs are, respectively, hospitality and benevolence.

Hospitality is a foundational virtue of human encounter and interpersonal relationships, answering the need to be welcomed and included. It is the disposition to welcome the other qua another human, beyond differences—and the moral evaluation thereof—or precisely because of such differences and separateness, which call for responsiveness and create the need for hospitality. Hospitality encompasses and goes beyond material welcome (for example, adapting a space to facilitate the movement of a physically handicapped person); it is primarily a gift of self. It involves the ability to engage with those who are different, to reveal our own belongings, social spaces, and culture to them, and to invite them in (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1988). This can take many forms, such as helping a colleague from a different culture navigate the organization’s norms and customs, fostering connections with other employees and teammates, actively giving them space to express themselves, and bridging cultural gaps that might hinder the encounter (for instance, by adopting a lingua franca). Hospitality should also guide organizational practices, particularly orientation and onboarding programs. It involves an effort on the part of the host: acknowledging one’s own vulnerability and strangeness, and accepting the discomfort of change—or, more precisely, a better sharing of discomfort (Ferdman, Reference Ferdman2017). For example, one might adopt a lingua franca to accommodate a colleague, even at the cost of ease or fluency. While this benefits the newcomer, it also shapes the host, deepening their relational capacity and humanness.

The virtue of hospitality also entails entering the other’s culture and space: “that one learn to inhabit the other’s culture, to share, so far as possible, in the other’s practice and so to reason as the other reasons” (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre and Brinkmann1999b: 5). Hospitality does not place the “host” and the “guest” in opposition—in some languages, the same word denotes both roles—and, over the course of a lifetime, everyone alternates between being host and guest; these roles are therefore contextual and dynamic. Hospitality involves forming a relationship of mutual welcome: “Much depends here on how hospitable the other is … and that in turn depends in part on how far and how effectively the other is invited to participate” (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre and Brinkmann1999b: 5). In this sense, hospitality is a common good—one that can only exist in common, through interaction with others. At the organizational level, hospitality is the collective work of each and all, regardless of their differences, to create a shared space where everyone can belong.

The practice of the virtue of hospitality must aim at a golden mean—a balance between a deficiency and an excess. A deficiency of hospitality occurs when we close ourselves off, despite our own or our company’s capacity to welcome those who are different and particularly vulnerable, thereby refusing to respond to the other’s request and undermining relationship and exchange. Excess consists of opening up too much, in a way that neglects the identity, capacities, and needs of oneself, one’s group, or one’s organization, as well as the limits of one’s space, potentially endangering the existing harmony and common good, and exhausting oneself or the group. Managers play a central role in finding this balance, which necessarily depends on knowledge of the welcoming group, its capacities and limitations in its specific context, along with awareness of the other person and their distance from the group. Managers must also ensure mutual exchange between host and guest, so that everyone participates in this reciprocal virtue.

Acting for the Good of Others: The Virtue of Benevolence

Benevolence, for its part, enables a person to adequately address the broader human need to flourish—that is, reach human goodness—alongside other people. Benevolence consists of seeking and wanting the good of others (Aristotle, Reference Rackham1934; Mercier & Deslandes, Reference Mercier and Deslandes2020). It depends on the virtue of discernment regarding deep-level characteristics (cultural norms, values and beliefs): agents must first exercise discernment about these characteristics in order to act in accordance with the other’s true, discerned good. Benevolence implies entering the other’s perspective with positive expectations (Aristotle, Reference Freese2020; MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre and Brinkmann1999b), valuing their good, which may differ from ours in its specifications, while remaining in harmony with it—as both are specifications of the same human goodness. It means acknowledging and welcoming genuine diversity, “recogniz[ing] one another as beings who wish to have at least some separateness of context, a little space to move around in, some special items to love or use” (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1992: 220), and serving those needs.

