Introduction
Land reform was one of the key political, social, economic and legal issues in the Second Polish Republic from the very beginning of its existence. The debate around this reform constituted one of the fundamental points considered by the Legislative Sejm (1919–22), the first post-independence parliamentary assembly, whose main task was to lay down the principles of the state’s political system and adopt the first constitution.Footnote 1 The aim of this article is to analyse the role that the politics of memory, in particular the memory of serfdom (poddaństwo) and its key element, compulsory labour (pańszczyzna), played in arguments presented by peasant circles in favour of land reform. In addition to arguments of a social, economic and ethical–legal nature, supporters of both the moderate and radical versions of this reform justified their positions in historical terms: as compensation for centuries of systemic injustice inflicted upon peasants in the Polish lands by the nobility/landed gentry (szlachta) from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries.
The politics of memory has tended to be sidelined in earlier scholarship on inter-war land reform. This article demonstrates that the memory of serfdom provided a unifying force that cut across the divergent political agendas of Polish peasant parties in the inter-war period.
The memory of a common and tragic peasant past that was marked by enslavement, exploitation and marginalisation, on the one hand, and resistance to injustice, on the other, was crucial for the formation of a common peasant identity. The crystallisation of this identity in the political sphere certainly played an important role in overcoming intra-class tensions and reconciling the divergent interests of individual members of peasant communities that resulted primarily from their varied property status.
In this context, demonstrating the importance of historical arguments in discussions of land reform will also reveal how peasant memory makers have challenged the dominant perception of Polish history as merely the history of the nobility and church elites, as well as the simultaneous marginalisation of the subaltern classes, particularly the peasantry.Footnote 2 On a more general level, it will demonstrate the importance of references to the past within political discourse, which play an instrumental role in addressing current problems and interests in political, social, cultural and economic life. Political discourse relating to the past, known as the politics of history or politics of memory, is, as noted by Pierra Nora, ‘a management of the past in the present’.Footnote 3 This management is required in order to control the social imaginary of the past and thus shape the collective historical consciousness and identity of a given society to a lesser (in liberal-democratic regimes) or greater (in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes) extent.
Importantly, the politics of history is pursued not only by powerful figures who utilise particular visions of the past to legitimise and stabilise their position, acquire moral capital and shape societal identity but also by forces who oppose the hegemonic discourses that are controlled by those in power. These forces also instrumentalise the past for their counter-hegemonic practices and the realisation of their interests. This article shows how inter-war peasant political activists in Poland practised their own politics of history and memory in this way. It examines the temporal and thematic fragmentation of this politics in focusing on the use of the memory of serfdom in efforts to push for land reform. To do so, the article draws extensively upon the inter-war peasant press, in particular the weekly journals Piast and Wyzwolenie. These publications were the official press organs of the two main peasant parties of inter-war Poland respectively: the centre-right Polish People’s Party ‘Piast’ (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe ‘Piast’; PSL Piast) and the centre-left Polish People’s Party ‘Liberation’ (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe ‘Wyzwolenie’; PSL Wyzwolenie).Footnote 4
The Galician-born PSL Piast was a right-leaning centrist party that cooperated with the national movement in the early 1920s, which often gave its politics a nationalist hue. The Piasts also supported the idea of Poland as a regional power, which was reflected primarily in their support of the internal colonisation of the so-called eastern borderlands by ethnically Polish peasants.Footnote 5 The PSL Wyzwolenie operated primarily in the lands that had formerly been part of the Russian Empire and was politically much more left leaning than the PSL Piast. It was also a party of the so-called independence left (lewica niepodległościowa), which was comprised of many supporters of Marshal Józef Piłsudski, one of the founding fathers of newly independent Poland. The PSL Wyzwolenie also had a strongly anticlerical, but not anti-religious, character and called for a greater separation between Church and state. The Liberators, as PSL Wyzwolenie supporters were called, tried to represent the interests of not only Polish but also Ukrainian and Belarusian peasants, while at the same time distancing themselves from antisemitic attitudes, although not always consistently. Despite being left-oriented, the Liberators were more than sceptical about communist ideology, especially the collectivisation of agriculture. The PSL Piast and PSL Wyzwolenie fought each other throughout the 1920s, but during the political repression of the Sanacja regime and the global financial crash, united with the left-wing Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Chłopskie; SCh) to create the People’s Party (Stronnictwo Ludowe; SL) in March 1931. The SL was the largest political party of the Second Polish Republic with a registered 289,700 members in 1932.Footnote 6 Focusing on these parties’ approach to the politics of history provides a more comprehensive examination of peasant politics in early inter-war Poland. In particular, it allows us to see views that were shared by peasant political activists on their politics of memory, particularly on the issue of historical injustice. These shared ideas were an important factor that enabled cohesion, despite the deep divisions that existed between various factions of the peasant movement during the first decade of independence.
