The re-discovery of virtue in the language of the founders by “republican synthesis” historians touched off a lively debate about the importance of character as a check on the self-destructive features of popular forms of government and free societies. Yet, assuming Lockean consensus theorists are correct that American political culture is permeated by an intensely individualistic ethos, political philosophers such as Michael Sandel and William Galston remind us that even a liberal regime needs basic civic virtues and a sense of community to sustain itself. Madison, often described as an exponent of the “new science of politics,” which sought to temper the effects of man's factious instincts with circumstance (the extended republic) and channel self-interest in socially beneficial directions through institutional design (separation of powers and federalism), recognized that without sufficient virtue among the people, such devices would be incapable of securing stable and decent government. But, from what agency will those requisite human qualities be cultivated and nurtured? The Constitution makes no explicit provision for character formation. Scholars such as Martin Diamond and Robert Bellah point to Tocqueville's depictions of voluntary associations and religion as the prime engines of civic responsibility.

The volume under consideration here, Pews, Prayers, and Participation: Religion and Civic Responsibility in America, is the collaborative effort of five scholars who have made substantial contributions to the burgeoning religion and politics literature. They provide an empirical exploration of religion's role in fostering civic virtues, social skills, and community engagement essential to democracy. Here we find empirical answers to philosophical questions first raised by theorists from Aristotle to Montesquieu.

The primary dependent variable is civic responsibility, a subject of considerable scholarly interest since Robert Putnam's seminal “Bowling Alone” article (1995). The authors draw on data from multiple sources, including the General Social Survey and the American National Election Studies, for indicators of public and private virtue and other behaviors and predispositions associated with civic responsibility. Their root explanatory variable, “forms of religious expression,” is a composite of private (prayer) and public expressions of religion (worship attendance). The result is a four-fold typology: diminished faith or secular (low on both), privatized, public, and integrated religious expression (high on both dimensions). Assorted bivariate statistics and multiple classification analysis are enlisted to probe how forms of religious expression stack up against alternative explanations of civic responsibility; in most instances this variable performs well.

Persons expressing their faith in a privatized way (through prayer but not through worship attendance) tend to withdraw from civic and political life. Seculars are the most selfish in comparison with members of the other groups in the authors' typology and are also the most willing to condone evading the law and cheating on taxes. In contrast, “integrated faith” promotes the highest levels of altruism, law abidingness, and honesty.

Some of the results point up the religious underpinnings of associational life and demonstrate the variety of ways in which places of worship provide venues for learning and practicing civic skills. Congregation membership surpasses membership in voluntary associations, and congregation members are more likely to join other voluntary associations. The authors also find that integrated faith stimulates diffuse support of public institutions, a richer quality of associational life, and higher levels of civic participation. In short, how a person expresses his/her faith greatly affects civic engagement. This study confirms the findings of Arthur Brooks and David Campbell demonstrating that religion fosters volunteerism and charitable giving in general.

The issue of political tolerance is a thorny one. To their credit, the authors assess a variety of tolerance indicators and therefore reveal a rather balanced picture of the relationship between religiosity and tolerance. They also demonstrate convincingly that the manner in which religion affects tolerance hinges on the group targeted, the activity being carried out, and when the data were collected. Integrated religionists were least tolerant of racists and militarists. All of the groups tended to be less willing to allow members of a target group to teach in public schools than to give public speeches. The data show a remarkable increase in tolerance for gay people over a twenty-year span beginning in 1987 among all groups, particularly those exhibiting the integrated form of faith. In a refreshing twist, this book provides a valuable corrective to the social science-abetted stereotype depicting seculars as champions of tolerance and people of faith as its enemy. When it comes to allowing religious people to exercise First Amendment liberties, those with a diminished faith are least tolerant. Seculars, for example, were the most supportive of muzzling the voices of religious leaders.

Among the most fascinating parts of this book are the theoretical discussions focusing on the “naked public square” concept and its partisans. The authors remind us that, notwithstanding the views of political and legal theorists who wish to privatize and marginalize religion, any fair reading of the debates over the drafting of the religion clauses or awareness of the backgrounds of the individuals participating in that enterprise would be hard put making the case that the framers intended to suppress all forms of religious expression touching public life. The data in this volume show empirically the social costs of a naked public square: a public conversation consisting of only secular voices and value preferences; an enfeebled civil society with declining levels of associational participation and law abidingness; more dishonesty, selfishness, and cynicism; and fewer citizens willing to help their neighbors by pitching in with their own resources and time to improve their community—in short, a less civilized (and less democratic) society.