When faced with someone mistaken about the human good or holding beliefs or behaviors inconsistent with the human good, benevolence leads us to seek to correct and realign them with the good through dialogue and reflection. This is not about judging their good from a moral perspective, but rather from a practical one: inconsistency in the pursuit of the good is, above all, a form of fragility and vulnerability that requires support (Frémeaux et al., Reference Frémeaux, Mercier and Grevin2025). Conversely, genuinely benevolent people should be ready to revise their own views with the help of others. More broadly, they ought to acknowledge their own vulnerability and their dependence on the benevolence of others as essential aspects of their human nature.

Benevolence also considers what is lacking in the lives of excluded, marginalized, or vulnerable individuals, and the limitations imposed on their human condition that they need to overcome (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1992). It leads us to act in ways that help others transcend these limitations and flourish. For example, bearing a child is a human good that can also be experienced as a limitation for women in terms of career development; a manager, then, should consider how to help women overcome such limitations—for instance, by discussing and implementing career paths that accommodate periods of fatigue or absence, and by establishing formal systems that help combine these different human goods, such as an on-site childcare service.

As a relational and social virtue, benevolence seeks the common good, which in companies is expressed through cooperative work that allows each and all to flourish (Sison & Fontrodona, Reference Sison and Fontrodona2012). Truly benevolent managers and colleagues strive to align the good of each individual—experienced in their own genuine and diverse specifications—with cooperative harmony, mutual understanding, and justice. The pursuit of the community good must not overshadow the good of each individual, just as the pursuit of individual good cannot compromise the common good (Frémeaux, Reference Frémeaux2020; Mercier & Deslandes, Reference Mercier and Deslandes2017).

Organizing and Managing Diversity

The practical challenge of diversity and inclusion is to foster a “diversity climate” (Roberson, Reference Roberson2006) or a “culture of inclusion” (Pless & Maak, Reference Pless and Maak2004)—one that is open and welcoming, yet defined by discerned boundaries (Demuijnck, Reference Demuijnck2015): “inclusion does not mean the absence of limits” (Ferdman, Reference Ferdman2017: 254). From the perspective of virtue ethics, this means creating a space in which all members can practice hospitality, benevolence, and discernment—and thereby participate in their own good, the good of each, and the good of all. It also involves embodying these virtues in the organizational culture and in both formal and informal practices (Mercier & Deslandes, Reference Mercier and Deslandes2020). Personal actions can help initiate and institutionalize such practices, including onboarding procedures, career development programs, training, mentoring and coaching, various forms of support and assistance (like childcare services), and the example set by leaders.

There is a risk that these virtues may be distorted, if some—particularly those in a position of power—create or maintain through them unequal relationships that in fact perform “the hegemony of one group, which constitutes its world as naturally and morally superior” (Romani, Holck, & Risberg, Reference Romani, Holck and Risberg2019: 387). They may monopolize discernment and impose its outcomes on others, or even base discernment on their own values rather than on the pursuit of universal human goodness. They may display “benevolent discrimination” (Romani et al., Reference Romani, Holck and Risberg2019) —that is, a condescending magnanimity from the strong toward the weak—or practice a form of hospitality that objectifies others, preventing them from truly belonging (Adamson et al., Reference Adamson, Kelan, Lewis, Śliwa and Rumens2021).

To avoid such distortions, all participants, especially those who appear well-integrated, should acknowledge that their intrinsic diversity, separateness, and need to belong are not only capabilities but also limitations and sources of vulnerability (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1992). More broadly, they should recognize their natural vulnerability, which renders them dependent on others (Bernacchio, Reference Bernacchio2018; Frémeaux et al., Reference Frémeaux, Mercier and Grevin2025; MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre1999a). Such acknowledgment may foster genuine discernment, hospitality, and benevolence—practiced not merely for vulnerable others, but with them, in interdependence. These virtues can sustain relationships of giving and receiving, where participants focus on mutual flourishing, treat the needs of others as reasons for action, and enable one another to develop their natural capabilities (Bernacchio, Reference Bernacchio2018; MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre1999a). Such relationships approximate true friendship (Aristotle, Reference Rackham1934).