In addition to examining the instrumentalisation of history in the inter-war peasant press, this article also contributes to memory work on serfdom, which is an important part of the debate on the history and heritage of the peasantry that has been ongoing in Poland for more than a decade. This debate takes place within not only the humanities and social sciences but also broader culture, including mass media, literature, theatre, film, music and visual arts. This is evidenced by the appearance of a large number of academic and popular books, novels, music, theatre performances, documentaries and feature films, countless media debates and exhibitions.Footnote 7 The popularisation and intensification of discussions on the history of the peasantry has even prompted some observers to postulate that we are dealing with a so-called people’s/plebeian turn (zwrot ludowy) within the field of Polish culture.Footnote 8
The modern phenomenon of the ‘people’s turn’ is deeply rooted within Polish history. Focusing on the countryside and the peasantry is a recurring leitmotif in Polish culture, social sciences and politics. The strong presence of rural/peasant themes in Polish culture has been evident since the fifteenth century, when landlords complained about ‘cunning peasants’ and peasants lamented about ‘furious lords, drunken tyrants; prideful, greedy, wicked, worse than heathens’.Footnote 9 In the centuries that followed and right up until the present day, these themes can be seen in admiration from poets, writers, musicians, painters and filmmakers for the ‘fabulously colourful’ ‘peaceful village, cheerful village’, which has long been presented as a ‘treasury of values’ and a stronghold of Polishness and Catholicism, on the one hand, and a stronghold of ‘boorish’ violence, brutality, greed, intolerance and drunkenness, on the other.Footnote 10 Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, this strong interest in the life of the rural population has been accompanied by scholarly reflection within the humanities and social sciences, including the pre-ethnographic accounts of Zorian Dołęga-Chodakowski, the monumental ethnographic work of Oskar Kolberg, the sociological studies of Florian Znaniecki and Józef Chałasiński and the historical works of Franciszek Bujak and Witold Kula.
In addition to cultural and academic examinations of rural life, the so-called peasant question has long been a fervently discussed political and socio-economic issue. This can be traced back to the sixteenth-century parliamentary debates on the introduction of laws concerning serfdom, through to further discussions on whether it ought to be maintained at the end of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth two centuries later. Discussions accompanying the processes of the emancipation of the serfs and the enfranchisement of peasants raged during the partitions, as did speculations on the causes of the so-called Galician Slaughter, which was the 1846 anti-feudal peasant uprising in Galicia. These conversations continued into the inter-war period during debates on land reform and attempts to implement it, and then re-emerged within the top-down controlled post-war discourse on radical land reform and collectivisation in the 1940s and early 1950s. After 1989, debates on reforming agriculture within a capitalist economy also continued these discussions, as did debates on the adaptation to the common agricultural policy before and after Poland’s accession to the European Union and contemporary discourses on the introduction of the European Green Deal. Participants in all these different debates, from the sixteenth century to the present day, often instrumentalised the past to advance their arguments, in either a conservative manner, extracting what was worth preserving and continuing from earlier periods, or a progressive manner, highlighting what was earlier unjust and reprehensible and therefore should be amended and redressed. The contemporary ‘people’s turn’ in Poland is therefore part of a longer tradition of interest in the history of the countryside and peasantry in the Polish lands that appears across culture and science, as well as political, social and economic life.
The ‘people’s turn’ within modern Poland aligns with what Pierre Nora describes as the democratisation of history and memory.Footnote 11 Peasants have certainly been a socially underprivileged group throughout Polish history, despite the fact that they constituted the majority within society. As Dipesh Chakrabarty aptly notes, ‘numerical advantage by itself is no guarantor of a major/majority status. Sometimes, you can be a larger group than the dominant one, but your history could still qualify as “minor/minority history”’, and therefore can be placed into an ‘inferior’ or ‘marginal’ position.Footnote 12 The version of Polish history that is taught in schools and promoted in the official collective memory tends to be presented as the history of one class: the ‘nation’ of the nobility. Similarly, Polish culture tends to focus on the achievements and perspectives of the nobility, the urban middle classes and the intelligentsia.Footnote 13 Within this context, peasants have been pushed to the margins of social, political and cultural life of the country, despite their enormous contributions to the development of Polish society.
The ‘difficult’ legacy of serfdom has become one of the major issues debated within the context of the ‘people’s turn’ in modern Poland. Using the categories developed by Aleida Assmann, I categorise the current Polish public debate as an attempt to shift serfdom from passive (archive) memory to active functional memory, that is, to memory in which specific content concerning the past becomes part of current social consciousness and identity.Footnote 14 This article shows that this shift in the Polish discourse had already begun in the early years of the Second Republic, when political peasant leaders attempted to use the memory of serfdom as a weapon in one of the most important debates in inter-war Poland. While the land reform debate has been discussed extensively in historiography, the historical arguments for the land reform that focused on the memory of peasant injustice have not be subject to extensive analysis.Footnote 15 Focusing on the early years of the Second Republic (from late 1918 to the May Coup in 1926), I will show how the memory and afterlife of serfdom became a potent mobilising force across political divides. Drawing upon the main press organs of the leading peasant parties, I will demonstrate that in addition to advancing arguments of a social, economic and ethical–legal nature, supporters of both the moderate and radical versions of land reform justified their positions in historical terms, regarding this reform as compensation for the centuries of systemic injustice that the nobility inflicted upon peasants in the Polish lands during serfdom. This will lead me to conclude that despite deep divisions between various factions of the Polish peasant movement in the first decade of independence, the shared peasant memory of serfdom was an important factor that helped prepare the ground for the political unification of this movement in the early 1930s.
Serfdom in the Polish Lands
The serfdom system in the Polish lands was established in the sixteenth century and remained almost unchanged until the mid-nineteenth century. Some of its essential elements, however, had been gradually developing since the beginning of the Polish state in the tenth century. One of the most important factors that contributed to the economic functioning of the early Piast state prior to the introduction of Christianity was the use of serfs as a labour force in agriculture and other branches of the economy.Footnote 16 The land was also cultivated by free peasants, who were economically diverse and ranged from economically independent peasants with hereditary rights to land (Lat. heredes) to the so-called smardowie, a category of people who did not own land and were economically dependent on their lords but personally free.Footnote 17 After the adoption of Western Christianity, when a specific form of Central European feudal system began to emerge, the differences between the free and unfree rural population began to disappear and a relatively uniform serf class emerged. A key characteristic of the socio-economic system of feudalism in the Polish lands was not so much the existence of a feudal relationship based on hierarchical dependence within the ruling class, but the ubiquity of serfdom.Footnote 18 Polish feudalism was built upon feudal land ownership and the existence of a class of peasants (some personally free, others enslaved) who were obligated to provide various services to landowners, such as paying rent and tithe, paying in kind, providing transport and performing compulsory labour on the lord’s estate, known as pańszczyzna.
