Contemporary book-length treatments of St Thomas's theological understanding of virtue are surprisingly rare. Justin M. Anderson's monograph is therefore a welcome and important addition to our understanding of virtue in Aquinas and its place within his theology as a whole. Anderson convincingly argues that understanding Aquinas on virtue requires an engagement with wider theological themes in his writings, such as grace, merit, divine providence, and sin.
The book begins with an excellent general introduction to Aquinas on virtue, pursuing a similar path to Nicholas Austin's Aquinas on Virtue in bringing out the physical and metaphysical principles which underpin Aquinas’ presentation. In second chapter Anderson shows how Aquinas distinguishes various meanings of virtue through the use of analogy. Aquinas draws a distinction between the full sense of virtue (virtue simpliciter) and the various types of virtue that fall short of this full sense (virtue secundum quid). Anderson acknowledges the difficulty of constructing a schema covering these various senses of virtue in Aquinas, and to make sense of Aquinas's ordering it is necessary to see that whereas he reserves the use of virtue simpliciter to graced, infused virtue, virtue secundum quid covers a variety of meanings, some of which at first sight may appear contradictory (see p. 41). By paying attention to how Aquinas distinguishes between these various meanings of virtue secundum quid Anderson shows us how Aquinas preserves the full Augustinian sense of virtue as that ‘which God works in us without us’, while maintaining the possibility of genuine Aristotelian pagan virtue.
In chapter three Anderson traces the medieval development of the distinction between grace and nature and how Aquinas's understanding of the necessity of grace for the beginning of and perseverance in virtue simpliciter changed in the light of his reading of St Paul and St Augustine. Acquired virtue may point towards the need for infused virtue, but it is not a first stage in the acquisition of virtue simpliciter. For Aquinas, without God's grace we cannot begin our journey towards union with him, nor can we persevere on that journey. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that Aquinas divided his treatment of virtue into a theological treatise on graced, infused virtue and a purely philosophical account of natural, acquired virtue. In order to understand acquired virtue it is necessary to attend to theological topics, such as the effects of sin on human nature and how God governs and orders his creation.
These reflections on grace and nature bring the first part of the book to its end. In the second part Anderson examines in greater depth the conditions for the beginning (chapter four), perseverance in (chapter five), and end of (chapter six) virtue simpliciter. These chapters contain a wealth of material for students to develop their understanding of Aquinas's theological understanding of virtue. Anderson shows how in order to understand Aquinas's conception of virtue we need to attend to his theology of grace and merit, placed within wider theological themes such as beatitude and sin. Part three repeats this pattern by presenting the beginning (chapter seven), perseverance in (chapter eight), and end of virtue secundum quid. Anderson argues that while remaining rooted in an Augustinian understanding of grace Aquinas remained optimistic that pagan virtue is possible. To understand Aquinas's position on pagan virtue it is important to keep in mind that when describing the acts of pagans as good Aquinas means good in some respect, not good in the full sense of acts performed through God's grace which thereby merit a share in God's glory. However, although all can be described as good in some respect, not all are virtuous. The further qualifications for an ungraced act to be virtuous are threefold. First, that their ends are ordainable to God as our ultimate end; secondly, that they issue from some good principle in the agent who performs them (Anderson, using the analogy of unformed faith and hope, argues that such good principles need not be virtues themselves, but contain the seeds of virtue; see p. 186); and, thirdly, such acts must be in conformity with right reason.
The possibility of pagan virtue for Aquinas is thus established when we consider the limited nature of the good they achieve. They bring human happiness, but this is not the perfect happiness promised to the faithful who possess sanctifying grace. Anderson here supports the reading of Aquinas on human natural happiness most recently expounded in depth by Lawrence Feingold, and readers who disagree with Feingold's arguments against de Lubac's are unlikely to be won over. For those who accept that some form of pagan virtue is possible, not merely as a hypothesis in some state of pure nature, but in a world corrupted by sin, the difficultly remains to explain how in conditions of sin pagan virtue can develop and be preserved. Here Anderson argues that Aquinas's doctrine of application is key. For Aquinas, not only does God preserve the universe in existence, but through his wise governance he also orders all things to their end. This includes both non-rational and rational agents, and in the case of human beings involves both nature and grace. While not discounting the workings of grace in those who exercise pagan virtue, Anderson argues that on the level of nature, over and beyond God's action in creating and conserving human beings, which applies to all human acts, God sometimes acts to move a person to perform a good act (p. 213). This is the part of the book which is likely to cause most controversy, particularly when Anderson describes God's action as immediate and distinct from the manner in which God is present in all human actions. The text Anderson cites in support of this reading of Aquinas is from Summa theologiae Ia q. 82, a. 4, ad. 3., which considers whether the will moves the understanding, but the response here concerns God as the principle of our understanding, not God in select cases using the intellect to move the will.
There is much to praise in Anderson's book, and it opens several avenues for future reflection on Aquinas's theological account of virtue and its relationship to wider theological themes in his writing. There is still much to explore, but Anderson provides a beginning and much to help us along the way.