A meaningful way to genuinely practice these virtues within a relationship of giving and receiving—and to avoid the distorted interpretations mentioned above—is to engage in dialogue. Dialogue is the form that discernment takes when exercised collectively (Aristotle, Reference Rackham1934). It renders discernment hospitable, inclusive of the other, who is given a voice and with whom we share speaking and listening (Trittin & Schoeneborn, Reference Trittin and Schoeneborn2017). Dialogue also enables to encounter others and to actively pursue, together, the good of each one through benevolent discernment. It helps us recognize the primacy of our shared humanness over diversity, without excluding the latter:

Dialogue can also stimulate reflection and refine our shared understanding of the human good and what ought to be done, through the exchange of views on differences and disagreements: “What will be important … will be to ask what can be learned from such dissenters” (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre and Knight1998: 251). Hospitable and benevolent discernment means “treating the other as a partner in one’s own enquiries” (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre and Brinkmann1999b: 5). It involves making room for the other—especially the most marginalized—which may require a degree of withdrawal on the part of those already established (Ferdman, Reference Ferdman2017; Mercier & Deslandes, Reference Mercier and Deslandes2017). It also implies a mutual willingness to expose one’s views to refutation and to learn from the other.

Such cooperative, investigative relationships can only be established among people who have developed mutual benevolence and trust. This requires adherence to precepts such as honesty, fairness, and the protection of each other’s freedom and life (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre and McLean2000, Reference MacIntyre and MacIntyre2006). Coercion, threat, or domination cannot serve to advance this inquiry. Consensus would be deceptive if it merely reflected the domination of a group (for example, “the majority,” “headquarters,” “top management”) or a culture—for instance, the convergence around the anthropological model of Homo economicus may result from the ideological dominance of American liberalism and the uncritical adoption of American management practices (Weaver, Reference Weaver2001). It is precisely the role of hospitality (welcoming and including all as they are) and benevolence (genuine attention to others and their arguments, and disinterestedness) to neutralize the power and domination dynamics at play in language and discussion (Foucault, Reference Foucault1971). In this way, dialogue and reconciliation of viewpoints rely on the quality of discussion and argumentation, impartial evaluation of the competing traditions, and sincere motivation for truth, regardless of wins and penalties (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre and MacIntyre2006). Only then does this inquiry constitute a true common good—a possibility offered to everyone to cooperate and progress toward a universalist agreement (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre and McLean2000).

This human-nature-based approach to dialogue has affinities with Habermas’s discourse ethics yet differs in important respects. Both approaches accept that norms can have universal validity, but Habermas bases universalization on the acceptability of the norm by all participants through rational and free debate rather than on the content of the norm itself. His ethics is procedural rather than substantive, emphasizing the framework for discussion and the conditions for rational consensus—that is, universal acceptability. Those main conditions are freedom of access, equal rights to participate, truthfulness, valuing only the better argument, thereby rejecting coercion (Habermas, Reference Habermas1995; Scherer & Patzer, Reference Scherer, Patzer, Tsoukas and Chia2011). These conditions resonate with MacIntyre’s (Reference MacIntyre and McLean2000, Reference MacIntyre and MacIntyre2006) requirements for fruitful inquiry. Moreover, rationality as a fundamental human characteristic can manifest in multiple genuine specifications, both within and outside dialogue. As the culturalist critique of Habermas notes, his “argumentative rationality”—rooted in the Enlightenment tradition—is a genuine but not the only form of rationality (Scherer & Patzer, Reference Scherer, Patzer, Tsoukas and Chia2011). Other genuine forms, such as symbolic stories, oral traditions, and narrative accounts, can also advance dialogue and ethical inquiry.