In the early centuries of the state’s existence, pańszczyzna was not frequently extracted by landowners. Historians claim that until around the fourteenth century, during the so-called German colonisation, pańszczyzna was limited to a few, at most a dozen or so, days a year.Footnote 19 However, the legal situation of the rural population deteriorated in the period of feudal fragmentation (1138–1320), during which the Church and some noble families gained judicial immunity, which granted landowners the exclusive right to administer justice on their estates. During the reign of Casimir the Great (1333–70), the last king of the Piast dynasty, greater numbers of feudal lords were granted such judicial privileges. After the passing of the Statutes of Wiślica for the area of Lesser Poland (Małopolska) and Piotrków for Greater Poland (Wielkopolska) in 1346–7, the personal freedom of peasants became further limited because no more than two peasants could leave the village during the year without the lord’s consent.
The position of the village in relation to the feudal lord was also significantly weakened by the adoption of the Statute of Warta in 1423, which permitted the removal of a ‘rebellious and useless’ village leader (sołtys), despite the right of inheritance guaranteed to him by the foundation charter for a new village. Soon after, in 1454, the Statutes of Nieszawa tightened penalties for harbouring runaway peasants and prohibited their employment in towns. It was also in this century that pańszczyzna began to increase rapidly, increasing from one to two days a week. This was related to the development and expansion of manorial farms (folwarki) within landlords’ estates, which mainly produced grain to be sold on both the domestic and international market, the latter through the port of Gdańsk.Footnote 20 This expansion took place at the expense of peasant labour and land, which was seized by the landed gentry.
The seizure of peasant land was possible because of the strong socio-political position of the nobility in Poland. Polish nobles were more numerous than the nobility in other European countries, comprising around 8 per cent of the total population, which allowed them to steadily secure more and more privileges at the expense of other social groups.Footnote 21 For example, the Privilege of Piotrków (or Statutes of Piotrków), issued by King Jan Olbracht in 1498, provided the nobility with privileges in exchange for support for the Crown’s military campaign. Nobles were granted a monopoly on owning and buying land outside cities and towns, whereas townspeople were prohibited from acquiring land and holding public office and peasants experienced greater restrictions upon their own mobility and that of their children. In 1518, during the reign of Sigismund the Old, peasants from private estates were deprived of the right to complain about their lords to the royal courts. Thus, the nobility obtained the right of life and death over their subjects. In 1543, under the rule of Sigismund Augustus, peasants were finally assigned to the land (Lat. glebae adscriptum) and denied the right to buy their freedom from serfdom.
The sixteenth century also brought significant changes to pańszczyzna. In 1520, Sigismund the Old approved the nobility’s demand that peasants work for their lords one day a week. Since no upper limit was set, the lords could demand as many days a week from the peasants as they wanted, which, of course, they eagerly took advantage of. By the mid-sixteenth century, peasants were already required to perform an average of three days of pańszczyzna per week, which increased to five to six days throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the amount of compulsory labour began to be calculated on the basis of the land used by the peasant. In addition to the pańszczyzna, there were other crucial characteristics of Polish serfdom that Edward Trzyna has outlined:
bondage or assignment peasants to the land (glebae adscriptum); free disposal of peasants assets by the lord; prohibition of marriage without the consent of the lord; compulsory service of serfs and their children in the manor house, penalties for peasant desertion; propination laws forcing peasants to buy a given quota of alcohol, and other monopolies introduced by the nobility; sale of peasants; total judicial dependence of peasants from the nobility and clergy.Footnote 22
The dismantling of the serfdom system began in the second half of the eighteenth century with the partitions of Poland. As early as 1772–92, the Prussians undertook thorough reforms of rural relations, including the emancipation of landless peasants, peasant children and those who went to school. The incorporation of peasant land into manorial farms was also prohibited, and pańszczyzna in state domains was limited to sixty days a year. In 1807, serfdom was abolished throughout Prussia, and from 1811, with the exception of Greater Poland, the enfranchisement processes began, along with the gradual cessation of pańszczyzna. In Greater Poland, this process began in 1823 with an edict on the enfranchisement of peasants after several years of heated discussions, debates and protests from the local landed gentry. The enfranchisement reforms formally ended in 1857, although some issues related to the separation of peasant land from manorial land dragged on until 1865.
In the Austrian partition between 1781 and 1789, Emperor Joseph II began the reform of rural relations by introducing so-called patents, which limited pańszczyzna to three days a week and granted peasants the right to migrate from the countryside, freely choose their profession and marry without the consent of their lord. He even intended to replace pańszczyzna with rent but did not manage to implement this reform before his death. His successor, Leopold II, revoked most of Joseph’s reforms, and it was only after the peasant uprising of 1846 in Galicia and the Spring of Nations that the work begun by Joseph II was continued. Serfdom and pańszczyzna were abolished and enfranchisement took place in 1848.
