Peter Hamilton's study of Chinese elites in Hong Kong during the Cold War years and beyond sets a novel and persuasive framework for understanding the city and its international role. He argues that Hong Kong was not simply one of the Asian tigers but alone among developing countries in finding a unique trajectory to economic success during the Cold War, one that involved neither decolonization nor reliance on processing petrochemicals. He provides a provocatively pathbreaking interpretation of the contributions of Chinese business elites in Hong Kong to Sino-U.S. relations, from the 1950s until close to the present, that restores agency to this group in terms of their role in driving much of the internal development and external relations of post-1945 Hong Kong. This is placed in the context of earlier linkages between the United States, on the one hand, and Chinese in both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Hong Kong itself, on the other.
Not all these elites were homegrown. Many were well-connected capitalist business refugees from post-1949 China, often boasting degrees from well-regarded U.S. universities, who used their personal networks of Chinese and American connections to restart their careers in Hong Kong. They established enterprises in cotton spinning and garment manufacturing that quickly formed relationships with U.S. partners and were central in making the United States Hong Kong's leading export market by 1959 and the territory's largest source of investment capital from 1963 onward. In an innovative terminology, Hamilton christens them kuashang (straddling merchants).
Hamilton's work—based on massive research in Chinese and English-language archival sources in Hong Kong and the United States, published materials, and interviews—also provides a new interpretation of Hong Kong as having effectively a colonial relationship to the United States from the 1950s onward, due to economic and educational linkages. Overall, these developments meant that while Hong Kong's governor and many civil servants still came from the United Kingdom, in its final half-century under British rule the territory's elites and growing middle class looked increasingly to the United States, economically, intellectually, and as a potential bolt-hole and refuge for their families, should they decide to leave Hong Kong.
Hamilton details how Hong Kong's growing ties with the United States were facilitated not simply by the Cold War, which encouraged an expanding U.S. presence in Asia, but also by the increasing popularity of American over British educational models and partners in Hong Kong tertiary institutions, especially the colleges that eventually coalesced into the Chinese University of Hong Kong. This institution (like Hong Kong Baptist College and Lingnan College) received substantial funding from U.S. philanthropic foundations, some of which were heavily subsidized by the U.S. government via the CIA–Asia Foundation–Mencius Foundation linkage. The post-1949 relocation of many Chinese scholars and missionary networks to Hong Kong likewise drove this process. These institutions also encouraged Hong Kong students contemplating higher degrees to look to the United States rather than the British Commonwealth. Within Hong Kong, the Chinese University of Hong Kong pioneered the introduction of the Master of Business Administration (MBA) program, an American rather than British concept. By the early 1970s, Hong Kong had more students in the United States than did any other foreign territory or country.
Hamilton describes how, thanks to their U.S. connections, the majority (though not all) of these businesses and their Chinese founders adjusted to the changing international climate of the late 1960s and 1970s, often with some advice and assistance from their U.S. partners and networks. During the 1970s, most also cultivated ties with PRC enterprises and officials, links that became crucial to the trajectory that Chinese economic reform policies followed. In 1984, implicit threats by Hong Kong Chinese tycoons that they might move their businesses and economic resources out of Hong Kong were crucial in persuading Chinese leaders from Deng Xiaoping downward that Hong Kong should enjoy genuine and significant economic and social autonomy following 1997 and continue to function as a capitalist enclave. Following the events of June 1989, Hong Kong business leaders associated with the American Chamber of Commerce—many ethnically Chinese though some American—successfully launched efforts to convince the U.S. Congress that rescinding China's most-favored-nation trade status would be both counterproductive in terms of the Chinese domestic balance of forces and deeply harmful to Hong Kong.
Hamilton concludes that this cohort of elite Hong Kong business leaders played a transitional role on the international economic stage comparable to that of the later fifteenth-century Italian Genoese bankers who reoriented Italian financial expertise toward the up-and-coming Kingdom of Castile and Aragon, which funded Genoese explorer Christopher Columbus's expeditions to the New World and ultimately merged with the Hapsburg drive to establish a global international order. Genoa became part of the Spanish Empire. Hamilton suggests that endeavors by kuashang Hong Kong business elites from the 1970s onward to involve the United States and China in an economically codependent relationship likewise midwifed a new international world system, in which China and the United States embarked on “a dual-star system of Sino-US co-dependence” (p. 290).
The final chapters implicitly call into question the depth of their pro-U.S. orientation, as they delineate the degree to which from the 1970s Hong Kong business elites leaned toward supporting the PRC and providing expert guidance on its economic development that proved lucrative and advantageous for China and themselves alike. They cast themselves as new-model compradors, mediators and interlocutors between China and elsewhere, but most particularly China and the United States. What would happen, however, if these two allegiances ever came into conflict?
One might plausibly argue that American (and other Western) educational influences within the territory, both before and after 1997, tended to promote a vision of an independent civil society, responsive to public concerns, that came to a head first in the 2014 Umbrella Movement and then in the 2019 protests. To some degree, it seems, protest leaders may have drawn on American—and British—models when demanding greater input into the composition and policies of the Hong Kong government. Has this aspect of American contributions to the Hong Kong higher education system helped to undercut the comfortable continuing oligopoly that Hong Kong kuashang expected to operate within? And what are the likely future consequences for Hong Kong itself?
Its current situation, following the introduction in Hong Kong of harsh national security legislation, poses uncomfortable dilemmas for such tycoons as Tung Chee-hwa, Victor Fung, and Ronnie Chan. Is it still even possible for them to serve as mediators and interpreters between China and the United States, or must they choose? Will they and their families opt to back the new hard-line PRC stance, remain in Hong Kong, and seek to mold its future, or will they deploy their ample foreign assets, passports, and bolt-holes to bail ship, abandon Hong Kong, and become global players? Does Hamilton's stimulating book describe an era whose day has already come and gone?
