Recent decades have witnessed a growing literature on human dignity. Pablo Gilabert contributed significantly to this literature with his 2018 book, Human Dignity and Human Rights, in which he argued successfully that human dignity is the core of human rights. His “conceptual network” (p. 122) integrated complex components of dignity and identified the most basic dignitarian ideas supporting human rights (DI). He then showed how to implement such ideas institutionally (DII) and advocated for necessary political transformations (DIII), where rights-protecting institutions are inexistent. This constituted Gilabert’s Dignitarian Approach, a normative program elucidating the theoretical and practical implications of human relations, the basic claims to human dignity, and the human rights deriving from dignity—including labor rights.

In Human Dignity and Social Justice, Gilabert compellingly builds on this previous book by moving from a defense of basic dignity to more ambitious claims about maximal dignity. Among the book’s main contributions, it “offers a systematic defence of the view that human dignity is the moral heart of justice” (p. v), that it empowers individuals to express solidarity with workers, and that it supports democratic socialism. Gilabert applies his Dignitarian Approach to labor rights by linking human dignity to the advancement of social justice, thereby presenting a new interpretation of longstanding critiques of capitalism. He then suggests a novel understanding of the Abilities/Needs Principle and, after discussing the feasibility of implementing social justice under capitalism and socialism, he opts for the core ideals of democratic socialism. I commend Gilabert’s use of his “conceptual network” to align plural dimensions of dignity and solidarity in defense of labor rights, but I will note that the communitarian dimension, a more grounded discussion about “class,” and an explicit moral critique of “expropriation” are missing from this book.

Human Dignity and Social Justice has two parts. In part I, Gilabert outlines his theoretical framework in four chapters. Chapter 1 reintroduces the Dignitarian Approach and the ideal of solidaristic empowerment, which he first presented in the 2018 book. Here, Gilabert reiterates that “we have reason to organize social life in such a way that we respond appropriately to the valuable features of individuals that give rise to their dignity” (p. 4). He then situates this ideal with respect to labor rights. In chapter 2, Gilabert transitions to Kant and Marx. From Kant he gets the deontic status of dignity, its inherence and its universal scope, which provides for a fundamental moral equality between human beings as well as the normative grounds for their claims to freedom. From Marx, he takes the critique of capitalism and the alternative proposal of socialism.

In chapter 3, Gilabert reinterprets the core socialist Abilities/Needs Principle—“From each according to their ability, to each according to their needs” (p. 87–88)—in relation to issues of justice, responsibility, and other demands. After putting his views into dialogue with Will Kymlicka and Joseph Carens, Gilabert defines both the ANP and socialism according to the DI and DII dimensions of the dignitarian approach. He also recognizes the need to transition to DIII so that individuals “help promote, not just refrain from hampering, the conditions” in which workers can flourish (p. 130). Chapter 4, in turn, deals with the worry that his dignitarian project might be unrealistic. Gilabert’s answer proposes “a dynamic approach to the relation between justice and feasibility” (p. 137) and differentiates between evaluative and prescriptive principles regarding justice within DI. This implies a tension between the ideality of DI and the reality of DIII, which requires individuals to cultivate an ethics of responsibility to consider dynamic approaches to feasibility before implementing the dignitarian vision in active social, political or economic processes.

In part II, “Rethinking the Socialist Critique of Capitalism,” Gilabert applies his dignitarian and solidaristic reinterpretation of ANP to the critiques of alienation, exploitation, and domination. Chapter 5 defines exploitation as an asymmetric and wrongful use of power, which is morally problematic because it yields a “contra-solidaristic use of power” incompatible with the demands of human dignity and solidarity (p. 179, p. 186–190). Here Gilabert engages with both John Roemer and Nicholas Vrousalis but moves beyond their views because he contends that they miss the multidimensional power asymmetries that produce and intensify exploitation.

Chapter 6 addresses the problem of alienation, starting with David Leopold’s analytical definition of alienation as a division between “a subject S and some object O in certain circumstances C” (p. 209). I appreciate how Gilabert expands on this by explicitly opting for a moral account of how alienation affects the dignity of workers, rightly relating this issue to a normative “realm of freedom” as opposed to a prudential “realm of necessity” (p. 213). His pluralistic approach reveals that circumstances are multiply determined, that exploitation is a complex phenomenon, and that experiences of alienation are dynamic and open to change.

Chapter 7 foregrounds concepts of domination, power, and injustice to explain the relationship between capitalists and workers. Here, Gilabert draws on Erik Wright’s tripartite description of where workers encounter power asymmetries: “(1) the day-to-day relationship with the workplace, (2) the setting up of a labour contract, and (3) the broader political process” (p. 252, 255). This leads Gilabert to propose a complex definition of domination:

For Gilabert, this conceptualization of domination has limited normative relevance because many ways of exercising power are not necessarily morally wrong. After discussing Phillip Pettit, Rainer Forst, and Elizabeth Anderson’s views, he offers a pluralistic, inclusive, and accessible alternative to what he sees as their monistic, justificatory, and relational views on justice and power, respectively. Persuasively, he argues that the dignitarian approach differs from liberal and republican views because it has more affinities with “views emerging from human rights, feminism, and socialism” (309–311). As examples he cites human rights doctrines recognizing positive rights to healthcare for those who cannot afford it, feminists connecting freedom to mutual aid and solidarity, and socialists valuing community as a medium to serve others and address their needs.

Consequently, chapter 8 concludes by comparing G. A. Cohen’s 2009 short book Why Not Socialism? and Jason Brennan’s 2014 response to Cohen in Why Not Capitalism? While Cohen highlights principles of equality of opportunity and community, Brennan argues that the ideal and real aspects of capitalism are superior to socialism because they promote “voluntary community, mutual respect, reciprocity, social justice, and beneficence” (p. 327). Both Cohen and Brennan mention the value of “community,” and yet Gilabert seems to downplay this important point. Instead, he concludes that democratic socialism combines the best of capitalism and socialism by linking DI, DII, and DIII to ideal and feasible strategies that support “individual freedom in a way that recognizes the significance of solidarity” (p. 338).

Throughout the book, Gilabert applies his pluralistic conceptual network consistently and successfully to justify labor rights according to the dignitarian approach and the ideal of solidaristic empowerment. The dignitarian approach articulates very effectively the ambitious ideals of liberal egalitarianism and democratic socialism, but there are three critical issues that would require further discussion. First, in part I, Gilabert introduces labor rights but avoids mentioning the “working class” because he sees class—like gender, nationality, or ethnicity—as a social convention that contradicts the moral humanistic universality of human rights. This is a missed opportunity to explore how individuals exercise their freedom of association to form a working class and defend their rights against the structural injustices of capitalism. Second and relatedly, in part II, he focuses on workers’ alienation, exploitation, and domination but neglects the “expropriation” of both individuals and the working class—and yet the latter is actually the most important moral problem for Marx. Third and finally, Gilabert starts the book emphasizing individual freedom but then transitions to communitarian solidarity at the end without a proper explanation of how these two ideals are articulated together and may come into tension when addressing social injustice. These three issues are intrinsically related to each other and deserve further discussion, but they do not necessarily invalidate Gilabert’s worthwhile project.

In Human Dignity and Social Justice, Gilabert successfully integrates individual, plural, and universal dimensions of dignity in a constructive way. He deserves credit for his conceptual network theorizing dignity and applying it to labor rights, his reinterpretation of the ANP, and his willingness to address complex questions about capitalism. This book is a necessary reading for all those interested in human rights, human dignity, and in the promotion of social justice.