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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2004
This book emerged from Glenn C. Loury's W. E. B. Du Bois lectures delivered at Harvard University in April of 2000—in his words, a “meditation on the problem of racial inequality in the United States focusing specifically on the case of African-Americans.” It offers no new evidence, but presents an encompassing conceptual framework “to clarify how the phenomenon called ‘race’ operates so as to perpetuate the intergroup status disparities that are so readily observed in Americans social life” (p. 3). This brief review cannot convey the depth and breadth of this small book. I highly recommend it to anyone who thinks seriously about racial inequality in the United States. It is an enlightening piece of interdisciplinary theorizing that reveals the honed craft of a seasoned and impassioned intellectual.
Chapter 1 is a brief introduction that defines the book's subject matter as the “social” determinants of racial inequality in the United States. Assume there are no innate differences across “racial” groupings, but that society interprets the bodily marking of “blacks” as a signal of innate group difference. What structures and processes can reproduce this “racial bias” in perception and outcome?
Chapter 2, says it is self-fulfilling prophecies, vicious circles, and discrimination in contract and contact. Loury argues that information-hungry agents use bodily markings to classify information in an uncertain world. Stereotypes reflecting what “blackness” signals about the unobservable characteristics of blacks in general (statistical discrimination) set in motion processes whereby the presumption of guilt produces a response from the accused that produces guilty behavior. This comes out of a long tradition in the social sciences. The structure is very flexible and appealing. In the past, Loury has used it to argue against affirmative action. This time he uses it ultimately to support affirmative action.
Chapter 3, “Racial Stigma,” adds to self-fulfilling prophecies a kind of “stigmatization” of blacks as dishonored descendents of slaves who are viewed by society at large as less than fully human. The result is a greater inflexibility in stereotypic priors, a degree of individual and systemic resistance to contrary evidence, persistence of discrimination in the long term, a greater willingness to accept black suffering, and a lessened inclination to implicate the “structure.” All of this strengthens the tendency towards racial segregation in voluntary associations such as networks, family, neighborhoods, and clubs, what Loury calls “discrimination in contact”—the more important but less talked about cousin of “discrimination in contract.”
As one can see, this conception of racism and discrimination is powerful and conciliatory without being apologetic. Rather than racial hatred, we see “rational” stereotypes, responses to stereotypes and stigma generating familiar results. Rather than conflict, we see vicious circles where both sides of the racial divide play a part. Rather than discrimination eroding in the face of competitive pressures, we see resilience and perhaps even reliance on competition. This type of vision has the markings of a clarion call for mass action against racial injustice—a conceptual umbrella under which a broad coalition of antiracist forces could gather, palaver, and act. Unfortunately, on this point Loury falls depressingly short of expectations, and one is left to wonder whether the meditation was a purely personal one.
Chapter 4 is entitled “Racial Justice.” Here Loury argues that sensitivity to a history of racial injustice can be reconciled with libertarian notions of color-blindness so as to justify calls for racial justice. The libertarian Axiom of Anonymity is often imposed on the relationship between individual values and collective public choice to ensure that liberty is not a sham: the choice of one social outcome cannot be preferred over another simply because the identity of the placeholders has changed. Color-blindness is an application. But color-blindness, Loury argues, ignores history, stigmatization, discrimination in contact, and vicious circles. If one is sensitive to this history then color-blindness will appear morally bankrupt, especially so because the principle of color-blindness can not be used to correct deviations from it.
Unfortunately, Loury argues, the current manifestation of this past injustice is “foggy” because it is nearly impossible to say with any quantitative precision just how much of the current racial inequality is due to this sort of disadvantage. Because of this epistemological fog Loury can only assert that, in general, the past has been unjust. As an example, Loury uses Orlando Patterson's hypothesis about the legacy of slavery on black family structure today. He calls the argument persuasive, but says it cannot answer the question “what would the family pattern look like among today's blacks in the absence of these historical depredations” (p. 125).
To me, this part of the book is confusing. Loury begins his meditation with three axioms that together claim that all racial inequality is “socially constructed,” yet now he argues that one cannot tell how much of it is determined socially because we cannot measure its historical components and processes precisely. Which is it? When Loury argues, as on page 40, that “race predicts behavior only because, thinking it will do so, the observer uses the race-marker to discriminate, thereby inducing a statistical association between functionally irrelevant though easily observable markers and functionally relevant but unobservable traits,” I take him to mean that observed social inequality by these markings is due to the processes of racial classification and the resulting social dynamics—all of it, even if the processes and dynamics cannot be measured. To argue otherwise—that the marker itself is intrinsically relevant in some way—is racial essentialism, an argument that Loury rejects explicitly in his second axiom.
I believe Loury retreats from social determination at this point because he wants to distance himself from any hint of support for reparationists, preferring instead the bland view that “past injustice is relevant in establishing a general presumption against indifference to present racial inequality (p. 126, author's italics) … interpretive rather than compensatory, … an ethically indefensible past, … the right interpretation, … be open-minded” (pp. 126–27). There is nothing wrong with wanting to hold this view, but nothing in Loury's argument leads inexorably to it. To me, Loury's conclusion seems a bit contrived. The first two chapters emphasize information-hungry agents, racially biased priors, vicious circles, and stigma, and their role in producing enduring discriminations in contract and contact. One would expect, then, that the policy prescription would focus on interrupting these processes: multicultural education to weaken racially biased priors; calls for mass heroic deviations in behavior, or altered structures, on both sides of the racial divide for the purpose of disproving the prior (which often happens in times of war or civil unrest, but why wait for that?); engaging the political process across the board to establish a general presumption against indifference to racial inequality; and, yes, even class action suits for damages from southern states, the federal government and corporations for their participation in and gains from state-sanctioned racial oppression—a wonderful public exercise in that great American tradition of settlement and political compromise. What better way to teach “the right interpretation” than to demonstrate it?
Finally, on stigma: the dishonor of slavery is part of the story, but by no means the major part. American racism is more American and more contemporary than that. The color “black” was sharply stigmatized in England (as opposed to Iberia) long before the New World resuscitation of slavery. The rhetoric of the Revolutionary War era did bring the contradiction between slavery and freedom into sharp relief—precipitating black freedom in the north while reconfirming black slavery in the south. But slavery was a well-known institution in western culture and posed no truly disturbing conundrum. Black freedom did. The very same vicious circles that Loury so eloquently describes produced the very “evidence” used to argue that blacks were inferior and that slavery was the solution to having them “in our midst.” America's racial problem has always been one of segregation, with slavery being one of its many forms. Racial dishonor follows this ever-changing contour, not some meta-memory of a distant past. The more things changes, the more they stay the same. Perhaps a fog prevents us from seeing this, but this particular fog can be lifted.