In the territories seized by Russia, in 1807, during Napoleon’s brief rule, serfdom was abolished in the Constitution granted by the Emperor to the Duchy of Warsaw. ‘Serfdom is abolished. All citizens are equal before the law’, proclaimed the famous article 4 of this document. However, the issues of land rights and pańszczyzna were regulated by a decree of 21 December 1807, which granted landlords ownership rights to the land used by peasants. Only those who had secured ownership rights through a contract with the landowner could receive land. Almost all serfs were transformed into short-term tenants and could be evicted at any time. After the Congress of Vienna and the establishment of the Russian-controlled Kingdom of Poland, serfdom was not restored, but the December 1807 decree was not repealed either, which significantly worsened the position of the peasantry. Reforms were only enacted after the peasant uprisings in Galicia in 1846, when Tsar Nicolas I prohibited landowners from arbitrarily evicting peasants who owned more than three morgi (four acres) of land and abolished all gratuitous extra labour days and compulsory-hire days if their amount was not specified in the amount of pańszczyzna days. In March 1864, Tsar Alexander II, who had enacted the Edict of Emancipation elsewhere in the Russian Empire in 1861, issued four emancipation decrees for the Kingdom of Poland that granted peasants ownership of land that they were using and exempted them from pańszczyzna and all other duties they had been burdened with for the benefit of the previous landowners.Footnote 23 After the abolition of serfdom in the three partitions of Poland, the nobility received compensation for lost land and labour, which was paid directly by the peasants or by the state. When it was paid by the state, as was the case in the Austrian and Russian partitions, funds for this purpose were extracted from increased taxes on peasants.Footnote 24
The experience of serfdom was a traumatic experience that directly affected around seventeen generations from roughly the sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth century and continued to have an impact upon future generations long after emancipation.Footnote 25 After the abolition of serfdom, although peasants’ social and economic position undeniably improved, they were very often treated as second-class citizens with lower incomes and poorer access to public services such as education and healthcare, which was partly a legacy of serfdom. Peasants kept the serfdom period alive in their memory, and, after Poland regained independence in 1918, this memory was mobilised by peasant political activists during debates concerning various aspects of political, social, economic and cultural life, and especially in debates concerning the land reform.Footnote 26
Peasants in Inter-War Poland: Agrarian Structure and Land Hunger
Poland at the end of 1918 faced a number of pressing problems, including the economic reconstruction of a country heavily devastated by war, the creation of new state institutions and the establishment and defence of the still uncertain and threatened borders. The fact that the new Polish state was formed from lands belonging to three separate states (Austria, Germany, the Russian Empire) generated legal, administrative, economic and cultural difficulties. The unstable political situation in the immediate post-independence period also further exacerbated the situation. The fragility of the political coalitions formed by numerous political parties translated into the fractious character of Sejm politics before the 1926 May Coup and, consequently, frequent changes in government. There were fifteen different cabinets between November 1918 and May 1926.
The newly formed Polish state was a multi-ethnic and religiously diverse country with a predominantly rural population. In 1921, 65 per cent of the total population were peasants and by 1938 this had only dropped to 61 per cent.Footnote 27 In the eastern borderlands, peasants were even more numerous: approximately 88 per cent of ethnic Ukrainians were peasants and almost all Belarussians, who, according to historians, ‘were socially very homogeneous’ and had the largest percentage of peasants in comparison to other ethnic groups in inter-war Poland.Footnote 28 Thus, throughout the entire inter-war period, agriculture dominated within the Polish economy and peasants were the most numerous social class.Footnote 29
The agrarian structure of the newly formed Polish state was characterised by regional divergence, which resulted from the fact that the land ownership structure, dominance of the nobility and methods of abolishing the system of serfdom varied from one partition to another.Footnote 30 In the Prussian partition, German colonisation of the eastern territories had a significant influence on agrarian structures, especially after the unification of Germany. In the Russian partition, the agrarian reforms of Pyotr Stolypin after the 1905 revolution reshaped the agricultural system, in particular the large-scale consolidation of peasant and noble smallholders’ plots, as well as the new regulations of servitudes that were enacted thereafter.Footnote 31
In the country as a whole, the overwhelming majority of farms (almost 65 per cent) were so-called mini-farms (gospodarstwa karłowate) (less than 2 hectares) and smallholder farms (2–5 hectares), where the farm owners owned only 15 per cent of the arable land. Large farms (over 50 hectares) accounted for less than 1 per cent of the total number of farms, but their owners controlled almost 48 per cent of total arable land. Around 38 per cent of farms could provide a self-sustaining workplace for an average peasant family (between 5 and 50 hectares), but only 10 per cent of the total number of farms were large enough to actually generate a profit.Footnote 32
The domination of large-scale private land ownership in agriculture, the underdevelopment of industry, the fragmented dysfunctional peasant economy and rapid population growth all combined to generate so-called land hunger in the countryside. These phenomena also contributed to agrarian overpopulation, which meant that there was an excess of working age people on peasant farms.Footnote 33 The problem of overpopulation was partially solved by permanent and seasonal labour emigration, which was a mass phenomenon long before Poland gained independence. According to estimates, up to the outbreak of the First World War, almost eight million Poles emigrated, most of whom were peasants.Footnote 34 In Polish territories during the partitions, mass emigration was only possible after the abolition of serfdom, because before emancipation peasants could not leave the land without the permission of the landlord. Therefore, the emancipation of serfs facilitated an economic exodus, especially for the segment of the rural population who had not benefited economically from the nineteenth-century agrarian reforms.Footnote 35
