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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 July 2005
Iran's macroeconomic performance, especially in terms of inflation, is an economic enigma for many observers. Since 1979, the economy has been destabilized by a revolution, massive nationalizations, a protracted war, trade sanctions, demographic change, and fluctuating oil prices in an economy that is very much dependent on oil revenues and on state and quasi-state economic activities. The Central Bank of Iran, which is effectively under the control of the government, has generously financed government. Yet despite high inflation, low economic growth, and declining per capita income until recently, and the external and internal shocks, the rise in the price level has not reflected hyperinflation {à} {la} Latin American countries. The primary objective of Thierry Coville's book is to decipher this economic puzzle.
As an economist who has closely followed the evolution of Iranian society in the postrevolutionary and post-Khomeini periods, Coville studies the political economy of “macroeconomic disorder” there and offers his prescription for a gradual move toward “economic order” in five chapters that hang together well. In this endeavor, he looks at the Iranian economy through the prism of money. Following Michel Aglietta-André Orléan's conceptualization of “social totality of money” and the “legitimacy” of money, Coville asserts that monetary order in Iran reflects the interaction of social, political, cultural-religious, and economic factors. Based on this outlook, the author depicts the rentier nature of the Iranian economy and state in general, and the dependence of its monetary system on the Islamic government policies in particular, and explores the link among public finance, money, and the redistributive policy of the Islamic government. He also relies on analytical concepts and tools developed by monetarists and economists of the International Monetary Fund and the European Union for measuring the explicit and implicit size of fiscal and monetary accounts, such as budget deficits and extrabudgetary (or quasi-budgetary) funds (i.e., government expenditures and debt that are not directly recorded in budget accounts).
Chapter 1 presents the nature of the unstable macroeconomic environment of the Iranian economy in a system that is structurally dependent on oil revenues. It is argued that, in the face of exogenous shocks (e.g., revolution, oil revenues, and the Iran–Iraq War) and government policies, the Iranian economy has gone through high and sticky inflation, trade imbalances, foreign-exchange crises, and low economic growth. In 1980–99, the average annual increase in prices of consumer goods and services and in per capita income was 21.7 percent, and 1.1 percent, respectively (if the chosen period is 1977–99, per capita income declined on the average by 1.2 percent annually [pp. 26–27]). In the same period, the Iranian rial depreciated relative to the dollar on the black market by 12,600 percent (p. 36). Meanwhile, budget deficits have been financed by interest-free loans (that were not paid back in 1980–99) from the Central Bank. In 1980–99, the average annual share of explicit budget deficit in gross domestic product (GDP) was 4.3 percent, and on average 83 percent of the budget deficit was financed by the banking system; the average annual growth of broad money supply (M2; i.e., M1 plus savings and time deposits) was 22.3 percent; and despite its fluctuation, velocity of money (M2/GDP) increased as a trend, indicating the presence of a liquidity surplus (pp. 38–39). Yet if the growth of public debt explains an important part of the growth of M2 in 1980–98, in 1988–99 this growth is mainly the result of the expansion of the private-sector debt, including the debt of Islamic foundations (p. 31).
According to Coville, financing budgetary and extrabudgetary activities of a clientalist state through an accommodating and dependent banking system is the primary source of high inflation in Iran (p. 47). Chapters 2–4 are in-depth analyses of this claim based on budget data adjusted for implicit expenditures and revenues and income statements and balance sheets of the Central Bank. In the absence of classical distributive means, the redistributive policy of the government in favor of its sociopolitical supporters has been effectuated by extrabudgetary activities. The network that has mainly benefited from the choice of the government in terms of its explicit and implicit expenditures and receipts included Islamic foundations, merchants, and the “disinherited” (p. 80). The losers in this inflationary economic situation were those who saved and could not transfer their savings into rent or profit and all those with fixed incomes—that is, the majority of households. However, despite the persistence of inflationary sources that have “reduced the moral authority of the central bank,” the high rate of inflation could not be called hyperinflation because the Iranian money “remained legitimate under the Islamic government” (pp. 81, 130). In the author's opinion, the monetary order in Iran, especially during the first decade of the Islamic Republic, benefited from the fact that the state incarnated certain national–Islamic values “that a large part of the society identifies with them” (p. 175). Yet the objective and discretionary policy factors that have prevented the appearance of a very deep and long-lasting macroeconomic disequilibrium are the flow of oil rent, pragmatic change of economic policies, especially after the end of Iran–Iraq War, and, “in the final analysis,…the maintenance of certain social cohesion” (p. 175).
Given that the sources of economic dependence, inefficiency, and instability are still operating in the economy, Chapter 5 presents the author's recommendations for avoiding a deep economic crisis. The critical point in the author's economic reform is the change in the position of Iran in the international division of labor. Such a reform, preferably a gradual one, ideally would reduce the dependence of the economy on oil revenues and the weight of state and quasi-state economic activity by concentration on exports of industrial and agricultural goods produced by the private sector. However, Coville ends the book by asserting that the current state of politics in Iran is not very promising for such a reform.
In closing, Coville should be commended for a systematic, informative, and well-argued study of the political economy of macroeconomic disorder in post-revolutionary Iran. Yet more discussion on “non-monetary” sources of inflation, the social dimension of money, and redistributive policies of the government in favor of its sociopolitical supporters would have enhanced readers' understanding of the complex and interesting relationship between politics and economics.