After almost 50 years of struggle, the conventional narrative about Latin America's most durable guerrilla movement, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army, FARC–EP), suggests that it has renounced its revolutionary goals and is now little more than a group of bandits, kidnappers and drug traffickers. Recent governments, flushed with triumph after a number of high-profile successes, have promoted this story in order to empty the FARC–EP's resistance efforts of any vestige of political legitimacy. Indeed, one of the great successes of Alvaro Uribe's presidency was the demonisation of the FARC as the main obstacle to national progress, and today the slightest whisper of sympathy for the guerrillas is likely to lead to accusations of support for ‘terrorism’.
James J. Brittain's study sets out to dismantle this official view of the insurgency by presenting the FARC as the proponents of a vibrant and uniquely Colombian version of Marxism-Leninism. As he describes the movement's origins, considers its current strategy and speculates about its prospects, the image of the FARC–EP as a fragmented terrorist group is replaced by that of a well-organised peasant movement that poses the most significant political threat to the Colombian state and international corporate interests. In the face of the savagery of paramilitary violence and the continued intransigence of Colombia's elites, Brittain suggests that the FARC–EP is the greatest hope for social change in Colombia.
To support this account, he uses the early chapters to explore the movement's origins, providing a well-documented if unoriginal account of the Colombian state's historic connivance in the repression of the peasantry. There are occasional blunders as he examines the development of the insurgency (Operación Anorí, for example, targeted the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN), not the FARC), but in general he makes a strong case for the FARC's continuing relevance as defenders of these vulnerable groups, in spite of significant recent reverses.
The later chapters examine contemporary strategy. With their references to the author's experiences in the guerrillas' heartland these should have been particularly revealing, but while they include extended quotations from a number of informants they do not offer the detailed ethnographic analysis that might have allowed an insight into the relationship between the guerrillas and the rural population. Given the difficult circumstances in which one assumes the interviewing was carried out this may not have been possible, but that does not alter the fact that in their current form the words of unidentified interviewees provide a tantalising yet frustratingly decontextualised glimpse of life in the zones of guerrilla influence.
The key chapter examines the FARC's contribution to social change. In this section Brittain details the movement's attempts to set up alternative institutions and co-opt existing ones, in particular the juntas de acción comunal. He comments on the provision of basic education, the active role of women within the organisation and the relationship with indigenous communities, painting a rosy picture of a benign and progressive force that responds in a flexible fashion to the demands of the rural poor.
What all of this leaves out, however, is the precarious nature of FARC control, the absence of women from the secretariat and the fraught relationship of the guerrillas with many indigenous groups. Indeed, Brittain surely goes too far in his enthusiasm for the guerrillas' cause. He simply dismisses the disturbing social authoritarianism that has frequently been reported in the guerrillas' zones of influence and fails to consider the costs of hostage-taking. He also overestimates the guerrillas' operational capacity. At the height of its power in the late 1990s the FARC was a constant presence on the edges of Colombia's cities, yet the suggestion – gleaned from the work of Richani and Petras – that it refrained from taking power in order to build alternative institutions in its rural heartland is overstated. The late Jorge Briceño's promise to take the war to the cities was surely meant as more than an idle jest, yet in the face of the guerrillas' increasing power the Colombian state proved itself more than capable of mobilising significant popular support in its attempts to force the FARC onto the defensive. Even if it had been possible, a military victory would hardly have been legitimate. Brittain is right to question the validity of opinion polls, but the fact remains that most Colombians do not currently sympathise with the armed Left. Indeed, he himself notes that the negative view of the insurgency has been ‘uncritically accepted by large sectors of the [Colombian] population’.
This suggests deeper problems with the analysis. Although Gramsci is cited approvingly, a great deal more ‘pessimism of the intellect’ is required if we are to grasp the dilemma faced by the Left today. Any serious consideration of counter-hegemonic movements in Colombia today needs to note that popular discontent remains largely untapped by the FARC. The widely accepted cynicism and opportunism of much of the ‘political class’ has not automatically conferred legitimacy on the guerrillas, which in itself is indicative of the movement's failure to advance in the ideological struggle. While this may be partly due to its idiosyncratic relationship with the Communist Party, as well as the brutal repression of the Unión Patriótica (Patriotic Union, UP), it is also linked to the militaristic hubris and dogmatism that was in evidence among the guerrillas and their sympathisers during the peace negotiations.
In short, while Brittain's work is a timely reminder that the insurgency is a symptom of Colombia's problems rather than their root cause, it underestimates the magnitude of the task facing the Left in Colombia today. As it explains the dynamics of the relationship between the FARC and the peasantry, it loses sight of the need to put forward a convincing strategy for the radical transformation of social relations in the country as a whole. Social and political change is long overdue in Colombia, but for the FARC–EP to be part of a genuinely counter-hegemonic alternative it would have to mutate into an entirely different kind of organisation. As things stand, such an outcome seems highly unlikely.