The Land Reform and the Memory of Serfdom
After the end of the First World War, both permanent and seasonal emigration slowed down significantly, especially to the United States, which had long been the primary destination for Polish emigrants. In the inter-war period, the US government increasingly abandoned their liberal immigration policy, introducing immigration quotas in 1921 and further anti-immigration legislation in 1924. At the same time, the repatriation and re-emigration of a considerable number of people took place. This phenomenon, in conjunction with the underdevelopment of industry and the destruction of the war, generated a rapid increase in urban unemployment and agrarian overpopulation in the countryside. This combination of circumstances meant that land reform was one of the most pressing problems to be solved by the newly established Polish state.Footnote 36 In particular, political forces representing peasant interests considered land reform to be one of the most urgent problems to be solved. The primary aim of the reform was to create as many self-sufficient peasant farms as possible while not affecting the country’s food security. The architects of reform envisaged the process as a ‘a directed change in the ownership structure in agriculture carried out within the existing legal order without violating the fundamental principles of the existing political and social system’.Footnote 37
Historical arguments that mobilised the memory of serfdom played an important role in debates on the land reform from the very beginning of Polish independence. In early December 1918, when the foundations of the new Polish state were being laid, anonymous author(s) of a proclamation published in the journal Wyzwolenie recalled the myth of the Battle of Racławice, which was crucial to peasants’ collective memory and instrumental to shaping their socio-political identity.Footnote 38 In this appeal, they compared Tadeusz Kościuszko, a national hero of the late eighteenth century, to Józef Piłsudski, the current Polish Chief of State. According to the authors, the memory of Tadeusz Kościuszko rises ‘[a]bove the serfs’ misery of the past centuries’ because he ‘declared peasants-slaves to be the rightful sons of the Fatherland’. For this reason ‘he was attacked by the entire noble rabble (szlachecka hołota) of that period’, just as in 1918, Commander Piłsudski is attacked by the landed gentry and bourgeoisie ‘because he is the Head of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Government, because he is the first Commander-in-Chief of the Polish People’s Republic’.Footnote 39 As we can see, the author(s) of this article not only invoked ‘the serfs’ misery of the past centuries’ but also openly equated serfdom with slavery. Piłsudski, who was supported by the left-leaning PSL Wyzwolenie and had been strongly associated with the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna; PPS) before the war, regarded the issue of a fair land reform that took into account the needs of those who work on the land, especially smallholders, landless peasants and farm workers, as a matter of crucial importance. It was only later, especially after the May Coup of 1926, that Piłsudski drifted further and further to the right and that the peasant left began to see him as a traitor to leftist ideals.
The theme of serfdom appeared also in the next issue of Wyzwolenie in the article ‘Land for the People!’ (Ziemia dla ludu!). The article’s author, Andrzej Mur, argued with opponents of the expropriation of large-scale landholdings who saw expropriation as an attack ‘on the sacred right of property’ and who threatened landowning peasants with the seizure of their land. Mur explained that ‘If … our party or the People’s Government speaks of expropriation, they have in mind the larger agricultural property that benefits from hired labourers. It is not the peasants but the lords and the nobility who are threatened with expropriation’, because, as he explained in the words very often repeated in peasant circles: ‘Poland must be arranged in such a way that all the land is in the hands of those who work on it’.Footnote 40 Following this, Mur, constructing his historical–legal argument, noted that the nobility had deprived peasants of the right to own land and pushed them into the condition of serfdom. Therefore, the state-ordered re-acquisition of land by the peasants, both at the time of the emancipation and in inter-war Poland, was presented as not only legal but also ethically justified.
A few months later in March 1919, when the Legislative Sejm sessions had already begun, Józef Sanojca, later the vice-president of the PSL Wyzwolenie, ironically argued for one of the ‘worst’ and ‘terrible’ points of the PSL Wyzwolenie programme, namely, the expropriation of land without compensation for wealthy landowners. He claimed that:
We still suffer due to the old peasant injustice of those times when the lord expropriated by law the peasant from his land, his cottage, his personal liberty and even his right to defend his children and his wife against the lord’s urges; when the whip was a paragraph of law for the peasantry, and when estates were estimated and sold by the number of souls.Footnote 41
Sanojca referred here to not only the physical violence enacted by the nobility against peasants – what Kacper Pobłocki has called the ‘basso continuo of three hundred years of serfdom’ – but also more specifically the sexual abuse of peasant women by landlords and manor officials.Footnote 42 Until recently, this was ‘one of the least frequently raised aspects of peasant slavery’, according to Jacek Podsiadło.Footnote 43 Silence surrounding the issue of sexual abuse is unsurprising considering the hegemonic role played by the nobility in shaping its own image in the collective consciousness of Poles and the patriarchal nature of Polish culture. The issue certainly requires more comprehensive analysis, but existing scholarship indicates that the sexual abuse of serfs was a fairly common practice.Footnote 44 Sanojca regarded the radical land reform as a form of compensation for the ‘theft of humanity, both of the peasant and of his wife and daughters’. He also refused to make any compromises, noting that ‘If we had compromised, our fathers would have cursed us’.Footnote 45
