Social movement theories (SMTs) and related theories of collective action have been the analytical tool of choice of several social scientists interested in Iran over the last couple of decades. As in other fields of academic research, the Iranian revolution served as a midwife, encouraging scholars to try out and adjust their concepts. Meanwhile, in the field of SMT itself, a central debate has been turning around the role of structures (resources and political opportunities) versus culture in facilitating movements. A product of the 1980s cultural turn, the latter factor was first conceptualized as “the frame”—“a compelling movement narrative” (p. 10) that helps to recruit actors. In the early 1990s, the concept “master frame” was coined “to describe why movement activity tends to cluster together and become focused toward eradicating the same social problem” (p. 13).
Poulson's analysis of Iranian social movements is situated in this latter field. Although not discounting structures (touched on in two short thematic chapters in part I), his focus lies on culture (another two chapters in part I), an orientation he shares with scholars interested in the role of ideology in the Iranian revolution (p. 7, fn. 3). However, rather than being confined to a single episode, his study embraces a century-long progression of social movements. Looking at the tobacco revolt, the constitutional revolution, the post World War II nationalist movements, the religious revival in the 1960s/1970s, the revolution, and the reformist movement of the 1990s, he concludes that all these cycles have been informed by one master frame: the question of national and individual sovereignty, that is, the need to end foreign imperialism. This concern was not exclusively Iranian, but preoccupied “many countries in the developing world beginning at roughly the turn of the century” (p. 13).
Although Iranian anti-imperialism has been studied before, Poulson is the first author to examine the entire 20th century through the prism of sovereignty. To fine-tune his analysis, he enumerates, throughout the second part's chronological chapters, a number of frames informing the master frame. He introduces, for instance, law (tobacco movement), calls for an assembly of justice and nationalism (constitutional revolution), or anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism (1960s/1970s). He also points to the importance of conservative “counter-frames” used to defy “progressive” prosovereignty movements. Moreover, he argues that “sovereignty”—individual as much as national—is not a fixed concept. Rather, it is continuously being modified as a function of changing views of the West, which are, in turn, linked to shifting conceptions of what it means to be Iranian/Muslim. Perhaps the most useful contribution of this book, however, concerns the interplay between national and individual sovereignty. The author is at his best when he demonstrates how and why, during the constitutional revolution, the 1978/1979 revolution, and the second Khurdad movement, different factions supported the former but were divided sharply over the latter.
Unfortunately, however, social scientific concepts have a way of acquiring a life of their own. The book's overarching theme is certainly well taken. However, in the chapters on specific periods, the master frame and regular frames are all too often simply grafted on well-known narratives and topics. Poulson's discussion of the turn of the century anjomans (secret societies) or of the constitutional revolutionary interest in expressions of individual sovereignty such as equality and free will illustrates this point. Here as elsewhere he draws exclusively on English sources. Original language sources that could have enriched the analysis are not consulted, a practice that is no longer the rule among social scientists. Thus, Poulson relates specific activities, frames, and the master frame—but the latter two do not truly add to our historical understanding of these specific phenomena. Admittedly, his book addresses scholars of “social movements who are likewise interested in the Middle East, but may not have studied the regions of the Middle East in depth” (p. 2). However, the historical chapters of part II contain only very few comparative or theoretical references to the SMT literature that would have helped social scientists to link the Iranian case to their own fields of interest.
Furthermore, considering Poulson's argument that imperialism was central to sovereignty, the reviewer would have expected a more pointed debate of the international context (especially post-1945 American dominance), a theoretical discussion of Iran's semicolonial (i.e., postcolonial) conditions, and a reference to the relevance (or lack thereof) of world-system theories. In addition, although anti-shah protesters linked autocracy to American imperialism, the former was not seen exclusively as a product of the latter. True, Poulson chose to focus on the effects of imperialism on sovereignty. However, the Iranian constitutionalist struggle against autocracy was part and parcel of the debate over the type of sovereignty the country should have. Last but not least, whereas the term “sovereignty” works well for national self-determination, it appears to be a less happy choice to denote individual rights (and duties). The use of “sovereignty” for both fields suggests an underlying equivalence that quite simply does not exist. Although linked, the former is a political issue whereas the latter has as much to do with sociocultural changes as with political rights.
Poulson's book contributes to the SMT literature on Iran and usefully underlines the importance of sovereignty for modern Iranian social movements. However, it would have benefited from a more fine-grained historical or, conversely, theoretical, SMT-grounded discussion of its topic.
