In The Divine Economy (2024), Paul Seabright addresses three inquiries fundamental to the economy of religion. He first examines religion as an individual belief system, exploring the dynamics of “demand” for faith. Seabright then turns to the organizational aspects of religion, including different forms of religion, the impact of technological innovation, and the growth and death of religions. Finally, the book tackles issues related to power, including the intersection of religion and politics, the use and abuse of power, and internal and external religious conflicts.

Seabright defines religion as “the very large and diverse set of human activities that directly or indirectly involve interaction with invisible spirits who intervene causally in the world, and who can be influenced by appropriate appeals from human subjects” (p. 36). Utilizing economic theory, he analyses the many questions through the lenses of “supply” and “demand,” while also identifying the role of individual choice.

Seabright conceptualizes religion as a “platform” business, where religious groups function like firms that manage internal incentives and adapt to technological or social shifts to ensure longevity. In this crowded marketplace of ideas, religions compete for wealth, power, or political influence, and “market share” in the form of followers. Acting as intermediaries, these institutions facilitate social, economic, and spiritual exchanges; as Seabright notes, their “core activity consists in bringing together various groups of users” (p. 93).

A crucial issue in this market is how religions generate demand or attract members. In contrast to the many findings suggesting a global decline in religiosity, Seabright provides a nuanced analysis using census data and surveys. He contends that determining whether religious belief is truly declining across diverse societies is difficult, noting that many “laments” about secularization are “entirely anecdotal.” Instead, he observes significant variation. Christianity and Islam remain robust, increasing their global population share largely due to their competitive organizational models.

Seabright attributes the continuing influence of major religions such as Christianity and Islam to transformations in organization, incentives, and business models as much as to doctrine.

He explains that while religion may be struggling in Europe and North America, it is booming elsewhere because of its capacity for adaptation. As secular civilization evolves, religion adapts to meet new challenges. However, when religious institutions are perceived as partisan political actors, they often lose their authority.

The book highlights how religious organizations must strategically decide which services to offer and which members to target. The distinctiveness of a religion’s “product” is central to buffering threats from rivals, which can be true for both religious and other social organizations. Seabright illustrates various organizational strategies and suggests that this strategic differentiation helps explain the coexistence of diverse religions and how smaller faiths find niches that allow them to survive for long periods.

However, strategy may not be the sole factor in religious survival and growth. While the “platform” model fits the hierarchical and expansionist nature of Christianity and Islam, other faiths operate under different social logics. For example, Buddhism thrives in East Asian societies despite lacking the formal structures or conversion rituals typical of Western monotheism. Its popularity stems partly from this fluidity, attracting not only self-identified believers but also a vast number of practitioners who participate in rituals without formal affiliation. In such cases, inherent organizational structure may be more influential than business strategies.

Furthermore, the efficacy of these strategies is often affected by the political environment. The market for religious ideas is rarely “free” or “fair,” as different faiths maintain varying relationships with the state that can exercise important influence on religion. History shows that alliances between religious and political leaders for mutual benefit are common. Seabright echoes Adam Smith’s assertion that such entanglements can damage the long-term legitimacy of both parties. These alliances persist because leaders are frequently tempted by short-term gains, ignoring the long-term risks to their credibility.

Indeed, even if political and religious leaders value long-term legitimacy, they may still form alliances—sometimes because these alliances are part of the religion’s business model or because they serve the immediate interests of political actors. Loss of legitimacy does not always threaten survival. In some instances, state support is the very thing that ensures a religion’s longevity. Who defines this legitimacy also matters.

The relationship between religion and the state can be paradoxical: while heavy-handed state intervention can successfully suppress religious activity and erode its follower base, repression can also bolster religious popularity. Seabright notes that the Catholic Church’s strength in Communist Poland was in part a product of government repression. The platform model is thus complicated by political dynamics.

On the demand side, Seabright provides a comprehensive picture and rightly emphasizes that people’s needs for religion arise from diverse sources. One such source is family background and broader geographical or social communities, through which religion may be inherited as an identity. Many individuals also become adherents because of the practical assistance provided by religious organizations. For example, religious groups may offer implicit forms of insurance that partially substitute for the explicit contracts provided by secular institutions.

The author stresses that members are reflective actors who weigh the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action. Some parents choose religious schooling for their children not because they have been indoctrinated or because they wish to transmit religious belief, but also because they judge religious schools to be superior by objective standards.

Therefore, religious choice occurs across a wide variety of settings and is not necessarily accompanied by any single psychological state. Yet, as Seabright concedes, there remains “a place for passion, commitment, and even some degree of blind faith within the religious experience” (p. 71). These complex motivations imply that successful religions achieve a good match between “platforms” and “customers.” This raises a question: if religions disappear because they fail to provide the right product, what accounts for their failed strategies?

In conclusion, The Divine Economy is a well-researched and wide-ranging book that offers a stimulating framework linking behavioral economics and religious studies. By bringing incentives and organizational design into analyses of religious survival, growth, and decline, Seabright provides fresh tools for comparative study. His claim that “[r]eligions are, after all, business” (p. 323) resonates in contexts—especially in parts of East Asia—where temples and religious institutions generate significant revenue by offering diverse services to both committed and occasional participants.

This short review cannot do full justice to a rich book that tackles a series of questions in the study of religion. With thousands of religions worldwide, the ideas developed in the book offer promising avenues for systematic and rigorous comparison in future research. In that respect, Seabright’s work is thought-provoking and will inspire further scholarship.