Such a dialogue has intrinsic value as an existential quest in which we can flourish together as human beings. While agreement and consensus are desirable, their absence does not necessarily constitute failure or an impasse. Some may refuse to participate in the inquiry or be influenced by cultural biases and misinterpretations. What matters is achieving “enough of a working consensus” (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1992: 223) to guide organizational decisions without halting cooperation and dialogue. Ultimately, managers bear the responsibility of making the right decision—grounded in the broadest understanding of human nature—and enforcing, through rules and requirements, behaviors that promote human goodness. In extreme cases, if the context prevents the manager and organization from ensuring humane conditions for workers and other stakeholders, withdrawal may be the only option (Foot, Reference Foot2001).

Advancing the Ethical Case for Diversity and Inclusion

The central idea of the much-needed ethical case is to define a normative foundation to diversity and diversity management (Lozano & Escrich, Reference Lozano and Escrich2017; Melé & Sánchez-Runde, Reference Melé and Sánchez-Runde2013; Pless & Maak, Reference Pless and Maak2004). This foundation should be universalist—an objective approach to human beliefs, values, and actions—without excluding the fundamental human experience of separateness and diversity and the subsequent human need for belonging and inclusion (Demuijnck, Reference Demuijnck2015; Pless & Maak, Reference Pless and Maak2004): “cultivating our humanity in a complex, interlocking world involves understanding the ways in which common needs and aims are differently realized in different circumstances” (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1997: 10, emphasis added). Virtue ethics, based on human nature, embraces relatedness and separateness, commonality and difference, and the universal and the local, as parts that make up our human—and particularly organizational—experience. Integrating these dyads offers a more solid foundation for human diversity than opposing them in binaries (Ferdman, Reference Ferdman2017; Vu & Burton, Reference Vu and Burton2024).

Human goodness can serve as a compass for navigating these dyads and for determining how to integrate and manage diversity in an organization well. It can help to address diversity well in its three dimensions of separation, disparity and variety (Harrison & Klein, Reference Harrison and Klein2007).

First, diversity tends to separate people (Harrison & Klein, Reference Harrison and Klein2007)—or rather, it reveals the separateness inherent in individuals and groups (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1992). It can reduce cohesion and trust, and foster conflict (Harrison & Klein, Reference Harrison and Klein2007; Harrison et al., Reference Harrison, Price and Bell1998). Giving primacy to individual differences and separation within a social group may therefore prove counterproductive (Ferdman, Reference Ferdman2017). Meanwhile, similarity—particularly in deep-level characteristics—fosters attraction, cohesion, cooperation, trust, and prosocial helping (Roberson, Reference Roberson2019). Individuals and groups need to build a form of cohesion—a community where they can belong together—grounded in their shared humanity and common good. Such cohesion is cultivated in particular through common discernment of the good, dialogue, mutual understanding, and friendship. Yet the quest for cohesion must not lead us to neglect our separateness and intrinsic diversity, nor to turn human interactions into experiences of fusion—groupthink being a telling example of such fusion in organizations. Instead, our interactions should be experiences of responsiveness, in which each member strives to respond both to others’ and to their own need for belonging and separateness (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum1992; see Bryer, Reference Bryer2020; Shore et al., Reference Shore, Randel, Chung, Dean, Holcombe Ehrhart and Singh2011, Reference Shore, Cleveland and Sanchez2018). The pursuit of cohesion undermines human flourishing when it deprives individuals of meaningful social fulfillment, and when the preservation of group homogeneity overrides discernment or distorts judgment—especially through in-group favoritism or cronyism.

Second, diversity can cause a disparity and lead to unequal treatment, prompting non-cooperative behavior (Bernstein et al., Reference Bernstein, Bulger, Salipante and Weisinger2020; Harrison & Klein, Reference Harrison and Klein2007). This disparity may be caused by screening people on surface-level attributes, such as gender or ethnicity, and possibly assigning a behavioral value to these attributes through stereotyping or stigmatization. This discrimination against people differs from discernment, which involves sifting through values, beliefs and behaviors. It wounds human nature, both in those who make false judgments about others—they have impaired their discernment—and in those who subsequently cannot enjoy full, serene participation in the sociability of the group—they are deprived of due hospitality as well as justice, which is a shared virtue necessary for the development of a human community (Dierksmeier & Celano, Reference Dierksmeier and Celano2012). The genuine collective practice of hospitality and benevolence can provide a relational framework for improving—perfecting—institutions and systems, dismantling some and creating others, beyond the dynamics of power and domination. This framework supports a vision of human development as a shared purpose, achievable only with and for others.