Even those who were ready to compromise and not willing to demand land for peasants without compensation for wealthy landowners, such as the doyen of the Galician peasant movement Jakub Bojko, took a very similar view of peasant history in pre-partitioned Poland.Footnote 46 In the article published in March 1919 in Piast under the pseudonym ‘Kuba z nad Wisły’ (Kuba of the Vistula River), Bojko noted that the peasants under serfdom ‘had to put their necks under the hard collar of the nobility’ and that at the end of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, ‘the peasant well-wishers spoke out in vain in favour of the peasants to free them from serfdom and grant them ownership of the land’.Footnote 47 Next, in order to strengthen his argument that providing peasants with land was not only a moral obligation as compensation for centuries of injustice but also a legal necessity, Bojko cited Michał Kubrakiewicz, who was a defender of peasant rights in the first half of the nineteenth century. Kubrakiewicz wrote:
peasants were previously the owners of the land that they cultivated. There is no historical evidence that the peasants voluntarily ceded land to their lords, rather the lords took it by force; violence does not constitute law, so the peasant estate (stan chłopski) is still the legal owner of the land which is in its possession or which was taken away from it.Footnote 48
A similar argument was advanced by an anonymous journalist in Piast in the article ‘Expropriation in the History of Poland’. The article was published after the passing of the first legislative act on the land reform on 10 July 1919.Footnote 49 The author, referring to ‘one of the strongest’ arguments put forward by the opponents of the land reform that was related to ‘the crime of unprecedented lawlessness inherent in expropriation’, accused the opponents of ignorance or the deliberate concealment of history. He noted that:
in Poland there were expropriations in various forms, sometimes by a simple resolution, sometimes in a different, more delicate form. The nobility, having assumed the power of the state completely, based itself on land; the right to land was given to it by the privilege of military service, and they jealously guarded this privilege. With the hope of concentrating as much land as possible in their hands, they began to take land from their peasants in order to enlarge their estates.Footnote 50
In support of this thesis, the author went on to quote a number of expropriation legal acts that had been enacted in pre-partitioned Poland and referred to well-regarded nineteenth-century Polish historians such as Wacław Aleksander Maciejowski and Karol Szajnocha. He noted that these historians ‘were not “Piasts” at all’ and instead ‘clearly state that, immediately after the Wiślica Statute, the “expulsion of peasants from fertile land” and the “taking of peasant land” began. From the time of Olbracht [John I Albert], this had already become common practice.’Footnote 51
A few months later, in November 1919, an article entitled ‘To the Last Supporters of the Noble Yoke’ appeared in Piast. The author, PSL Piast MP Adam Krężel, noted with pride that the new Poland was a ‘people’s Poland’ with peasants ‘leading the way in the Sejm, carrying out agricultural reform, rebuilding the country, deciding to form the army which bravely defends the Polish land and attacks the Bolshevik Muscovites’. Krężel juxtaposed the new Poland with the old Poland, which he regarded as a ‘a noble country’ where ‘the peasant did forced labour, and the landlord, or his steward, paid him with whips for the sweat of his brow; the priest advised the peasant to pray and work, to obey lord’s orders, promising him that he could get to heaven when he finished his miserable life’.Footnote 52 Krężel deplored the fact that many peasants in the new Poland still behaved in this way, despite the fact that they now had their own political representation in the form of the PSL Piast. Finally, in a solemn oratorical tone, he addressed these sceptical peasants:
To you, brother peasants, bewildered by those who kept your ancestors in the yoke of heavy serfdom, we turn with an admonition and a cry: Abandon this work with the lords to the detriment of yourselves and your children, and stand in line under the banner of the Polish People’s Party.Footnote 53
This article must have provoked a sharp reaction in conservative and nationalistic circles. Two months later, Krężel published another article entitled ‘Defenders of the Noble Yoke’ in which he reproached his eponymous ‘heroes’ for slandering peasants who were allegedly unable to participate in building the new Poland. According to Krężel, defenders of the nobility argued that if Poland could emerge ‘in spite of these “boorish” betrayals (chamskie’ zdrady)’, it would down to ‘the intelligentsia and that segment of society whose motto is: “God and Fatherland”’. Krężel also noted that defenders of the nobility shouted the common refrain ‘Down with boorish darkness and disgraceful Szelas!’Footnote 54 Using the derogatory and class-laden term cham (which can be translated into English as ‘boor’ or ‘bumpkin’) and referencing Jakub Szela and the peasant insurgents of 1846 was a common method for discrediting the peasant movement.Footnote 55 The leader of PSL Piast, Wincenty Witos, reflected on the use of this strategy in his famous proclamation ‘To Brother Peasants’, which was published at the beginning of July 1920 during the Polish–Soviet War and shortly before he was entrusted with the mission of forming the government (the so-called Government of National Defence).Footnote 56 According to Witos, he was seen only as ‘Szela, a common boor (pospolity cham), a traitor to the Fatherland, for whom a murderer’s bullet would still be an immeasurable mercy’.Footnote 57
In the modern Polish language, the term cham refers to a person behaving rudely and who violates established conventions of behaviour and rules of coexistence with other people. For several hundred years, Polish noble landholders used the term cham to refer to serf labourers and to justify their slave-like condition. The term comes from the biblical story of Noah, who cursed his son Ham’s descendants to be slaves. This story was henceforth often used in Jewish, Christian and Islamic tradition to justify the institution of slavery.Footnote 58 In Polish territories after the abolition of serfdom, this term was still in use in relation to the peasantry or, more broadly, to those belonging to the lower social classes.
Shortly after the above-mentioned proclamation, on 11 July 1920, Witos issued another proclamation to the peasants together with the leading members of the PSL Piast. The proclamation called on peasants to defend the Fatherland, which ‘after 150 years of bondage and disgrace, bloody struggle and strife [. . .] has regained its lost freedom and regained its state existence that had been recklessly lost by the nobility and those in power’. Positioning themselves as ‘representatives of the broad masses of the people’, PSL Piast representatives saw their main task as ensuring ‘that the rights, equality and freedom of all citizens were forever preserved in Poland, that the working people were given land and prosperity, and that injustice and abuse never again take place on Polish soil’. They also invoked historical arguments to strengthen their call:
For centuries, the people had been kept distant from the state, made into an instrument and a slave of the lords, which destroyed their human dignity. The true sons of the Fatherland who wanted to save the nation had to wage a double struggle against their own and foreigners, a struggle against corruption in society, and a hard, unequal, armed struggle against their enemies. These struggles did not remain without effect; the armed uprisings, although they did not give the nation independence, contributed to the abolition of serfdom and the acquisition of some civil rights by the people.Footnote 59
A significant portion of the peasantry did not remain passive to the call of Witos and his colleagues and defended Poland against the Bolshevik invasion, largely motivated by the fact that they had been promised an effective land reform. On 15 July 1920, the Sejm unanimously adopted the Act on the Implementation of Land Reform, the draft of which had been prepared by the PSL Piast. The law was enacted under the pressure of a potential Soviet invasion and with the intention of motivating peasants to defend Poland. It introduced the compulsory purchase of land by the state and the division of surplus land held by large landowners, as well as mandating that the owners of estates with surplus land were to receive compensation at the sum of half the land’s market value. After the enactment of the March Constitution (1921), this provision was found by the Supreme Administrative Tribunal to be unlawful, because article 99 of the constitution guaranteed full compensation in the event of expropriation. This became the reason that the implementation of the land reform was severely restricted, although the division of large land holdings continued on a voluntary basis and in relation to state-owned lands.
On 28 December 1925, another Act on the Implementation of Land Reform was passed after many months of heated parliamentary and extra-parliamentary debate.Footnote 60 It was formally in force until the end of the Second Republic, although it strongly divided peasant circles. A number of the Act’s provisions actually prevented its implementation, in particular article 5, which stated that ‘farms devoted to seed production or breeding, on farms with intensive production and highly industrialised farms’ were not subject to compulsory division. For this reason, the PSL Wyzwolenie voted against the Act and demanded the division of land without compensation for large landowners. This was clearly stated in the declaration of the joint PSL Wyzwolenie and People’s Unity (Jedność Ludowa; JL) parliamentary bloc on 23 May 1925 in the Sejm’s Committee on Agrarian Reform. Among other things, they argued that ‘the great historical right to reclaim his land belongs to the Polish peasant, as the heir of the former free peasant (kmieć) who had been dispossessed of their land by the nobility and the clergy without compensation’.Footnote 61
In the same issue of Wyzwolenie, Józef Mężyk, an academic and PSL Wyzwolenie activist, set out the historical rationale for the division of land without compensation. Noting that the agrarian structure in Poland was unjust in terms of ownership, he argued that it was primarily a legacy of serfdom. Thanks to the privileges granted to the nobility by the king and the rights they acquired, this social group gained the upper hand in Poland and gradually began to oppress poorer people, not only ‘forcing them to work their land’ but also ‘unlawfully claiming the land of these poorer people as their own property’. In this way, according to Mężyk, ‘the large landowners in Poland came into being’.Footnote 62 The expropriation of large landowners was therefore an act of historical justice and a reclamation of the land that had been unjustly taken from peasants. Although Mężyk admitted that the practice of distributing land to the nobility in the past could be partially justified as a reward for their military service, this argument no longer held true in the present moment: ‘Today, the peasants are the main armed force of the state and its vital force. It is to them that the land should be handed over.’Footnote 63
The Memory of Serfdom among the Political Allies and Adversaries of the Peasant Movement
Historical arguments about serfdom were not only advanced by peasant political activists in debates on land reform. Instead, the memory of serfdom was also mobilised by a broader circle, including the political allies and adversaries of the peasant movement. During the period 1918–26, political alliances were very unstable, both within the peasant movement itself and more generally. In particular, the PSL Piast placed the principle of private property at the forefront of their programme and emphasised the strong connections between the countryside and Catholicism, while simultaneously demanding the rapid implementation of land reform. Therefore, it was a party that constantly manoeuvred between the conservative and nationalist right and the progressive and socialist left.
For the allies of peasant movement, the most important group was politicians and activists of the PPS. Although the party was critical of the peasant parties’ programmes (especially that of PSL Piast), it generally supported peasant projects on land reform and voted favourably during all the final votes on the land reform laws (in 1919, 1920 and 1925). When the first debate on land reform began in the Sejm on 3 June 1919, the article ‘On Land Reform’ appeared on the front page of Robotnik, the main press organ of PPS. The article’s author regarded the law as a ‘desirable harbinger of great social change’ and a move towards the ‘nationalisation of large property’ and ‘collectivisation of large workshops’. The article also looked back to the past, noting that it was to be the first time since 1864 (the year when serfs in the Russian partition were emancipated) that ‘a thorough reform was carried out – this time not by a foreign government, but by the Sejm of the independent Republic of Poland’. Arguing that the reform in question ought not to be an isolated act but the beginning of significant systemic change, the journalist drew an analogy with the earlier emancipation reform, which, in their opinion, ‘was not an isolated reform: it was accompanied by a general liquidation of the old ownership relations based on privilege and the constraint of productive forces’.Footnote 64
During the debate on the land reform, Robotnik published a speech delivered in the Sejm by Norbert Barlicki, chairman of the PPS parliamentary faction. In stating that ‘for centuries, the agricultural issue has never left the agenda of our national life for a moment’, Barlicki caused a great stir in the chamber and put forward ‘a terrible indictment, a historical indictment’ against the large landowners (obszarnicy). According to Barlicki, because of ‘the former so-called nobility’ and their ‘unbelievable selfishness’ [. . .] ‘the agricultural question everywhere, in all partitions, [. . .], was decided on the initiative and under the influence of foreign, hostile factors’. Therefore, large-scale landowners must disappear ‘because they have failed the test of history: nationally, economically, and culturally’.Footnote 65
Parties on the opposite side of the political spectrum also negatively assessed serfdom, for example the clerical-conservative Polish Catholic People’s Party (Stronnictwo Katolicko-Ludowe; SKL), which was founded by Bishop Leon Wałęga of Tarnów as a counterweight to the PSL Piast. In an April 1920 article entitled ‘For the Unbiased to Consider’ that was published in its main press organ, Lud Katolicki, the anonymous author strongly advocated for land reform. The author did not support the reforms proposed by PSL Piast and claimed that the Piasts ‘have no right to accuse us of having joined forces with the lords against the peasants’. They allegedly did not have the right, because SKL supporters:
do not want other lords for the people, nor other forms of serfdom, neither noble nor Bolshevik – only that God be the all-powerful Lord in hearts, families, villages, cities and in the politics of the entire Polish state.Footnote 66
Here, the comparison of serfdom under the nobility with serfdom under the despised Bolsheviks reflected an overall strong negative assessment of the historical system of serfdom.