Third, diversity can reflect variety—in talents, approaches, and knowledge. Such variety offers opportunities for mutual enrichment, the development of cooperation, creativity, innovation, and improved decision-making (Ferdman, Reference Ferdman2017; Harrison & Klein, Reference Harrison and Klein2007; Zanoni et al., Reference Zanoni, Janssens, Benschop and Nkomo2010), as well as a more comprehensive understanding of our common humanness, provided it is grounded in dialogue and collective discernment. It involves recognizing and agreeing that some beliefs and approaches are bad and others are good or better, embracing the possibility of moral evaluation and progress. In contrast, utilitarians—who propose a mere value-neutral aggregation of individual preferences and prioritize the numerous (Anscombe, Reference Anscombe1981; Goldstein, Reference Goldstein2021)—and subjectivists—who emphasize the individual’s existential self-definition and choices beyond any conditioning—deny any objective ethical value to beliefs and behaviors. By doing so, they “turn things over to the free play of [subjective] forces”—that is, to social and political domination and power relations, to the dictates of the majority—“in a world where the social forces that affect the lives of women, minorities and the poor are rarely benevolent” (Nussbaum Reference Nussbaum1992: 212).

Anchoring Virtue Ethics in Universalism

Our approach shows that even in a field like diversity and inclusion, where relativism is prevalent, virtue ethics can propose a universalist and objective ethical stance, grounded in human nature. Contextual and situational specificities do not necessarily imply excessive contextualism or a narrow focus on contingency (Fowers & Davidov, Reference Fowers and Davidov2006; van Dijk et al., Reference van Dijk, van Engen and Paauwe2012). These specificities can be considered within a universalist framework that allows investigation of what it means to be human in that context. When the virtues are understood as necessary character traits for fulfilling our purpose and flourishing in all dimensions of our humanness, they acquire universal normative value as a proposition of good human behavior in a situation (MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre1999a). Human-nature-based virtue ethics offers some ethical “slack,” it can accommodate specificities and support discernment of alternative solutions, while still relying on a sound and stable framework: “while it may lead you to stretch a point on the circumference, it will not permit you to destroy the center” (Anscombe, Reference Anscombe1981: 36). By rejecting the “center,” relativists also reject the idea of a circumference as well as the possibility of a discussion or discernment on the positioning of the circumference.

This approach to human nature provides virtue ethics with a sound universal foundation, enabling it to respond to the universal appeal expected of a normative ethics (Demuijnck, Reference Demuijnck2015), while still acknowledging diversity. It offers meaning and a basis for what can be called descriptive universalism—the consensus or convergence that exists between the great traditions and cultures (Dahlsgaard et al., Reference Dahlsgaard, Peterson and Seligman2005; Koehn, Reference Koehn2013), beyond descriptive relativism. I argue that this consensus rests on our common humanness, which grants each of us “the inherent dignity … of all members of the human family” (United Nations, 1948), a special status compared to other species, as humans who share nature, experience, needs, and consequently rights (Acevedo, Reference Acevedo2012; Pirson, Goodpaster, & Dierksmeier, Reference Pirson, Goodpaster and Dierksmeier2016). Moreover, it is significant that specific scientific approaches, such as psychology and evolutionary theory, converge in their understanding of what it means to be human (Sadler-Smith, Reference Sadler-Smith2012). The human-nature approach, and thus virtue ethics, can be considered an ontology as well as an ethology (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, Reference Hursthouse, Pettigrove, Zalta and Nodelman2022); it draws on and encompasses these multiple human dimensions to better comprehend our common humanness.