Even representatives of the right-wing nationalist National Democrats (Endecja), who argued that the former Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth was ‘an organism more democratic than many of contemporary states, as a larger number of people than elsewhere enjoyed very broad civil rights’, noted that a distinctive feature of pre-partition Poland was ‘the one-sided class policy of the nobility and the subordination of the interests of other classes to those of the rural nobility’.Footnote 67 In later discussions around the land reform of 1925, a similar accusation against the nobility was made by Bohdan Wasiutyński, a close associate and friend of chief ideologue of Endecja, Roman Dmowski. Wasiutyński, while not refraining from speaking of serfs as ‘impoverished and unaccustomed to economic independence’, openly pointed out that the nobility was to blame for this state of affairs.Footnote 68
Moreover, similar observations were made even within the conservative landed gentry circles that were initially strongly hostile to the reform proposed by the peasant parties. For example, in a pamphlet An Open Letter to a Polish Peasant, which was written in early May 1919, Count Tadeusz Łubieński admitted that ‘In the past, before the partition of Poland, the nobility inflicted great abuse upon the people’.Footnote 69 For this reason, he maintained that land reform was a form of redress for injustice and a necessary act of historical justice.Footnote 70 Nevertheless, he also emphasised that the modern nobility was completely different from its earlier iteration and did not seek to cause harm to peasants. According to Łubieński, those peasants who are susceptible to anti-nobility propaganda about ‘past injustices and serfdom’ – and ‘there are still many such peasants’ – are people ‘from whom the serf soul has not yet departed’, that is, they have maintained a serf mentality.Footnote 71 A similar observation was made a year later in a 1920 article in the conservative Warsaw newspaper Dziennik Powszechny. In an article entitled ‘The Psychology of a Slave’, Władysław Wydżga, commenting on the Piast project of land reform, stated that ‘the people, who have been awakened to social life, are harmed by those who impose vengeful policies upon them. [These policies] encourage [peasants] to adopt the mindset of an unchained slave who burns with hatred towards yesterday’s masters.’Footnote 72 The reporter of Czas, the main organ of the Kraków conservatives, expressed a similar view when, reporting on the Sejm debate on land reform in June 1919, he noted that the leaders of the peasant parties considered this reform to be a punishment imposed on present-day landowners for the sins of the former nobility.Footnote 73
As we can see, both allies and opponents of the peasant movement agreed quite unanimously that land reform, however they understood it, was necessary not only for pragmatic and economic reasons but also as a form of compensation for the injustices that had been inflicted on peasants in the past by the nobility. At the same time, numerous political figures, especially conservatives, pointed to the danger of turning land reform into a tool of blind revenge, a ‘punishment for sins’, which they argued would reinforce already strong social conflicts.
Conclusion
In early inter-war Poland, land reform was a matter of great social, political and economic importance. Sweeping land reform was necessary not only to fix the country’s anachronistic and dysfunctional agrarian structures but also to redress the centuries-old injustice suffered by peasants at the hands of the landowning classes in the times of serfdom. As this article has shown, the memory of this injustice was used to call for the forced expropriation of large property, either with partial or even full compensation for the landowners (as supported by PSL Piast) or without any compensation (as PSL Wyzwolenie consistently pushed for from the very beginning). It is therefore not surprising that procrastination and delays in implementing land reform led to the radicalisation of political attitudes, especially in the context of increasing repressions by the Sanacja regime, particularly against peasant parties, and the deepening economic crisis at the end of the 1920s. This process was also represented in approaches to land reform. In May 1933, at the first congress of the People’s Party (Stronnictwo Ludowe; SL), which had been established two years earlier by the unification of the main peasant parties (PSL Piast, PSL Wyzwolenie and the Peasant Party), a new programme was adopted that called for the ‘immediate takeover by the state of large areas of land, especially for back taxes and debts in state banks, and of those estates whose profits are invested abroad’.Footnote 74 The radicalisation of attitudes towards the land reform of the united peasant movement was also rooted in feelings of historical injustice that stretched beyond peasant circles. Furthermore, despite deep political divides between various factions of the Polish peasant movement in the first decade of independence, the memory and afterlife of serfdom became an important factor that paved the way for the political unification of this movement in 1931.
